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Recent Decisions
The Maryland Court of Appeals
I. COMMERCIAL LAW
A. The Doctrine of Adverse Domination and Tolling the
Statute of Limitations
In Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp.,' the Maryland Court of Appeals
considered whether the doctrine of adverse domination tolled the
running of the statute of limitations or delayed accrual of causes of
action against former officers and directors of a failed savings and
loan association.' In answer to this question of first impression, which
was certified to it by the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland,' the Court of Appeals adopted the presumption that claims
do not accrue against officers and directors of a corporation until a
disinterested majority replaces the culpable directors in control of the
board.4 To rebut this presumption, defendants must demonstrate
that someone had the knowledge, ability, and motivation to act on
behalf of the corporation against the defendants.5
The court's adoption of the disinterested majority version of the
adverse domination doctrine represents a significant departure from
prior jurisprudence. The decision establishes corporate ability and
motivation to bring suit as prerequisites to the commencement of the
period of statutory limitation and shifts the burden of proof from the
party who invokes the doctrine to the party who claims the benefit of
the conventional statutory rule.6 The Hecht decision will protect plain-
tiffs in circumstances where defendants constitute a majority of the
board, but may not go far enough to protect corporations from an
unjust imposition of the statute of limitations in other circumstances.
Nevertheless, Hecht provides a workable solution to the complicated
problem of statutory limitations in the context of corporate
governance.
1. 333 Md. 324, 635 A.2d 394 (1994).
2. Id. at 331, 635 A.2d at 398.
3. Id; see Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hecht, 833 F. Supp. 529, 534 (D. Md. 1993) (or-
dering certification of the limitations question to the Maryland Court of Appeals).
4. Hecht, 333 Md. at 352-53, 635 A.2d at 408-09.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 352, 635 A.2d at 408.
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
1. The Case.-The Hecht controversy arose in the wake of the
failure of Baltimore Federal Financial, I.S.A. (BFF), a Baltimore sav-
ings and loan institution.7 After the bank was declared insolvent in
1989, the plaintiff, Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), sued nine
former directors and a former officer of BFF in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland. 8 The complaint alleged sim-
ple negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, and breach of
fiduciary duty9 on the part of the director-defendants, who constituted
a majority of the board of directors of BFF from 1983 to 1988.1"
During the early 1980s, BFF converted much of its loan portfolio
from long-term, fixed-rate residential mortgages to higher-risk com-
mercial real estate, development, and construction loans." Following
a routine examination in 1985, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) issued a report criticizing BFF's commercial real estate loan
solicitation program and noting significant deficiencies in record
keeping and loan documentation.1" The following year, the FHLBB
compelled BFF to enter into a supervisory agreement to remedy se-
vere accounting and underwriting problems." BFF's financial condi-
tion worsened as its large commercial real estate loans fell into
default.14 In February 1988, the bank entered into a consent agree-
ment that severely limited its ability to make commercial real estate or
construction loans and to adjust executive compensation.15 Robert E.
Hecht, Board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, was forced to
resign.16 On February 7, 1989, the FHLBB determined that BFF was
insolvent and appointed the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC) conservator. 17 RTC succeeded FSLIC as conserva-
tor on August 9, 1989, and was later appointed receiver.1 8
On February 6, 1992, one day before the three-year anniversary of
FSLIC's appointment as conservator, RTC filed suit against the of-
7. Id. at 327-28, 635 A.2d at 396.
8. Id. at 327-28 & n.2, 635 A.2d at 396 & n.2.
9. Id. at 328, 635 A.2d at 396. The district court eventually dismissed the counts alleg-
ing simple negligence. Id. at 328 n.3, 635 A.2d at 396 n.3.
10. Id. at 328 n.2, 635 A.2d at 396 n.2.
11. Id. at 329 n.4, 635 A.2d at 397 n.4.
12. Id. at 328-29, 635 A.2d at 396-97.








ficers and directors of BFF in federal district court.19 Each of the de-
fendants raised a limitations defense.2" The parties agreed that any
claims that were viable when FSLIC was appointed conservator on
February 7, 1989, would not be barred by the statute of limitations.2 1
The instant dispute arose with respect to the viability of the claims on
that date.22 Defendants argued that any claims against them accrued
more than three years before FSLIC became conservator and were
therefore barred by Maryland's three-year statute of limitations.2"
In the initial hearing on the limitations issue, Judge Norman
Ramsey ruled against the defendants and predicted that the Maryland
Court of Appeals would adopt the doctrine of adverse domination "so
as to toll the running of limitations so long as a majority of the corpo-
rate board consisted of persons liable for the subject cause of ac-
tion."" After Judge Ramsey's retirement, the defendants moved for
reconsideration of the ruling.25 Judge Marvin Garbis agreed that
Maryland would adopt adverse domination, but predicted that the
doctrine would toll the running of the statute of limitations only until
such time as a person reasonably able to bring suit on behalf of the
corporation had "knowledge sufficient under discovery rule jurispru-
dence to trigger the running of limitations."26 Judge Garbis then cer-
tified the matter to the Court of Appeals for a determination of
whether Maryland recognizes the doctrine of adverse domination to
toll the running of the statute of limitations or delay accrual of a cause
19. Id. at 327, 329, 635 A.2d at 396, 397. The complaint focused on six loans made
between November 11, 1983, and July 13, 1985. Id. at 329-30, 635 A.2d at 397.
20. Id. at 330, 635 A.2d at 397.
21. Id. at 330 n.6, 635 A.2d at 397 n.6. When a federal agency asserts claims it has
acquired by assignment, a court engages in a two-step analysis. Id. First, it determines
whether the state statute of limitations period expired before the assignment of the claims.
If a viable claim existed at the time of assignment, the court must then determine whether
the federal statute of limitations expired during the period between assignment and filing
of suit. Id. Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), a federal agency has three additional years from the date of conservator-
ship or accrual, whichever is later, in which to file suit on a tort claim, and six additional
years in which to file suit on a contract claim. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14) (1988 & Supp. IV
1992). Because RTC filed against Robert E. Hecht and the other directors in this case
within three years of the date of FSLIC's appointment, the validity of the claims under
FIRREA was not disputed. See Hecht, 333 Md. at 329, 330 & n.6, 635 A.2d at 397 & n.6.
22. Hecht, 333 Md. at 330 n.6, 635 A.2d at 397 n.6.
23. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (Supp. 1994) ("A civil action at
law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the
Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced").
24. Hecht, 333 Md. at 330-31, 635 A.2d at 397-98.
25. Id. at 331, 635 A.2d at 398.
26. Id.
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of action and, if so, in what form and to what extent the doctrine
would apply to the facts of Hecht.2
7
2. Legal Background.-
a. Maryland.-In Maryland, the general rule is that a civil
action must be filed within three years from the date it accrues. 28 The
harshness of this rule, especially in cases where plaintiffs do not know
of the initial wrong until the limitations period has run, has led to the
creation of several legislative and judicial exceptions. 29 In the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article, the General Assembly has provided
exceptions for fraud3" and for persons under a disability."
Although Section 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article provides that the statute of limitations begins to run when a
cause of action "accrues," the term "accrue" is undefined.3 2 There-
fore, the question of accrual has been left to judicial determination.38
Although a rule of strict construction has long applied to statute of
limitations problems,34 courts have created exceptions to protect
plaintiffs in cases where they "may ... be blamelessly ignorant of the
fact that a tort has occurred and thus, ought not be charged with
slumbering on rights they were unable to ascertain."3 5 The most im-
portant of these exceptions, the discovery rule, delays accrual of a
claim where the cause of action is "inherently unknowable" and the
plaintiff could not have reasonably known of the wrong within the
27. Id.
28. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101.
29. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 451, 550 A.2d 1155, 1165 (1988)
("[T]he discovery rule has evolved as a means of mitigating the often harsh and unjust
results which flow from a rigid application of the statute of limitations.").
30. See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JuD. PROC. § 5-203 (1989) ("If the knowledge of a cause
of action is kept from a party by the fraud of an adverse party, the cause of action shall be
deemed to accrue at the time when the party discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary
diligence should have discovered the fraud.").
31. See id. § 5-201 (providing that claims in favor of minors or mental incompetents
shall be filed within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after
the disability is removed). Other legislative exceptions include longer limitations periods
for specialties, id. § 5-102; absence from state, id. § 5-205; adverse possession, id. § 5-103;
and shorter limitations periods for assault, libel, and slander, id. § 5-105.
32. Id. § 5-101.
33. Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 633, 431 A.2d 677, 679 (1981).
34. See Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 623, 500 A.2d 641, 645
(1985) ("We have long adhered to the principle that where the legislature has not ex-
pressly provided for an exception in a statute of limitations, the court will not allow any
implied or equitable exception to be engrafted upon it.").
35. Harig v. Johns Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 83, 394 A.2d 299, 306 (1978).
1995]
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limitations period. 6 The continuing-course-of-treatment rule delays
accrual of a medical malpractice claim until the end of the treatment
by the alleged tortfeasor, unless the patient knew or should have
known of the injury or harm at an earlier date.37 Similarly, it delays
accrual of contractual claims until the contract is completed.38
In Maryland, the party raising a statute of limitations defense gen-
erally bears the burden of proving the period of limitations has run.3 9
There are, however, some exceptions to this rule.4" Where the statute
of limitations would appear to bar a claim on its face, the plaintiff who
wishes to avoid its preclusive effect must demonstrate facts justifying
the applicability of an exception.41 The reason for this departure
from the general rule is that "ordinarily, defendant will have no per-
sonal knowledge of when plaintiff discovered, or should reasonably
have discovered, the facts upon which his cause of action is based."
42
Prior to the Hecht decision, the specific problem of equitable toll-
ing of a corporation's claim against directors and officers in control of
the board of directors had not been addressed by a Maryland court.
43
The state's general law of agency provided, however, that knowledge
by an agent whose interests are adverse to those of the principal is not
imputed to the principal.' Therefore, one could have concluded
that knowledge by directors and officers who participated in acts that
harmed the corporation should not be imputed to the corporation
and should not be sufficient under the discovery rule to trigger the
running of the statute of limitations. However, it was unclear by this
36. Id. at 80, 394 A.2d at 305. The discovery rule has been specifically applied to many
types of cases. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 452, 550 A.2d 1155, 1165
(1988) (products liability); Smith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 303 Md. 213, 234, 492 A-2d
1286, 1296 (1985) (latent disease); Steelworkers Holding Co. v. Menefee, 255 Md. 440,
443, 258 A.2d 177, 179-80 (1969) (professional malpractice); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 241
Md. 137, 145, 215 A.2d 825, 830 (1966) (medical malpractice). The Court of Appeals,
moreover, has declared that the rule applies generally in all civil actions. See Poffenberger,
290 Md. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680.
37. Waldman, 241 Md. at 140-45, 215 A.2d at 827-30.
38. See Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365, 374, 19 A_2d 183, 189 (1941). The statute
begins to run when the cause of action becomes vested and enforceable, not at the time of
the making of a contractual promise. Id.
39. Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 725, 594 A.2d 1152, 1156 (1991). Normally, de-
fendants must plead and prove the application of the statute. Id.
40. See id. at 725-26, 594 A.2d at 1156-57 (noting that plaintiffs who either attempt to
invoke an exception to the statute of limitations or allege that fraudulent concealment
prevented filing of an action within the statutory period shoulder the burden of proof).
41. Id.
42. Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md. App. 190, 242, 469 A.2d 867, 893, cert. denied,
300 Md. 88, 475 A.2d 1200 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
43. Hecht, 333 Md. at 338, 635 A.2d at 401.
44. See Lohmuller Bldg. Co. v. Gamble, 160 Md. 534, 539, 154 A.2d 41, 43 (1931).
674 [VOL. 54:670
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reasoning at what point the corporation would be deemed to have
had notice of a claim as a matter of law.
b. Other Jurisdictions.-Many federal and state courts have
considered the applicability of the doctrine of adverse domination to
delay accrual of a claim or toll the running of the statue of limitations.
Interestingly, adverse domination has had its greatest impact in the
failed savings and loan context.45 The first wave of such cases, de-
cided at the time of the Great Depression, failed to provide a clear
rule for the application of the doctrine.' Courts disagreed on
whether to apply the doctrine of adverse domination or the general
rule, which holds that in the absence of actual fraud, the statute runs
from the time of the making of the excessive or imprudent loan.47
Those courts that espoused the doctrine of adverse domination dis-
agreed on the degree of domination required to delay accrual or toll
the running of limitations.48
After sixty years of relatively little activity in this area, another
wave of adverse domination cases made its way through the courts in
the late 1980s. Almost without exception,49 the new cases embraced
45. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Manatt, 723 F. Supp. 99 (E.D. Ark. 1989);
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Buttram, 590 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Bird, 516 F. Supp. 647 (D.P.R. 1981).
46. See generaly Annotation, Running of Statute of Limitations Against Action Against Bank
Directors or Officers for Making Excessive or Unauthorized Loans, 83 A.L.R. 1204 (1932).
47. Compare San Leandro Canning Co. v. Perillo, 295 P. 1026, 1028 (Cal. 1931) (apply-
ing the "well-settled principle" that the statute of limitations would not run on claims
against directors while they were in full control of the corporation) and Bates St. Shirt Co.
v. Waite, 156 A. 293, 297 (Me. 1931) (holding that the earliest the statute would run in
favor of the directors of the corporation was when they had relinquished control) with
Mobley v. Faircloth, 164 S.E. 195, 195-96 (Ga. 1932) (holding that the limitations period
on claims against the bank directors commenced at the time excessive loans were made)
and Department of Banking v. McMullen, 278 N.W. 551, 554-55 (Neb. 1938) (finding that
a cause of action "accrued when the loan was made").
48. Some courts required the presence of at least one and possibly more than one
disinterested director on the board. See, e.g., Adams v. Clarke, 22 F.2d 947, 959 (9th Cir.
1927) (holding that the statute of limitations did not begin to run in favor of defendants
while they constituted the entire board of directors); cf Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039,
1042-43 (8th Cir. 1931) (finding that a single disinterested director was sufficient to com-
mence the running of the statute of limitations). Some courts have reasoned that the
directors were trustees of a corporation and held that the statute of limitations did not
begin to run against the institution, or beneficiary of the trust, until it learned of the trust-
ees' wrongdoing or of the effective repudiation of the trust. See, e.g., Greenfield Say. Bank
v. Abercrombie, 97 N.E. 897 (Mass. 1912).
49. One recent decision suggests that closely-held corporations are not subject to the
doctrine of adverse domination. In INB Nat'l Bank v. Moran Elec. Serv., Inc., 608 N.E.2d
702 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), the Indiana Court of Appeals rejected the "presidential domina-
tion" theory, which would have extended the period in which shareholders could seek
compensation for the misappropriation of stock by the former president of a family-owned
1995] 675
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some form of adverse domination.5" These cases provided no more
guidance, however, than the Depression-Era jurisprudence with re-
gard to the degree of control necessary for commencement of the
limitations period and the allocation of the burden of proof on the
limitations issue. Most courts have now adopted the "disinterested
majority" version of the rule.51 Some courts continue to find that the
statutory period begins to run as soon as there is a "single disinter-
ested director" on the board.52 Still others have delayed accrual of
claims against a particular director until that director has resigned.55
Finally, some courts have applied adverse domination principles with-
out providing any indication of which version of the doctrine they es-
pouse.54 Courts have generally rejected the "illusory control" theory,
which provides that domination of a board is broken when a bank
comes under the supervision of a governmental agency.55
Even those decisions that have adopted a particular version of the
adverse domination doctrine often have been unclear as to which
business. Id. at 707-08. This case is distinguishable from other cases in which courts have
considered adverse domination not only because it involves a closely-held corporation, but
because the shareholders participated in the operation of the business and acquiesced in
the former president's conduct. See id. at 708-09.
50. The old rule, that a cause of action accrues against a corporate director at the time
the wrongs are committed, has been largely repudiated. In Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Bird, 516 F. Supp. 647 (D.P.R. 1981), the first modem case to apply adverse domination in
the savings and loan context, the court rejected the Depression-Era case law upon which
defendants relied as "suspect and subject to reexamination" and adopted the theory of
adverse domination. Id. at 651-52; see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hudson, 673 F.
Supp. 1039, 1043 (D. Kan. 1987) (following the reasoning in Bird).
51. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Tex.
1990) ("Under Texas law a cause of action by a corporation against its directors does not
accrue until a majority of disinterested directors have discovered or are put on notice of
the cause of action."); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Greenwood, 739 F. Supp. 450, 453
(C.D. Ill. 1989) (finding that the statute of limitations is tolled so long as the wrongdoers
constitute a majority of the board of directors); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Williams,
599 F. Supp. 1184, 1195 (D. Md. 1984) ("This Court is persuaded that the better rule of law
provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations, and the postponement of the accrual
of a cause of action until after the culpable defendants have relinquished control of the
institution.").
52. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520, 1522-23 (10th
Cir. 1990) (noting that to take advantage of the doctrine of adverse domination a plaintiff
had to demonstrate full and exclusive control on the part of the defendants).
53. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Carlson, 698 F. Supp. 178, 180 (D. Minn. 1988);
Hudson, 673 F. Supp. at 1042.
54. See, e.g., Bird, 516 F. Supp. at 651 (stating only that a claim does not accrue while
culpable directors remain in control of a corporation).
55. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kerr, 804 F. Supp. 1091, 1095-96 (W.D. Ark.
1992) (finding that whether a consent agreement effectively transferred the control of a
bank to the FHLBB involved material issues of fact); accord Howse, 736 F. Supp. at 1442.
676 [VOL. 54:670
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party bears the burden of pleading and proving the limitations issue. 56
Sometimes, it has been unclear whether a court applied federal or
state law.57 There is no question that federal limitations principles
apply to the period after assignment of the claims against directors to
the federal agency.58 Courts have disagreed, however, on whether
state or federal law should govern the pre-assignment period.59
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Hecht, the Court of Appeals
adopted the doctrine of adverse domination to delay accrual of claims
against directors and officers where the corporation had been pre-
vented from taking action because no one had the knowledge, motiva-
tion, and ability to act on its behalf.6" The court adopted the
"disinterested majority" version of the doctrine, which raises the pre-
sumption that, as long as the culpable directors constitute a majority
of the board, accrual does not occur.6' Defendants can rebut this pre-
sumption by providing evidence that someone other than the culpa-
ble directors was aware of a potential cause of action and had the
ability and the motivation to bring suit.62
To reach this conclusion, the court first considered relevant prin-
ciples of corporate law.63 In Maryland, the board of directors is the
primary enforcer of the legal rights of a corporation. 64 It exercises all
56. See, e.g., Williams, 599 F. Supp. at 1192 (denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment because he had not "shown beyond any doubt that [the bank] knew or reason-
ably should have known of the causes of action against the defendant on or before... the
date of the assignment of [the bank's] claim to the FSLIC").
57. In Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Greenwood, 739 F. Supp. 450 (C.D. Ill. 1989), for
example, the court found that "the adverse domination theory [was] the law that should be
applied" and cited federal case law in support of its holding. Id at 453. But see Hudson, 673
F. Supp. at 1043 ("This court believes that Kansas . . . would adopt the modern 'adverse
domination' theory."). Some decisions have been based on both state and federal law. See,
e.g., Williams, 599 F. Supp. at 1194. Others have been decided solely on the basis of state
law. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Buttram, 590 F. Supp. 251, 254 (N.D. Ala. 1984);
Bird, 516 F. Supp. at 650. Some courts have referred to adverse domination as a federal
common-law doctrine. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520,
1523 (10th Cir. 1990); Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp. 1174, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
58. See Howse, 736 F. Supp. at 1440 (noting that if a viable claim existed at the time of
assignment, the court must determine whether the applicable federal statute of limitations
applies); see also supra note 21.
59. Some courts have held that federal law governs the running of limitations in the
pre-assignment period. See, e.g., Bryan, 902 F.2d at 1522. But other courts have determined
that limitations during the pre-assignment period is a matter of state law. See Howse, 736 F.
Supp. at 1441 (applying Texas law); Carlson, 698 F. Supp. at 180 (applying Minnesota law).
60. Hech4 333 Md. at 353, 635 A.2d at 409.
61. Id. at 347, 635 A.2d at 406.
62. Id.




powers of the corporation not conferred on or reserved to sharehold-
ers.65 If suit is brought on behalf of the corporation, it is generally the
board rather than shareholders, officers, or individual directors who
must initiate the proceeding.66
The court then considered Maryland's law of limitations.67 In
particular, the court discussed the doctrines of discovery and continu-
ous-course-of-treatment, which operate to prevent the running of the
statute of limitations against plaintiffs who lack the knowledge neces-
sary to bring suit within the limitations period. 68 The court next ex-
amined the doctrine of adverse domination, as applied in other
jurisdictions.69 Finally, the court focused its analysis on the defend-
ants' three principal arguments: that the doctrine of adverse domina-
tion was inconsistent with Maryland law, that it was contrary to public
policy, and that it achieved nothing more than was already accom-
plished by existing case law.7°
The court found that the doctrine of adverse domination was
consistent with the Maryland law of limitations and agency. 71 It re-
jected the defendants' assertion that the court's refusal to adopt toll-
ing mechanisms in other cases reflected a judicial precedent
inconsistent with adoption of the doctrine of adverse domination.72
The defendants relied on three cases in support of their position.
In McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 7 3 the court refused to expand a
statute which tolled the statute of limitations for actions to collect a
debt if the debtor had made a payment of interest to a case where the
debtor had repaid a portion of the principal." In Walko Corp. v. Bur-
65. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-401(b) (1993). Although BFF was a
mutual association with members rather than shareholders, Maryland law regards a mutual
association as a nonstock corporation. Hecht, 333 Md. at 332 n.7, 635 A.2d at 398 n.7; see
MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 9-1010) (1992) ("Mutual association means a savings and loan
association for the purpose of increasing or maintaining the capital of the association.");
id. § 9-301 (a) (1) ("A member of a savings and loan association means a holder, as shown in
the association's records of [o]ne or more savings accounts as to a mutual association.");
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 5-201 (1993) ("The provisions of the Maryland General
Corporation Law apply to nonstock corporations unless: (1) [t]he context of the provi-
sions clearly requires otherwise; or (2) [s]pecific provisions of this subtitle or other subti-
tles governing specific classes of corporations provide otherwise.").
66. Hecht, 333 Md. at 332, 635 A.2d at 398.
67. Id. at 332-38, 635 A.2d at 398-401.
68. Id. at 338, 635 A.2d at 401.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 343, 635 A.2d at 404.
71. Id. at 348, 635 A.2d at 406.
72. Id. at 343.45, 635 A.2d at 404-05.
73. 184 Md. 155, 40 A.2d 313 (1944).
74. Id. at 159-60, 40 A.2d at 315-16.
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ger Chef Sys., Inc.,75 the court found that, where nothing had prevented
the plaintiff from filing against the defendant directly, the statute was
not tolled while the plaintiff attempted to intervene in another related
lawsuit.76 Finally, in Booth Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 77 the court
held that the statute of limitations was not tolled on a claim for negli-
gent installation while the contractor attempted to repair the defec-
tive glasswork.7s
The court distinguished Hecht from these cases on the basis that
the plaintiffs in each case had actual knowledge of their causes of ac-
tion and the unfettered ability to bring suit during the limitations pe-
riod.79 By contrast, the facts of Hecht raised legitimate issues of
concealment and control."0 Furthermore, the cases cited by the de-
fendants involved tolling exceptions in which there was no question of
accrual and for which the application of the statute of limitations was
clear.8
The court further explained that adverse domination was consis-
tent with Maryland's law of agency, which provides that knowledge by
an agent with interests adverse to those of the principal is not imputed
to the principal.8 2 In Hecht, the agents, as the directors and officers of
the corporation, not only could not reasonably be expected to act
upon or communicate knowledge of their wrongdoing, but consti-
tuted an "insuperable barrier to [the] corporation's ability to acquire
the knowledge and resources necessary to bring suit" on behalf of the
corporation.8 3 In that sense, the court's decision to delay accrual of
the corporation's cause of action represented a logical extension of
the discovery rule.
84
The Court of Appeals rejected the proposition that adverse domi-
nation was inconsistent with Maryland legislation.8 The court found
that the enactment of a statute providing for delayed accrual in cases
75. 281 Md. 207, 378 A.2d 1100 (1977).
76. Id. at 215, 378 A.2d at 1104.
77. 304 Md. 615, 500 A.2d 641 (1985).
78. Id. at 624-25, 500 A.2d at 645.
79. Hecht 333 Md. at 344-45, 635 A.2d at 405.
80. See id. at 345, 635 A-2d at 405.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 346, 635 A.2d at 405.
84. Id. The court observed that adverse domination was based on knowledge and not
simply on the power to act on that knowledge, because "actual notice of a claim [would]
not be possible until the corporation plaintiff [was] no longer under the control of the
defendant board members." Id.
85. Id. at 347-48, 635 A.2d at 406.
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involving fraudulent concealment86 did not mean that all claims in-
volving something less than fraud should be subject to the general
three-year rule.87 The court explained that fraudulent concealment
was not the only reason a corporation might be "blamelessly unaware"
of a cause of action.88 For example, directors and officers may be so
disengaged from their responsibilities that they themselves are una-
ware of the wrongful conduct.8 9
The court then proceeded to reject the defendants' second argu-
ment: that adverse domination was contrary to public policy.9" In the
realm of corporate governance, where the balance of power is
weighted heavily in favor of the majority of the board of directors,
which has almost exclusive power to determine whether to sue on be-
half of the corporation, 9 ' the court stated that fairness mandates ap-
plication of the adverse domination doctrine.92 Although the court
acknowledged that shareholders could institute proceedings in some
circumstances, 93 it noted that, as a practical matter, it would be diffi-
cult if not impossible for shareholders to gain access to the informa-
tion and resources necessary to bring suit.94 For these reasons, the
court concluded that "equitable considerations warrant[ed] a shifting
of the balance in favor of the corporation or association."95
With respect to the defendant's final argument, that adverse
domination achieves nothing more than already accomplished under
existing law, the court said that the doctrine went beyond the discov-
86. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-203 (1989).




91. The court noted that even if conscientious directors attempted to bring suit against
themselves, they would be prevented from doing so under Maryland law. Id. at 349, 635
A.2d at 407; see Parish v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 84, 242
A.2d 512, 545 (1968) ("[T]he court would not permit [directors] to conduct litigation
against themselves even if they were willing to do so." (citation omitted)), affd on re/'g, 261
Md. 618, 277 A.2d 19, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
92. Hecht, 333 Md. at 348-49, 625 A.2d at 406-07.
93. Id. at 350, 625 A.2d at 407. The shareholders must first make a demand to the
directors unless making such a demand would be futile. Eisler v. Eastern States Corp., 182
Md. 329, 333, 35 A.2d 118, 119-20 (1943). Where the directors are accused of wrongdoing,
a demand would be deemed futile. Parish, 250 Md. at 83, 242 A.2d at 512.
94. Hecht, 333 Md. at 350-51, 635 A.2d at 407-08. The court stated that adverse domina-
tion would not render the statute of limitations ineffective. Id. at 349-50, 635 A.2d at 407.
Not only is the presumption created by the doctrine rebuttable, but the contemporaneous
ownership rule limits the class of potential plaintiffs to those who held shares during the
allegedly wrongful conduct. Id. at 350, 635 A.2d at 407. Shareholders cannot sue for acts
which took place before they became shareholders. Id.
95. Id. at 351, 635 A.2d at 408.
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ery rule, the law of agency, and the state's fraudulent concealment
statute.96 The doctrine extends the discovery rule to the corporate
context and uses it to delay accrual not only until a claim is discov-
ered, but until someone has the knowledge, ability, and motivation to
act for the corporation.97 It goes beyond the law of agency to create a
presumption that there is no knowledge while wrongdoing directors
control the corporation.98 Finally, the doctrine does not require any
fraudulent concealment but is based on the directors' exclusive con-
trol over information."
To explain its adoption of the disinterested majority version of
the doctrine, the court stated that because defendants had greater ac-
cess to relevant information and because it was more probable that no
one, other than the defendants, was in the position to bring suit, it was
appropriate and fair that the defendants bear the burden of proof.1"0
In dissent, Judge Bell argued that the "single disinterested direc-
tor" version of the doctrine was more consistent with Maryland law. 1
Judge Bell found that, but for the adverse domination, limitations
would have run and concluded that the court should have placed the
burden on the plaintiff to prove an exception to the ordinary opera-
tion of the statute of limitations. 10 2
4. Analysis.-
a. Consistency with the Discovery Rule.-That a corporate
plaintiff may avoid the preclusive effect of Maryland's statute of limita-
tions during a period when culpable directors dominate the board is
not surprising. In other jurisdictions, federal and state courts consist-
ently have reached the same conclusion. 0 3 What distinguishes Hecht
from other cases that involve adverse domination is the Court of Ap-
peals' attempt to reconcile the doctrine with Maryland law on the stat-
ute of limitations.10 4 With the Hecht decision, the court significantly
modifies the operation of the discovery rule and dramatically alters





101. Id. at 353, 635 A.2d at 409 (Bell, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 358, 635 A.2d at 411.
103. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
104. Other jurisdictions have treated adverse domination as a special case and, in the
savings and loan context, have relied heavily on federal precedent. See, e.g., Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Bird, 516 F. Supp. 647, 651 (D.P.R. 1981).
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the balance of power in cases that involve misfeasance by officers and
directors.
The court's decision to treat adverse domination as a corollary to
the discovery rule is significant because the doctrine actually extends
that rule considerably. Prior to Hecht, Maryland's discovery rule juris-
prudence dealt primarily with bilateral disputes involving tortfeasors
on one side and aggrieved parties on the other. Because the plaintiffs
in these earlier cases brought suit to redress injuries that they person-
ally had suffered, courts had only to determine when the plaintiffs
knew or should have known of their potential claims. In the corpo-
rate context, where the plaintiff is the corporation itself, a court must
decide who qualifies as a triggering person-that is, one whose knowl-
edge is sufficient to commence the running of the limitations
period.' 0 5
In Hecht, the court determined that a triggering person was some-
one with actual knowledge of the corporation's claim and the ability
and the motivation to act upon that knowledge."0 6 In effect, the court
added two prerequisites to the accrual of a claim under the discovery
rule: the ability and motivation to bring suit.1"7 However, the court's
rationale for extending the discovery rule in this case makes it clear
that these additional requirements only apply in cases involving claims
brought on behalf of a corporation.1 0 8
Under both adverse domination and the discovery rule, the stan-
dard is actual or constructive knowledge of a claim.10 9 In the corpo-
rate context, "actual notice of a claim is not possible until the
corporate plaintiff is no longer under the control of the defendant
board members," that is, until someone other than the wrongdoers
has the ability and motivation to act.1 10 While many other courts, par-
105. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hecht, 833 F. Supp. 529, 532 (D. Md. 1991).
106. See Hecht, 333 Md. at 352, 635 A.2d at 408. The court might also have explained the
new control requirement by comparing it to the statutory exception that prevents running
of the statute of limitations against plaintiffs under a disability. See MD. CODE ANN., CrS. &
JuD. PROC. § 5-201 (1989); see also supra note 31. A corporation dominated by culpable
directors could be viewed as operating under a disability, and thus the court's decision has
merely extended to corporations the same protection the legislature has provided to
individuals.
107. Hecht, 333 Md. at 351, 635 A.2d at 408.
108. Id. at 348-49, 635 A.2d at 406-07.
109. Id. at 352, 635 A.2d at 408 ("As with the discovery rule, the test is whether a plaintiff
knows or should know of a claim.").
110. Id. at 346, 635 A.2d at 405. If the court had not equated knowledge and control in
the corporate context, then its holding might have generated arguments for extension of
the statutory period in other cases where plaintiffs lack the ability to bring suit within the
limitations period. For example, a future plaintiff might have argued that a cause of action
does not accrue while the plaintiff lacks the financial resources to bring suit.
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ticularly in the failed savings and loan context, have applied the doc-
trine of adverse domination to allow the government to bring a claim
against directors and officers, few have articulated a clear rule and
allocated the burden of proof as the Court of Appeals has in Hecht.
A second way in which the version of adverse domination
adopted by the Hecht court differs from prior limitations law is in the
allocation of the burden of proof. Hecht holds that in cases where
culpable directors comprise a majority of the board, the defendants
bear the burden of proving adequate notice to the corporate plain-
tiff.11 The majority, however, did not adequately address the dis-
sent's argument that, in general, a plaintiff who invokes an exception
to statutory limitations, such as the discovery rule or the exception for
fraudulent concealment, bears the burden of showing why the statute
of limitations should not bar the claim."' In Hecht, the court simply
stated that it was appropriate for the defendants to bear the burden
because the defendants enjoyed greater access to information of
claims and that it was probable that no one else was in a position to
bring suit."i
Although it is not immediately clear why plaintiffs who invoke the
discovery rule or the fraud exception should bear the burden of proof
while plaintiffs who invoke the doctrine of adverse domination do not,
the difference can be explained by the parties' respective access to
relevant information. Under the discovery rule, plaintiffs must show
that they did not know or have reason to know of a cause of action.1 14
Plaintiffs bear this burden because they are in the best position to
ascertain from the surrounding facts whether there is a basis for a
claim.115 Similarly, culpable members of the corporation's board are
likely to have better access to information with respect to who had the
knowledge, motivation, and ability to challenge their wrongful
conduct. 116
111. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
112. See Hecht, 333 Md. at 355-58, 635 A.2d at 410-11 (Bell,J, dissenting); see also Finch v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 57 Md. App. 190, 469 A.2d 867, cert. denied, 300 Md. 88, 475 A.2d 1200
(1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft Int'l, Inc.,
67 Md. App. 424, 508 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 307 Md. 260, 513 A.2d 314 (1986).
113. Hech4 333 Md. at 352, 635 A.2d at 408.
114. Finch, 57 Md. App. at 241, 469 A.2d at 892.
115. Id. at 242, 469 A.2d at 892.
116. Hech4 333 Md. at 350-51, 635 A.2d at 407-08. Courts have shifted the burden of
proof to corporate directors in other situations. For example, in Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981), directors sought to dismiss a shareholders' derivative ac-
tion on the basis that the action had been rejected by the corporation's independent
litigation committee. Id. at 781. The Delaware Supreme Court determined that the de-
fendant-directors had the burden of proving that the litigation committee had acted inde-
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b. Adequacy of Protection.-An important rationale for shift-
ing the burden of proof to the defendants under the doctrine of ad-
verse domination is the probability that no one other than the
defendants is in a position to bring suit. 117 Under the "single disinter-
ested director" version of the adverse domination rule, which the
Court of Appeals rejected, a plaintiff must, without the benefit of dis-
covery, prove a negative: that no one could have or was willing to
bring suit on behalf of the corporation."' 8 Under the version of ad-
verse domination adopted by the Hecht court, the defendant-directors,
who have the best access to relevant information, must establish the
existence of one person capable of representing the interests of the
corporation to rebut the presumption that the statute of limitations
should not run." 9 Naturally, if a suit has not been brought, it is prob-
able that no such person exists.
Although the adoption of the adverse domination doctrine and
the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant-director will allow
plaintiffs to bring suits that would otherwise be barred by the statute
of limitations, the application of the rule does not provide complete
protection to shareholders and corporations. This is because the rule
ignores the structural biases inherent in our system of corporate gov-
ernance. While Hecht establishes that knowledge on the part of culpa-
ble directors is not adequate notice to a corporation of a cause of
action, the court failed to recognize that even knowledge on the part
of disinterested directors may sometimes be insufficient notice to a
corporation. The court's sense of the term "disinterested director"
would appear to include any director who did not participate in the
allegedly wrongful conduct. 2 ° That might well include directors who
are members of corporate management and who would be reluctant,
pendently and in good faith and that the committee's decision not to bring suit against the
directors was reasonable. Id. at 788; see a/soJames D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice
in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959, 976
n.71 ("[The] shift in the burden of proof is... justified by efficiency considerations: The
Committee is in a better position than the plaintiff to produce evidence in support of the
issue in dispute.").
117. Hecht, 333 Md. at 352, 635 A.2d at 408.
118. See id. at 353, 635 A.2d at 409 (Bell, J., dissenting).
119. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Hecht, 333 Md. at 327, 635 A.2d at 369 (describing adverse domination by
officers and directors as long as they remain in control); id. at 340, 635 A.2d at 402 (stating
that claims can be brought "only when the culpable directors are replaced by a majority of
nonculpable directors"); id. at 341, 635 A.2d at 403 (explaining how under the single disin-
terested director version, a plaintiff would have the burden of showing "full, complete and
exclusive control by the culpable directors charged with wrongdoing").
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whether out of loyalty, ambition, or fear of reprisal, to bring suit
against their superiors.'
Even outside directors may not be truly independent. 122 Many
directors owe their positions to the corporation's chief executive of-
ficer.123 Most are executives of other corporations and understand
the role of the outside director to be a passive one.1 2 4 The process for
selecting board members, the "criteria by which their candidacy and
continued service are evaluated, and the motives and rewards that im-
pel nominees and directors to serve on the board all interact to form a
highly cohesive group of mutually attractive individuals. '12 5 Such a
group is unlikely to initiate litigation against one or more of its
members.
Even if outside directors acted with complete independence, they
might not have the knowledge necessary to protect the interests of the
corporation.1 26 Many outside directors have backgrounds in indus-
tries completely different from those of the corporations on whose
boards they sit.127 Their contact with the corporation is limited, and
their decisions generally are based on information filtered by
management. 12
8
Although Maryland's adoption of the "disinterested director" ver-
sion of the doctrine of adverse domination removes a significant ob-
stacle to claims against corporate directors, the rule does not, and
cannot, completely protect a corporation from the harsh effects of the
statute of limitations. The rule adopted in Hecht will facilitate the pur-
suit of claims so long as the board is comprised primarily of directors
121. See George W. Dent, Jr., The Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board,
and the Director's Duty of Care, 61 B.U. L. REv. 623, 626 (1981) ("The subordinates cannot
flout the chief's authority when functioning as directors in his presence. Outside directors,
though less subject to the control of the chief executive officer, are still unlikely to be very
independent.") (footnote omitted).
122. See id. at 627-28.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Directors are selected largely on the basis of personal compatibility with other
board members. Individuals who perceive a group, such as their colleagues on the board,
as agreeable, tend to desire a continued association with that group. Because of this de-
sire, they tend to conform their actions to the group's views. James D. Cox & Harry L.
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate
Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 83, 91-92, 98 (1985). The effects of this phenomenon
are intensified by the prestige associated with board membership. Id. at 95.
126. Dent, supra note 121, at 627.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 628, 672 ("[Flew [outside directors] spend more than thirty-six hours per
year attending meetings; moreover, many receive little information about the meeting[s]
prior to their attendance.").
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who participated in the transaction in question. But once the balance
of power shifts in favor of directors who did not participate in the
wrongful acts, the statute will begin to run, whether or not these direc-
tors are sufficiently independent and involved in the affairs of the cor-
poration to represent the corporation's best interests. Unless the
plaintiffs-without the benefit of discovery or access to the relevant
information-can establish that there was no one with sufficient
knowledge, ability, and motivation to bring suit on behalf of the cor-
poration, the directors likely will prevail.
As incomplete as the protection of the disinterested majority stan-
dard may be, the Hecht decision represents the outer limits of what the
court could reasonably accomplish without completely violating the
principles of repose that underlie the statute of limitations.' 29 A pre-
sumption that includes all inside directors or all directors with per-
sonal ties to the wrongdoers is simply unworkable. Although a
corporation's directors have superior knowledge of the motivations of
other members of the board, it would be unreasonable to ask defend-
ant-directors to prove in each case not only that there had been a shift
in control of the corporation, but also that they did not exercise influ-
ence over new directors through professional or personal relation-
ships. The better rule, which the Court of Appeals has chosen,
assumes that directors who did not participate in culpable conduct
have acted in a conscientious manner and requires that a corporate
plaintiff produce evidence to the contrary.
5. Conclusion.--In Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corporation, the Court
of Appeals adopted the doctrine of adverse domination to ensure
that, even in the absence of fraud, the statute of limitations will not
run against a corporation dominated by wrongdoers unless the culpa-
ble directors can demonstrate that someone else had the knowledge,
ability, and motivation to bring suit against them. Because the court
classifies any director who did not participate in the wrongful conduct
as disinterested, plaintiffs will continue to have the burden of proving
actual domination in those cases where a disinterested majority of the
board, whether out of loyalty, fear of retaliation, or lack of sufficient
knowledge, is unwilling or unable to act for the corporation. In such
cases, plaintiffs will have the formidable task of showing that no one
129. See Hecht, 333 Md. at 338, 635 A.2d at 401 (stating that one of the purposes of
statutes of limitation is that of "ensuring fairness to plaintiffs by encouraging prompt filing
of claims"); Harig v. Johns Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 76-77, 394 A.2d 299, 302
(1978) (explaining that the purposes served by statutes of limitation include "encouraging
'promptness in instituting actions, suppressing stale or fraudulent claims, and avoiding in-
convenience which may stem from delay when it is practicable to assert rights").
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could have enforced the rights of the corporation. Despite this handi-





A. Local Control Over Alcoholic Beverage Licensing: Ending Gender
Discrimination Through the Back Door
In Coalition For Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No. 622, Benevolent &
Protective Order of Elks,' the Maryland Court of Appeals unanimously
upheld an Annapolis ordinance which prohibited the renewal of li-
quor licenses to private clubs that engaged in discriminatory member-
ship practices.2 The court held that the Annapolis City Council has
broad power under Article 2B3 to regulate alcoholic beverages and
that the Annapolis ordinance is not preempted by the state public
accommodations law.4 With Coalition for Open Doors, the court has al-
lowed the City of Annapolis effectively to nullify the exception for pri-
vate clubs in the public accommodations law.
1. The Case.-Following a hotly contested political debate,5 the
Annapolis City Council enacted an ordinance on April 9, 1990, that
prohibited the issuance or renewal of an alcoholic beverage license to
any private club that engaged in certain discriminatory practices.6
Specifically, Ordinance 0-11-90 Revised, which passed on a vote of five
to four,7 provided that "[a]n establishment licensed under the [vari-
ous club classes] provisions ... shall not exclude from membership
solely on the basis of race, sex, religion, physical handicap or national
origin in its membership."8 The ordinance forbade the Annapolis Al-
coholic Control Board from issuing new or renewal licenses to any
1. 333 Md. 359, 635 A.2d 412 (1994).
2. Id. at 361-62, 635 A.2d at 413.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B (1957 & Supp. 1993). For the text of the statute, see infra
note 18.
4. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 362, 635 A.2d at 413.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 363, 635 A.2d at 413.
7. Id. at 365 n.6, 635 A.2d at 415 n.6.
8. ANNAPOLIS, MD., CODE § 7.12.430 (1986 & Supp. 1993). Ordinance 0-11-90 Revised
provides in pertinent part:
A. An establishment licensed under the provisions of Sections 7.12.240,
7.12.270 and 7.12.330 [various club classes] shall not exclude from membership
solely on the basis of race, sex, religion, physical handicap or national origin in its
membership.
1. In addition to any other requirements of law, each application for a new
license, a transfer of a license, or a renewal of a license, described in [above listed
sections], shall be accompanied by an affidavit declaring that the establishment
for which the license is sought is not required by any organizational by-laws to
engage in any practice described in subsection (A) of this section.
2. The issuance, transfer or renewal of a license described in [above listed
sections] shall not be approved if the affidavit required by subsection (A) (1) of
this section is not submitted.
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private club that failed to submit "an affidavit declaring that the estab-
lishment for which the license is sought is not required by any organi-
zational by-laws to engage in any [discriminatory] practice."9 To
accommodate clubs that had to apply to a national or international
organization for permission to change their by-laws, the Annapolis
City Council subsequendy postponed the effective date of Ordinance
0-11-90 fromJanuary 1991 until September 1, 1991.10
Annapolis Lodge No. 622, Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks, is a Maryland corporation and subordinate to the national frater-
nal organization, the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the
United States of America. 1 The national Elks limit membership to
male citizens of the United States and require each subordinate lodge
to adhere to this policy. 12 In its clubhouse, the Annapolis Lodge oper-
ates a cocktail lounge that serves only lodge members and their
guests, wives, dependents, and members of the lodge's Women's Aux-
iliary.13 The Annapolis Lodge holds a Class C (club class) alcoholic
beverage license.14 At the national Elks convention in July 1991, the
Annapolis Lodge unsuccessfully requested permission to amend its by-
laws and admit female members. 15
In anticipation of the loss of their alcoholic beverage license, the
Annapolis Lodge filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County on September 3, 1991, seeking both a declaratory judgment to
invalidate the ordinance and an injunction to require the City of An-
napolis to review its license renewal application without regard to the
ordinance. 6 In December 1991, the Annapolis Lodge filed a motion
in the same court for summary judgment,' 7 and argued that the ordi-
nance was invalid because the City of Annapolis lacked the authority
under Article 2B 18 to enact Ordinance 0-11-90, and further, that the
5. The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to applications for




10. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 364, 635 A.2d at 414.
11. Id. at 362, 635 A.2d at 413.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 362-63, 635 A.2d at 413. The court noted that the record contained no refer-
ence to the membership requirements of the Women's Auxiliary. Id. at 363 n.3, 635 A.2d
at 413 n.3.
14. Id. at 362, 635 A.2d at 413.
15. Id. at 364, 635 A.2d at 414.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Article 2B, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
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ordinance conflicted with the state's public accommodations law, Arti-
cle 49B, Section 5(e).19 In particular, the lodge argued that as a pri-
vate club not generally open to the public, it fell within the exception
to the public accommodations law, namely Section 5(e).2"
The City of Annapolis acknowledged no dispute as to any mate-
rial fact and moved for summaryjudgment upholding the ordinance
(a) Regulation necessay.-(l) It is hereby declared as the policy of the State
that it is necessary to regulate and control the manufacture, sale, distribution,
transportation and storage of alcoholic beverages within this State and the trans-
portation and distribution of alcoholic beverages into and out of this State to
obtain respect and obedience to law and to foster and promote temperance.
(2) It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent that such policy will
be carried out in the best public interest by empowering the Comptroller of the
Treasury, the various local boards of license commissioners and liquor control
boards, all enforcement officers and judges and clerks of the various courts of this
State with sufficient authority to administer and enforce the provision of this
article.
(3) The restrictions, regulations, provisions and penalties contained in
this article are for the protection, health, welfare and safety of the people of this
State....
(b) Powers authoizei-....
(3) The powers granted to any official or agency pursuant to this subsec-
tion shall not be construed:
(i) To grant to any official or agency powers in any substantive area
not otherwise granted to the official or agency by other public general or public
local law;
(ii) To restrict the official or agency from exercising any power
granted to the official or agency by other public general or public local law or
otherwise;
(iii) To authorize the official or agency or officers of the agency to
engage in any activity which is beyond their power under other public general
law, public local law, or otherwise; or
(iv) To preempt or supersede the regulatory authority of any State
department or agency under any public general law.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 1 (1957 & Supp. 1993).
19. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 364-65, 635 A.2d at 414. The Maryland public
accommodations law states in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for an owner or operator of a place of public accommoda-
tion or an agent or employee of the owner or operator, because of the race,
creed, sex, age, color, national origin, marital status, or physical or mental handi-
cap, of any person, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of such place of public
accommodation.
(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a private club or other
establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facili-
ties of such establishments are made available to the customers or patrons of an
establishment within the scope of this section.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5 (1957).
20. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 364-65, 635 A.2d at 414.
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as valid. 1 After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County issued ajudgment on April 16, 1992, that declared Ordinance
0-11-90 invalid on both grounds advanced by the Annapolis Lodge.22
The court granted the lodge's requested injunction.23 Specifically,
the trial court judge found that the General Assembly intended to
preclude a "lesser government" body from regulating discrimination
by private clubs 2 4 and that the city lacked authority under Article 2B
to reach membership discrimination unless it bore some relationship
to the consumption of alcohol. 3
On May 11, 1992, the Annapolis City Council decided not to ap-
peal the circuit court's judgment.26 The City Council, however, did
not repeal the ordinance.2 ' Four days after the council's decision, a
group comprised of the Coalition for Open Doors, the Maryland
Commission on Human Relations, and two female Annapolis resi-
dents, Pamela Anderson and Carol Gerson 2 1 filed a motion to inter-
vene as defendants for purposes of appeal.29 In a separate motion,
the four aldermen who had supported an appeal of thejudgment also
sought to intervene.3 ° The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
granted the first group's motion to intervene,3' but denied the alder-
men's motion for lack of standing.3 2
The Annapolis Lodge appealed from the order allowing the mo-
tion to intervene and the intervenors appealed from the injunction
and the declaratory judgment invalidating Ordinance 0-11-90." 3
21. Id. at 365, 635 A.2d at 414.
22. Id.
23. Id.




28. The Coalition for Open Doors is an organization of civil rights and women's rights
groups, as well as individual advocates, that works toward the integration of private clubs
across racial, ethnic, gender, and religious lines. The Maryland Commission on Human
Relations, a state agency, is responsible for the enforcement of provisions in Article 49B
related to discrimination. Pamela Anderson, a lawyer, and Carol Gerson, a business-
woman, wished to join the Annapolis Elks or other Annapolis private clubs that have dis-
criminated based on gender. Id. at 365 n.7, 635 A.2d at 415 n.7.
29. Id. at 365-66, 635 A.2d at 415.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 366, 635 A.2d at 415.
32. Id.
33. Id. The Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court's ruling on the intervention
issue, noting that "the decision of the losing party [Annapolis City Council] not to appeal
certainly justified intervention for purposes of appeal." Id. at 370, 635 A.2d at 417. The
court concluded, "the cases have upheld postjudgment intervention for purposes of ap-
peal when the applicant has the requisite standing and files the motion to intervene
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Before the Court of Special Appeals considered the case, the Court of
Appeals granted certiorari on its own motion."
2. Legal Background. -Coalition for Open Doors implicates three
major issues: first, the constitutional right of private association; sec-
ond, the authority of a local government to expand regulation of alco-
holic beverages beyond those areas enumerated under a detailed state
statute; and third, the conflict between the state's public accommoda-
tions law and a local ordinance aimed at ending gender discrimina-
tion within private clubs.
a. Right of Private Association.--The Court of Appeals ap-
proached Coalition for Open Doors in light of three recent Supreme
Court decisions" that significantly broadened the power of states to
regulate the right of private association. While it has asserted consti-
tutional protection for expressive and intimate associational rights, 6
the Supreme Court has carefully balanced these individual and group
rights against the state's interest in ending gender discrimination. As
stated in Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, "the nature and degree of con-
stitutional protection afforded freedom of association may vary de-
pending on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the
constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case." 7
Aside from explicit protection for familial rights of association,"
the Court has not defined a test to determine what other kinds of
promptly after the losing party decides against an appeal .... The intervenors obviously
acted promptly." Id. at 370-71, 635 A.2d at 417.
34. Coalition for Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No. 622, Benevolent & Protective
Order of Elks, 328 Md. 462, 615 A.2d 262 (1992).
35. See New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (approv-
ing a New York statute which declared that clubs with over 400 members that provided
certain services were no longer considered private); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that application of a California law
requiring admission of women did not violate the Rotary Club's First Amendment right of
expressive association); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (upholding
application of a Minnesota public accommodations law requiring the Jaycees to admit
women).
36. In Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, the Court distinguished between two types of associ-
ational rights, intimate and expressive. 468 U.S. at 617-18. The former includes the free-
dom "to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships" without "undue
intrusion by the state." Id. The latter relates to the freedom to engage in activities pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Id. at 618.
37. Id.
38. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (holding that the
state's interest in preventing overcrowding was an unjustified intrusion on the fundamen-
tal rights of a family, including an extended family, to choose their living arrangements);
see also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding an ordinance
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groups merit protection for their associational rights. 3 9 The Roberts
Court, however, did note several factors to consider in assessing the
limits of state authority over the right to associate, including the "size,
purpose, policies, selectivity [and] congeniality" of the subject
group.4°
In 1989, the Court of Appeals explored these constitutional issues
in State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc.41 The Burning Tree Country Club
sought to invalidate a law which conditioned continuance of their
favorable tax status upon admission of women into their Montgomery
County golf club.4" The Court of Appeals applied the factors devel-
oped by the Supreme Court in Roberts and concluded that the Mary-
land statute violated neither the intimate nor the expressive
associational rights of the club.43 Specifically, the court did not find a
440-member club devoted to playing golf sufficiently "intimate" to es-
cape regulation forbidding gender discrimination.' The Burning Tree
court declared that "governments are under no obligation to sanc-
tion, subsidize or support discrimination by private entities ....
b. Authority to Regulate Alcoholic Beverages.-The authority to
regulate alcoholic beverages has been expressly reserved to the Gen-
eral Assembly under both the Maryland Constitution' and Article
23A.4 7 With the enactment of Article 2B, the General Assembly at-
tempted to preempt this area with a comprehensive regulatory
restricting the rights of unrelated individuals to live together because the ordinance did
not affect intimate associational rights).
39. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
40. Id.
41. 315 Md. 254, 554 A.2d 366, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
42. Id. at 261, 554 A.2d at 370. This was the third in a series of cases dealing with the
Burning Tree Country Club's discrimination policy. See Burning Tree Club, Inc. v.
Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 501 A.2d 817 (1985) (finding unconstitutional that part of the Mary-
land tax code that exempted clubs which operated with the primary purpose of benefiting
one sex); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 301 Md. 9, 481 A.2d 785 (1984) (holding that
the Attorney General had no standing to bring a declaratory judgment action challenging
the constitutionality of an enactment by the General Assembly).
43. Burning Tree, 315 Md. at 277-84, 554 A.2d at 378-80.
44. Id. at 280, 554 A.2d at 379 ("The size of Burning Tree's membership is not so small
as to suggest that it is entitled to constitutionally protected intimate associational rights.").
45. Id. at 289, 554 A.2d at 384.
46. "Nothing in this Article shall be construed to authorize any municipal corporation,
by any amendment or addition to its charter, to permit any act which is prohibited by the
laws of this State concerning.., the manufacture, licensing or sale of alcoholic beverages."
MD. CONST. art. XI-E, § 6.
47. The authority to regulate alcoholic beverages is not listed among the powers
granted to municipalities under Article 23A. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 2 (Supp. 1993).
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scheme.4" Article 2B, Section 184(a) delegates authority to county
boards of license commissioners which "have full power and authority
to adopt such reasonable rules and regulations as they may deem nec-
essary to enable them effectively to discharge the duties imposed
upon them by this article."
49
One major exception to this system of county-level boards in-
volves the City of Annapolis, which according to Article 2B, Section
158(d) has direct authority to act as the local liquor board.5 ° Based
on this statute, the Annapolis City Council has enacted its own com-
prehensive regulatory system under Chapter 7.12 of the Annapolis
Code" of which Ordinance 0-11-90 was added as Section 7.12.430.52
Prior to Coalition for Open Doors, the extent of the statutory authority
given to Annapolis under Article 2B had not been fully examined.
In Sullivan v. Board of License Commissioners,13 the Court of Appeals
simultaneously affirmed and curtailed the authority under Article 2B
of local license boards other than in Annapolis.54 Although it ac-
knowledged the broad authority vested under Article 2B,55 the court
found that the Board of License Commissioners for Prince George's
County had overstepped its discretion in arbitrarily denying permis-
sion for a license holder to build a drive-in window.56 The Sullivan
court concluded that a local board can exercise its authority only
within the boundaries of the controlling statute, but cautioned that
48. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B (1957).
49. Id. § 18 4(a) (Supp. 1993).
50. Id. § 158(d). In the Maryland counties and Baltimore City, the Boards of License
Commissioners are either appointed by the Governor, county commissioners, county exec-
utives, or composed of other officials. See id §§ 148, 148A, 149, 150, 150(c), 150(e), 151A,
153, 159(c) (6) (1957).
Section 158(d)(1) states:
Anne Arundel County.-In Anne Arundel County (1) the Mayor, Counsellor and
Aldermen of Annapolis shall have the power to make and enforce such rules,
regulations and restrictions, in addition to, or in substitution of, those contained
in this article, but not inconsistent therewith, as in the judgment of the Mayor,
Counsellor and Aldermen of the City of Annapolis would give the municipality
more effective control of each of the places of business.
Id. § 158(d)(1).
51. ANNAPOLIS, MD., CODE ch. 7.12 (Supp. 1993).
52. See supra note 8.
53. 293 Md. 113, 442 A.2d 558 (1982).
54. Id. at 123-24, 442 A.2d at 563-64.
55. "The broad authority vested.., under §§ 1 and 184(a) of the Act to adopt reason-
able rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively administer the law and to
foster and promote temperance in the public interest is both necessary and constitutional."
Id. at 123, 442 A.2d at 563.
56. Id. at 124, 442 A.2d at 564.
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"the power delegated to an administrative agency to make rules is not
the power to make laws."57
In another 1982 case, Montgomery County v. Board of Supervisors of
Elections, 8 the Court of Special Appeals further limited the power of
local voters to regulate alcoholic beverages. The court held that vot-
ers could not stop the county from selling alcoholic beverages because
the state, and "the State alone, shall regulate and control, within Mary-
land, the sale, manufacture, distribution, storage, or transportation of
alcoholic beverages."59 The court concluded that local voters could
not "effectively repeal or render nugatory, an act of the General
Assembly."6"
c. Preemption by the Public Accommodations Law.-The Court
of Appeals has established three ways in which a state law may pre-
empt a local law: (1) preemption by conflict,6 ' (2) implied preemp-
tion,62 and (3) express preemption.63
As early as 1909, the Court of Appeals in Rossberg v. State,6' de-
clared invalid local ordinances that either prohibited an activity in-
tended to be permitted by state law or, conversely, permitted an
activity intended to be prohibited.65 In City of Baltimore v. Sitnick,"6 the
court further refined this rule to apply only to activities which state
law has expressly prohibited or permitted.67 More recently, in Boulden
57. Id.
58. 53 Md. App. 123, 451 A.2d 1279 (1982).
59. Id. at 126, 451 A.2d at 1280.
60. Id. at 125, 451 A.2d at 1280.
61. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
62. See Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 488, 620 A.2d 880, 883 (1993) (indicat-
ing that local law is impliedly preempted when the Legislature acts with the intent to oc-
cupy the entire field); see also Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 298-99,
631 A.2d 77, 86-87 (1993).
63. See Montgomery County v. Atlantic Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540, 549, 489 A.2d 1114,
1118 (1989) (holding that the comprehensive State statute regulating handguns expressly
preempted all local laws on the subject).
64. 111 Md. 394, 74 A. 581 (1909).
65. Id. The Rossberg court stated:
Such ordinances must not directly or indirectly contravene the general law.
Hence ordinances which assume directly or indirectly to permit acts or occupa-
tions which the State statutes prohibit, or to prohibit acts permitted by statute or
Constitution, are under the familiar rule for validity of ordinances uniformly de-
clared to be null and void.
Id. at 416, 74 A. at 584 (citations omitted).
66. 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969).
67. Id. at 317, 255 A.2d at 382.
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v. Mayor of Elkton,6" the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the preemption
by conflict rule established in Rossberg.69
In Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie,7° the court examined the
concept of implied preemption.7 1 In that case, the court determined
that although no exact formula existed for deciding whether the Gen-
eral Assembly intended to preempt an entire area by implication, the
.primary indicia of a legislative purpose to preempt an entire field of
law is the comprehensiveness with which the General Assembly has
legislated the field." 72 Because of the comprehensive nature of the
state's licensing scheme, the Allied court therefore held that the Gen-
eral Assembly intended to occupy the field of cigarette sales through
vending machines.73
The Court of Appeals, however, has been careful to distinguish
between those state laws which were intended to permit or to prohibit
a particular activity and those which were meant to exempt an area
from coverage.74 In City of Baltimore v. Sitnick,75 for example, the court
found that exclusion from state law not only fails to indicate a legisla-
tive intent to preempt local laws but also leaves the field open for
supplemental local regulation. 76 The court continued this line of rea-
68. 311 Md. 411, 535 A.2d 477 (1988).
69. Id. at 415, 535 A.2d at 479 (holding as invalid a town ordinance limiting the right of
appeal under the zoning ordinance when state law expressly permitted the appeal).
70. 332 Md. 279, 631 A.2d 77 (1993).
71. Id. at 287, 631 A.2d at 81. Following a thorough examination of Md. Ann. Code
art. 56, §§ 607-631 (1957 & Supp. 1991) as well as other state regulations, the court held
that comprehensive state laws governing cigarette sales preempted local laws by implica-
tion. Id.
72. Id. at 298-99, 631 A.2d at 87.
73. Id. at 300, 631 A.2d at 87.
74. Id.
75. 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969).
76. Id. at 324, 255 A.2d at 385-86. The court stated, "We do not think in this case that
the exemption from State regulation, unaccompanied by any prohibition against inclusion
in local legislation, was an affirmative guarantee against local regulation." Id. The court
summarized Maryland law on this point as follows:
A distillation of the opinions we have cited leaves the residual thought that a
political subdivision may not prohibit what the State by general public law has
permitted, but it may prohibit what the State has not expressly permitted. Stated
another way, unless a general public law contains an express denial of the right to
act by local authority, the State's prohibition of certain activity in a field does not
impliedly guarantee that all other activity shall be free from local regulation and
in such a situation the same field may thus be opened to supplemental local
regulation.
Id. at 317, 255 A.2d at 382.
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soning in Mayor of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 7 7 when it
stated that "'municipal regulations are not struck down where they
are in conformity with the plan or spirit of the State statutes.' 78 In a
1981 case, National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Prince George's County,79
the court expressly found that a local ordinance was not preempted by
state employment discrimination law.8' The court upheld a Prince
George's County ordinance which prohibited discrimination by em-
ployers with fewer than fifteen employees, even though those employ-
ers were exempt under Article 49B, Section 15(b). 81 The court noted
that "[t] he state statute would have to permit discrimination by employ-
ers with less than fifteen employees for there to be a conflict under
the test set forth in our cases."82
3. Court's Reasoning.-In Coalition for Open Doors, the Court of
Appeals upheld the Annapolis ordinance on two distinct grounds:
first, the City of Annapolis has unique authority under Article 2B, Sec-
tion 158(d) (1) to control the licensing of alcoholic beverages,83 and
second, the ordinance is valid supplemental legislation of an activity
not expressly permitted under state law.84
After an examination of Annapolis's authority under Article 2B,
the court stressed the comprehensiveness of the regulatory scheme. 85
Specifically, the court noted the broad scope of the statute and its
enumeration of a range of issues, from general policy statements86 to
77. 284 Md. 383, 396 A.2d 1080 (1979) (holding that a city charter provision permit-
ting additional environmentally-based regulation of the construction of wharves did not
conflict with state law).
78. Id. at 392, 396 A.2d at 1086 (quoting Reed v. President of North East, 226 Md. 229,
249-50, 172 A.2d 536, 545 (1961)).
79. 292 Md. 75, 437 A.2d 651 (1981).
80. Id. at 79-80, 437 A.2d at 653-54.
81. Id. The Maryland employment discrimination law states in pertinent part:
§ 14. Declaration of policy.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Maryland... to assure all
persons equal opportunity in receiving employment and in all labor manage-
ment-union relations regardless of race, color, religion, ancestry or national ori-
gin, sex, age, marital status, or physical or mental handicap ... and to that end to
prohibit discrimination in employment by any person, group, labor organization,
organization or any employer or his agents.
§ 15. Definitions
(b) Employer.-The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry
or business who has fifteen or more employees ....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 14, 15(b) (1957).
82. National Asphalt, 292 Md. at 79 n.3, 437 A.2d at 653 n.3 (citations omitted).
83. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 377, 635 A.2d at 420.
84. Id. at 382-83, 635 A.2d at 423.
85. Id. at 371, 635 A.2d at 418.
86. Id. at 374, 635 A.2d at 419; see supra note 18.
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requirements for uncovered windows.8 7 The court pointed out that
the lodge had not suggested, nor had the court discovered, any incon-
sistencies between the Annapolis ordinance and the provisions in Arti-
cle 2B."8
Notwithstanding Annapolis's detailed regulatory scheme, the
court concluded that the General Assembly had left room for local
control and had delegated substantial authority to county boards of
license commissioners.8 9 In addition, the Coalition for Open Doors court
attached great weight to Section 158 (d) (1) of Article 2B,9" which the
court said gave the City of Annapolis power "considerably broader
than the authority granted to the county boards of license commis-
sioners."91 As an explicit exception to the system of county-level
boards, the court emphasized that the City of Annapolis had direct
authority to act as the local liquor board.92 The court explained that
"Ordinance 0-11-90 ... falls within § 158(d) (1)'s authorization to en-
act provisions and restrictions 'in addition to, or in substitution of,
"',93those contained in this article ....
Rejecting the circuit court's reasoning, the Court of Appeals fur-
ther noted that express authority under Article 2B is not limited to the
regulation of alcohol.94 In support of this conclusion, the court cited
numerous sections of Article 2B that do not directly control the con-
sumption of alcohol,95 including, for example, criteria for the sizes of
golf courses and swimming pools.96 Other sections of Article 2B like-
wise describe membership eligibility requirements for various private
87. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B § 122 (1957) (requiring that licensed premises in Charles
County must have at least one plain glass window without any curtain or other covering
such that a person outside could observe the interior of the premises).
88. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 375, 635 A.2d at 419.
89. Id. at 372-73, 635 A.2d at 418.
90. See supra note 50.
91. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 373-74, 635 A.2d at 419.
92. Article 2B, § 152 states:
In Annapolis, the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Annapolis, may consti-
tute the Board of License Commissioners for the city or may delegate all or any
portion of the authority to regulate alcoholic beverage licensees to a subsidiary
Board established by the Mayor and Aldermen. The Board of License Commis-
sioners of Anne Arundel County shall have no jurisdiction in the City of
Annapolis.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 152 (1957).
93. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 375, 635 A.2d at 419 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE
art. 2B, § 158(d) (1) (1957)).
94. Id., 635 A.2d at 419-20.
95. Id. at 375-76, 635 A.2d at 420.
96. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 20(n)(6)(iv) (1957) (requiring country clubs in
Harford County with liquor licenses to maintain at least a 9 hole golf course or, in lieu of
that, a swimming pool at least 20 by 40 feet in size, and at least 6 tennis courts).
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clubs. 9 7 The court concluded that "Annapolis Ordinance 0-11-90 has
just as much, or just as little, connection with the consumption of alco-
hol at the club as these provisions of Art. 2B have.""8
The court further found that the ordinance had a direct bearing
on the sale of alcohol at the club.99 Specifically, the court opined that
"[t] here may be many women who desire to use the alcoholic bever-
age service of the Annapolis Lodge" and who are currently ex-
cluded.' ° The court reasoned that since the number of available
alcoholic beverage licenses was limited, the City of Annapolis, in
awarding licenses to private clubs that do not discriminate, "has de-
cided that a broader range of the adult population should have the
opportunity to enjoy alcoholic beverages at clubs.""0 ' The court held,
therefore, that Annapolis was authorized to enact the ordinance. 0 2
The Coalition for Open Doors court next considered the issue of
preemption by the state public accommodations law. The court first
examined the language of the public accommodations law'0 3 and
then reviewed the lodge's argument that "the intent of the legislature
[in enacting the public accommodations law) was to permit the ex-
cluded group [private clubs] to discriminate if they so choose." 104
After a recitation of the general rule for preemption by con-
flict,10 5 the court reviewed case law in which it had declared local laws
invalid based on preemption. 0 6 The court concluded that "mere ex-
clusion from regulation in the state statute did not indicate a state
legislative intent that the excluded entities be free of regulation." 10 7
Based on this reasoning, the court rejected the lodge's argument that
it was free to discriminate without local regulation.10 8
97. See id. § 20(c) (3) (iii) (stating that the members of any club in Anne Arundel
County that obtains a special veterans license must be composed solely of service members
who have served in actual wartime).
98. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 377, 635 A.2d at 420.
99. Id., 635 A.2d at 420-21 ("[A]n ordinance conditioning an alcoholic beverage li-
cense upon the removal of a membership restriction does have some connection with who
may purchase alcoholic beverages at the club's facilities.").
100. Id. at 378, 635 A.2d at 421.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See supra note 19.
104. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 379, 635 A.2d at 421-22.
105. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
106. See Allied Vending, Inc. v. Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 631 A.2d 77 (1993); Talbot County
v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 620 A.2d 880 (1993).
107. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 381, 635 A.2d at 423.
108. See id. (finding the court's language concerning preemption in City of Baltimore v.
Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969), "directly applicable to Annapolis Lodge's argu-
ment in the present case.").
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The court further supported its holding by comparing the lan-
guage of the state public accommodations law' 09 to the language of
the state employment discrimination law involved in National
Asphalt. "0 The Coalition for Open Doors court noted that the employers
in National Asphalt were "'not permitted by the state statute to discrim-
inate in their employment practices; they simply [were] not cov-
ered.""l In light of the National Asphalt holding, the court disallowed
the lodge's argument that the public accommodations law "conflicts
with the permission to discriminate embodied in Article 49B, Section
5(e)."112
Not only did the court reject outright the Annapolis Lodge's as-
sertion that the public accommodations law permits discrimination,
but Judge Eldridge also suggested that such an interpretation still
might not change the outcome.1 3 In addition, the court dismissed
the lodge's argument that under the findings of Burning Tree, Article
2B also creates an affirmative authorization to discriminate. 1 4 If the
public accommodations law was so interpreted, the court noted, then
"a substantial question about § 5(e)'s validity under Articles 24 and 46
of the Declaration of Rights would be presented. And if § 5(e), as so
construed, were invalid, there would be no viable state statute with
which Ordinance 0-11-90 conflicted." 15 Based on this reasoning, the
court found the lodge's argument unpersuasive.11 6
The court also buttressed its conclusion by citing laws in other
states that condition the grant of an alcoholic beverage license on
non-discriminatory membership or entrance policies. 7 The court
109. See supra note 19.
110. 292 Md. 75, 437 A.2d 651 (1981); see supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
111. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 382, 635 A.2d at 423 (quoting National Asphalt,
292 Md. at 79, 437 A.2d at 653).
112. Id. at 379, 635 A.2d at 422.
113. Id. at 383 n.40, 635 A.2d at 423 n.40.
114. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 379, 635 A.2d at 422. In Burning Tree, the Court
of Appeals held as unconstitutional § 8-214 of the Tax Property Article of the Maryland
Code, which allowed a periodic discrimination exception to a statute that prohibited gen-
der discrimination at country clubs that agreed to maintain their land for open spaces in
exchange for favorable tax treatment. The court found that the provision violated the
state's Equal Rights Amendment, Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Human Rights.
Burning Tree, 315 Md. at 294-96, 554 A.2d at 386-87; see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying
text.
115. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 383 n.40, 635 A.2d at 423 n.40 (referring to
Article 49B, § 5(e)).
116. Id. at 383, 635 A.2d at 423.
117. Id. at 363 n.5, 635 A.2d at 414 n.5; see, e.g., Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks,
Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d 607, 610 (Me. 1972) (holding that the Maine Li-
quor Commission had the authority to withhold renewal liquor licenses to 15 Elks lodges
under a state statute prohibiting licensees from denying membership based on race), ap-
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thereupon concluded that while the Annapolis ordinance was a "novel
approach in Maryland," 118 it did not diverge or conflict with Article
49B, Section 5(e) of the public accommodations law." 9
4. Analysis.-The decision in Coalition for Open Doors signals a
tacit willingness to allow local jurisdictions to assail the private clubs'
exception to the public accommodations law. 2 ° Despite the probable
impact of this case on the associational rights of private clubs in Mary-
land, Coalition for Open Doors avoided all discussion of the policy impli-
cations that it had previously considered in Burning Tree.1" The
Court of Appeals instead chose to decide the case on two simply
drawn questions: first, whether the City of Annapolis had the author-
ity to enact the ordinance, and second, whether the ordinance was
preempted by the Maryland public accommodations law.1 22 Within
this narrow framework, the court has disguised an agenda to eliminate
the exception for private clubs.
In granting summary judgment, the Circuit Court for Anne Arun-
del County commented on the fact that the parties had not addressed
the constitutional questions at issue. 123 Specifically, the circuit court
pointed out that the Annapolis Lodge had not challenged the right of
an appropriate government to force private clubs to open their mem-
bership to women. 1 The court below reflected that the policy aims
behind the ordinance were laudable, observing that "[i]t is a proper
and beneficial statute to be enacted by an appropriate policy
maker."1 25 The question for the lower court remained whether the
City of Annapolis was the appropriate decision-maker. 12 6
peal dismissed, 411 U.S. 924 (1973); Vaspourakan, Ltd. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control
Comm'n, 516 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (Mass. 1987) (upholding the revocation of a liquor li-
cense where a nightclub violated a state anti-discrimination statute by barring entrance to
African-Americans); Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge No. 1743, Benevolent & Protective
Order of Elks, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah) (holding that the Elks club, by possessing a private
club liquor license, was a state-regulated enterprise and was therefore subject to the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 195 (1993).
118. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 363 n.5, 685 A.2d at 414 n.5.
119. Id. at 383, 685 A.2d at 423.
120. See supra note 19.
121. The Annapolis lodge, moreover, did not suggest that the ordinance violated its
members' rights of association.
122. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 361-62, 635 A.2d at 413.
123. Record at 96, Annapolis Lodge No. 622 Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v.
City of Annapolis (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County 1992) (No. C91-02212).
124. Id.
125. Id. In granting the motion to intervene the circuit court noted that, "I certainly
didn't decide a lot of the issues that some people probably think I decided." Id. at 166-67.
126. Id. at 96.
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To answer this question, the trial court merged the separate is-
sues of authority and preemption into one question, namely, "whether
the grant of power under Article 2B is broad enough to cover a public
accommodations law."1 2 7 The circuit court traced the history of the
public accommodations law128 to show that the legislature explicitly
excluded private clubs from the anti-discrimination clause of the pub-
lic accommodations law. 129 The lower court held that even a broad
grant of power, as under Article 2B, did not enable a local entity to
override the exception and pass its own version of a public accommo-
dations ordinance.
1 30
The Court of Appeals, however, avoided a direct answer to the
question as defined by the court below. By isolating the two lines of
reasoning into discrete components-authority and preemption-the
court managed to uphold the Annapolis ordinance while claiming to
sustain the fragile shell of the private club exception. The court was
indifferent to the lower court's view that the ordinance nullified the
private club exception and controverted legislative intent.
Perhaps in anticipation of the probable impact of the ruling, the
Coalition for Open Doors court expressly limited the holding to the City
of Annapolis as the only local political body allowed direct authority
to regulate alcoholic beverages under Article 2B, Section
158(d)(1)."3 Judge Eldridge cautioned that "[w]hether a county
board of license commissioners would have authority to promulgate a
regulation like Ordinance 0-11-90... is an issue not before us in this
case, and we intimate no views upon the matter."13 2
In a final footnote, Judge Eldridge made it clear, however, that
the court most likely would declare unconstitutional any statute which
was "construed as affirmatively authorizing discrimination based on
race, [or] gender." 33 This express agenda, perhaps, underlies the
court's rigid treatment of the issues. In the event of an outright chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the private clubs' exception, the court
can return to footnote 40 for support to strike down the exception.
127. Id. at 101.
128. Id. at 98-99. As originally enacted in 1963, the public accommodations law applied
to all establishments, both public and private, except for premises primarily devoted to the
sale of alcohol. Act of Mar. 29, 1963, ch. 227, 1963 Md. Laws 401, 402-03. In 1967 the
legislature enacted the exclusion for private clubs. Act of Apr. 21, 1967, ch. 386, 1967 Md.
Laws 767-68.
129. Record at 99. "We therefore find legislative intent to except private clubs. Only
the Maryland legislature, not the City of Annapolis, can undo that." Id.
130. Id. at 102.
131. Coalition for Open Doors, 333 Md. at 378 n.38, 635 A.2d at 421 n.38.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 383 n.40, 635 A.2d at 423 n.40.
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This underlying justification may well survive as the most significant
effect of the Coalition for Open Doors decision.
5. Conclusion. -In Coalition for Open Doors, the Court of Appeals
upheld an Annapolis ordinance which prohibited the renewal of alco-
holic beverage licenses for private clubs that engaged in discrimina-
tory membership practices. Although the decision focused strictly on
the issues of Annapolis's regulatory authority under Article 2B and
preemption by the state's public accommodations anti-discrimination
law, the court signaled a readiness to permit the demise of the excep-
tion in Article 49B for private clubs.
PAMELA M. MOORE-ERICKSON
B. A New Direction in Maryland's Rational Basis Review of
Economic Regulation
In Verzi v. Baltimore County,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals held
that a county's requirement that only towing operators located within
the county may be called by police to tow vehicles disabled by acci-
dents2 violates the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Article
24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.' Under the equal protec-
1. 333 Md. 411, 635 A.2d 967 (1994).
2. BALTIMORE CouN-ry, MD., CODE § 24-230 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
Section 24-230 provides in pertinent part:
The chief of police shall retain a current list of all duly licensed towing operators.
Whenever the services of a towing vehicle shall be required and request is made
to the police department for the providing of such services, the police depart-
ment shall call the licensed towing operator located in the county whose place of
business is closest to the scene of the accident, except when an owner requests a
specific licensed towing company; provided that such tow company can respond
within a reasonable time.
Id.
3. Verzi, 333 Md. at 427, 635 A.2d at 975. Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights states:
"That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land." MD.
CONST. DECL. OF RTs. art. 24.
Maryland case law has established that Article 24 contains the same equal protection
guarantees as found in the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 353, 601 A.2d 102, 107
(1992); Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704, 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981). Article
24 and the Fourteenth Amendment are, however, independent authorities and "a discrimi-
natory classification may be an unconstitutional breach of the equal protection doctrine
under the authority of Article 24 alone." Waidron, 289 Md. at 715, 426 A.2d at 947; see also
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 640, 458 A.2d 758, 781 (1983).
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tion doctrine, the Vezi court applied a rational basis test4 to invalidate
an economic regulation even though no fundamental rights were im-
pinged.5 This case represents a reinvigoration of the court's rational
basis review of economic legislation. By making a searching inquiry
into whether the government's classification of in- and out-of-county
towers was rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective,
the Verzi court demonstrated that it would not shelter economic regu-
lations behind an essentially insurmountable presumption of
constitutionality.
1. The Case.-In February 1987, Douglas Verzi applied to the
Baltimore County Department of Permits and Licenses for a towing
license for his business "located in Harford County, about two and
one-half miles from the Baltimore County line."6 When his applica-
tion was denied,7 Verzi appealed to the Baltimore County Board of
Appeals.8 The Board also denied Verzi's application and held that
Section 24-230 of the Baltimore County Code, which governs the pro-
cedures for dispatching towing operators, prohibits the issuance of
licenses to out-of-county towers.9 The Board relied on the ordi-
nance's instruction that "'the police department shall call the licensed
towing operator located in the county .. . .10 Although it denied
Verzi's application, the Board admitted that "there was an established
need for another tower in the section of Baltimore County that Verzi
wished to serve . . . 1
Verzi subsequently appealed the Board's decision to the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County. 12 The court reversed the Board's deci-
sion and held that eligibility for a license was governed by Section 24-
229 of the Baltimore County Code, which looks to need, not location,
for granting licenses." Section 24-230, the court ruled, did not gov-
• 4. The rational basis test requires that a legislative classification be rationally related
to a legitimate governmental interest and that statutes have a presumption of constitution-
ality. Murphy, 325 Md. at 355-56, 601 A.2d at 108.
5. Verzi, 333 Md. at 418, 635 A-2d at 970. Courts have construed fundamental rights as
those guaranteed by the federal constitution such as First Amendment rights, the right to
vote, the right of interstate travel and the right to procreate. Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 641, 458
A.2d at 781.
6. Verzi, 333 Md. at 414, 635 A-2d at 968.
7. Id. at 414-15, 635 A-2d at 968.
8. Id. at 415, 635 A.2d at 968.
9. Id.
10. Id. (quoting BALTIMORE COUNT, MD., CODE § 24-230 (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
11. Id.
12. Id., 635 A.2d at 969.
13. Id. Section 24-229 provides:
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ern the issuance of licenses.14 Pursuant to the court's order, the
county granted Verzi a towing license.1 5 After the license was granted,
the Baltimore County Police Department nevertheless refused to as-
sign him a towing area.' 6 Verzi again filed suit in the circuit court,
this time to seek both a declaratory judgment that the location re-
quirement in Section 24-230 was unconstitutional and a writ of man-
damus to order the county to assign him an area.1 7 The court,
however, granted the county summary judgment and declared Section
24-230 constitutional.18 Verzi appealed to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, but prior to that court's review the Court of Appeals issued a
writ of certiorari on its own motion."9
2. Legal Background. -When reviewing economic legislation
under the equal protection doctrine, courts generally apply a rational
basis test.2" Under this test, a classification will be upheld "'unless the
varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [the
court] can only conclude that the [governmental] actions were irra-
tional."'2 1 A statute is given a "strong presumption of constitutional-
ity" and will be upheld unless the legislative classification is clearly
arbitrary.22
(a) New license towers shall be approved by the department of permits and
licenses based upon the need for additional service. If the need does not exist,
the application will not be approved. The transfer of an existing license shall be
treated in the same manner as a new license, and any such transfer shall be sub-
ject to all provisions applicable thereto.
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MD., CODE § 24-229 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
14. Verzi, 333 Md. at 415, 635 A.2d at 969; see supra note 2.




19. Id. at 415-16, 635 A.2d at 969.
20. To review a legislative classification under the equal protection doctrine, courts
first determine what level of scrutiny the classification requires. "Where ... a statutory
classification burdens a 'suspect class' or impinges on a 'fundamental' right, the classifica-
tion is subject to strict scrutiny. Such statutes will be upheld... only if it is... 'tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.'" Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 356, 601 A.2d 102,
109 (1992). Classifications based on gender, or on the denial of the right to earn a living
in the field for which one is qualified and licensed, for example, while not found to re-
quire strict scrutiny by the courts, require a more searching review than the rational basis
test. Id. at 357, 601 A.2d at 109. This level of review is known as "intermediate scrutiny."
Id. at 358, 601 A.2d at 109. Economic and social legislation that does not trigger strict or
intermediate scrutiny will be reviewed under the rational basis test. Id. at 355, 601 A.2d
108.
21. Id. at 355, 601 A.2d at 108 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 471 (1991)).
22. Id. at 356, 601 A.2d at 108.
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Traditionally, the Court of Appeals has followed the direction of
the United States Supreme Court and has allowed economic legisla-
tion to pass the rational basis test if" 'any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify"' the legislative classification.23 Recently, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals in Kirsch v. Prince George's Count)?4 refused
to accept the county government's hypothetical justifications for a
classification. 5 Notwithstanding the traditional deference given to
legislative classifications, the Kirsch court held that a zoning classifica-
tion based on a tenant's off-premises occupation failed rational basis
scrutiny.26
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Verzi, the Court of Appeals applied
a more searching review under the rational basis test to Baltimore
County's distinction between in- and out-of-county towers by first de-
termining whether the purposes for the classification were legitimate
governmental objectives.27 The county stated that its objectives for
the towing ordinance were "to protect the public from fraud, decep-
tion and abuses and to decrease traffic congestion and delays in the
23. Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 707, 426 A.2d 929, 942 (1981) (quoting
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)); see also Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v.
State, 286 Md. 611, 409 A.2d 250 (1979), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 801 (1980). The Court
of Appeals has not always applied the "any conceivable basis" test. See, e.g., Bruce v. Direc-
tor, Dep't of Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971) (striking down
territorial requirements for commercial crabbing and oystering as violating the equal pro-
tection guarantees of both the state and federal constitutions). Since its ruling in Supermar-
kets General, the court has not invalidated any economic regulations through its application
of the rational basis test.
Federal courts have refused to subject economic legislation to meaningful rational
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the
Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See,
e.g., Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 555 (1947) (upholding state
law requiring completion of apprenticeship term against equal protection challenge in the
face of the allegation that the "pilots, having unfettered discretion under the law in the
selection of apprentices, had selected with occasional exception, only [their] relatives and
friends"). For a brief period, beginning with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432 (1985), the federal courts used the rational basis test to strike down arbitrary and
irrational economic regulations. See, e.g., Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352, 353 (D.D.C.
1989) (striking down a District of Columbia regulation prohibiting operators of bootblack
stands from obtaining vending permits for a public place as a violation of the federal con-
stitution's equal protection guarantee). This more searching version of review, though,
was banished from the federal courts by FCC v. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. 2096
(1993). But cf Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 607-08 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (hold-
ing that city's anti-jitney ordinance "based on pure favoritism" violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
24. 331 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 600 (1993).
25. Id. at 106, 626 A.2d at 380.
26. Id.
27. Ve4z, 333 Md. at 425, 635 A.2d at 974.
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roadways."' 8 The court found these reasons to be legitimate govern-
mental objectives.29 The court next examined whether the in- and
out-of-county distinction was rationally related to those objectives."
The county argued that "the County Council could have reasoned
that... [the location requirement] was rationally related to time and
distance factors" affecting the speed in which disabled cars would be
cleared from the roads.3 The court, however, found this justification
"spurious" 2 and noted "[i] t is established ... that Verzi... is closer to
much of the area he intends to serve than are existing in-county tow-
ers.""3 The court further reasoned that "it is not difficult to envision
... other situations in which an out-of-county tower will be substan-
tially closer.., to an accident scene than are in-county towers."'
Although the county further argued that the in- and out-of-
county classification of towers was necessary to administer its regula-
tory scheme, the court saw "little merit" in this claim.35 The court
found that the county's powers were broad enough to revoke towing
licenses and to investigate and initiate criminal proceedings beyond
the county's borders.3 6 The court noted additional difficulties with
the classification because the county had already allowed out-of-
county towers to work in the county when a motorist requested a par-
ticular tower. Moreover, the county allowed the police to summon
out-of-county towers when a vehicle was disabled, not because of an
accident, but because of a mechanical breakdown.37
The court determined that the ordinance prevented nonresi-
dents from conducting "a specific business activity" within the
county' and found no rational basis for the distinction between in-
and out-of-county towers.3 9 Consequently, the court arrived at the
"'more reasonable and probable view that [the classification] was in-






32. Id. at 426, 635 A.2d at 974.
33. Id. at 425, 635 A.2d at 974.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 426, 635 A.2d at 974.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 427, 635 A.2d at 974.
39. Id. at 426-27, 635 A.2d at 974.
40. Id. at 427, 635 A.2d at 974 (quoting Havre de Grace v.Johnson, 143 Md. 601, 608,




a. The Transformation of Maryland's Rational Basis Test.-Verzi
marks a trend by the Court of Appeals to transform the equal protec-
tion doctrine's rational basis test into a more searching review of the
constitutionality of economic legislation.4" In the past, the rational
basis test essentially was no test at all because of the strong presump-
tion of constitutionality it afforded statutes.4 2 With the Kirsch deci-
sion,4 however, the court appeared to have abandoned the principal
barrier to equal protection review of economic legislation, namely,
the requirement that statutory discrimination not be set aside if "'any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.'" 44 By refusing
to "ride the vast range of conceivable purposes,"45 the Vezi court sig-
naled both the General Assembly and local governments that eco-
nomic legislation will be subject to meaningful equal protection
review.
For many years, Maryland courts maintained the almost insur-
mountable rule that any conceivable set of facts would sustain a classi-
fication and assumed the existence of those facts at the time of the
law's enactment.' Courts took this rule to its logical extreme and
allowed this deferential review to operate "'quite apart from whether
the conceivable "state of facts" (1) actually exists, (2) would convinc-
ingly justify the classification if it did exist, or (3) has ever been urged
in the classification's defense by those who either promulgated it or
have argued in its support.'"4 7 The test has been "more often than
not interpreted to mean any conceivable basis rather than any con-
ceivable rational basis."48 This development has prompted some ob-
servers to conclude that a statute subjected to the rational basis test
"receives 'minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."' 49
41. This more searching standard of review has been called rational basis with a "bite."
See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) ("Putting consistent new bite into the
old equal protection would mean that the Court would be less willing to supply justifying
rationales by exercising its imagination.").
42. Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 708, 426 A.2d 929, 942-43 (1981).
43. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
44. Waldron, 289 Md. at 707, 426 A.2d at 942 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961)).
45. Id. at 722, 426 A.2d at 950.
46. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368, 601 A.2d 102, 114 (1992).
47. Waldron, 289 Md. at 707, 426 A.2d at 942 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 16-3 (1978)).
48. Hargrove v. Board of Trustees, 310 Md. 406, 434, 529 A.2d 1372, 1386 (1987) (Mc-
Auliffe, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988).
49. Waldron, 289 Md. at 708, 426 A.2d at 942-43 (quoting Gunther, supra note 41, at 8).
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In light of these difficulties, the court, in Kirsch v. Prince George's
County, refused to accept hypothetical justifications in its application
of the rational basis test."° At issue in Kirsch was whether a Prince
George's County ordinance51 that placed greater zoning require-
ments on property rented to college students violated the equal pro-
tection of the laws. 2 The court held that basing zoning requirements
"solely on the occupation which the tenant pursues away from the res-
idence" is an arbitrary classification forbidden by Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.53
The crucial question for the court was "whether the county by
adopting the ordinance's classification advances its objective of clear-
ing residential neighborhoods of noise, litter, and parking conges-
tion."54 The court concluded it did not55 and noted that occupancy
by students and non-students alike "would equally add motor vehicles
to a congested parking situation and pose the threat of increased
noise and litter."56 Yet, premises rented to students incurred the extra
cost of compliance with more burdensome zoning requirements.57 In
his Kirsch dissent, Judge Chasanow noted that "the court seems to be
either subtly altering the rational basis test, or paying lipservice to that
test by refusing to apply it in the instant case." s5 The Vezi holding,
however, solidifies the court's shift toward a generally more searching
application of the test.
b. The Rational Basis Test and the Supreme Court. -Both Kirsch
and Verzi relied on a series of United States Supreme Court decisions
in the mid-1980s that applied the rational basis test to economic legis-
lation and found the legislation lacking.59 The most significant of
50. 331 Md. 89, 106, 626 A.2d 372, 380, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 600 (1993).
51. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNT, MD., ZONING ORDINANCE No. CB-152-1989.
52. Kirsch, 331 Md. at 91, 626 A.2d at 373.
53. Id. at 106, 626 A.2d at 380.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 107, 626 A.2d at 381.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 108, 626 A.2d at 381 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). Judge Chasanow believed
that the zoning ordinance should be held constitutional because rational hypothetical jus-
tifications could be made for it. Id. at 110, 626 A.2d at 382.
59. Kirsch, 331 Md. at 98-104, 626 A.2d at 376-79; Verz4 333 Md. at 418-19, 635 A.2d at
970-71; see City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating a city
ordinance requiring homes for the mentally retarded to obtain special permits); Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985) (invalidating state tax exemption for Viet-
nam War veterans residing in the state before a certain date); Williams v. Vermont, 472
U.S. 14 (1985) (invalidating vehicle registration tax exemption for cars that were
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these cases is City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,60 in which the
Court wrote that "[t]he state may not rely on a classification whose
relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the dis-
tinction arbitrary or irrational."6" More recently, however, the
Supreme Court has reasserted the "any conceivable basis" test. In FCC
v. Beach Communications,62 the Court examined whether a law exempt-
ing certain cable television facilities from local franchise requirements
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found the statute
constitutional and stated that legislative classifications will be upheld
"if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification." 63 The legislature's choice in
making a classification "is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or em-
pirical data."'
Under the "any conceivable basis" standard presented in Beach
Communications, the Verzi court would have found Baltimore County's
location requirement for towing operators to be constitutional. Yet,
the court stated that it was "particularly distrustful" of geographical
classifications, 6 5 and, after examining the established facts, believed
that the classification "was intended to confer the monopoly of a prof-
itable business upon residents" of the county.' But under a Beach
Communications test, the Court of Appeals could not have disputed the
county's justification that its territorial classification was rationally re-
lated to the objective of quickly clearing the roadways of disabled vehi-
cles. The county council's assumption that in-county towers would be
able to respond more quickly to accidents "may be erroneous, but the
purchased and sales tax paid in the state); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869
(1985) (invalidating gross premiums tax favoring domestic insurance companies over out-
of-state firms); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (invalidating dividend distribution
scheme based on length of state residency).
60. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). The Cebrume Court considered whether a city ordinance re-
quiring permits for group homes for the mentally retarded violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 448.
61. Id. at 446-47 (citations omitted).
62. 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993). The statute in question distinguished between cable facili-
ties that served commonly owned or managed buildings not using public rights of way and
those serving separately owned or managed buildings. The former were exempt from
franchise rules while the latter were not. Id. at 2101.
63. Id. at 2101-03.
64. Id. at 2102. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens criticized this standard of review
and stated that such a test is "tantamount to no review at all." Id. at 2106 n.3 (Stevens, J,
concurring).
65. Verzi, 333 Md. at 423, 635 A.2d at 973.
66. Id. at 427, 635 A.2d at 974.
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very fact that [it is] 'arguable' is sufficient, on rational-basis review,"67
to find the ordinance constitutional.
c. Assessing Greater Scrutiny.--Critics of a more searching re-
view under the rational basis test for economic legislation argue that
such scrutiny permits judges the opportunity to pass judgment on the
wisdom of economic legislation. They believe that a more searching
review would allow judges to "'substitute their social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass
laws.'" '68 Judges, it is argued, should practice self-restraint and allow
the democratic process to correct unwise legislation.69 Critics believe
that a more searching review lacks clear principles and provides courts
with no guidance in their application of the rational basis test.
70
Another difficulty that critics have with this more searching ra-
tional basis test is a court's determination of the legislature's reasons
for a particular classification. In Beach Communications, Justice
Thomas declared that because the Court "never require[s] a legisla-
ture to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrele-
vant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the
challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature."71 If the leg-
islature's actual purpose must be examined, courts are faced with the
often impossible difficulty of identifying a purpose or resolving the
problem of multiple or contradictory legislative purposes.7 2 In his
Cleburne dissent, Justice Marshall went even further and argued that
economic legislation is not covered by the guarantee of equal
protection.73
[G] overnment is free to move in any direction, or to change
directions, in the economic and commercial sphere. The
structure of economic and commercial life is a matter of
political compromise, not constitutional principle, and no
norm of equality requires that there be as many opticians as
optometrists, or new businesses as old.7 4
67. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. at 2104 (citations omitted).
68. Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 113, 626 A.2d 372, 384 (1993)
(Chasanow, J., dissenting) (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)).
69. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. at 2101.
70. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 360 n.8, 601 A.2d 102, 111 n.8 (1992); see also
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall,J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. at 2102.
72. Gunther, supra note 41, at 46-47.
73. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 470-71 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
74. Id. (citations omitted).
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Equal protection, however, has long been recognized as a neces-
sary limitation on legislative power.75 As a fundamental guarantee of
liberty, equal protection "is essentially a direction that all persons simi-
larly situated should be treated alike." 76
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not
forget today, that there is no more effective practical guar-
anty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to
require that the principles of law which officials would im-
pose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Con-
versely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so
effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a
few to whom they apply legislation and thus to escape the
political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger
numbers were affected.77
To allow virtually all economic legislation to pass equal protection re-
view, the courts would abdicate their duty to protect citizens from ar-
bitrary government action. Vezi's location requirement for towers,78
Kirsch's zoning classification based on a resident's occupation,7 9 and
Cleburne's special permit requirements for group homes for the men-
tally retarded8" all exemplify discriminatory legislative classifications
that would go unchallenged under the "any conceivable basis" test.
While these classifications do not involve "fundamental" or political
rights, they do subject citizens to arbitrary and irrational government
action. Given the scope and importance of economic legislation in
citizens' lives, the distinction between economic and fundamental
rights deserves critical reexamination. 81
75. The philosopherJohn Locke noted that legislative power must "govern by promul-
gated establish 'd Laws, not to be varied in particular Cases, but to have one Rule for Rich and
Poor, for the Favourite at Court, and the Country Man at Plough." 2JOHN LocKE, An Essay
Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil-Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOV-
ERNMENT § 142 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (3d ed. 1698).
76. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439.
77. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
78. Veri, 333 Md. at 413, 635 A.2d at 967-68.
79. Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 91, 626 A.2d 372, 373 (1993).
80. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
81. In his opinion in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972),Justice Stew-
art stated:
The dichotomy between personal and property rights is a false one. Property
does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without
unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in
truth a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a
home, or a savings account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists be-
tween the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither
could have meaning without the other.
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The meaningful application of equal protection to all laws, in-
cluding economic legislation, however, does not license courts to sub-
stitute their views for that of the legislature. A broader equal
protection review focuses, rather, on the means by which legislation
seeks to achieve its ends. This is a narrow inquiry. The Kirsch court,
for example, did not find a constitutional infirmity in the county's
objective of clearing residential neighborhoods of noise, litter, and
parking congestion. 2 The zoning ordinance violated equal protec-
tion because its classification of residents by occupation bore no ra-
tional relationship to its objective of maintaining peaceful
neighborhoods.83 A more searching review "permit[s] the state to
achieve a wide range of objectives. The yardstick for the acceptability
of the means [is] the purposes chosen by the legislatures . . .8"
Since the federal courts have refused to guarantee equal protec-
tion in the economic sphere, state courts must step in to fill this
void.85 "[S] tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citi-
zens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitu-
tions ...are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of federal law."86 State courts, moreover, have a duty to follow
the provisions of their own constitutions. The Supreme Court of Min-
nesota has stated:
Id. at 552.
82. Kirsch, 331 Md. at 105, 626 A.2d at 380.
83. Id. at 107-08, 626 A.2d at 381.
84. Gunther, supra note 41, at 21.
85. Many states have used equal protection provisions in their state constitutions to
apply a more searching scrutiny of economic legislation first abandoned by the Supreme
Court in Carotene Products Co., and again in Beach Communications. See Isakson v. Rickey, 550
P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976) (striking down a program to limit entry into the ranks of
commercial fishermen and noting that the court "will no longer hypothesize facts which
would sustain otherwise questionable legislation as was the case under the traditional [fed-
eral] rational basis standard"); Hasegawa v. Maui Pineapple Co., 475 P.2d 679 (Haw. 1970)
(holding a statute which required large employers, but not small employers, to pay workers
for jury duty violated the equal protection clauses of both the Hawaii and federal constitu-
tions); Murphy v. Commissioner, 612 N.E.2d 1149, 1150 (Mass. 1993) (holding filing fee
requirement in workers compensation appeals for those using counsel violates state and
federal equal protection guarantees); State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991)
(invalidating a piece of non-economic legislation, for a lack of "a reasonable connection
between the actual, and not just the theoretical, effect of the challenged classification and
the statutory goals"); Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 489 A.2d 600, 604 (N.H. 1985) (hold-
ing a town's zoning ordinance governing the location of mobile homes violated property
owner's equal protection rights). See generally James C. Kirby, Jr., ExpansiveJudicial Review of
Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions: The Case for Realism, 48 TENN. L. REv. 241, 261-
68 (1981).
86. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. Ra,. 489, 491 (1977).
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To harness interpretation of our state constitutional guaran-
tees of equal protection to federal standards and shift the
meaning of Minnesota's constitution every time federal case
law changes would undermine the integrity and indepen-
dence of our state constitution and degrade the special role
of this court, as the highest court of a sovereign state, to re-
spond to the needs of Minnesota citizens.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has observed that "'state courts
may be in a better position to review local economic legislation than
the Supreme Court. State courts, since their precedents are not of
national authority, may better adapt their decisions to local economic
conditions and needs."'88
Critics further argue that the current three-tier approach of re-
viewing classifications challenged under the equal protection doc-
trine-according to strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and the
rational basis test-is overly rigid 9 and does not adequately explain
how courts make their decisions.9" Justice Marshall argued that the
entire system should be abandoned and replaced with an approach
that varies its scrutiny depending upon "'the constitutional and socie-
tal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized
invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn."' 91 Justice Stevens has argued that one true rational basis test
should be applied for all classifications reviewed under the equal pro-
tection doctrine: whether an "impartial lawmaker could logically be-
lieve that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose
that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged
class."92 Both Marshall and Stevens correctly point to the need for an
all-encompassing equal protection standard of review to replace the
rigidity of the current system. Until the Court of Appeals chooses to
reject this system, however, the court's more searching rational basis
test for economic legislation remains the best hope for the promise of
equal protection under the law.
87. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
88. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 490 (Pa. 1971) (quot-
ingJohn A.C. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53
Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 260 (1958)).
89. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring).
90. See Hargrove v. Board of Trustees, 310 Md. 406, 429-30, 529 A.2d 1372, 1383 (1985)
(McAuliffe, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 (1988).
91. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973)).
92. Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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5. Conclusion.-The Verzi court followed Kirsch and refused to
apply the rule that economic legislation will not be struck down if
there is any conceivable basis for the legislative classification. By its
decision, the court overcame a previously formidable barrier to equal
protection review. In finding no rational basis for Baltimore County's
distinction between in- and out-of-county towers, the Court of Appeals
solidified its application of a more searching standard of review and
signaled an important trend toward greater scrutiny of economic leg-
islation. The Verzi decision places both state and local governments
on notice that commercial legislation is no longer immune from
equal protection review.
MARK G. PARENTI
C. Assessing the Constitutional Implications of the
Maryland Hate Crimes Statute
In Ayers v. State,' the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a convic-
tion under the Maryland hate crimes statute,2 which prohibits bias-
motivated crimes, but left open the question of whether the statute
violates the First Amendment's3 protection of free speech by proscrib-
1. 335 Md. 602, 645 A.2d 22 (1994).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 470A (1992 & Supp. 1994) states in relevant part that:
(b) Prohibited Acts.-A person may not:
(3) Harass or commit a crime upon a person or damage the real or personal
property of:
(i) A person because of that person's race, color, religious beliefs, or
national origin; ....
(c) Penaties.-A person who violates the provisions of this section is subject to the
following penalties:
(1) If the violation involves a separate crime that is a felony, the person is
guilty of a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for not more
than 10 years, or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both.
(2) If the violation involves a separate crime that is a felony and results in
death to a victim, the person is guilty of a felony and upon conviction is subject to
imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $20,000, or
both.
(3) In all other cases, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon convic-
tion is subject to imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or a fine of not more
than $5,000, or both.
(d) Penalties additional.-Prosecution of a person under this section does not pre-
clude prosecution and imposition of penalties for any other crime in addition to
any penalties imposed under this section.
Id. § 470A(b) (3), (c) (1)-(3), (d).
3. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ing bias-motivated harassment.4 The court declined to rule on
whether the term "harass" in the statute is overbroad5 and vague,6 or a
content-based regulation of speech,7 because the appellant was not
charged with "harassing" his victims, and therefore lacked standing'
to raise these issues.9 The court raised the possibility, however, that
the harassment prong of the statute may not survive future constitu-
tional challenges.1 ° The court also ruled that evidence of a prior ra-
cial incident in which the appellant was involved was admissible to
establish motive for committing a racially motivated crime, as re-
quired by the bias-motivated crime portion of the statute."'
While the court was correct in holding that the appellant lacked
standing to challenge the harassment prong of the statute, this por-
tion of the statute nevertheless suffers from significant constitutional
infirmities and will likely face a successful challenge in the future.
Although the use of evidence of biased speech to convict a person of a
crime under the statute is valid, there still remain constitutional diffi-
culties for the criminalization of speech based on its content.' 2
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. It has been
held to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
4. Ayers, 335 Md. at 625, 645 A.2d at 33.
5. An overbroad statute infringes on both protected and unprotected speech. See in-
fta text accompanying notes 79-81.
6. A vague statute is unclear as to what conduct is prohibited and thus fails to give
adequate notice to citizens and law enforcement officials, as required by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See infta text accompanying notes 74-78.
7. A regulation of speech must be "content neutral," or "'justied without reference to
the content of the regulated speech.'" Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2358
(1992), the Supreme Court held that content-based regulations of speech in a hate crimes
statute violate the First Amendment. See infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
8. To have standing, a litigant must have suffered some actual or threatened injury.
This requirement is mandated by Article III of the Constitution, which gives the federal
judiciary power over "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see, e.g.,
Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); see also infra notes 82-85
and accompanying text.
9. Ayers, 335 Md. at 625, 645 A.2d at 33.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 635, 645 A.2d at 38.
12. This Note will not discuss two other challenges Ayers made to his conviction: (1)
that his conviction under the hate crimes statute violates a longstanding rule that a person
may not be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, because the
only evidence of Ayers's racial motivation came from his accomplice Riley, Ayers, 335 Md. at
621, 645 A.2d at 31; and (2) that the court's sentence was so oppressive as to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. Id. The Court of Appeals ruled against Ayers on both of
these issues, stating that (1) "corroboration is necessary only when criminal agency has not
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1. The Case.-After consuming approximately three six-packs of
beer at his home in Silver Spring, Maryland, John Randolph Ayers,
age twenty-two, and his friend, Sean Riley, age twenty, set out at 2:00
a.m. on March 3, 1992, to "look for black people to beat up."1" They
were angered by a racial incident in which they had been involved at a
nearby 7-Eleven store several nights earlier.14 According to the evi-
dence, on February 29, while Ayers was waiting in line behind a group
of African-American teenagers to purchase a case of beer, he bumped
into one of them, then threw down the beer and left the store.' 5
Although Ayers and Riley drove off, gesturing with their fists, they re-
turned within a few minutes. 16 Ayers confronted one of the teenagers,
who was knocked down, and shouted racial epithets including "nig-
ger" and "black motherfucker." 17 Ayers also chased an African-Ameri-
can female teenager, calling her a "black bitch," a "nigger," and a
"black motherfucker."
1 8
As the State's witness, Riley testified that their anger at this inci-
dent motivated them on March 3 to go out "nigger hunting."19 Riley
testified that after he and Ayers discussed the incident, Ayers initiated
the idea of "burning somebody or something," and then took char-
coal lighter fluid from the shelf in his garage.2 0
After observing two African-American women walking on Georgia
Avenue, Ayers and Riley stopped the car they were driving and began
walking behind the women. 1 When the women started to run, Ayers
and Riley chased them.22 The women split up, and Riley chased one,
Myrtle Guillory, while Ayers chased the other, Johnnie Mae McCrae. 23
Guillory testified that while running she looked back, saw Ayers
grab McCrae, and heard McCrae scream.24 She also testified that
Riley yelled repeatedly to her, "I'm going to kill you, you black
bitch."2 5 Guillory reached a friend's home and screamed for help.26
been established," id. at 638, 645 A.2d at 40; and (2) the sentence fell within the "consider-
able discretion" of the sentencing judge, id. at 641, 645 A.2d at 41.
13. Id. at 609-10, 645 A.2d at 25.
14. Id. at 612, 645 A.2d at 26.
15. Id. at 609, 645 A.2d at 25.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 609-10, 645 A.2d at 25.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 611-12, 645 A.2d at 26.
20. Id. at 612, 645 A.2d at 27.
21. Id. at 610, 645 A.2d at 25.
22. Id.
23. Id., 645 A.2d at 25-26.




When her friend opened the door, Riley fled. 7 Guillory's friend
called 911. An officer arrived promptly and took Guillory in his car to
search for McCrae.28 During their search, Guillory and the officer ob-
served Riley walking across Georgia Avenue, and the officer appre-
hended him. 9 When the officer frisked Riley, he found a container
of charcoal lighter fluid inside Riley's jacket.30
Meanwhile, Ayers had caught McCrae by the back of her coat col-
lar and dragged her into the woods off Georgia Avenue. 1 McCrae
testified that Ayers began "banging her head" and told her he was
going to kill her. 2 She could not remember anything after that until
police led her to an ambulance.33 The police had found McCrae
when she ran out of the woods crying for help.34 She was hysterical,
naked from the waist up, and bleeding from the head.35 Her pants
were wet, and she smelled of lighter fluid.3 6
Riley testified that after he fled from Guillory and her friend, he
heard a scream and entered the woods.37 He saw McCrae lying mo-
tionless on her stomach on the ground, 8 and Ayers was kneeling with
McCrae's head between his knees, hitting her in the back of the head
with his fist.39 Riley testified that Ayers stood up and sprayed McCrae
with the lighter fluid from her waist to her feet.' Riley said that Ayers
told him to "light her, light her," but Riley took the lighter fluid away
from Ayers and put it in his pocket, saying "you're crazy."41
The police found Ayers at his home at 3:20 a.m., with blood on
his clothing and body.42 When he was taken into custody, Ayers
signed a statement admitting that it was his idea to attack the women,
and that he had dragged McCrae into the woods and sprayed her legs







32. Id. at 611, 645 A.2d at 26.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 610, 645 A.2d at 26.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 610-11, 645 A.2d at 26.
37. Id. at 612, 645 A_2d at 27.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 612-13, 645 A.2d at 27.
41. Id. at 613, 645 A.2d at 27.
42. Id. at 611, 645 A.2d at 26.
43. Id.
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Ayers later recanted his statement to the police, and claimed that
he had only told the police what they wanted to hear.44 He denied
striking McCrae and ever having the lighter fluid.45 He further de-
nied that there was any racial motivation for the attack and stated that
he was not a "racial person."46 At trial, Ayers claimed that he and
Riley had gone to the woods to drink; he had brought lighter fluid to
build a campfire.47 They chased the two people, without knowing
their race or gender, according to Ayers, because he thought they had
thrown something at the car.' Ayers claimed that he chased McCrae
into the woods, but "blacked out" after that.4
9
During the State's case, the defense objected repeatedly to the
introduction of evidence concerning the 7-Eleven incident, on the
grounds that it was improper "other crimes" evidence and highly prej-
udicial."0 The trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible to
show motive, which is an element of the offense of a racially motivated
crime." Defense counsel requested and received two cautionary in-
structions to the jury to limit the use of the evidence.52
The jury found Ayers guilty of assault, assault with intent to maim,
kidnapping, conspiracy to commit a racially motivated crime, and
commission of a racially motivated crime in violation of Section
470A(b) (3) (i) of the Maryland statute.55 The court sentenced him to
a total of sixty years imprisonment.5 4 Ayers appealed, and the Court
of Appeals granted certiorari prior to review by the intermediate ap-
pellate court to consider Ayers's constitutional challenge to the Mary-
land hate crimes statute.55
2. Legal Background.-During the 1980s, a number of states en-







50. Id. at 613-16, 645 A.2d at 27-29.
51. Id. at 617, 645 A.2d at 29. Motive is an element of the crime because the statute
makes it an offense to "[h]arass or commit a crime upon a person . . . because of that
person's race, color, religious beliefs, or national origin." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 470A(b) (3) (i) (1992 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
52. Ayers, 335 Md. at 616-18, 645 A.2d at 29. The trial court, in an admittedly confusing
instruction, cautioned jurors that the evidence was not to be used to infer defendant's
involvement in other crimes, but to establish the words that he uttered. Id.
53. Id. at 618, 645 A.2d at 30.
54. Id. at 618-19, 645 A.2d at 30.
55. Id. at 619, 645 A.2d at 30.
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League of B'nai B'rith's model statute for criminalizing "ethnic intimi-
dation."56 Maryland passed its hate crimes statute in 1988. 57 Propo-
nents of ethnic intimidation laws justify them because of the special
harm victims of bias-motivated crimes suffer beyond mere physical in-
jury.58 Critics of such statutes claim that they impermissibly regulate
the content of speech, regardless of whether the statutes are directed
at speech or conduct, because they attempt to punish the thoughts of
the defendant.59
a. Speech Issues.-The Supreme Court recently clarified this
issue when it held that a content-based regulation of speech in a bias-
motivated crime statute violated the First Amendment.6" In R.A. V.v.
City of St. Paul, the Court struck down as facially invalid a city ordi-
nance prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly conduct.61 Adopting the
Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the statute that it reached
only "fighting words,"6 2 the Court held that the ordinance prohibited
otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of content.63
In RA. V, the petitioner had allegedly burned a cross on an Afri-
can-American family's lawn and was charged under St. Paul's Bias-Mo-
tivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibited the display of a symbol
that one knows or has reason to know "arouses anger, alarm, or re-
sentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gen-
der."64 The Court declared that the First Amendment prohibits the
56. Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your
Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 38 UCLA L. RE%,. 333,
335 (1991); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. CL 2194, 2198 n.4 (1993) (listing states
that have enacted penalty enhancement statutes for bias-motivated crimes).
57. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 470A (1992 & Supp. 1994).
58. See Gellman, supra note 56, at 340.
59. See generally Gellman, supra note 56.
60. RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
61. Id. at 2542-47. Relying on the Court's reasoning in R.A.V., the Maryland Court of
Appeals struck down a Maryland cross-burning statute as an impermissible content-based
regulation of speech. State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 64, 629 A.2d 753, 763 (1993).
62. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542. Fighting words are not protected by the First Amend-
ment because of their "particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expres-
sing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey." Id. at 2549. However, "[t] he government
may not regulate use based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message
expressed." Id. at 2545. But see id. at 2553 (White,J., concurring) (criticizing the majority's
"underbreadth" doctrine and the notion that "lawmakers may not regulate some fighting
words more strictly than others because of their content"). The Court has defined a lim-
ited number of categories of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment. In
addition to fighting words, these categories include obscenity and libel. Id. at 2542-43.
63. Id. at 2547. Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Stevens concurred in the
judgment, but on the grounds that the statute was fatally overbroad for criminalizing ex-
pression both protected and unprotected under the First Amendment. Id. at 2550-71.
64. Id. at 2541 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
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government from proscribing speech because of "disapproval of the
ideas expressed"65 and noted that "[c]ontent-based regulations on
speech are presumptively invalid."66 To overcome that presumption,
the Court stated, the "'danger of censorship"' in content-based stat-
utes requires that there be a compelling state interest and that no
other means be available to achieve the desired end.67 Because the
city could have passed an ordinance prohibiting all "fighting words,"68
instead of only those involving disfavored subjects, the content-based
regulation was not reasonably necessary to achieve its compelling in-
terest in protecting members of groups that historically have been the
targets of discrimination.69
While the KA.V Court made it clear that content-based regula-
tions of speech are invalid, it recently upheld a content-based regula-
tion of criminal conduct. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell,70 a unanimous
Court upheld a statute that enhances the penalty whenever the de-
fendant "'[ilntentionally selects the person against whom the crime
... is committed because of [his] race, religion, color, disability, sex-
ual orientation, national origin, or ancestry . ... ,,,71 The Court ruled
that the statute does not impermissibly criminalize bigoted thought,
but only conduct that is motivated by racial animus and thus unpro-
tected by the First Amendment.72 The Court declared that "a physical
assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct pro-
tected by the First Amendment. " 73
b. Vagueness and Overreadth.-The due process principles of
the Fourteenth Amendment require that one's life, liberty, or prop-
erty not be jeopardized by an unclear statute. 74 To pass constitutional
muster, a statute must be "sufficiently explicit" to give citizens fair no-
65. Id. at 2542.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2549-50, (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991) and Burson
v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1852 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
68. See id. at 2545, 2548-49.
69. Id. at 2549-50. Justice Scalia explained, "Thus, the government may proscribe libel;
but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of
the government." Id. at 2543.
70. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
71. Id. at 2196 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1) (b) (1989-1990)). Wisconsin's statute
is similar to the Maryland hate crimes statute in its prohibition of bias-motivated criminal
conduct, with which Ayers was charged. Ayers did not challenge the constitutionality of
this part of the statute. Ayers, 335 Md. at 620, 645 A.2d at 30.
72. Mitchek 113 S. Ct. at 2200-01.
73. Id. at 2199.
74. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). "All are entitled to be informed
as to what the State commands or forbids." Id.
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tice that certain conduct is proscribed, 75 and it must provide "legally
fixed standards and adequate guidelines" to assist the police, judicial
officers, and triers of fact in the application of the law.76 A statute will
be found "void for vagueness" if it fails to meet these criteria.77 These
concerns are amplified when a vague statute involves speech. A vague
statute could have a chilling effect on speech protected by the First
Amendment. Rather than risk prosecution or civil penalties, citizens
may curb their protected speech.78
An overbroad statute sweeps within its scope both protected and
unprotected speech.79 A statute must be narrowly drawn and limited
to define and punish specific conduct that is within the state's power
to proscribe."0 "Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with nar-
row specificity. " "
c. Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality of a Statute.-An
exception to the standing rule8 2 allows a defendant to challenge a por-
tion of a statute under which he was convicted for being overbroad
and vague when it could infringe on the First Amendment rights of
others.8 3 A defendant may challenge a statute even if it is constitu-
tional as applied to him, but could possibly encompass unconstitu-
tional applications.8 4 Although a defendant may challenge possible
unconstitutional applications of the portion of the statute under
75. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
76. Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 121, 389 A.2d 341, 345 (1978).
77. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see also NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963) (stating vague statute may lead to selective application of the law
to unpopular causes).
78. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
79. Id. at 114-15; see also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519, 527 (1972) (finding
unconstitutional a statute prohibiting "abusive" or "opprobrious" language tending to
cause a breach of the peace); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 433 (stating that an overbroad
statute threatens, "in the area of First Amendment freedoms... sweeping and improper
application"); Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 864 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (not-
ing a law will be deemed overbroad "if it sweeps within its ambit a substantial amount of
protected speech . . ").
80. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
81. Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
82. See supra note 8.
83. Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 122-23, 389 A.2d 341, 346 (1978); see also City Council
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984) (noting that for a statute to be chal-
lenged on overbreadth grounds, a "realistic danger" to the First Amendment rights of par-
ties not before the court must exist).
84. Bowers, 283 Md. at 122-23, 389 A.2d at 346.
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which he was convicted, he may not challenge a portion of the statute
under which he was never charged or convicted.85
The Court has allowed defendants to challenge a conviction
under a statute that includes both constitutional and unconstitutional
provisions when it is unclear on which provision the conviction rests.
For example, in Stromberg v. California,6 the Court struck down a stat-
ute that prohibited the display of a flag or other symbol in public for
one of three enumerated reasons, one of which was an unconstitu-
tional regulation of speech.8 7 The conviction in Stromberg rested on a
general verdict, making it impossible to say under which clause of the
statute the defendant had been convicted. 8 Because the statute was
so broad as to prohibit political speech and because it was impossible
to determine whether the defendant had been convicted under the
unconstitutional prong of the statute, the Court reversed the
conviction. 9
Similarly, in Street v. New York,9" the Court reversed a conviction
under a statute making it a misdemeanor to publicly mutilate or cast
contempt upon a United States flag "either by words or act."9" The
Court reasoned that the general verdict against the defendant would
permit a conviction for uttering contemptuous words about the flag,
in violation of the right to free speech.92 The Court observed that
there is no similar hazard when the indictment is in several counts
and the conviction explicitly rests on a certain count.
93
d. Evidence of "Other Crimes. "-Courts generally prohibit the
introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts to prove
the defendant guilty of the offense for which he is on trial.94 This rule
protects the defendant from punishment for a history of criminal dis-
position 95 and helps prevent undue juror prejudice against the de-
fendant.96 The courts recognize exceptions to this rule if the
85. Colton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 112 n.3 (1972). See generally Anthony G. Amster-
dam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 97 (1960).
86. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
87. Id. at 369-70.
88. Id. at 367-68.
89. Id. at 369-70.
90. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
91. Id. at 578.
92. Id. at 588.
93. Id.
94. See Terry v. State, 332 Md. 329, 334, 631 A.2d 424, 426 (1993); State v. Faulkner,
314 Md. 630, 633, 552 A.2d 896, 897 (1989); Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329, 333, 465 A.2d
1166, 1168 (1983); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976).
95. Straughn, 297 Md. at 333, 465 A.2d at 1168.
96. Terry, 332 Md. at 334, 631 A.2d at 426.
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
evidence of prior crimes or bad acts "is substantially relevant to some
contested issue in the case and if it is not offered to prove the defend-
ant's guilt based on a propensity to commit crime or his character as a
criminal."97 Such evidence is admissible if it tends to establish motive,
intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme or plan, or identity.98
To admit such evidence, the court will (1) determine if it "fits within
one of [the above] exceptions," (2) decide whether the defendant's
"involvement in the other crimes is established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence," and (3) weigh the necessity and probative value of the
evidence against "'any undue prejudice from its admission."'99 Such
evidence is also admissible if the offenses "are so connected or
blended in point of time or circumstances" that one offense cannot be
fully shown or explained without proving the others.'00
3. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. Speech Issues.-The Ayers court held that, although the
"harassment" prong of Section 470A may raise constitutional con-
cerns, Ayers lacked standing to challenge the statute because he was
not charged with the crime of harassment."0 ' Ayers's indictment and
verdict sheet charged him only with committing racially motivated
crimes, and the casual use of the term "harass" by the court and the
prosecutor in describing the statute at trial was not enough to lead the
jury to convict him of mere harassment.' 02 In addition, there was no
evidence that Ayers had engaged in any expressive conduct beyond
the underlying crimes he had committed.' 03
97. Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d at 897; see Terry, 332 Md. at 334-36, 631 A-2d at
426-27 (holding evidence of prior conviction for cocaine possession was inadmissible be-
cause it was not substantially relevant to a contested issue, but offered only to prove crimi-
nal character); Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 501, 597 A.2d 956, 962 (1991) (holding
evidence of prior convictions for heroin distribution was inadmissible in trial for distribu-
tion of cocaine because it was offered only to show disposition of defendant); Ross, 276 Md.
at 671-72, 350 A.2d at 685 (holding evidence of defendant's prior drug dealing was inad-
missible because it was not substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show
criminal character); see also MD. R. 5-404(a) (1994).
98. Ross, 276 Md. at 669-70, 350 A.2d at 684; see also MD. R. 5-404(b) (1994).
99. Teny, 332 Md. at 335, 631 A.2d at 427 (quoting Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634-35, 552
A.2d at 898).
100. Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 712, 415 A.2d 830, 839 (1980); see also Bryant v.
State, 207 Md. 565, 586, 115 A.2d 502, 511 (1955) (allowing evidence of prior crimes that
were not exactly concurrent with, but had an obvious connection to, the offense for which
the defendant was on trial).
101. Ayers, 335 Md. at 625, 645 A.2d at 33.
102. Id. at 628, 645 A.2d at 34-35. In addition, the court pointed out that Ayers did not
object to the use of the term "harass" during trial, and therefore did not preserve the issue
for appellate review. Id. at 627, 645 A.2d at 34.
103. Id. at 628, 645 A.2d at 35.
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The court rejected Ayers's argument that he could challenge the
harassment prong of the statute for being vague and overbroad under
the special rule of standing for First Amendment cases.10 4 The court
pointed to precedent holding that a defendant may not facially chal-
lenge portions of a statute under which he was not convicted.' 0 5 The
court distinguished its holding from those in Stromberg v. California°6
and Street v. New York,107 which Ayers cited to support his argument
that a conviction must be reversed if it could have been based on an
unconstitutional ground. Unlike the defendants in Stromberg and
Street, Ayers did not question the constitutionality of the statute as it
applied to him.10 8 Because Ayers's indictment contained no count
based on the harassment portion of the statute, 09 and because he did
not challenge the constitutionality of the portion of the statute that
was applied to him, he lacked standing to challenge the statute. °
b. Evidence of "Other Crimes. "--The court found that evi-
dence of the prior racial altercation at the 7-Eleven store was not prej-
udicial or irrelevant, and that Ayers was not denied a fair trial by its
admission.1 1' Because "other crimes" evidence is admissible if it tends
to establish a contested issue such as motive,1 12 the court reasoned
that evidence that the prior incident motivated Ayers's and Riley's at-
tacks on the women was admissible.'
The court also rejected Ayers's claim that the statute unconstitu-
tionally permitted the admission of prior racist statements made dur-
ing the incident at the 7-Eleven store and forced him to prove that he
was not a racist.' 4 Concluding that the evidence of the incident was
not generalized in nature, but rather that there was a "tight nexus"
between this incident and the later offense, the court held it proper to
admit the evidence to prove motive.' 1 5
104. Id. at 629, 645 A.2d at 35; see supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
105. Ayers, 335 Md. at 625-26, 645 A.2d at 33 (citing Colton v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104,
112 n.3. (1972)).
106. 283 U.S. 359 (1931); see supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
107. 394 U.S. 576 (1969); see supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
108. Ayers, 335 Md. at 625, 645 A.2d at 33.
109. Id. at 627, 645 A.2d at 34.
110. Id. at 629, 645 A.2d at 35.
111. Id. at 636, 645 A.2d at 38.
112. Id. at 631, 645 A.2d at 36.
113. Id. at 633, 645 A.2d at 37.
114. Id. at 636-37, 645 A.2d at 38-39.
115. Id. at 637, 645 A.2d at 39. The "nexus" in this case arises from the proximity of the
two events in time and the apparent causal connection between the two as indicated by
Riley's testimony. Id. at 631, 634, 645 A.2d at 36, 37.
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The dissent, written by Judge Bell and joined by Judges Chasanow
and Raker, did not address Ayers's challenge to the constitutionality
of the statute on its face. Instead, the dissenters argued that the testi-
mony about the prior racial incident was inadmissible because it was
insufficient to prove motive, and because its probative value was out-
weighed by the prejudice that it would engender in the jury." 6 The
dissent agreed with Ayers that the evidence was introduced to prove
his racial bigotry, and therefore directly punish thought in violation of
the First Amendment.' 1 7
4. Analysis.-Although it sustained a conviction under the Mary-
land hate crimes statute, the Ayers decision opens the door to future
challenges to the statute for violation of the First Amendment's pro-
tection of free speech. The court observed that
Section 470A(b) (3) (i)'s prohibition against harassing some-
one based on race, color, national origin or religious beliefs,
if construed to include merely speech that annoys or offends,
would appear to target squarely certain speech based upon
the destructive nature of its message .... [W]hile the term
'harass' in the context of § 470A(b) (3) may raise constitu-
tional concerns, we need not here address the statute's con-
stitutionality on that premise.118
Because of Ayers's standing deficiencies, the court did not ad-
dress the most important constitutional issues raised by Maryland's
hate crimes statute. If Ayers had had standing to challenge the
criminalization of bias-motivated "harassment," there is reason to be-
lieve that the court would have found it an unconstitutional infringe-
ment of speech under RA.V v. City of St. Paul"9 and State v.
Sheldon.120
a. Standing.-The court correctly found that Ayers lacked
the requisite standing to challenge the harassment portion of Mary-
land's hate crimes statute. Because Ayers was charged with and con-
victed of committing a bias-motivated crime, and not harassment, the
typical standing exception for First Amendment issues did not apply
to him. 1
2 1
116. Id. at 656, 645 A.2d at 49 (Bell, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 646-48, 645 A.2d at 43-44.
118. Id. at 625, 645 A.2d at 33.
119. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); see supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
120. 332 Md. 45, 629 A.2d 753 (1993).
121. Ayers, 355 Md. at 625, 645 A.2d at 33; see supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
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To allow Ayers to challenge the statute's harassment prong, de-
spite the fact that he was not charged with this crime, would open the
door for courts to venture beyond the "cases and controversies"
before them and to make policy in a vacuum, unconstrained by the
facts of the case.12 2 For the court to hear such a challenge, it would
have to alter radically its traditional standing requirements, a step that
it is unlikely to take in the near future.
b. Content-Based Limitations on Speech.-Despite his standing
deficiencies, Ayers raised valid arguments that challenge the harass-
ment portion of the statute as a content-based limitation on free
speech. The term "harass" contemplates speech by its definition be-
cause it includes "words, gestures and actions which tend to annoy,
alarm and abuse (verbally) another person."12 ' To prohibit only
harassing speech that involves race, color, religious beliefs, or national
origin is an impermissible content-based limitation on speech under
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul124
The harassment portion of Maryland's hate crimes statute suffers
from the same constitutional infirmities that plagued the St. Paul ordi-
nance struck down in KA.V. That ordinance compares closely with
the harassment prong of Maryland's statute in that it prohibited
"fighting words"125 that one knows or has reason to know "'arouse[ ]
anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion, or gender."'1 26 One could easily substitute the term
"harassment" for "fighting words" and achieve substantially the same
meaning.
In order to sustain such a content-based regulation of speech, the
Court in RA. V. required a compelling state interest and the unavaila-
bility of other means to achieve the desired end.12 7 Presumably, Mary-
land's state interest, like that cited by the City of St. Paul in RA. V,1 28
is to protect minorities and other groups that historically have been
targets of discrimination. However, as the Court pointed out in
RA. V, there are other ways to protect such groups. For example, the
state could have passed a statute prohibiting all "fighting words," as
122. See supra note 8.
123. BLACK'S LAw DicriONARY 717 (6th ed. 1990). Other definitions of harass include to
vex, trouble, annoy, plague, bedevil, or worry. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC
TIONARY 1031 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986).
124. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); see supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
126. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
127. Id. at 2549-50.
128. Id. at 2549.
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the Court suggested in RA. V.129 The existence of other, content-neu-
tral means to achieve the state's end "'undercut[s] significantly' any
defense of such a statute."1
30
c. Vagueness and Overbreadth.-The harassment portion of
Maryland's hate crimes statute may not survive future scrutiny for
vagueness and overbreadth given that it could infringe on permissible
speech. The term "harass" in the Maryland statute is not sufficiently
clear as to what conduct or speech is prohibited. Given the many defi-
nitions of "harass,"1 31 including "to lay waste [to] ... an enemy's coun-
try" and "to tire OUt,"1 32 the fair notice requirement may not be met.
The harassment portion of the statute may be overbroad as well
because its scope may encompass both protected and unprotected
speech. With no guidelines as to what speech is prohibited, however,
it is impossible to tell whether the statute covers protected speech.
The statute is not drawn narrowly, as courts require for regulations of
speech. 133
d. Evidence of. "Other Crimes. "--The court correctly con-
cluded that evidence of the prior racial incident at the 7-Eleven store
was admissible to prove Ayers's racial motivation in committing the
crimes against his victim. While evidence of other crimes or prior bad
acts is not admissible to prove a defendant's criminal disposition, it is
admissible if it has special relevance to prove an essential element of
the crime 134 -here, that the defendant committed the crime against
his victim because of her race. The nexus between the two events was
sufficient to ensure that the evidence was not overly generalized in
nature. 135
In reaching its holding, the court applied the three-part test ar-
ticulated in State v. Faulkner36 to determine if such evidence meets the
exception to the rule against evidence of other crimes.1 37 First, mo-
129. Id. at 2550. "An ordinance not limited to the favored topics, for example, would
have precisely the same beneficial effect." Id.
130. Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 458 U.S. 312, 329 (1988)).
131. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
132. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1031 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1986).
133. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
135. See supra text accompanying note 115.
136. 314 Md. 630, 634-35, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989); see supra note 99 and accompanying
text.
137. Ayers, 335 Md. at 632-36, 645 A.2d at 36-38.
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tive, which is an essential element of the crime, 13 8 is a recognized ex-
ception to the general rule against other crimes evidence.13 9 Second,
the court concluded that the evidence of the prior criminal acts was
established by clear and convincing evidence by the testimony of two
witnesses."' Even Ayers admitted on cross-examination that the inci-
dent at the 7-Eleven store was racial in nature, and that he chased the
teenagers because he was upset at their racial slurs.1 41
Third, the court concluded that the probative value of the evi-
dence demonstrated Ayers's racial motives and outweighed its possi-
ble prejudicial effect on the jury. 42 Given that the 7-Eleven store
incident occurred only a few days before the attacks in question, the
probative value of the evidence was substantial because of the close
nexus between the two events. 143 In addition, the evidence of the
prior incident was necessary for the state to prove that Ayers had a
racial motivation for the crime as required by Section 470A of the
statute. 4 Finally, the court pointed to the "strong presumption" that
judges properly perform their duties in weighing these factors. 45
The dissent asserted that the majority had inappropriately en-
dorsed proof of racial bigotry in order to prove motive as required by
the statute. 46 According to the dissent, the state offered the evidence
of the prior incident simply to prove Ayers's bigotry. 147 The focus of
the evidence was on what he said, not what he did, 4 ' and therefore
had a chilling effect on speech. 49 The dissent, however, failed to ad-
dress adequately the testimony about Ayers's use of racial epithets
138. Id. at 633, 645 A.2d at 37. Under Article 27, § 470A(b) (3) (i) of the Maryland
Code, the defendant must have committed the crime "because of" the person's race or
other prohibited category.
139. Id. at 631, 645 A.2d at 36.
140. Id. at 634, 645 A.2d at 37. Clear and convincing evidence renders the proposition
at issue "much more likely so than not." JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HAND-
BOOK § 406, at 173 (2d ed. 1993). The evidence "need not be established with absolute
certainty and that it is to some degree conflicting does not preclude the trial judge from
being satisfied that it is nonetheless clear and convincing." Id. at 174 (citing Committee on
Civil Pattern Jury Instruction of the Maryland State Bar Association, Inc., MJPI 1:8(b) (2d
ed. 1984)).
141. Ayers, 335 Md. at 613-15, 645 A.2d at 27-28.
142. Id. at 635-36, 645 A.2d at 38. Mere prejudice is not enough to disallow such evi-
dence if its probative value is greater. Id. at 635, 645 A.2d at 38.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 635-36, 645 A.2d at 38 (citing Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 273, 619 A.2d 105,
110 (1993).
146. Id. at 643 n.1, 645 A.2d at 42 n.1 (Bell, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 651-52, 645 A.2d at 46-47.
149. Id. at 648, 645 A.2d at 44.
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which showed that the prior event was racially charged and corrobo-
rated Riley's testimony that the prior event had angered Ayers and
motivated him to seek retribution against African-American victims. 15 0
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the First Amendment
does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the ele-
ments of a crime. 15' Ayers was convicted not because he is a bigot, but
because he selected his victim on the basis of race in violation of the
hate crimes statute. Evidence of his racist speech was used in Ayers
only to prove that he had the racial animus and the motive to commit
the crime.
If Ayers had been charged solely with harassment based on his
use of racial epithets, it would have run counter to the First Amend-
ment's protection of speech. In the case, however, he was charged
with bias-motivated criminal conduct. Criminal conduct is not
speech, and the use of speech in evidence to prove the motive for a
crime does not tread impermissibly on the First Amendment.1 52
5. Conclusion.-In Ayers v. State, the Court of Appeals upheld a
conviction under Maryland's hate crimes statute, but avoided a full
constitutional inquiry into the "harassment" component of the statute.
In light of the Supreme Court's ruling against content-based limita-
tions on speech in R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, '53 there remain significant
questions about the continued viability of the harassment portion of
the statute. While the Court of Appeals made clear that the use of
speech as evidence to prove motive for a hate crime is valid, the
criminalization of speech based on its content is not.
MEREDITH B. PARENTI
D. Dual Sovereignty: Trumping the Full Faith and Credit Clause
In Gillis v. State,' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution ' did not bar
150. Id. at 636-37, 656, 645 A.2d at 39, 48. The evidence differed from that in Eier v.
State, cited by the dissent, where a prior racial slur that had no relation to any material
issue in the case was held inadmissible because it was prejudicial, irrelevant, and collateral.
See 63 Md. App. 439, 492 A.2d 1320 (1985).
151. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993).
152. Id. at 2200 (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1094 (1992)).
153. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
1. 333 Md. 69, 633 A.2d 888 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1558 (1994).
2. Article IV of the Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The United
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the State of Maryland from prosecuting an individual for murder,
even though he previously had been acquitted of the same charge in
Delaware.' To reach its holding, the court analyzed both the limited
application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in criminal prosecu-
tions and the dual sovereignty exception to the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.4 The court affirmed the state's inter-
est in protecting the public through the enforcement of its own laws,
even in situations where an offender previously has been prosecuted
for the same acts in another state.
1. The Case.-In April 1990, Ronald Gillis was tried and acquit-
ted for the murder of Byron Parker in the Superior Court of Kent
County, Delaware.' In November 1990, Parker's body was discovered
in Kent County, Maryland,6 less than one mile from the Delaware bor-
der.7 Subsequently, in July 1992, Gillis was indicted in Maryland for
the first degree murder of Parker.' Gillis filed a motion to dismiss the
Maryland charge and argued that because the Full Faith and Credit
Clause required Maryland to recognize the Delaware acquittal, the
Maryland murder prosecution violated the United States Constitu-
tion.' The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss and Gillis immedi-
ately appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.' °  Prior to
consideration by that court, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
determine whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause barred the Mary-
land prosecution.11
States Code provides: "Such Acts, records andjudicial proceedings... shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Posses-
sions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
3. Gillis, 333 Md. at 78, 633 A.2d at 892.
4. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part: "[N]or shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.




9. Id. at 71-72, 633 A.2d at 889.
10. Id. at 72, 633 A.2d at 889.
11. Id. Ordinarily, such an appeal will lie only from a final judgment. See Harris v.
Harris, 310 Md. 310, 314-15, 529 A.2d 356, 358 (1987). Thus, it would seem that Gillis's
appeal was not properly before the Court of Appeals. Some orders, however, are immedi-
ately appealable, even though they are not considered final judgments. See Huff v. State,
325 Md. 55, 61, 599 A.2d 428, 431 (1991). The order must "[1] conclusively determine the
disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue, [3] be completely separate from the
merits of the action, and [4] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."
Id. In Gillis, the court determined that the order met the Huff criteria and entitled Gillis to




a. Double Jeopardy and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.-The
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant
in a criminal prosecution from being "twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb ... ."2 The clause provides three related protections for a crimi-
nal defendant: "The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a sec-
ond prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple pun-
ishments for the same offense.""3 The historical purposes for these
protections.were summarized in Green v. United States. 14
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system ofjurisprudence, is that the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an al-
leged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, ex-
pense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possi-
bility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.'5
Despite these protections, a significant exception exists whereby a
defendant can be subject to successive prosecutions for the same acts
by different sovereigns-the dual sovereignty doctrine.16 This doc-
trine is "founded on the common law conception of a crime as an
offense against the sovereignty of the government."1 7 In United States
v. Lanza, 8 the Supreme Court considered a case in which both fed-
eral and state authorities prosecuted defendants for the same con-
duct.19 The defendants in Lanza were charged in federal court with
the violation of a prohibition statute enacted after the adoption of the
Eighteenth Amendment.2" The federal district court dismissed the
charges because the Superior Court of Whatcom County, Washington,
had rendered a judgment against the defendants based upon the
same acts for the violation of another statute in effect before the adop-
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. Department of Revenue v. Ranch, 114 S. CL 1937, 1941 n.1 (1994).
14. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
15. Id. at 187-88.
16. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985).
17. Id.
18. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
19. SeeJAC. Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 1309,
1311 (1932). Prior to Lanza, the Court had only dealt with situations where the federal
government and a state could prosecute for the same acts, but did not. See, e.g., Moore v.
Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852); United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560,
569 (1850).
20. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 378-79.
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tion of the Eighteenth Amendment. 1 The United States appealed,
and the defendants asserted that punishment for the same conduct by
both the federal and state governments would violate the Fifth
Amendment.22 The Court held that conviction and punishment in
the state court under state law was not a bar to a second prosecution
for the same act in a federal court under federal law.23 Chief Justice
Taft wrote that the Eighteenth Amendment provided for concurrent
power to the states and to the federal government because "[e]ach
government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace
and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other."24
The Chief Justice stated that the Fifth Amendment applied exclusively
to the federal government and prohibited "a second prosecution
under authority of the Federal Government after a first trial for the
same offense under the same authority."2 In Lanza, the same act was
a violation of both state and federal law.26 Because the defendants
committed two different offenses by the same acts, double jeopardy
was not implicated if they were punished for both offenses.2 7
Thirty-seven years later, the Supreme Court applied the dual sov-
ereignty doctrine in Bartkus v. Illinois.2" In Bartkus, the defendant was
tried and acquitted for robbery in federal court, then he was tried in
an Illinois state court on "substantially identical" facts, for the viola-
tion of a state robbery statute. 9 Despite his plea that the second pros-
ecution should have been barred, Bartkus was convicted in the state
court and sentenced to life imprisonment.3 0 justice Frankfurter
noted that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was
not binding on the states.31 Frankfurter explained that a long history
of decisions, in both federal and state courts, permitted successive fed-
eral and state prosecutions and provided "irrefutable evidence" that
the dual sovereignty doctrine did not violate due process.32 To bar a
state prosecution after a federal prosecution "would be a shocking
and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the
21. Id. at 379.
22. Id. at 378-79.
23. Id. at 385.
24. Id. at 381-82.
25. Id. at 382.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
29. Id. at 122.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 127.
32. Id. at 136.
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States to maintain peace and order within their confines.""3 In a vig-
orous dissent, Justice Black maintained that to allow dual prosecutions
was a "dangerous practice,"3 4 and was "contrary to the spirit of our
free country." 5 Justice Brennan also dissented, and argued that the
state prosecution came about only because dissatisfied federal authori-
ties wanted a second chance to convict Bartkus."6 In Brennan's view,
because a second federal prosecution was barred by the Fifth Amend-
ment, the authorities had solicited the state to initiate a state prosecu-
tion. 7 The second prosecution was, in effect, a repeated attempt by
the federal authorities to convict Bartkus, and, as such, was prohibited
by the Fifth Amendment.38
In Abbate v. United States, 9 the defendants pleaded guilty in Illi-
nois state court to charges of conspiring to injure or destroy property
and were sentenced to three months in jail.' The defendants then
were indicted in federal court in Mississippi for violating a federal
conspiracy statute based upon the same acts.41 The Supreme Court
concluded that the federal prosecution was not barred by the prior
Illinois conviction.42 The Court relied on the dual sovereignty princi-
ple articulated in Lanza43 to hold that if a state prosecution for the
violation of its criminal laws precluded a federal prosecution based on
the same acts, "federal law enforcement must necessarily be
hindered."'
In Benton v. Maryland,45 the Court determined that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to the states.4 6
Since Benton, however, the Court has continued to adhere to the dual
sovereignty doctrine and has extended the doctrine to additional situ-
ations. In Heath v. Alabama,4 7 the Court considered successive prose-
33. Id. at 137.
34. Id. at 163 (Black, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 150.
36. Id. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 169.
39. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
40. Id. at 188. The defendants were part of a conspiracy to blow up facilities of the
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennes-
see. Id. at 187.
41. Id. at 188-89 & n.2.
42. Id. at 196.
43. Id. at 193-95.
44. Id. at 195.
45. 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
46. Id. at 794.
47. 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
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cutions for the same act brought by different states.48 In Heath, the
defendant left his Alabama home, drove to Georgia, and returned to
Alabama with two men he had hired to kill his wife.49 The two men
kidnapped Heath's wife from her home, and she was later found shot
to death in the Heath car on a roadside in Georgia. 0 The Georgia
and Alabama authorities cooperated to some extent with their respec-
tive investigations.51 In September 1981, Heath was arrested by the
Georgia authorities and gave a full confession admitting to his role in
the kidnapping and murder.5" In February 1982, Heath pleaded
guilty to malice murder in Georgia in exchange for life imprisonment,
thereby avoiding the death penalty.55
In May 1982, an Alabama grand jury indicted Heath for capital
murder.54 Heath claimed that the Alabama prosecution was barred
under the Alabama and United States Constitutions by his conviction
and sentence in Georgia for the same conduct.5 Heath, nevertheless,
was convicted of murder during a kidnapping and sentenced to
death.56 On review, the Supreme Court noted that successive prose-
cutions were barred by the Fifth Amendment only if the offenses to be
prosecuted were the "same" under double jeopardy. 7 The Court ex-
plained that had Heath been prosecuted separately within one state
for the offenses of "murder during a kidnapping" and "malice mur-
der," the second charge would have been barred by the Fifth Amend-
ment.5" But the Court held that successive prosecutions by two states
for the same conduct were not barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.59 The Court noted that "[t]he States are no less sovereign
with respect to each other than they are with respect to the Federal
Government"6' and asserted that a "[ s]tate's interest in vindicating its
sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws by definition can
never be satisfied by another State's enforcement of its own laws." 6 A
state, therefore, must be entitled to decide whether a prosecution by
48. Id. at 83.





54. Id. at 84-85.
55. Id. at 85.
56. Id. at 85-86.
57. Id. at 87.
58. Id. at 87-88.
59. Id. at 88.
60. Id. at 89.
61. Id. at 93.
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another state "satisfied its legitimate sovereign interest."62 According
to the Court, "to deny a state the power to enforce its criminal laws
because another state has won the race to the courthouse 'would be a
shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obliga-
tion of the States to maintain peace and order within their con-
fines.""'6 The Court concluded that it has "always understood the
words of the Double Jeopardy Clause to reflect [the] fundamental
principle" that a single act is an offense against each sovereign whose
laws are violated by the act.6 4
b. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine in Mayland.-In Evans v.
State,6" the Court of Appeals indicated that Maryland common law em-
braced the dual sovereignty doctrine.66 A federal court convicted the
defendants in Evans of civil rights violations and witness tampering.67
Indictments were filed by the State of Maryland for murder, conspir-
acy, and handgun violations for the same acts.68 The defendants
moved to dismiss the state indictments on double jeopardy grounds.69
The Court of Appeals ruled that the two prosecutions were by differ-
ent sovereigns and, therefore, did not constitute double jeopardy.70
Although the Maryland common law originally may have prohibited
successive prosecutions by different jurisdictions, 71 the court deter-
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959)).
64. Id. at 93. The dual sovereignty doctrine has been strongly criticized. See, e.g., Ron-
aldJ. Allen &John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine and Rational-
ity in the Supreme Court, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 801, 828 (1985) (arguing that the
dual sovereignty doctrine should apply only in extraordinary cases); Marc Martin, Heath v.
Alabama: Contravention of Double Jeopardy and Full Faith and Credit Principles, 17 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 721, 757 (1986) (stating that the dual sovereignty doctrine is inconsistent with estab-
lished double jeopardy principles).
The federal government has instituted the Petite policy, which prohibits the federal
prosecution of an individual already prosecuted by a state court for the same acts, unless "a
compelling federal interest would be served by the second prosecution." Allen & Ramas-
wamy, supra, at 813 & n.78. The Petite policy was named for Petite v. United States, 361 U.S.
529 (1960), in which the Supreme Court, in the interests ofjustice, vacated a federal con-
viction following a state conviction for the same acts. Id. at 531.
65. 301 Md. 45, 481 A.2d. 1135 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034 (1985).
66. Id. at 58, 481 A.2d at 1141.
67. Id. at 48-49, 481 A_2d at 1136-37.
68. Id. at 49, 481 A.2d at 1136.
69. Id., 481 A.2d at 1137.
70. Id. at 51, 481 A.2d at 1138; see also Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 660, 496 A.2d 665,
670 (1985) ("Offenses against separate sovereigns are separate offenses for double-jeop-
ardy purposes even if the successive prosecutions are based upon the same acts.").
71. The Evans court cited two cases, King v. Roche, 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (1775), and King
v. Hutchinson, 84 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1685), for the proposition that successive prosecutions
by different sovereigns for the same offense were prohibited under the common law of
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mined that "the common law is not static and may be changed by
decisions of the Court."72 The court explained that in light of the
history of the dual sovereignty doctrine in the Supreme Court, and
recent articulations of the doctrine by lower federal courts, the Mary-
land prosecution was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.7"
c. Full Faith and Credit in Criminal Prosecutions. -The Full
Faith and Credit Clause "require [s] a state court to recognize judg-
ments of courts of other states." 74 State courts are "generally required
to give judgments rendered in other states the same effect that they
have in the rendering state."7 5 The clause "serves to coordinate the
administration ofjustice among the several independent legal systems
which exist in our Federation."76 The concept of full faith and credit
is firmly rooted in the area of civil litigation 7 but it is generally ac-
cepted that one state will not enforce the criminal or penal laws of
another.78
In 1825, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in The Antelope79 that " [t]he
Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another."8" This brief
statement was one of the earliest in the United States to mention this
proposition, but the Chief Justice did not elaborate on the issue.8' In
Huntington v. Attrill,s2 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the
ambiguity in Marshall's famous formulation." In Huntington, the
plaintiff, who was a creditor of the defendant's insolvent New York
corporation, brought an action against the defendant in Maryland
based on a judgment the plaintiff had recovered in New York. 4 The
England. The court then examined these cases in light of a provision in the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, which states that "'the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the
Common Law of England.'" Evans, 301 Md. at 55-57, 481 A.2d at 1140-41 (quoting MD.
CONST. DECL. OF RTrs. art. V).
72. Evans, 301 Md. at 57, 481 A.2d at 1141.
73. Id. at 55, 481 A.2d at 1140.
74. Weinberg v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 299 Md. 225, 234, 473 A.2d 22, 27 (1984);
see also supra note 2.
75. Weinberg, 299 Md. at 234, 473 A.2d at 27.
76. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2 (1945).
77. Allan D. Vestal, Criminal Prosecutions: Issue Preclusion and Full Faith and Credit, 28
KAN. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1979).
78. SeeJackson, supra note 76, at 9; Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and
Governmental Claims, 46 HARv. L. REv. 193, 196 (1932).
79. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
80. Id. at 123.
81. See Leflar, supra note 78, at 195.
82. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
83. See id. at 666.
84. Id. at 660.
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Maryland Court of Appeals dismissed the action based on the determi-
nation that the judgment was a penalty, and, therefore, it could not be
enforced in Maryland. 5
The Supreme Court reversed and explained that penal laws were
in the strictest sense "those imposing punishment for an offence com-
mitted against the state."6 According to the Court, the appropriate
test to determine if a judgment of one state is enforceable in another
is "whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public,
or a wrong to the individual.""7 The Court concluded that the statute
under which the New York judgment was obtained provided for a civil
remedy against a private individual and thus was not penal in its strict-
est sense.88 The Maryland courts were required to give full faith and
credit to the New York judgment8 9 Had the particular judgment
been based on a "criminal" violation, however, the Court indicated
that Maryland would not have been required to enforce the New York
judgment.90
The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that a state is not re-
quired to enforce the penal judgment of a sister state in Nelson v.
George.9 While serving a sentence in California, the defendant in Nel-
son sought a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court in California
to challenge a detainer filed by the state of North Carolina based on a
conviction for which he was to serve a subsequent sentence.92 The
Court explained that "the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not re-
quire that sister States enforce a foreign penal judgment."9" There-
fore, the State of California had the discretion to decide whether it
would give effect to the North Carolina detainer.94
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the appli-
cability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to criminal judgments in
Turley v. Wyick.95 Turley and another defendant were acquitted of
bank robbery charges in federal court; thereafter, a prosecution was
85. Id. at 663.
86. Id. at 667.
87. Id. at 668.
88. Id. at 676-77.
89. Id. at 686.
90. See id. at 669.
91. 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970).
92. Id. at 226.
93. Id. at 229.
94. Id. The Court noted, however, that upon the completion of George's California
sentence, that the state would be required to extradite him to North Carolina under Arti-
cle IV, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution. Id. at 229 n.6.
95. 554 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978).
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brought against Turley in a Missouri state court.9 6 Turley filed a mo-
tion to dismiss, arguing that the state prosecution was barred by the
prior federal acquittal, but the trial court denied the motion, and
Turley was convicted.9 7 After Turley's conviction was affirmed on ap-
peal, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court, which denied the petition.98 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit ex-
plained that the federal judgment only determined that Turley did
not violate federal law, not whether he violated Missouri law.99 Ac-
cordingly, the doctrine of full faith and credit did not bar the state
prosecution. l0
d. Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Prosecutions.-The concept
of full faith and credit is closely related to the doctrine of issue preclu-
sion, or collateral estoppel. 10 1 The Supreme Court found a constitu-
tional basis for the doctrine of collateral estoppel in Ashe v. Swenson." 2
In Ashe, the Supreme Court held that in light of its recent decision in
Benton v. Maryland,0'0 collateral estoppel was "embodied in the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.""°4
According to the Court, under the collateral estoppel doctrine,
"when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid
and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the
same parties in any future lawsuit.""0 5 In civil litigation, the require-
ment of mutuality of parties has eroded somewhat.106 In criminal pro-
ceedings, however, mutuality is generally required.1 0 7 As a result, an
acquittal in one jurisdiction will not preclude a subsequent prosecu-
tion in a different jurisdiction, because the second prosecuting au-
thority "has never had [its] day in court on the issue." 10 8
96. Id. at 840-41.
97. Id. at 841.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 842.
100. Id.
101. Vestal, supra note 77, at 6 ("Issue preclusion ... is included in full faith and credit
102. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
103. 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (holding that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
104. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445.
105. Id. at 443.
106. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979) (holding that the
doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel could apply to plaintiffs who did not join an
earlier action but later brought suit on the same issue).
107. Vestal, supra note 77, at 22.
108. Id. at 23.
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Maryland law on collateral estoppel is consistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in Ashe v. Swenson. In Butler v. State," the
Court of Appeals explained that in order for collateral estoppel to
apply, "the critical consideration is whether an issue of ultimate fact
has been previously determined in favor of the defendant." ' Mutu-
ality of parties, moreover, is required for estoppel to apply in criminal
proceedings.I"
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari in Gillis to consider whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause pro-
hibited a murder prosecution in a Maryland court after an acquittal in
a Delaware court for the same alleged crime." 2 The court held that
successive criminal prosecutions by Delaware and Maryland did not
violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause,"' and the Maryland murder
prosecution could continue.1 1 4
The court first maintained that successive criminal prosecutions
by different states were permitted under the dual sovereignty doctrine
and stated that "separate sovereigns deriving their power from differ-
ent sources are each entitled to punish an individual for the same
conduct if that conduct violates each sovereignty's laws." 1 5 The court
explained that the dual sovereignty principle was well established in
constitutional jurisprudence as well as a part of Maryland common
law. 116
In light of this precedent, the court speculated that Gillis must
have "recognize[d] the futility of challenging the Maryland prosecu-
tion as a violation of common law or constitutional double jeop-
ardy,"1 7 and hoped instead "to use the Full Faith and Credit Clause as
a means to circumvent the previously foreclosed double jeopardy chal-
lenge."'118 The court frustrated this stratagem when it found that the
109. 355 Md. 238, 643 A.2d 389 (1994).
110. Id. at 253, 643 A.2d at 396.
111. See Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 660, 496 A.2d 665, 670 (1985) (holding that collat-
eral estoppel did not apply to a Maryland prosecution after a New Jersey prosecution be-
cause the party adverse to the defendant was different in each case); Carbaugh v. State, 294
Md. 323, 329-30, 449 A.2d 1153, 1156 (1982) (same).
112. Gillis, 333 Md. at 72, 633 A.2d at 889.
113. Id. at 76, 633 A.2d at 891.
114. Id. at 83, 633 A.2d at 895.
115. Id. at 73, 633 A.2d at 890.
116. Id. at 75, 633 A.2d at 891; see supra notes 47-64 and accompanying text.
117. Gillis, 333 Md. at 75, 633 A.2d at 891.
118. Id. at 76, 633 A.2d at 891.
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dual sovereignty doctrine applied to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.' 19
The court explained that although the Full Faith and Credit
Clause historically applied to civil disputes 2 ° and did not require
states "to enforce the penal judgments of other states," it was unclear
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied to criminal prosecu-
tions.1 " In this matter, the court found the Eighth Circuit Court's
opinion in Turley v. Wyrick persuasive.1 22 Because the Delaware prose-
cution did not give the State of Maryland the opportunity to deter-
mine whether Gillis violated Maryland law, the Delaware acquittal
could not affect Gillis's culpability under Maryland law. 123 The court
concluded that Maryland should not be denied the opportunity to
prove such a violation based upon "a misplaced application of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause."
124
To support its conclusion, the court also looked to the doctrine
of collateral estoppel to refute Gillis's assertion that the Delaware
judgment of acquittal precluded Maryland from relitigating the is-
sue.1 25 The court noted that "estoppel will not be invoked against an
individual or his privy who was never afforded the opportunity to be
heard on the particular issue ."126 Because Maryland was not a party to
the Delaware prosecution, Maryland could not "be estopped from at-
tempting to prove Gillis's culpability under its law." 127 The Gillis court
also refused to apply the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel,
reasoning that it was inappropriate in criminal proceedings because
of the state's strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws. 28
In a brief dissent, Judge Eldridge stated that the motion to dis-
miss the Maryland prosecution should have been granted." He as-
serted that the Maryland prosecution was barred by common law
double jeopardy principles as incorporated into Article V of the Mary-
119. Id.
120. Id., 633 A.2d at 892.
121. Id. at 77, 633 A.2d at 892.
122. Id. at 78, 633 A.2d at 893; see supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
123. Gillis, 333 Md. at 78-79, 633 A.2d at 892-93.
124. Id. at 79, 633 A.2d at 893.
125. Id. at 78-79, 633 A.2d at 892-93.
126. Id. at 78, 633 A.2d at 892.
127. Id. at 81, 633 A.2d at 894.
128. Id. at 81 n.5, 633 A.2d at 894 n.5. The court noted in dicta that, because Parker's
body was found in Maryland, it was questionable whether Delaware initially had subject
matter jurisdiction to prosecute Gillis, in which case 'the judgment of a particular state
need not be given full faith and credit if that state did not have jurisdiction to render such
judgment.' Id. at 82, 633 A.2d at 894-95.
129. Id. at 83, 633 A.2d at 895 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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land Declaration of Rights.13 0 As a result, Judge Eldridge did not
reach the full faith and credit issue. 13
4. Analysis.-
a. DoubleJeopardy.-In holding that Gillis could be tried for
murder in Maryland, despite his acquittal of the same charge in Dela-
ware, the Court of Appeals faced the difficult task of justifying a deci-
sion that is doctrinally correct, but appears to be a clear case of
double jeopardy.1 32 Yet, not only did the court permit a successive
prosecution for the same conduct, the issue of double jeopardy was
not formally before the court.1 33 The court could have decided Gillis
solely on the basis of full faith and credit, the grounds for which certi-
orari was granted, and the related doctrine of collateral estoppel.
1 34
But to do so would have left the public to ponder why double jeop-
ardy did not preclude the second prosecution.
To allay double jeopardy concerns, the court appealed to general
policy preferences for law and order. The court stressed "'the state's
obligation to maintain peace and order within [its] confines,' 135 as
well as the need to punish offenders who threaten Maryland's "peace
and dignity."1 3 6 To support its position, the court relied on the well-
accepted, though perhaps not widely known, dual sovereignty excep-
tion to the Double Jeopardy Clause to demonstrate strong public pol-
icy arguments in favor of the successive prosecutions. This put the
court in a position to state that its rationale was equally applicable to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.13
7
130. Id.
131. Id.; see supra note 71.
132. According to one commentator:
Even the man in the street knows what "double jeopardy" means. He is rightly
shocked when he hears that somebody has been tried twice for the same
thing.... All advanced systems of law agree with him in abhorring the second
prosecution of a man who has already been determined innocent.
Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CHI.
L. REv. 591, 592 (1961).
133. See Gillis, 333 Md. at 73, 633 A.2d at 890. Gillis challenged the Maryland prosecu-
tion solely on full faith and credit grounds. Id.; see supra notes 112-114 and accompanying
text.
134. Gillis, 333 Md. at 72, 633 A.2d at 889; see supra notes 10 1-111 and accompanying
text.
135. Gillis, 333 Md. at 73-74, 633 A.2d at 890 (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121,
137 (1959)).
136. Id. at 74, 633 A.2d at 890 (citations omitted).
137. See id. at 76, 633 A.2d at 891.
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b. Full Faith and Credit.-The convergence of the doctrine of
full faith and credit and the dual sovereignty exception provided the
foundation for the court's holding that the Delaware acquittal "has no
impact on Gillis's culpability under Maryland's murder statute."138
When Delaware prosecuted Gillis the first time, it was doing so based
on its own penal law. Because states may only enforce their own penal
laws, 139 the Delaware acquittal in no way implied that Maryland law
was not violated in this case.14 ° Maryland still retained the option to
determine whether to give full weight to the Delaware acquittal. 41 If,
for example, Maryland and Delaware had cooperated in the investiga-
tion from the beginning, and both authorities believed that the mur-
der occurred in Delaware, Maryland authorities could have decided
that its interest in the administration ofjustice was sufficiently served
by a Delaware judgment. In Gilis, however, Maryland's interests were
not considered by the Delaware prosecution. 4 ' There was, in fact, no
evidence that a crime may have occurred in Maryland until the discov-
ery of the body after the Delaware trial and acquittal.143
Because one of the purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
to "help weld the independent states,""4 the court's decision to allow
a second prosecution is correct. If Maryland were forbidden to prose-
cute a suspected murderer solely because the Delaware authorities
raced to the courthouse first, without a body, justice would be
thwarted, and tension might well arise between the two states, particu-
larly among residents living close to the border where the body was
found. It would set the two states at odds and leave Maryland resi-
dents feeling unprotected within their own borders while a suspected
murderer remained free in their midst. As a matter of public policy,
Maryland must have the power to allay such fears through active pros-
ecution of criminal acts within its jurisdiction. 4
A state expresses public policy through its penal laws."4 Mary-
land would make an alarming statement about its regard for the safety
of its citizens if it were unable to prosecute a murder suspect after
138. Id. at 78, 633 A.2d at 892.
139. Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970); see supra notes 91-94 and accompany-
ing text.
140. Gillis, 333 Md. at 78, 633 A.2d at 892.
141. See Nelson, 399 U.S. at 229; see also supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
142. GilliS, 333 Md. at 81 n.5, 633 A.2d at 894 n.5.
143. See id. at 71, 633 A.2d at 889. Gillis was acquitted of the Delaware offense in April
1990, but the victim's body was not found until November 1990. Id.
144. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951).
145. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.




finding a body within its borders. Failure to prosecute Gillis, more-
over, would generally unsettle Maryland's fundamental policy of pro-
tecting state interests, in both civil and criminal areas, if it
subordinated its sovereignty to a neighboring state.
The presumption that the murder took place in Maryland raises
an additional question with regard to Delaware's jurisdiction to de-
cide the case. As the Court of Appeals indicated in dicta, if Delaware
did not have jurisdiction to decide the case because the murder may
never have occurred in Delaware, Maryland would not be required to
give full faith and credit to the Delaware judgment in any case.14 7
Thus, it would be extraordinarily unfair for Maryland to be bound by
the first judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause without hav-
ing the opportunity to dispute the issue of Delaware's jurisdiction,
simply because Delaware reached the courthouse first.
c. Collateral Estoppel.-The Gillis court's decision is also sup-
ported by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel will
prevent relitigation of an issue only if it was conclusively determined
in a prior proceeding between the same parties.1 48
In Gillis, it was unclear what issues were resolved against Delaware
in the first trial. 149 According to the Court of Appeals, "[s]ince
Parker's body had not been found at the time of the Delaware prose-
cution, the jury may have acquitted Gillis because there was either in-
sufficient evidence of Gillis's criminal agency or insufficient evidence
that any crime occurred in Delaware."1 50 The preclusion of a subse-
quent murder prosecution in Maryland would be an absurd result if a
rational jury acquitted Gillis simply because there was insufficient evi-
dence that a crime occurred in Delaware. Maryland does not have any
interest in proving where the crime was not committed, but the state
has a compelling interest to prove whether that crime occurred within
its own borders.
Maryland requires mutuality of parties for the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel to apply in criminal prosecutions.1 5 ' For purposes of
collateral estoppel, however, the prosecuting authorities of the two
proceedings against Gillis obviously were different. Maryland's prose-
cuting authorities did not participate in the Delaware prosecution
147. Gilis, 333 Md. at 83, 633 A.2d at 895.
148. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
149. Gilis, 333 Md. at 82 n.5, 633 A.2d at 894 n.5.
150. Id., 633 A.2d at 894.
151. Id. at 81 n.5, 633 A.2d at 894 n.5; see Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 329-30, 449
A.2d 1153, 1156-57 (1982) (holding that collateral estoppel did not apply since the same
parties were not involved in both proceedings).
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and, therefore, were not heard on the issue of Gillis's guilt or inno-
cence at the Delaware trial. 52 Thus, Maryland has not yet been given
its day in court.1
53
d. Dual Sovereignty Doctrine.-The argument in favor of the
Maryland prosecution is further supported by the dual sovereignty
doctrine, which permits successive prosecutions by two states for the
same conduct despite the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 54 The doctrine is
founded on the principle that each state has an "interest in vindicat-
ing its sovereign authority through enforcement of its laws." '55 When
a murder ictim is found within Maryland's borders, the presumption
is raised that the killing took place there.156 Maryland must be able to
maintain peace and order within its boundaries-a task that cannot
be vindicated by a Delaware murder prosecution, whether it results in
a conviction or an acquittal. Because the actual killing was presumed
to have occurred in Maryland, it would be a "shocking and untoward
deprivation"157 of the State of Maryland's rights if it were denied the
power to prosecute the alleged criminal simply because Delaware won
a race to the courthouse and decided to prosecute without a body.
Although it would seem only just that successive prosecutions by
different states should not be permitted in cases where it appears that
the two sovereigns cooperated with one another to achieve the de-
sired result,158 this concern is not raised by the Gillis decision. There
is no evidence that Delaware had any involvement in the second pros-
ecution, nor that Maryland had a role in the first. 59 Maryland author-
ities took no notice of the Delaware trial and had no way to know at
that time that a crime took place within its borders. 160
152. Gillis, 333 Md. at 81 n.5, 633 A.2d at 894 n.5.
153. Id. at 82, 633 A.2d at 894.
154. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985).
155. Id. at 93.
156. See Breeding v. State, 220 Md. 193, 200, 151 A.2d 743, 747 (1959) (stating that
finding "a dead body in a particular county raises a presumption, or supports an inference,
that the killing took place there").
157. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
158. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 95 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven
were the dual sovereignty doctrine to support successive state prosecutions as a general
matter, it simply could not legitimate the collusion between Georgia and Alabama in this
case to ensure that petitioner is executed for his crime.").
159. Gillis, 333 Md. at 81 n.5, 633 A.2d at 894 n.5.
160. See id. at 71, 633 A.2d at 889.
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e. Impact of Gillis.-
(i) Narrow Reading.-It is unclear how great an impact the
result reached in Gillis will have on Maryland law in the future. A
narrow reading of the opinion suggests a case-by-case approach, in
which the court examines whether the state's interest to maintain its
sovereign authority through the enforcement of its criminal laws war-
rants successive prosecutions. Such a discretionary approach may
help alleviate fears that to permit successive prosecutions is a "danger-
ous practice"161 by balancing fairness to a defendant with the state
interest. 162 For example, this approach would apply in situations simi-
lar to Gillis in which a defendant initially acquitted of a crime in one
state is prosecuted in Maryland after new inculpatory evidence is un-
covered within Maryland's borders. The courts, moreover, may wish
to limit the application of Gillis to serious crimes.
(ii) Broad Reading.-A broader reading of Gillis suggests that
the sovereign interests identified by the limited enforcement of crimi-
nal judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the dual
sovereignty doctrine apply to all situations where an individual has
committed any offense against the state. Under this reading of Gillis,
the seriousness of the crime and the outcome of the out-of-state prose-
cution are irrelevant. The Gillis court appears to favor this broad ap-
proach.16 Although it stressed the strong state interest to redress
wrongs to the public, the court did not emphasize the particular facts
of Gillis by its endorsement of Maryland's right to prosecute under the
constitutional doctrines without qualification.164
The potential difficulty with such a broad interpretation is that a
defendant may, for example, be convicted falsely in one state, serve a
lengthy sentence, and be forced to serve another lengthy sentence af-
ter evidence reveals that the crime also occurred in Maryland.16 Al-
ternatively, a defendant, induced to plead guilty in one state by a
prosecutor's assurances of a light sentence, may then be tried and
convicted in Maryland based on evidence obtained by investigators in
the first state that revealed that the crime occurred in Maryland.1 6
161. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 163 (Black, J., dissenting).
162. But see Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985) ("If the states are separate sover-
eigns ... the circumstances of the cases are irrelevant.").
163. See Gillis, 333 Md. at 83, 633 A.2d at 895.
164. Id.
165. It is unclear whether this would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.
CONsr. amend. VIII.
166. Such a situation is similar to the facts of Heath. See supra notes 47-64 and accompa-
nying text.
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The harsh result illustrated by the above examples suggests that a lim-
ited policy of discretionary prosecution may, in the interests ofjustice,
be the best solution. Maryland could institute a policy similar to the
federal Petite policy,'67 which would prohibit successive prosecutions
unless a compelling state interest were served.
5. Conclusion.-In Gillis, the Court of Appeals held that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution did not bar
the prosecution of a murder suspect, who had already been acquitted
of the same charge by a neighboring state's court.'6 In so holding,
the court asserted Maryland's authority to prosecute individuals who
commit offenses that threaten peace and order within the state. The
decision justifiably prevents a murder from going unpunished, but
may prove unduly harsh in less egregious cases.
LEORA R. SIMANTov
167. See supra note 64.




A. Sentencing and the Clouded Waters of Eighth Amendment
Proportionality
In Thomas v. State,' the Maryland Court of Appeals considered
whether a thirty-year sentence and a consecutive twenty-year sentence
for two common-law batteries violated Maryland common law, the
Eighth Amendment,2 and Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. The court held that the twenty-year sentence was grossly dis-
proportionate to the defendant's offense of slapping his wife in a do-
mestic dispute and was therefore unconstitutional;4 but the thirty-year
sentence for the defendant's offense of hitting his wife with a steam
iron did not violate either the Eighth Amendment or Article 25 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.5 In reaching its decision, the court
refused to extend its holding in Simms v. State6 to require that a sen-
tence be limited by the maximum penalty for a crime with which a
defendant might have been charged.7
In light of proportionality decisions by the Supreme Court, Mary-
land case law, and the holdings of Simms v. State and its progeny, the
majority's decision would appear to stand on shaky legal precedent.
The court, moreover, incorrectly applies the Supreme Court's limited
proportionality analysis. A more soundly reasoned opinion would
have avoided a decision based solely on constitutional grounds and
simply extended the court's holding in Simms v. State.
1. The Case.-On the evening of April 1, 1991, a domestic dis-
pute erupted between George Thomas and his wife, Shirlene, after
Mr. Thomas cashed a tax refund check, which was made out to them
1. 333 Md. 84, 634 A.2d 1 (1993).
2. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
3. "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel or unusual punishment inflicted, by the Courts of Law." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS.
art. 25.
4. Thomas, 333 Md. at 100-01, 643 A.2d at 9.
5. Id. at 102-03, 634 A.2d at 10. On a separate matter, the court held that the wife's
acceptance of Thomas's collect phone calls from prison did not preclude a finding that the
calls were unwanted within the meaning of the telephone misuse statute. Id. at 105, 634
A.2d at 11.
6. 288 Md. 712, 421 A.2d 957 (1980) (holding that when jeopardy attaches to charges
of both a greater offense and a lesser included offense arising out of the same conduct,
and the defendant is acquitted of the greater offense, the sentence for the lesser offense
cannot exceed the maximum for the greater offense).
7. Thomas, 333 Md. at 91-92, 634 A.2d at 4.
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jointly.' Sometime after 1:50 a.m. on April 2, Mr. Thomas slapped his
wife across her face, leaving a temporary mark on her cheek.9 On
April 5, Mrs. Thomas obtained an order requiring Mr. Thomas to va-
cate the home for thirty days. l0 Three days later, Mr. Thomas re-
turned to the home and accused his wife of adultery. 11 Another fight
started and Mr. Thomas struck Mrs. Thomas once in the head and
twice in the back with a steam iron, causing an eight-centimeter lacer-
ation on her head, two bruises on her back, loss of consciousness and
post-traumatic problems. 12 A helicopter flew her to the shock trauma
unit at the University of Maryland Hospital,"3 and Mr. Thomas turned
himself in to the police. 4
The Circuit Court for Caroline County found Mr. Thomas guilty
of battery for the slap to the face and guilty of battery, but not assault
with intent to murder, for striking his wife with a steam iron.' 5 During
sentencing the trial judge commented that if the victim had died, the
court could have convicted Mr. Thomas only of manslaughter, which
carries a maximum sentence of ten years. 16 Nonetheless, the judge
expressed his desire to protect the defendant's wife and sentenced
Mr. Thomas to consecutive terms of twenty and thirty years for the
April 2 and April 8 batteries. 7
Thomas appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. He
argued that the trial court should have extended its holding in Simms
v. State18 and limited his sentence to ten years because this was the
maximum sentence he would have received had he been convicted of
8. Id. at 88, 634 A.2d at 3. Although Thomas's wife confronted him at that time, no
physical violence occurred. As she testified, "that day was just push and shoving and get-
ting like iron pipes and aluminum bats," with each party threatening the other. Id.
9. Id. at 89, 634 A.2d at 3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 101-02, 634 A.2d at 9.
13. Id. at 102, 634 A.2d at 9.
14. Id. at 89, 634 A.2d at 3.
15. Id. at 89-90, 634 A.2d at 3-4. The judge also found Thomas guilty of reckless endan-
germent for swinging the iron, guilty of unlawful use of the telephone for threatening
phone calls made from jail, and guilty of violating an order to vacate. Id. at 90, 634 A.2d at
3.
16. Id. at 91, 634 A.2d at 4; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1957).
17. Thomas, 333 Md. at 90, 634 A.2d at 3-4. Thejudge stated that his intention was "to
send [the defendant] away as long as is necessary to protect [his wife], which essentially is
the balance of her life, not his." Id. The defendant was also sentenced to consecutive
terms of 60 days for violating the order to vacate, 6 months for unlawful use of the tele-
phone, and a concurrent term of 5 years for reckless endangerment. Id. at 88, 634 A.2d at
2-3. The sentence came to a total of 50 years and 8 months imprisonment. Id. at 88, 634
A.2d at 3.
18. 288 Md. 712, 421 A.2d 957 (1980).
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manslaughter if his wife died. 9 The defendant further argued that
each sentence violated Maryland common law, the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights and the Eighth Amendment." ° The Court of Appeals
issued a writ of certiorari prior to consideration by the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals."
2. Legal Background.-The Thomas court divided sharply over
the proper method of reviewing the defendant's sentence. While the
majority grounded its reasoning in the constitutional prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment,22Judge Chasanow's dissenting
opinion argued for an extension of Maryland common law.23 Two
lines of case law provide the background for each respective argu-
ment: first, Supreme Court and Maryland Eighth Amendment pro-
portionality decisions; and second, Simms v. State and its progeny.
a. Supreme Court and State Proportionality Decisions.-The pro-
portionality principle of the Eighth Amendment has gradually evolved
into a highly debated and, ultimately, convoluted area of law. In
Weems v. United States,24 the Supreme Court first endorsed the princi-
ple of proportionality in Eighth Amendment questions.25 In Weems,
the defendant was convicted of falsifying a public document.26 The
Supreme Court held that a sentence of fifteen years requiring the de-
fendant to engage in hard labor while wearing a chain connecting his
wrist to his ankle, coupled with the perpetual surveillance and depri-
vation of the defendant's political rights, constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment.27 The Court reasoned that a punishment may not
be greatly disproportionate to the crime charged: "[I]t is a precept of
19. Thomas, 333 Md. at 90, 634 A.2d at 4. Manslaughter carries a maximum penalty of
10 years. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 12 (1957).
20. Thomas, 333 Md. at 90, 634 A.2d at 4.
21. Id. at 88, 634 A.2d at 3. The Court of Appeals issued its writ of certiorari to resolve
the following questions:
1. Were the 30- and 20-year sentences for common law battery illegal, dispro-
portionate under the common law, or unconstitutional?
2. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for tele-
phone misuse?
Id.
22. See id. at 92-103, 634 A.2d at 4-10.
23. Id. at 108-11, 634 A.2d at 14-15 (Chasanow, J., dissenting in part).
24. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
25. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983).
26. Weems, 217 U.S. at 357-58.
27. Id. at 366.
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justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and propor-
tioned to offense."28
In Solem v. Helm,29 the Court developed this maxim into a consti-
tutional test to determine whether a criminal sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment. The Court held that "a criminal sentence must
be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been con-
victed."3" The Court stated that objective criteria should guide the
proportionality analysis of a criminal sentence."1 Namely, a court
should consider: (1) the seriousness of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals for the
same offense within the particular jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences
imposed for like offenses in other jurisdictions.3 2 The Court added
that a reviewing court should grant deference to the legislature when
conducting a proportionality analysis. 31
Eight years later, in Harmelin v. Michigan,4 the Supreme Court
significantly clouded the proportionality principles of the Eighth
Amendment.35 The Court held that a sentence of life without parole
for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment.36 The majority, however, split two ways in
its reasoning. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued that
28. Id. at 367. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the court warned that the
punishment in Weems was so unique that Weems could not be applied "without regard to its
particular facts." Id. at 274.
29. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Helm, the defendant was convicted of uttering a "no ac-
count check" for $100. Id. at 281. Because the defendant had seven prior convictions, the
South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole pursuant
to South Dakota's recidivist statute. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed, and
the United States District Court denied the defendant's writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 283.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court on
the grounds that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the offense. Id. 283-84. The
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 303.
30. Id. at 290.
31. Id. at 291-92.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 290.
34. 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion). In Harmelin, the defendant was sentenced
to life in prison without parole for the possession of 672 grams of cocaine. Id. at 961. The
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed because some of the evidence presented in the case
was obtained in violation of the Michigan Constitution. Id. On a petition for rehearing,
the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated its earlier decision and affirmed the sentence. Id.
The Michigan Supreme Court denied the defendant's appeal. Id. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether the defendant's sentence constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment, and ultimately affirmed the Michigan Court of Appeals. Id. at 961, 996.
35. See Mary K. Woodburn, Note, Harmelin v. Michigan and Proponionality Review Under
the Eighth Amendment, 77 IOWA L. REa. 1927 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
decision in Harmelin will likely confuse the lower courts).
36. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994-96.
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the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality guarantee
for non-capital sentences and therefore the analysis employed in Helm
"was simply wrong."37 Rather, they argued, the Eighth Amendment
applies only to the method of punishment.3 On the other hand, Jus-
tice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter argued
that the Eighth Amendment contains a "narrow" principle of propor-
tionality.39 The Eighth Amendment prohibits only sentences that are
"grossly disproportionate" to the criminal act.4" Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion gave only limited guidance as to the precise
meaning of "gross disproportionality." However, his opinion did con-
sider the public policy interest in deterring drug use and distribution,
as well as the importance of deference to the legislature.4 1 Finally, the
dissenters, lead by Justice White, subscribed to the principle of pro-
portionality42 and argued that the Court should have applied the anal-
ysis set forth in Helm to reverse the decision of the Michigan Court of
Appeals.4 3
Prior to Harmelin, Maryland case law had tracked the holdings of
the Supreme Court. In State v. Davis,4' the Court of Appeals held that
a sentence of life without parole for a fourth offense of house-break-
ing did not violate the Eighth Amendment.45 The court reasoned that
Helm was not factually dispositive, and therefore a proportionality re-
view was unnecessary.4 6 The court, nonetheless, conducted a Helm
37. Id. at 965.
38. Id. at 979. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has very recently rejected
Justice Scalia's opinion that a proportionality analysis is only appropriate for review of capi-
tal sentences. See United States v. Krastas, No. 93-5509 (4th Cir. Jan. 17, 1995) (holding
that a life sentence for a third drug conviction did not violate the Eighth Amendment's
proportionality principle and was therefore constitutional).
39. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 1001.
41. Id. at 1001-08. Although Justice Kennedy did not explicitly call for a reviewing
court to consider the seriousness of the defendant's crime, he cited the potential societal
effects of the defendant's offense. See id. at 1003-04. After discussing the "pernicious ef-
fects" that drugs inflict on society, Justice Kennedy concluded that "the severity of the
petitioner's crime brings his sentence within ... constitutional boundaries .... " d
42. Id. at 1009-20 (White, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1027.
44. 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987). In Davis, the Baltimore County Circuit Court
convicted the defendant of daytime house-breaking and sentenced him to life in prison
without parole pursuant to a recidivist statute. Id. at 613-14, 530 A.2d at 1224-25. The
Court of Special Appeals vacated his sentence as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's
principle of proportionality, but the Court of Appeals reversed on certiorari. Id. at 613,
530 A.2d at 1224.
45. Id. at 639, 530 A.2d at 1237.
46. Id. at 628-32, 530 A.2d at 1232-33. The Court of Appeals argued that house-break-
ing in Maryland constitutes a more serious offense than the crime of third degree burglary
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analysis and concluded that the defendant's sentence was not dispro-
portionate.47 In dicta, the court added that the extent to which a pro-
portionality analysis is required is "a question of process" as well as of
constitutionality.48 According to the Davis court, "a question of pro-
cess" pertains to the depth of the proportionality analysis conducted
by the court in relation to the defendant's criminal record and
sentence.49
A year later, in Minor v. State,"° the Court of Appeals again held
that a proportionality analysis was not necessary to review a twenty-five
year sentence for daytime house-breaking.5 Alternatively, the court
applied a Helm proportionality analysis and concluded that the sen-
tence did not violate the Eighth Amendment.52 In a concurring opin-
ion, Judge Eldridge argued that common sense would best inform an
appellate court whether a criminal sentence violates the Eighth
Amendment's proportionality principle. 3
b. Simms v. State and its Progeny.-In Simms v. State,54 the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that when a defendant is acquitted of
committed in Helm, and therefore the Supreme Court's decision in Helm did not control.
Id.
47. Id. at 633-39, 530 A.2d at 1234-37. The court stated that the Maryland legislature
considered daytime house-breaking a serious offense. Id. at 633, 530 A.2d at 1234. It com-
pared Davis's sentence to the sentences authorized for other serious crimes and reiterated
that Davis received his sentence only because he was a repeat offender. Id. at 635, 530 A.2d
at 1235. Finally, the court compared Davis's sentence to sentences for similar convictions
in other states and found at least five states that imposed penalties as severe. Id. at 637-39,
530 A.2d at 1236-37.
48. Id. at 628, 530 A.2d at 1231.
49. Id., 530 A-2d at 1231-32.
50. 313 Md. 573, 546 A.2d 1028 (1988). In Minor, the defendant was sentenced to 25
years in prison pursuant to a Maryland recidivist statute. Id. at 574-75, 546 A.2d at 1028-29.
51. Id. at 583, 546 A.2d at 1033.
52. Id. at 584-86, 546 A-2d at 1033-34.
53. Id. at 587, 546 A.2d at 1034-35 (Eldridge, J., concurring). Judge Eldridge stated
that he did not believe the Supreme Court's proportionality opinions required a strict
classification of criminal sentences into two categories, one requiring no proportionality
analysis and the other requiring an extended Helm review. Id., 546 A.2d at 1035. Instead,
the courts should determine the actual extent of review on a case-by-case basis. Id. Finally,
Judge Eldridge argued that a court's proportionality review need not consider only the
three factors in Helm. Id. He noted that the second and third Helm factors were only
suggestive. Id. at 587-88, 546 A.2d at 1035. A court may weigh other considerations such as
the pre-sentencing investigation report and the facts surrounding the crime. Id. at 588,
546 A.2d at 1035.
54. 288 Md. 712, 421 A.2d 957 (1980). In Simms, the court considered two cases in
which two defendants were charged with, inter alia, assault with intent to rob and simple
assault stemming from the same conduct. Id. at 715, 421 A.2d at 959. Each defendant was
acquitted of assault with intent to rob but convicted of simple assault. Id. The Criminal
Court of Baltimore sentenced each to 12 years in prison although the maximum sentence
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a greater offense but convicted of a lesser included offense, and both
charges arose out of the same conduct, he cannot receive a sentence
that exceeds the maximum penalty allowed for the greater, acquitted
offense.55 The court reasoned that to allow a defendant to receive a
penalty that exceeds the maximum for the greater, acquitted charge
would "sanction an extreme anomaly in the criminal law"; the defend-
ant would have served himself better by pleading guilty to the greater
charge.56 If the jury had convicted the defendant of both offenses,
the lesser offense would have merged under double jeopardy princi-
ples.57 Finally, the Simms court- refused to consider whether the sen-
tence constituted cruel and unusual punishment stating "we have
consistently adhered to a policy of not deciding constitutional issues
unnecessarily. "58
Four years later the Court of Appeals addressed a similar chal-
lenge to a criminal sentence. In Gerald v. State,59 a defendant charged
with assault, robbery, and armed robbery was convicted only of as-
sault.6" The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in
prison, which was less than the statutory maximum for armed robbery
but exceeded the maximum penalty for robbery.61 The Court of Ap-
peals, relying on Simms, held that a court cannot impose a sentence on
a defendant that exceeds the maximum for the next greater, acquit-
ted count.62
In 1987, the Court of Appeals extended the Simms reasoning to
hold that once jeopardy attaches to both counts, a sentence for a
lesser included offense cannot exceed the maximum for a greater
charge upon which a nolle prosequi was entered.6" The court reasoned
the defendants could have received for assault with intent to rob was 10 years. Id. The
Court of Appeals vacated the sentences. Id. at 718, 727, 421 A-2d at 960, 965.
55. Id. at 724, 421 A.2d at 964.
56. Id. at 723, 421 A.2d at 963.
57. Id. at 718, 421 A.2d at 960-61.
58. Id. at 725, 421 A.2d at 964.
59. 299 Md. 138, 472 A.2d 977 (1984).
60. Id. at 139, 472 A.2d at 978. The three charges arose out of the same incident and
jeopardy attached to each. Id.
61. Id. at 139-40, 472 A.2d at 978. Had the defendant been convicted of armed rob-
bery, his maximum sentence would have been 20 years imprisonmenL Id. at 143, 472 A.2d
at 980. If the jury had convicted him of robbery, the court could have sentenced him only
to 10 years in prison. Id.
62. Id. at 145-46, 472 A.2d at 981.
63. Johnson v. State, 310 Md. 681, 694, 531 A.2d 675, 681 (1987). In Johnson, the de-
fendant was charged with various crimes arising out of an attack in Baltimore City. Id. at
682, 531 A.2d at 675. After the evidentiary portion of the trial, the State dropped the
charges of attempted murder, assault with intent to maim, disfigure or disable, and carry-
ing a deadly weapon with intent to injure. Id. at 683, 531 A.2d at 676. The case went to the
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that the same anomaly addressed in the Simms opinion can result
when the prosecution chooses not to continue on a greater charge.
64
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Thomas v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the defendant's proposed extension of Simms v. State
and instead used a constitutional analysis to overturn the twenty-year
sentence for a slap to the face but to affirm the thirty-year sentence for
the blows with the steam iron.65 To reach its decision, the court estab-
lished a proportionality test to determine whether a sentence offends
the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition of the Eighth
Amendment.
66
Writing for the majority, Judge McAuliffe reasoned that the ex-
tension of Sims to cases where the defendant could have been
charged with a greater offense would establish "a binding hierarchy of
offenses and sentences,"6 7 a task better left to the legislature." Be-
cause the defendant was not charged with manslaughter or assault
with intent to maim, the court did not need to limit either the thirty-
year sentence for common law battery to the maximum term for man-
slaughter,69 or the twenty-year sentence for common-law battery to the
maximum term for assault with intent to maim, disfigure or disable. 70
Rather than apply the Simms logic, Judge McAuliffe chose to con-
struct a constitutional test to determine the validity of each sen-
tence. 7 ' To analyze an Eighth Amendment challenge, the court first
determined whether the imposed penalty appeared "grossly dispro-
portionate." 72 To make this determination, a reviewing court should
jury on the counts of assault with intent to murder and simple assault. Id. The jury con-
victedJohnson solely for simple assault and the court sentenced him to 20 years imprison-
ment. Id. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the sentence and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. Id. at 684, 531 A.2d at 676.
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
66. Thomas, 333 Md. at 95-97, 634 A.2d at 6-7.
67. Id. at 92, 634 A.2d at 4.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 91, 634 A.2d at 4. Judge McAuliffe commented that the trial court erred in its
conclusion that the defendant could only have been convicted of manslaughter had he
killed his wife in that the evidence could have supported a finding of second degree mur-
der. Id. at 101, 634 A.2d at 9.
70. Id. at 100, 634 A.2d at 8. The defendant never actually argued that the 15-year
maximum sentence for assault with intent to maim, disfigure or disable should serve as the
limit for the April 2 battery. The court raised this point in its discussion on proportional-
ity. Id. at 99-100, 634 A.2d at 8.
71. Id. at 95, 634 A.2d at 6. Judge McAuliffe emphasized that a reviewing court should
consider proportionality challenges only when "the punishment is truly egregious." Id. at
97, 634 A.2d at 7.
72. Id. at 95, 634 A.2d at 6.
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look at the seriousness of the crime, the defendant's criminal history,
any articulated support for the sentence, and the importance of defer-
ring to the sentencing court as well as to the legislature.73
If the sentence does not appear to suggest gross disproportional-
ity, the review is at an end.74 If, however, the review reveals gross dis-
proportionality, the court should conduct a more detailed Helm-type
analysis. 75 Judge McAuliffe stated that a court may conduct intra- and
inter-jurisdictional analyses of comparable offenses and sentences,
consider the effects of the offense upon society, review evidence of
improper motive on the part of the sentencing judge, or look to the
penological theory of the state. 76 He added that the court must ex-
amine the specific facts of the crime as well as the particular character-
istics of the defendant.77
With respect to Thomas, the absence of any articulated goal by the
legislature or the trial court on the deterrence of domestic violence
and the lack of any lasting physical injury to Mrs. Thomas suggested
that the twenty-year sentence for the slap to the face was grossly dis-
proportionate. 78 After consideration of an inter-jurisdictional analy-
sis, Judge McAuliffe concluded that the twenty-year sentence violated
the Eighth Amendment.79 The thirty-year sentence, while severe, did
not appear grossly disproportionate given the seriousness of the inju-
ries to Thomas's wife, and therefore did not constitute cruel and unu-
sual punishment."0
In a two-part dissent, Judge Chasanow vigorously chastised the
majority's reasoning and argued that the court unnecessarily created a
constitutional analysis that gives little guidance to trial judges." In
part one, Judge Chasanow stated that he would have joined the major-
ity had they grounded their holding in an extension of Simms v.
State."2 Judge Chasanow reasoned that if two assaults occur, and one,
at the most, involved an intent to maim, and the other, at the most,
involved an intent to murder, the court should limit the punishment
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
76. Thomas, 333 Md. at 95-96, 634 A.2d at 6. Judge McAuliffe cautioned that when
conducting an inter-jurisdictional analysis, the reviewing court should remember that the
principles of federalism allow a state's legislature to impose a more severe penalty than
other states. Id.
77. Id. at 96, 634 A.2d at 7.
78. Id. at 98, 634 A.2d at 7-8.
79. Id. at 100, 634 A.2d at 9.
80. Id. at 102-03, 634 A.2d at 10.
81. Id. at 108-09, 634 A.2d at 14 (Chasanow, J., dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 109, 634 A.2d at 14.
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to the maximum for assault with intent to maim consecutive to the
maximum allowed for assault with intent to murder.8 3
In part two, Judge Chasanow criticized the court's finding that
the twenty-year sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.8 4
He pointed out that the court has never reversed a sentence that lies
within the permissible range of punishment on Eighth Amendment
grounds."m He further argued that the majority never quite demon-
strated why the defendant's sentence violated the Eighth Amend-
ment." Rather, the majority engaged in a faulty factual analysis that
completely ignored the defendant's two prior assault convictions, the
seriousness of the April 8 assault, and the trial judge's desire to curb
spousal abuse.8 ' Finally, he noted that longer sentences stemming
from less reprehensible conduct have survived Eighth Amendment
challenges.8 8
Judge Bell concurred with the majority's holding and reasoning
with respect to the twenty-year sentence8 9 but dissented from the ma-
jority's decision not to vacate the thirty-year sentence. 90 He stated that
the imposition of a sentence equaling the maximum sentence for the
acquitted charge of assault with intent to murder created an unjust
anomaly.9 Therefore, the sentence for the April 8 battery should not
have exceeded twenty years.92
Judge Eldridge concurred with the court's judgment except for
the affirmation of the thirty-year sentence.9 3 He stated that the pro-
portionality reasoning used to vacate the twenty-year sentence com-
pelled the court to vacate the thirty-year sentence as well.94
83. Id. at 110, 634 A.2d at 14. Otherwise, a Simms-like anomaly may occur: The State
may elect not to charge the greater offense but thereafter seek a greater sentence. Id.
84. Id. at 111, 634 A.2d at 15.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 114, 634 A.2d at 16.
87. Id. at 114-15, 634 A.2d at 16-17.
88. Id. at 116-17, 634 A.2d at 18. Judge Chasanow referred to Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S.
370 (1982) (holding that a sentence of 20 years for the possession with intent to distribute
9 ounces of marijuana did not violate the Eighth Amendment), and Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding a life sentence required by a Texas recidivist statute and im-
posed upon a defendant convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses as not cruel and
unusual punishment). Id. at 117, 634 A.2d at 18.
89. Thomas, 333 Md. at 118, 634 A.2d at 19 (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 120, 634 A.2d at 19-20. Judge Bell argued that an acquittal on a greater
charge should prevent the imposition of a penalty that is not only greater but also equal to
the maximum penalty for the greater charge. Id. at 120-21, 634 A.2d at 20.
92. Id. at 121, 634 A.2d at 20.




4. Analysis. -In Thomas v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a
twenty-year sentence for common-law battery was grossly dispropor-
tionate, while a thirty-year sentence, also for common-law battery, did
not violate the Eighth Amendment or Maryland common law.95 In
reaching its holding, the majority developed a constitutional test from
the scattered remnants of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality
principle left by the Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin v. Michi-
gan.96 Not only does the reasoning of the majority stand on shaky
legal precedent, but it fails to follow the limited guidance provided by
the Supreme Court. The Thomas court would have better guided fu-
ture sentencing practices by an extension of Simms v. State,97 rather
than by base its decision solely on constitutional grounds.
a. The Court Offers Little Guidance on Proportionality Analy-
sis.-The majority in Thomas used the Supreme Court's decision in
Harmelin v. Michigan as the basis for its proportionality review.98 Yet,
as Judge McAuliffe ironically noted, the Supreme Court in Harmelin
significantly clouded the waters of the Eighth Amendment's propor-
tionality principle.99 While the Harmelin dissent strongly adhered to
the proportionality review endorsed in Solem v. Helm,' the majority
split over the very existence of proportionality in non-capital cases.'
The Thomas court ultimately sided with Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion, concluding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits only
grossly disproportionate sentences." 2 The court then proceeded to
develop its own test by adding pieces from State v. Davis' and Minor
v. State,104  neither of which found a sentence to be
disproportionate.105
The Thomas court should have followed the overall reasoning of
Davis and Minor rather than extract various components of these opin-
ions. In both Davis and Minor, the Court of Appeals-unsure of the
factual applicability of Solem v. Helm--analyzed the disputed sentenc-
ing with and without a Helm proportionality test.'0 6 It would, likewise,
95. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
96. 507 U.S. 957 (1991); see supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
97. 288 Md. 712, 421 A.2d 947; see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
98. See Thomas, 333 Md. at 93-94, 634 A.2d at 5.
99. Id. at 93, 634 A.2d at 5.
100. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
101. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
103. 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987); see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
104. 313 Md. 573, 546 A.2d 1028 (1988).
105. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
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have been logical for the Thomas court-also unsure of the extent of
Eighth Amendment proportionality-to examine the case initially by
a proportionality analysis similar to justice Kennedy's review in Harme-
lin. Then, because of the debated viability of proportionality in non-
capital cases, it should have developed a common-law test to review
the defendant's sentence.
If the court had followed Justice Kennedy's analysis by consider-
ing the public policy interest in curbing the defendant's crime and by
deferring to any legislative mechanism that makes substantive peno-
logical judgments, it is likely that the sentence would have survived
Eighth Amendment review. The defendant's slapping of his wife con-
stituted one part in a pattern of physical and mental abuse commonly
known as "domestic violence."1"7 The deterrence of domestic vio-
lence represents a significant public policy interest that has grown in
importance with the realization of its gravity and pervasiveness.' 0 8
Currently, domestic violence is the leading cause of injury for women
in the United States." 9 A significant justification exists for substantial
sentences in cases involving spousal abuse.
The legislature, moreover, has created a procedure for review of
criminal sentences by a panel of three or more trial judges. 110
Thomas elected to have his sentences reviewed, and a panel of three
circuit court judges found that his sentences should remain un-
changed.' 1 Legislative deference would therefore dictate that the de-
fendant's sentence survive Eighth Amendment review.
b. The Court Should Have Extended Simms v. State. -Although
the twenty-year sentence would have probably survived a "Kennedy
proportionality review," the court could have remanded the case by
adherence to its principle that it will not decide a constitutional issue
107. See, e.g., Thomas, 333 Md. at 144, 634 A.2d at 17 (quoting the trial judge as saying "I
don't have one particular offense here. I've got a continuation of offenses and they're
called spouse abuse .... ).
108. See Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 Hev. L. REv.
1498 (1993) (discussing the history of domestic violence towards women and responses to
this problem).
109. See Elena Salzman, Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Vwlence Prevention Pro-
gram: A Novel Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REv. 329 (1994).
110. Thomas, 333 Md. at 113, 634 A.2d at 16 (Chasanow,J., dissenting in part).
111. Id. at 113-14, 634 A.2d at 17. It is worth noting that the Thomas court also stated
that a reviewing court should consider deference to the legislature as well as any articu-
lated purpose for the sentence. Id. at 95, 634 A.2d at 6. However, the Thomas court ig-
nored the findings of the legislatively created panel as well as the issue of domestic
violence. Id. at 114-15, 634 A.2d at 17 (Chasanow,J., dissenting in part).
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except when absolutely necessary."' The Court of Appeals could
have simplified its review had it avoided basing the decision solely on
the constitutional issue of proportionality, and instead followed the
reasoning of Judge Chasanow and grounded the decision on an exten-
sion of Simms.
Since the holding in Simms, the court has gradually extended the
reach of its ruling to ensure that a defendant will not be punished
more severely by an acquittal or nolle prosequi of a greater charge." 3
Had it taken the next logical step, the court should have held that a
sentence for a common-law offense may not exceed the statutory max-
imum for the greater uncharged statutory offense. For example, the
April 2 slap involved at most an intent to maim.1"4 Therefore, the
sentence for the statutory crime of assault with intent to maim, disfig-
ure or disable should have served as the cap for the April 8 battery.
Otherwise, the anomaly addressed by Simms and its progeny will con-
tinue to exist. The defendant would have fared better had the prose-
cution charged and convicted him of a greater, statutory crime.
Not only is the above analysis grounded in the fundamental prin-
ciple of fairness,115 but it is much simpler in application than the con-
voluted proportionality review created by the majority. By extending
Simms, a trial judge has only to ensure that sentences for common-law
crimes stay within the legislatively-set maximum penalties for similar
statutory offenses, rather than wrestle with the abstractions of propor-
tionality. With today's crowded criminal dockets, trial judges need
this sort of simplicity and guidance.
The majority argued, "[w]ere we to apply the Simms rule anytime
a greater offense might have been charged, we would in effect create a
binding hierarchy of offenses and sentences, a task that is truly legisla-
tive."' 1 6 Yet by classifying the slap to the face as not "legally serious"
'' 17
112. See Simms, 288 Md. at 725, 421 A.2d at 964 (stating "we have consistently adhered to
a policy of not deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily"). Approximately seven months
before the court's decision in Thomas, the court refused to address the constitutionality of
anticipatory search warrants under the Fourth Amendment, stating, "This Court will not
decide a constitutional issue except when the necessity to do so arises from the record
before it." State v. Lee, 330 Md. 320, 329, 624 A.2d 492, 496 (1993).
113. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
114. See Thomas, 333 Md. at 108-09, 634 A.2d at 14 (1993) (Chasanow, J., dissenting in
part) (proposing that common-law assault be limited by the maximum statutory offense
involving the same actus reus and mens rea).
115. See id. (stating that the reasoning of Simms was based on principles of fairness and
not the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
116. Id. at 92, 634 A.2d at 4.
117. Id. at 98, 634 A.2d at 5.
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but the blows with the iron as "serious""1 the court has, in effect,
established two types of common-law assaults. 19 If the definition of
different types of crime belongs to the legislature, then the use of stat-
utory crimes as a guideline to determine a fair sentence for a com-
mon-law crime surely defers to legislative judgment.
5. Conclusion.-In Thomas v. State, the Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a twenty-year sentence for a slap to the face and a thirty-
year sentence for repeated blows with a steam iron constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, and whether they violated Maryland com-
mon law. In reaching its decision that only the twenty-year sentence
violated the Eighth Amendment, the court created a complex and
convoluted proportionality analysis. The court should have given
more guidance to trial judges through the simple extension of its
holding in Simms v. State.
MATTHEW G. HJORTSBERG
B. Delivering Justice to Defendants with Unenforceable Plea Bargains
In State v. Parker,1 the Court of Appeals held that a defendant's
plea agreement that promised prison service in a federal penitentiary
was unenforceable because the state sentencing judge lacked author-
ity to order the prison service of a Maryland sentence in the federal
system.2 In an issue of first impression, the court offered the defend-
ant the choice either to serve his time in Maryland, or to withdraw his
plea and renegotiate it, or stand trial.' To fashion its limited remedy,
however, the Parker court misconstrued case law and ignored more
recent trends that favor the award of specific performance in plea
agreements.
1. The Case.-Anthony Patrick Parker was charged with murder
and other related offenses stemming from an incident that occurred
at the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in Baltimore County.4 On July 8,
1983, Parker entered into a plea agreement which provided that if he
pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, testified against co-conspira-
118. Id. at 101, 634 A.2d at 9.
119. See id. at 114-15, 634 A.2d at 16-17 (Chasanow,J., dissenting in part) (arguing that
the majority has created a new category of "not legally serious" common-law assaults with-
out stating what the constitutional maximum penalty should be).
1. 334 Md. 576, 640 A.2d 1104 (1994).
2. Id. at 607, 640 A.2d at 1119.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 581, 640 A.2d at 1106.
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
tors, and pleaded guilty to one unrelated count of federal bank rob-
bery, the State would recommend that he serve his time in the federal
penitentiary, that his sentence not be more than twenty years, and
that it be served concurrently to any federal sentence resulting from
the plea agreement.5 Both federal and state trial courts sentenced
Parker to twenty-year terms.6 Parker fulfilled his part of the agree-
ment7 and entered the federal penitentiary.'
After Parker served seven years, he was paroled.9 The Baltimore
County Police Department immediately exercised a detainer and ob-
tained custody of the defendant.' ° Parker sought release from the bal-
ance of his Maryland sentence and argued that because the
sentencing judge agreed to allow him to serve his time in the federal
penitentiary, thejudge intended that the sentences be coterminous."
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County granted post-conviction relief
and set Parker free from state custody on the basis of the holding in
Gantt v. State.12 The State appealed the decision and argued that the
lower court's interpretation and reliance on Gantt to release Parker
was in error.13 The Court of Special Appeals, however, affirmed and
concluded that parole was part of his federal sentence and therefore
he could not be retained by Maryland until his federal sentence, in-
cluding parole, was fully served. 4 The Court of Appeals granted the
State's petition to consider the post-conviction relief granted to
Anthony Parker. 5
2. Legal Background.-Plea bargains originated in seventeenth
century England as a means to alleviate especially harsh punish-
ments.16 It was not until its 1969 decision in Brady v. United States'7




8. Id. at 582, 640 A.2d at 1107.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 583, 640 A.2d at 1107.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see Gantt v. State, 81 Md. App. 653, 569 A.2d 220 (1990); see also infra notes 49-
55 and accompanying text.
13. Parker, 334 Md. at 583, 640 A.2d at 1107.
14. State v. Parker, 93 Md. App. 597, 603, 613 A.2d 1020, 1022-23 (1992).
15. State v. Parker, 329 Md. 338, 619 A.2d 547 (1993).
16. See State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 692 n.2, 357 A.2d 376, 380 n.2 (1976). For a
history of plea bargaining, see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and its History, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1979).
17. 397 U.S. 742 (1969).
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and often desirable resolution to a criminal proceeding."8 A year later
in Santobello v. New York,9 the Court described plea agreements as "es-
sential" and "highly desirable" because they expedite criminal cases,
decrease the period of pretrial confinement for those awaiting trial,
increase public protection, and increase the potential for effective re-
habilitation."° Today, guilty pleas account for the resolution of more
than ninety percent of criminal prosecutions in the United States.2
Santobello marked the first time the Court dealt with a plea agree-
ment breached by a state. The defendant in Santobello withdrew a not-
guilty plea to two felonies and pleaded guilty to a lesser charge on the
basis of the prosecutor's promise that he would make no sentencing
recommendation.22 At the sentencing hearing, a different prosecutor
recommended, and the judge ordered, the maximum sentence.23 In
response, the defendant unsuccessfully tried to withdraw his plea.24
On review, the Supreme Court held that "when a plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor" it is a
material element of the plea bargain, and as such, "must be ful-
filled."25 The Court asserted that the defendant deserved a remedy
but remanded the issue to the state court to determine whether spe-
cific performance or withdrawal of the plea was appropriate.26
While the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the pro-
vision of remedies for unenforceable plea agreements, federal circuits
and state courts have extended the reasoning and policy concerns
found in Santobello to fashion appropriate remedies. For example, in
Palermo v. Warden,27 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit considered an illegal plea agreement and held that "the rea-
18. Id. at 752.
19. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
20. Id. at 261. For more discussion of the benefits of plea bargains, see Brockman, 277
Md. at 693, 357 A.2d at 380-81; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining,
36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 50 (1968); Eric S. Baker, Note, Double Jeopardy and Its Application to
Broken Plea Agreements, 31 ARiz. L. Rv. 127, 137-38 (1989); Julie A. Lumpkin, Note, The
Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish That a Defendant Has Materially Breached a Plea Agree-
ment, 55 FORDHAm L. REv. 1059, 1062-76 (1987) (recounting a general history of the use of
plea bargains).
21. Lumpkin, supra note 20, at 1059 n.1.
22. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 258.
23. Id. at 259.
24. Id. at 259-60.
25. Id. at 262.
26. Id. at 263.
27. 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976).
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soning underlying Santobello applies no less when the prosecution
makes unfulfillable promises in negotiating a plea."28
In Maryland, courts have long recognized the right to a remedy
for a broken plea agreement, including those breached by the govern-
ment.' The Court of Appeals strongly endorsed the Santobello man-
date that when the plea agreement "'rests in any significant degree on
a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration, such a promise must be ful-
filled."'3 ° The Court of Appeals expanded on the Santobello doctrine
in State v. Brockman,31 to find that a defendant may be entitled to a
remedy where the state breaches, even if the plea agreement was
never formally accepted by the court.3" The Brockman court explained
that specific performance of a plea agreement should be granted
when there is a showing of "prejudice arising from the bargain, which
prejudice cannot be remedied by permitting the defendant to with-
draw his plea and commence anew."" The court further wrote that
evidence of prejudice is not necessary if the defendant can show sub-
stantial performance with the agreement.3 4
Until Parker, the provision of a remedy for an unenforceable plea
bargain had not been addressed by the Court of Appeals. The issue
had been before the Court of Special Appeals twice, in Rojas v. State"5
and Johnson v. State. 6 In Rojas, the State offered to drop some charges
and to recommend a ten-year suspended sentence with five years pro-
bation if the defendant would leave the country within ninety days.3 7
28. Id. at 296; see Raymond E. Dunn, Jr., Note, Enforcing Unfufillable Plea Bargaining
Promises, 13 WAKE FotEs-r L. REV. 842, 850 (1977) (arguing fundamental fairness requires
specific enforcement of plea agreement regardless of prosecutor's lack of authority to
make the agreement).
29. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 272 Md. 249, 322 A.2d 527 (1974).
30. Id. at 252, 322 A.2d at 529 (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262); see also State v.
Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 694, 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976).
31. 277 Md. 687, 357 A.2d 376 (1976).
32. Id. at 694-95, 357 A.2d at 381-82.
33. Id. at 698, 357 A.2d at 383; see also State v. Poole, 321 Md. 482, 496-97, 583 A.2d 265,
272 (1991) (holding trial court bound to the terms of a plea agreement where defendant
has fulfilled all parts of his bargain); Meredith Kolsky, Guilty Pleas, 82 GEO. L.J. 926, 931-32
(1994) (reviewing the procedural options of defer~dant who alleges breach of a plea
agreement).
34. Brockman, 277 Md. at 698-99, 357 A.2d at 384. The Colorado Supreme Court has
taken this idea a step further and asserted that a defendant is entitled to specific perform-
ance where "no other remedy is appropriate to effectuate the accused's legitimate expecta-
tion engendered by the governmental promise." People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922, 931 (Colo.
1983).
35. 52 Md. App. 440, 450 A.2d 490 (1982).
36. 40 Md. App. 591, 392 A.2d 1157 (1978).
37. Rajas, 52 Md. App. at 441, 450 A.2d at 491.
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The court found that the state lacked the authority to make this agree-
ment because federal deportation laws controlled,"8 and vacated the
defendant's sentence in order to return the parties to their original
positions, protect the defendant's constitutional rights, and guard the
State's interest in public safety. 9
In Johnson, the appellant was arrested for violations of Maryland
law while on parole from a Pennsylvania conviction.' Johnson agreed
to serve a thirteen-year sentence for the Maryland violations concur-
rent to the term imposed by Pennsylvania for his parole violations.4 1
He expected to begin serving his Maryland sentence in a Pennsylvania
prison, but Pennsylvania had yet to revoke his parole. 42 Conse-
quently, Johnson began his Maryland sentence at the risk of doing all
of his time in Maryland and then being recalled to Pennsylvania to
serve the remainder of his original term plus any additional sentences
related to the parole violations.4 3
In analyzing the case, the Johnson court held that the plea agree-
ment failed to satisfy the voluntariness requirement in the Maryland
rule governing the acceptance of plea bargains because the agree-
ment was induced by a promise that was unkept and unenforceable.'
in addition, the court found that the element concerning place of
service was material to his motion to set aside the sentence because it
was impossible to determine if the defendant would have pleaded
guilty without the concurrency provision.45 Clearly, the defendant did
not receive what he bargained for-immediate return to Pennsylvania
to begin a concurrent sentence. The Johnson court considered an or-
der for specific performance, but concluded that it was impossible as
Maryland could in no way influence the criminal justice system in
Pennsylvania.46 As an alternative, the court offered the defendant a
choice between allowing the plea to stand and accepting the sentence
as imposed, or withdrawing the plea.47
38. Id. at 442, 450 A.2d at 492.
39. Id. at 446, 450 A.2d at 494.
40. 40 Md. App. at 592, 392 A.2d 1157 (1978).
41. Id. at 591-92, 392 A-2d at 1157.
42. Id. at 592-93, 595, 392 A.2d at 1157, 1160.
43. Id. at 596-97, 392 A.2d at 1160.
44. Id. at 597, 392 A.2d at 1160.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 597-98, 392 A.2d at 1160.
47. Id. at 599, 392 A.2d at 1161.
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-The court began its analysis of
Parker8 with an examination of the lower court's reliance on Gantt v.
State.49 In Gantt, the Court of Special Appeals held that a defendant
on parole was still serving a sentence for the purpose of imposing a
consecutive sentence.5 0 The Gantt court reasoned that a paroled pris-
oner "is actually serving a sentence outside the prison walls," and
noted the possibility that a paroled defendant sentenced to a consecu-
tive sentence may, until the completion of the first sentence, remain
free from physical restraint."1
The Parker court characterized this reasoning in Gantt as "over-
simplistic" and "illogical."5 2 Specifically, the court concluded that a
literal interpretation of Gantt would not only render meaningless the
notion of "constructive paroles" 3 but would compel a result "at odds
with the notion of dual sovereignty."51 In light of this conclusion, the
Parker court disapproved Gantt to the extent it treated time spent on
parole and time spent in prison identically in the context of multiple
sentences.5 5
The court then examined the specific issues of the case: (1) the
authority of the sentencing judge to approve the plea agreement di-
recting that Parker's sentence be served in a federal institution, (2)
the correctional authorities' ability to reclaim custody of the defend-
48. Before addressing the merits of the case, the court dealt with the defendant's mo-
ton to dismiss. Parker, 334 Md. at 584, 640 A.2d at 1108. Parker asserted that because
subsequent to his parole he had been arrested and re-incarcerated in federal prison for
multiple parole violations, the issue of Maryland's right to custody was moot. Id. The
court agreed that the case no longer presented an immediate controversy, but it decided to
consider the matter of the plea agreement under the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" exception to the moomess doctrine. Id. (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-
400 (1975)). Because in Parker's case "(1) the challenged action was too short in its dura-
tion to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again,"
id. at 585, 640 A.2d at 1108, the court denied the motion to dismiss for moomess. Id. at
586, 640 A.2d at 1109.
49. Id.; see 81 Md. App. 653, 569 A.2d 220 (1990).
50. 81 Md. App. at 660, 569 A.2d at 224.
51. Id. at 661, 569 A.2d at 224.
52. Parker, 334 Md. at 598, 640 A.2d at 1110.
53. Constructive parole permits an individual who is sentenced to consecutive
sentences to be constructively paroled from one sentence so as to begin serving the subse-
quent sentences. See id. at 580, 640 A.2d at 1110.
54. Id. at 588-89, 640 A.2d at 1110. The court explained that if a defendant were sen-
tenced to life inJurisdiction A and paroled, what would happen if he committed an offense
in Jurisdiction B while on parole? Under the reasoning in Gantt, Jurisdiction B would
effectively lose the right to sentence the defendant to a consecutive sentence. As a result,
thejurisdiction could be deprived of its right to punish, a right "essential to an independ-
ent sovereign." Id. at 589, 640 A.2d at 1110.
55. Id. at 591, 640 A.2d at 1111.
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ant following his release on federal parole, and (3) the effect of the
plea agreement.56 To address the first issue, the court looked to Arti-
cle 27, Section 690 of the Maryland Code and concluded that judges
do not have the authority to designate an institution, but must instead
"sentence such persons to the jurisdiction of the Division of Correc-
tions."5 7 The court concluded that by his designation of where Parker
would serve, the trial judge stepped beyond his authority not only with
respect to the powers of the judicial branch, but also with respect to
the jurisdiction of a completely independent sovereign, the federal
government.5
8
Citing case law from other jurisdictions, the court asserted that
concurrent sentences do not require the second sentencing sovereign
to forfeit the jurisdiction or authority necessary to regain custody.59
The court found no authority for the conclusion that "'serving the
balance of his [federal sentence of] twenty years on parole will satisfy
[Parker's] Maryland sentence."'6 ° Instead, the court asserted that the
Maryland Division of Corrections retained the penal jurisdiction and
the independent authority to enforce the sentence.61
The conclusion that parole from a concurrent federal sentence
did not deprive Maryland of jurisdiction over Parker brought the
court to consider the effect of an unauthorized, unenforceable plea
bargain that promised service in the federal correctional system.62
The court acknowledged that Parker bargained for service of his sen-
tence in federal custody in order to ensure his safety.65 The court
further agreed that this safety concern was in fact "a material element"
56. Id. at 591-92, 640 A.2d at 1111.
57. Id. at 592, 640 A.2d at 1112. In the federal system the Attorney General determines
the location of service under 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a): "A person convicted of an offense
against the United States shall be committed, for such term of imprisonment as the court
may direct, to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States, who shall designate
the place of confinement where the sentence shall be served." United States v. Eastman,
758 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1985).
58. Parker, 334 Md. at 592, 601-02, 640 A.2d at 1112, 1116. The court noted that the
sentencing judge retained only the power to determine the length and type of sentence
and to order the sentence be served consecutively or concurrently to an already existing
sentence. Id. at 593, 640 A.2d at 1112.
59. Id. at 593-95, 640 A.2d at 1112-13. The court concluded that a Maryland sentence
designated as concurrent with a federal sentence may be satisfied either by imprisonment
in federal custody or in Maryland custody, or by parole by Maryland authorities, but not by
parole from the concurrent federal sentence. Id.; see also State ex reL Bartle v. State, 501 So.
2d 260, 263 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
60. Parker, 334 Md. at 595, 640 A.2d at 1113 (quoting State v. Parker, 93 Md. App. 597,
603, 613 A.2d 1020, 1023 (1992)).
61. Id. at 593, 640 A.2d at 1112.




of the plea agreement.64 The court then turned to the remedies avail-
able under this unenforceable and unfulfillable agreement.6"
The Parker court first considered the remedy of specific perform-
ance66 but rejected it because the original promise upon which the
defendant relied cannot legally be fulfilled.6 7 The court further delin-
eated between "unfulfillable bargains" arising out of excess
prosecutorial discretion and those simply beyond the power of the
court to enforce.68 In the court's opinion, this latter reason made
specific performance in Parker impossible.69
To fashion an alternative remedy, the court relied on the Rojas
and Johnson decisions70 to suggest that when a court lacks the author-
ity to specifically perform, it should offer the defendant the choice
either to withdraw the plea or allow the sentence to stand as it had
been interpreted. 7' As a result, the court reversed the judgment of
the Court of Special Appeals and remanded the case for further
consideration.
72
4. Analysis.-The court's holding in Parker represents a depar-
ture from the spirit of Santobello and the recent trend that favors the
award of specific performance despite the unenforceability of a plea
agreement. As a consequence, Parker did not receive an adequate
consideration of his rights under the agreement. As precedent, the
Parker decision will undermine confidence in the use of plea agree-
ments as an effective resolution to criminal proceedings.
a. Contract Analysis and Due Process.-In its analysis of the
limitations on a sentencing judge's authority, the Parker court failed to
confront the nature of the defendant's understanding of and reliance
on the sentencing judge's unauthorized promise. Rather, the court
focused its plea bargain analysis upon Maryland's sovereign authority
64. Id.
65. Id. See generally James M. Smith & William P. Dale, Note, The Legitimation of Plea
Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771, 784 (1973).
66. Parker, 334 Md. at 598, 640 A.2d at 1115.
67. Id. at 601, 640 A.2d at 1116.
68. Id. at 601-02, 640 A.2d at 1116-17.
69. Id. at 602, 640 A.2d at 1117. The court added that it "simply cannot order federal
authorities to keep Parker in prison so that he may serve his state sentence after the federal
Parole Commission has decided to parole Parker from his federal sentence." Id.
70. Id. at 603-07, 640 A.2d 1117-19; see supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
71. Parker, 334 Md. at 607, 640 A.2d at 1119; see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
263 (1971) (granting courts the discretion to choose the best remedy given the circum-
stances of each case).
72. Parker, 334 Md. at 607, 640 A.2d at 1119.
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to imprison and parole prisoners sentenced under state law.7" This
latter analysis preserves the Division of Corrections' exclusive right to
make parole decisions in the state and protects the concept of con-
structive parole.74 Such reasoning parallels precedent by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which noted, " [w] hile
the situs of the institution determines which parole board shall have
supervisory jurisdiction over the prisoner, the designation of the place
of confinement in no way determines which parole laws shall apply. 75
To the extent that the court addressed the relationship between the
sentencing judge and the Division of Corrections' respective authority
over parole decisions, Parker's argument that the sentencing judge
intended the state and federal sentences to be coterminous received
little attention.
Underlying the court's focus upon the State's position was a con-
cern that by allowing Parker to remain free on federal parole the de-
fendant received "much more than he bargained for" while the state
did not get the "full benefit of its bargain."76 As the decision stands,
however, the state received much more than it bargained for: the
benefit of Parker's testimony plus the imposition of a separate Mary-
land sentence or the chance to retry the case.7 7 Conversely, despite
fulfilling his end of the bargain, Parker received less than what he
bargained for: a Maryland sentence coterminous with federal
imprisonment.
If the court had adopted a fairness and equity analysis, as used in
Brockman,7 8 instead of a strict contract analysis, a different result
would have occurred. This conclusion is reinforced by the Brockman
court's prior acknowledgement that a strict application of contract law
is not in itself dispositive of plea bargains.79 Mostjurisdictions likewise
recognize a qualified application of contract law.8" Rather than ex-
amine a bargain that involved, in addition to other consideration, the
73. See id. at 594-96, 640 A.2d at 1113-14.
74. If the court found otherwise, prisoners would be denied the ability to receive pa-
role from one sentence for the purpose of beginning to serve another consecutive sen-
tence. See Hines v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole, 420 A.2d 381 (Pa. 1980).
75. Gilstrap v. Clemmer, 284 F.2d 804, 808 (4th Cir. 1960).
76. Parker, 334 Md. at 603, 640 A.2d at 1117.
77. See id. at 607, 640 A.2d at 1119.
.78. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 697, 357 A-2d 376, 382-83 (1976).
79. Id.
80. See Kolsky, supra note 33, at 928-29 nn.1322-23. For a discussion of the various
contractual analyses to plea bargain agreements, see William M. Ejzak, Plea Bargains and
Nonprosecution Agreements: What Interests Should be Protected when Prosecutors Renege?, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REv. 107, 116-20; see also Smith & Dale, supra note 65, at 786 (noting the voluntary
character of a plea bargain as the consideration for the agreement).
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waiver of Parker's constitutional rights,81 the court myopically focused
on the materiality of an unenforceable promise and made no refer-
ence to Parker's detrimental reliance. Other jurisdictions place em-
phasis on the defendant's reliance on the promise and find that, at a
minimum, it gives rise to a contractual right to sue the state for spe-
cific performance. 82 Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit asserted that there is "authority to go beyond
contract analysis in a situation in which this type of analysis would not
have protected the defendant adequately."8"
In contrast to most other jurisdictions, the Parker court chose not
to examine or comment on the voluntariness of the plea.84 By over-
looking the element of voluntariness, the Parker court evaded consid-
eration of the potential involuntary waiver of the defendant's
constitutional rights. 5 While it may be sufficient to say that the trial
court lacked authority to make the plea agreement, the difficulty with
this abbreviated analysis is that it stops short of any meaningful reflec-
tion on the defendant, the importance of the plea to him, and his
detrimental reliance on it. A fuller examination would necessarily
move the court into a constitutional analysis of the rights of the de-
fendant. A constitutional analysis, moreover, would be in line with
the Brockman court's proclamation that "the standard to be applied in
plea negotiations is one of fair play and equity . .. which, although
entailing certain contract concepts, is to be distinguished from.., the
strict application of the common law principles of contracts."86 AsJus-
tice Douglas noted in his Santobello concurrence, the defendant's
wishes should control since he is the one whose "fundamental rights
81. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
82. Smith & Dale, supra note 65, at 784-85.
83. Judith A. Wood, Note, Constitution Held to Afford Criminal Defendants a Right to Spe-
cific Peiformance of Plea Proposals Under Appropriate Circumstances, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 295, 300
(1980) (analyzing Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 17 (4th Cir. 1979)).
84. But cf. Johnson v. State, 40 Md. App. 591, 597, 392 A.2d 1157, 1160 (1978). The
concurring opinion in Santobello noted the frequency with which the lower courts use the
voluntariness analysis: "[t]he lower courts, however, have uniformly held that a prisoner is
entitled to some form of relief when he shows that the prosecutor reneged on his sentenc-
ing agreement made in connection with a plea bargain, most jurisdictions preferring vaca-
tion of the plea on the ground of'involuntariness.'" 404 U.S. 257, 266 (1971) (Douglas,J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
85. In his concurring opinion in Santobello, Justice Douglas referred to the guilty plea
as a waiver of rights to ajury trial, to protection against self-incrimination, and to confront
witnesses. 404 U.S. at 266; see also Ejzak, supra note 80, at 110.
86. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 696, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976).
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[were] flouted by a prosecutor's breach." 7 In Parker, the defendant's
position was never adequately considered.88
b. Impact of Parker.-The shortcomings of Parker are not
limited to an incomplete consideration of the defendant's rights; it
also failed to promulgate safeguards for future plea agreements and
sent a negative message to defendants who wish to plea bargain. Had
the sentencing judge included in Parker's commitment papers a pre-
cautionary provision relating to the parties' rights in the event the
prisoner was paroled from the federal system, both the state and the
defendant would have been protected.8 9 The Parker decision provides
no clear guidance to avoid this problem in future cases. More impor-
tantly, the court offers no incentives for the prosecution or the judge
to avoid such a plea agreement because the prosecutor has received
the benefit of the bargain for relatively little consideration. This re-
sult will send a foreboding message to all defendants considering plea
agreements: The court recognizes the plea agreement as a tool of the
state to be used for its benefit, regardless of the defendant's expecta-
tions and constitutional concerns.
The court's avoidance of specific performance because it "would
infringe on the exclusive statutory authority and discretion of the Pa-
role Commission and effectively cede the state's penal jurisdiction to
federal parole authorities"9" is unsatisfactory. The court could have
delivered effective specific performance that met the defendant's ex-
pectations by granting the prejudiced defendant a remedy that would
put him and the state in similarly benefited positions. In essence,
Parker agreed to do time only in a federal penitentiary. Under the
Maryland rules, the " 'court may modify or reduce or strike, but may
not increase the length of a sentence' once a sentence has been im-
87. 404 U.S. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring).
88. The court's failure to consider the defendant is underscored by the ease with which
the court overcame a reasonable moomess argument. See Parker, 334 Md. at 584-85, 640
A.2d at 1108. The court also ruled upon the plea agreement issue without giving the de-
fendant the opportunity to brief the arguments fully. Id. at 596-97, 640 A.2d at 1114.
89. In People v. Lewis, 564 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1977), the Supreme Court of Colorado
faced the same kind of dilemma when a sentencing judge ordered that Lewis's sentence
run concurrent to a sentence he was already serving in Nebraska. Id. at 112. The court
ruled that there was a defect in the sentencing for failure to provide for the possibility of
early release from the underlying sentence. Id. at 114. The court went on the specify that
the sentencing order should have specified that Colorado retained jurisdiction and the
right to imprison the defendant for any remaining length of the original sentence the state
shall deem appropriate. Il at 115.
90. Parker, 334 Md. at 607, 640 A.2d at 1119.
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posed."91 Accordingly, to fulfill its end of the bargain, the state could
be ordered to: (1) reduce his sentence to time served, (2) commute
the sentence, (3) direct the balance of Parker's sentence be served in
the federal system, or (4) remand the case with specific instructions
for the Department of Corrections and the court to construct a new
solution in the spirit of the original agreement. But the court offered
no such guidance; instead, it remanded the case and left the defend-
ant to choose between two unbargained for options.
In circumstances where the original bargain cannot be fulfilled
by the state, other jurisdictions have gone so far as to dismiss a case on
these grounds.92 The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that where a prosecutor strikes a deal with a criminal
defendant but avoids the state's commitments and where the defend-
ant has performed his obligations under the contract, the proper rem-
edy may include dismissal of the indictment.9" In this context,
specific performance is especially important when the defendant can-
not be restored to status quo ante. 94 In State v. Poole,95 the Maryland
Court of Appeals found that because the defendant performed his
part of the bargain and it was "irreversible," the court had bound itself
to the plea agreement.96 To the extent that Parker's testimony is
"irreversible," the court should be bound to at least attempt to deliver
effective specific performance. Interestingly, the Poole court stated
that once a court accepts a bargain, it cannot later go back and refuse
91. State v. Sayre, 314 Md. 559, 560, 552 A.2d 553, 553 (1989) (quoting MD. R. 4-
345(b) (1988)). The Rojas court also noted that when a sentence has an unenforceable
term, remand for resentencing is a viable alternative. Rojas v. State, 52 Md. App. 440, 446,
450 A.2d 490, 494 (1978).
92. See, e.g., People v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356, 357 (Colo. 1988). In Palermo v. Warden,
an unfulfillable plea agreement case, a federal district court ordered the unconditional
release of the defendant due to the government's failure to live up to its promise to grant
early parole. 412 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 545 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1976).
93. United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742, 747 (D.D.C. 1969).
94. Smith & Dale, supra note 65, at 794.
95. 321 Md. 483, 583 A.2d 265 (1991).
96. Id. at 497, 583 A.2d at 272; see also Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862, 871 (5th
Cir. 1975) (finding that the prosecution should have at least attempted to live up to the
bargain).
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to carry it out.9 7 This responsibility to fulfill an agreement, moreover,
extends not only to the state but to the court as well. 98
The impact of Parker may well have a chilling effect upon defend-
ants' willingness to enter into plea agreements. Defendants may
choose not to turn state's evidence because their fear of retaliation
outweighs the uncertainty of the state's promises. Given the fre-
quency in which pleas are used to dispose of criminal cases, the im-
pact of fewer plea agreements could significantly harm the state's
ability to expedite criminal cases. Finally, the Parker decision may neg-
atively affect the credibility of the courts and the prosecution in the
plea bargaining process.99
c. Remedy.-The court's remedy in Parker relied on two cases
which do not fully support its conclusion. To establish the legal foun-
dation for its solution, the Parker court looked to Rojas v. State and
Johnson v. State.' Several key facts and reasoning, however, distin-
guish both Rojas and Johnson from Parker and suggest that a more faith-
ful application of their precedent would have resulted in a more
generous remedy for the defendant.
In Rojas, the defendant unilaterally broke his bargain and did not
have to provide testimony,1"' whereas, in Parker the defendant fulfilled
his end of the bargain while the court failed to meet its promise to the
defendant."0 2 In Rojas the court chose a remedy that would put "the
parties in their original positions, unprejudiced by the mistake of
97. Pooe, 321 Md. at 497, 583 A.2d at 272.
We cannot allow the court to renege on its effective acceptance of the plea agree-
ment as conveyed through its conduct, and then simply offer the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas. Nor do we envision a similar situation in
which we would permit a trial court to place its imprimatur on a plea agreement,
but later withdraw its approval and force the defendant to go to trial.
Id.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that if the court accepts a plea
agreement, "the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and
sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement." FED. R. CruM. P. 11 (e) (3)
(Supp. 1993).
98. Pooe, 321 Md. at 497, 583 A.2d at 272.
99. See Paul A.S. Spiegel, Note, People v. Calloway: A Restriction of Remedies for Broken
Plea Bargains, 70 CAL. L. Riw. 1091, 1105 (1982) (identifying one of the benefits of granting
specific performance as the encouragement of "actual and perceivedjudicial responsibility
in the plea bargaining process").
100. Parker, 334 Md. at 694-95, 640 A.2d at 1117-18; see supra notes 35-47 and accompany-
ing text.
101. Rojas v. State, 52 Md. App. 440, 444, 450 A.2d 490, 493 (1978).
102. Parker, 334 Md. at 581, 640 A.2d at 1106.
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law."103 Because there was no way to take back the testimony the de-
fendant had offered as well as the time already served, the option of
returning Parker to his original position was impossible. The court
has created a situation in which the state can avoid its promises to the
defendant and still gain the benefit of its bargain. This outcome is
difficult to reconcile with Rojas, especially given that court's observa-
tion that both the state and the defendant are "mutually entitled to
the benefit of the bargain."10 4
Finally, the Rojas court justified its decision by noting that vacat-
ing the sentence "protects the appellant's constitutional rights... and
protects the State's interest in public safety."1"' The Parker court, how-
ever, failed to demonstrate how the defendant's options to serve time
in Maryland or stand retrial protected his constitutional rights and
assured the receipt of something in exchange for his contribution to
the plea agreement.
The Parker court's reliance on the Johnson case was similarly mis-
placed. The Johnson court vacated an unfulfillable sentence because it
left the defendant facing no greater penalty than he would have origi-
nally faced without a plea.0 6 In Parker, however, the defendant bar-
gained for his safety in a federal prison and nothing short of keeping
him out of the Maryland system could remedy the situation. The
Parker court's reliance on Johnson is inappropriate because the defend-
ants were not in similarly situated positions that would justify the im-
position of identical remedies. Parker could not be returned to his
original position nor receive the benefit of his bargain under the John-
son rationale.
5. Conclusion.-The Supreme Court has noted that ultimately
there must be "fairness in securing agreement between an accused
and a prosecutor" if the benefits of the plea agreement are to be real-
ized.1 7 The Court further warned that the process "must be attended
by safeguards to ensure the defendant what is reasonably due in the
[varying] circumstances."10 8 The Court of Appeals in Brockman stated
that "the standard to be applied to plea negotiations is one of fair play
103. Rojas, 52 Md. App. at 446, 450 A.2d at 494. Because its sentence could not be
carried out, the Rojas court vacated the sentence and remanded the case. Id. at 443, 450
A.2d at 493. In Parker, the defendant had already served 11 years of a 20-year sentence.
104. Id. at 445, 450 A.2d at 494.
105. Id. at 446, 450 A.2d at 494.
106. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
107. Santobelo, 404 U.S. at 261.
108. Id. at 262; see also Spiegel, supra note 99, at 1101.
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and equity under the facts and circumstances of the case." 10 9 The de-
fendant who relies on a plea agreement should be protected and pro-
vided a reasonable remedy in the case of breach, regardless of the
validity of the promise. As it would be impossible to return the de-
fendant in Parker to the status quo ante, the court should have pro-
vided an effective equivalent of specific performance and vacated the
remainder of the defendant's sentence. Such a remedy would have
fulfilled the requirement of fairness as well as respected the terms of
the plea agreement and preserved the defendant's constitutional
rights.
LAURA L. SWARTZ
C. Introduction of a Mistake of Age Defense to a
Child Pornography Prosecution
In Outmezguine v. State,1 the Court of Appeals held that Article 27,
Section 419A(c) of the Maryland Code2 does not include knowledge
of the child's age as an element of the offense of child pornography.3
The court also concluded that in the absence of a statutory prohibi-
tion, a reasonable mistake of age defense would be available against a
prosecution under Section 419A(c). 4 The court rejected the defend-
ant's constitutional scienter arguments and held "that the First
Amendment does not require knowledge of the minor's age to be an
element of the crime ... nor does it require a reasonable mistake of
age defense."5 Thus, the Outmezguine decision represents a continua-
tion of the court's practice ofjudicial deference to the General Assem-
bly in the area of strict liability crimes.6
1. The Case. -In December 1990, Jennifer H., then fifteen years
old, posed for a series of photographs taken by Elan Outmezguine.7
109. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 697, 357 A.2d 376, 382-83 (1976).
1. 335 Md. 20, 641 A.2d 870 (1994).
2. Section 419A(c) makes it a crime to "photograph[ ] or film[ I a minor engaging in
an obscene act or engaging in sexual conduct. . . ." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A(c)
(1992). A "minor" is "an individual under 18 years of age." Id. § 419A(a). "Sexual con-
duct" is defined, in part, as "any touching of or contact with genitals, pubic areas or but-
tocks of the human male or female, or the breasts of the female .... " Id. § 416A(d).
3. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 45, 641 A.2d at 882-83.
4. Id. at 45-49, 641 A.2d at 883-85. The court noted that the defendant failed to pre-
serve the issue for appeal, see ii at 47, 641 A.2d at 883, rendering the discussion dicta.
5. Id. at 40-41, 641 A.2d at 880.
6. See Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 587, 632 A.2d 797, 805 (1993) (asserting that
modifications in such laws "should properly result from an act of the Legislature itself,
rather than judicial fiat."); see also infra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
7. Outmeqguine, 335 Md. at 25, 641 A.2d at 873.
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Jennifer modelled various items of revealing lingerie." Police later dis-
covered the resulting photographs while executing a search warrant.9
Among the photographs seized were several depicting Jennifer en-
gaged in "sexual conduct."1 °
Outmezguine's primary defense was factual: that he was not the
individual who photographed Jennifer. " He also offered an alterna-
tive, essentially legal argument: that knowledge of the child's age is a
necessary element of the offense, and that the State did not allege or
prove that Outmezguine knew Jennifer's age.12 After a two-day trial,
Outmezguine was convicted and sentenced to eight years
imprisonment.
1 3
Outmezguine appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, which affirmed the conviction. 4 The Court of Appeals granted
certiorari "to consider whether 'scienter [is] an element of the offense
of photographing a minor' under § 419A(c)."15
2. Legal Background.-
a. Protected Speech and the Overbreadth Doctrine.--Section
419A(c) of Article 27 makes it a felony to record a visual representa-
tion of "a minor engaging in an obscene act or engaging in sexual
conduct."' 6 Because the statute criminalizes a form of expression,
constitutional concerns are raised.1 7 As the Supreme Court noted:
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment
needs breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict
or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be
narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judg-
ment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to
other compelling needs of society. 8
8. Id.
9. Id. at 26, 641 A.2d at 873.
10. Id.; see supra note 2.
11. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 27, 641 A.2d at 873.
12. Id., 641 A.2d at 873-74. At no time, however, did Outmezguine proffer evidence of
any kind suggesting that he had any reason to think Jennifer might be 18 years of age or
older. See id, at 27, 641 A.2d at 874.
13. Id. at 23, 641 A.2d at 872.
14. Outmnezguine v. State, 97 Md. App. 151, 170, 627 A.2d 541, 550 (1993).
15. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 24, 641 A.2d at 872 (citations omitted).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A(c) (1992).
17. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) ("[T]he Fourteenth
Amendment requires that regulation by the States of obscenity conform to procedures that
will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often
separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line.").
18. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973).
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The First Amendment's protection does not encompass material
which is deemed obscene. 9 In Miller v. California,2" the Court enunci-
ated the current standard.2" In New York v. Ferber,22 child pornography
was similarly deemed to be outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment.23 Because the restrictions in Section 419A(c) are not limited to
unprotected expression,24 the statute may be examined for
overbreadth.25
The overbreadth doctrine permits a litigant to raise vicariously
the constitutional rights of third parties "because of a judicial predic-
tion or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech
or expression." 26 A successful invocation of the doctrine to void a law
requires "that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well,judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." 27 The burden falls upon "the person whose conduct is legiti-
mately proscribable, and who seeks to invalidate the entire law be-
cause of its application to someone else, to 'demonstrate from the text
of [the law] and from actualfacf that substantial overbreadth exists."28
19. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically
settled by this Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
20. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
21. The Miller test for obscenity has three elements: "whether 'the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest ... ; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id. at
24 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). A thorough historical out-
line of obscenity jurisprudence in Maryland was authored by Judge Wilner in 400 E. 19alti-
more Street, Inc. v. State, 49 Md. App. 147, 154-68, 431 A.2d 682, 686-94 (1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 940 (1982).
22. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
23. Id. at 764. The Court utilized the Miller standard to facilitate its discussion of what
constitutes child pornography. Id.
24. Section 419A(c) is not limited to obscenity, but extends its prohibition to photo-
graphs or films depicting "sexual conduct." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A(c) (1992).
25. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973).
26. Id. at 612; see also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
27. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615; see also Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 465, 569 A.2d 604,
618 (1990) ("[A] court should not resort to [the overbreadth doctrine] unless there is a
realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized first amend-
ment protection of parties not before the court.") (citation omitted).
28. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 590 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (quoting New York State Club Ass'n v. New York City, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988))
(emphasis added in Oakes).
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Previously, the Supreme Court has rejected overbreadth attacks on
state child pornography statutes. 9
b. Strict Liability Offenses and Judicial Deference. -At common
law, it was axiomatic that a crime was committed only if there was a
concurrence of mens rea and actus reus.3° With the industrialization of
American society, however, came a legislative movement to regulate
various "activities that affect public health, safety or welfare." 1 The
newly-created public welfare offense statutes3 2 were an "exercise of
what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute is
evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than
the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se." 3 Conse-
quently, courts were willing to accept prosecutions predicated solely
upon a wrongful act without regard to a defendant's mental state.34
By the middle of the twentieth century, the judicial practice of defer-
ence to a legislature's purposes in order to interpret the elements of a
crime was well-settled. 5
29. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 122 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773
(1982).
30. The notion has been expressed:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (foomote omitted).
31. Id. at 254.
32. See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. Rrv. 55 (1933) (tracing the
early development of these statutory offenses). For ajudicial examination of the history of
this jurisprudential area, see Justice Jackson's discussion in Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-62.
33. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
34. See id. at 254. "Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent
seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the
drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided." Id.; see also
United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922) (holding that an indictment for a
statutory offense that does not include an element of knowledge need not charge
knowledge).
35. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) ("Regard for [legislative]
purposes should infuse construction of the legislation if it is to be treated as a working
instrument of government and not merely as a collection of English words."); see also Moris-
sette, 342 U.S. at 262 (holding that although not explicitly mentioned in the statute, intent
is a necessary element of a prosecution for theft of property belonging to the United
States). In Morissette, the Court was willing to read a mens rea requirement into the statute
because the underlying offense was, effectively, common law larceny. In distinguishing
Balint and Behrman, the Morissette Court remarked:
Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely adopting into fed-
eral statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in common law and
statutory interpretation by the states may warrant quite contrary inferences than
the same silence in creating an offense new to general law, for whose definition
the courts have no guidance except the act.
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Maryland's law has evolved in a similar fashion. In the past six
years, the Court of Appeals has examined several statutory crimes to
determine the necessity of a mens rea element.36 In Dawkins v. State,37
the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled dangerous
substance and of controlled paraphernalia."8 The Court reversed the
conviction, holding that a prosecution under Section 287 of Article 27
requires the state to prove "a 'knowing' possession on the part of the
accused." 9 To reach its conclusion, the Court closely examined the
statute and the legislature's purpose in enacting it.4
0
In State v. McCallum,41 the defendant was convicted of driving
with a suspended license and sentenced to one year of incarceration
with all but ninety days suspended.42 The Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction and concluded that the offense in question was not a
strict liability offense because it was "both regulatory and punitive,"
the punishment was significant, and because a defendant could not
avoid violating the statute if he did not know his license was sus-
pended.43 Thus, proof of mens rea was required.'
In Garnett v. State,4" the defendant was convicted of second de-
gree rape.46 The court traced contemporary scholarly criticism of
Id. at 262. Thus, examined together, Balint, Behiman, Dotterweich, and Morissette represent a
consistent approach to the examination of the need for a mental element in a statutory
offense.
36. See, e.g., Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993) (second-degree rape);
Anderson v. State, 328 Md. 426, 614 A.2d 963 (1992) (carrying a concealed dangerous
weapon); State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 583 A.2d 250 (1991) (per curiam) (driving
while license suspended); Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988) (possession
of controlled dangerous substances).
37. 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988).
38. Id. at 640, 547 A.2d at 1042; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287(a) & (d) (1992).
39. Dawkins, 313 Md. at 649, 547 A.2d at 1046.
40. Id. at 649-51, 547 A.2d at 1046-47. The Dawkins court overruled its earlier ruling in
Jenkins v. State, 215 Md. 70, 137 A.2d 115 (1957) (holding that knowledge of the contents
of a package containing narcotics was not an element of the possession offense). In large
part, this about-face was the result of the evolution of the statute governing the possession
of controlled substances. The revised statute, unlike that under which Jenkins was
charged, had "It]he purpose of imposing a penalty upon possession of narcotics... to
punish and deter immoral behavior having serious consequences, rather than to merely
regulate conduct." Dawkins, 313 Md. at 651, 547 A.2d at 1047. Thus, the court's shift is
consistent with its preference to recognize legislative intent.
41. 321 Md. 451, 583 A.2d 250 (1991) (per curiam).
42. I& at 452, 583 A.2d at 250.
43. Id. at 456-57, 583 A.2d at 252-53.
44. Id. at 457, 583 A.2d at 253.
45. 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993).
46. Id. at 575, 632 A.2d at 799. Under Maryland law, "A person is guilty of rape in the
second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person .... Who
is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least four years older than
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strict liability crimes4 7 and noted the acceptance by many state legisla-
tures and appellate courts of mistake of age defenses in similar prose-
cutions.48 The court then explored the plain language of the statute
and its legislative history and concluded that "the current law imposes
strict liability on its violators."49 Although troubled by a harsh result,
the court strongly maintained that the judiciary will defer to the legis-
lature's purpose when determining whether a statutory offense re-
quires proof of knowledge.5 °
c. Statutory Interpretation and the Legislative History of May-
land's Child Pornography Statute.-The paramount judicial goal in the
construction of a statute "is to ascertain and effectuate legislative in-
tention."5 1 The "first recourse in doing so is to the words of the stat-
ute, giving them their ordinary and natural import."52 Nevertheless,
this "plain-meaning rule does not force [the court] to read legislative
provisions in rote fashion and in isolation."53  Instead, the court
should "construe statutory language in light of the Legislature's gen-
eral purpose and in the context of the statute as a whole,"54 with re-
course to legislative history when appropriate.55
the victim." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(a) (1992). Violation of the statute can be pun-
ished by up to twenty years in prison. Id. § 463(b).
The facts of Garnett were striking. The defendant was a 20-year-old retarded man, with
an I.Q. of 52 and the social skills of an 11-year-old boy. Garnett, 332 Md. at 574, 632 A.2d at
798. The victim was 13 years old; however, both she and her friends had told Garnett that
she was 16. Id. at 577, 632 A.2d at 800. The defendant entered the victim's room at the
latter's invitation, and the intercourse was consensual. Id. Garnett received a sentence of
five years incarceration, which the trial court suspended and replaced with five years of
probation; both the sentence and the conviction were affirmed. It. at 575, 632 A.2d at 799.
47. Id. at 578-82, 632 A.2d at 800-02.
48. Id. at 582-84, 632 A.2d at 802-03.
49. Id. at 587, 632 A.2d at 804-05.
50. See id. at 588, 632 A.2d at 805 ("[D]efendants in extraordinary cases, like [Garnett],
will rely upon the tempering discretion of the trial court at sentencing.").
51. State v. Crescent City Jaycees Found. Inc., 330 Md. 460, 468, 624 A.2d 955, 959
(1993) (citations omitted).
52. NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 313 Md. 118, 124, 544 A.2d 764, 767
(1993).
53. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). The
court, in attempting to clarify the application of the plain-meaning rule, noted that "the
rule comports with common sense, because what the legislature has written in an effort to
achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal. But the plain-
meaning rule is not rigid." Id.
54. Crescent City Jaycees, 330 Md. at 468, 624 A.2d at 959; see also Williams v. State, 329
Md. 1, 15-16, 616 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1992) ("We attempt to divine legislative intent from the
entire statutory scheme, as opposed to scrutinizing parts of the statute in isolation.").
55. NCR Corp., 313 Md. at 125, 544 A.2d at 767.
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In 1978, the General Assembly passed Maryland's first child por-
nography statute." That law, in part, made it an offense to "photo-
graph or film a person under 16 years of age in an obscene act."5 7 As
the Court of Special Appeals noted, "the Legislature limited the reach
of the statute to conduct or materials that were 'obscene,"' ostensibly
to avoid First Amendment challenges.58 The statute was subsequently
amended twice in response to the Supreme Court's opinion in Fer-
ber,59 first in 1985,60 and again one year later.6"
The most recent amendment to the statute occurred in 1989,
when the age of the victim was changed to eighteen.62 Prior to pas-
sage, the draft amendment "contained a provision that [a] mistake of
age is not a defense to a prosecution under this section' (emphasis ad-
ded), but the legislature deleted that statement... apparently in re-
sponse to a concern registered by a representative of the American
Civil Liberties Union." 5 Additionally, the title of the 1989 bill origi-
nally "provided that the purpose of the bill was, in part, to 'prohibit[ ]
a certain defense to prosecution.'"'4 This language was also deleted.65
Thus, the current version of Section 419A(c) is silent as to a requisite
state of mind for conviction.
56. Ch. 573, 1978 Md. Laws (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A).
57. Id. This initial enactment was, in some respects, similar to the Protection of Chil-
dren Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1988),
which had been passed by Congress three months earlier. See Outmezguine v. State, 97
Md. App. 151, 159-63, 627 A.2d 541, 545-46 (1993). For a discussion of the development of
the federal statutes, see id.; see also United States v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent.
Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d 534, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1988) (examining "whether scienter as to age is
an element of the offense [proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)].").
58. Outmezguine, 97 Md. App. at 162, 627 A.2d at 546.
59. 458 U.S. 747 (1982); see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
60. Ch. 494, 1985 Md. Laws (increasing the applicable penalty, detailing evidentiary
methods, and adding the phrase "sexual conduct").
61. Ch. 112, 1986 Md. Laws (making it criminal to photograph a "person under 16
years of age" performing "sexual conduct").
62. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A (1992). The amendment removed the "person
under 16 years of age" language and replaced it with the word "minor." Id. "Minor" is
defined as "an individual under 18 years of age." Id
63. Outnezguine v. State, 97 Md. App. 151, 165-66, 627 A.2d 541, 548 (1993) (quoting
H.B. 243, 1989 Md. Laws 2). The ACLU took the position that "the bill would unconstitu-
tionally remove any necessity of scienter from the section of the law...." Outmezguine, 335
Md. at 46-47, 641 A.2d at 883.
64. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 46 n.16, 641 A.2d at 883 n.16 (quoting H.B. 243, 1989 Md.
Laws 1).
65. Id. at 47 n.17, 641 A.2d at 883 n.17.
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. Defendant's First Amendment Challeng.-The Court of Ap-
peals first addressed Outmezguine's contention that without a scien-
ter requirement the statute would be unconstitutionally overbroad
and thus facially void. 6 6 Outmezguine asserted that if Section 419A(c)
operates as a strict liability offense, then "a photographer may decide
not to take pictures of adults engaging in nonobscene sexually explicit
conduct because of a fear that a minor, posing as an adult, is the sub-
ject of the photographs."" The issue was whether Section 419A(c),
which proscribes constitutionally unprotected speech,68 would likely
chill protected forms of expression. The court concluded that "the
vast majority of [adult pornographers] would continue to produce
their work even if they were faced with a strict liability child pornogra-
phy statute."6 9 Therefore, the court held that the First Amendment
does not prevent a state from protecting its children against sexual
exploitation with a statute that imposes strict liability upon its
violators.7 °
The court examined opinions from other jurisdictions that have
addressed similar cases 71 and found that knowledge of a minor's age is
not required for a conviction under Section 419A(c). 72 In acknowl-
edgment that the Supreme Court has mandated "some element of sci-
enter,"7 1 the court asserted that under Section 419A the "defendant
photographer must have knowledge that he or she is taking pictures
of sexual conduct as defined in § 416. " 74 Therefore, a sufficient scien-
66. Id. at 34-38, 641 A.2d at 875; see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
67. Outmezguin, 335 Md. at 31, 641 A.2d at 875.
68. "[C] hild pornography... is unprotected speech subject to content-based regula-
tion." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 766 n. 18 (1982); see supra notes 20-25 and accom-
panying text.
69. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 37, 641 A.2d at 878.
70. Id. at 38, 641 A.2d at 878-79.
71. Id. at 38-39, 641 A.2d at 879-80 (citing, inter alia, United States v. United States Dist.
Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d 534, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that "knowl-
edge of the minor's age is not necessary for a conviction under section 2251 (a) [producing
materials depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct]."); Hicks v. State, 561 So.
2d 1284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that ignorance of a victim's age is not a defense
to a charge of using a minor in a sexual performance); State v. Fan, 445 N.W.2d 243
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding "that the first amendment does not preclude strict liability
[for an offense of employing or permitting a minor to engage in sexual performance]")).
72. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 40-41, 641 A.2d at 880.
73. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982).
74. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 40, 641 A.2d at 880.
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ter element exists within Section 419A to satisfy the requirement of
Ferber.75
b. Strict Liability Precedent and Legislative Intent. -Historically,
the Court of Appeals has read a scienter element into statutory of-
fenses.76 But the court distinguished Outmezguine from this precedent
by focusing upon legislative intent. In Dawkins77 and McCallum,78 for
example, the court concluded that the legislature "intended to pro-
vide a mens rea requirement" despite the absence of such a term in the
statute. 79 The court was unwilling, however, to draw a similar conclu-
sion about the legislature's purpose in drafting Section 419A(c).80 In-
stead, the court found similarities in the legislative purposes of the
statutes in question in Outmezguine and Garnett v. State' and followed
Garnett's call for deference to the legislature.82
The court examined the language of Section 419A(c) to see if
knowledge of the victim's age was intended as an affirmative element
of the offense,83 and to determine if a mistake of age defense was
available to one charged with the offense.84 Because Section 419A(c)
is silent as to the requisite mental state,85 the court examined other
subsections of 419A to discern the legislature's intent.86 As both sub-
sections (b)8 7 and (d)88 of 419A explicitly require knowledge, the
court concluded that "the Legislature deliberately and purposefully
chose not to make knowledge of the child's age an element of the
75. Id.; see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974) (determining that it is
sufficient for an obscenity prosecution to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the
general "character and nature of the materials," and therefore unnecessary to show knowl-
edge that they were legally obscene).
76. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
77. 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988); see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
78. 321 Md. 451, 583 A.2d 250 (1991); see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
79. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 42, 641 A.2d at 881.
80. Id. at 41-43, 641 A.2d at 881. "[W]e are unable to say that the Legislature intended
to include a requirement that the State affirmatively prove that a photographer or film-
maker of child pornography had knowledge of the child's minority." Id. at 42-43, 641 A.2d
at 881.
81. 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993); see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
82. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 43-44, 641 A.2d at 881-82.
83. Id. at 41-43, 641 A.2d at 881-83.
84. Id at 43-45, 641 A.2d at 883-84.
85. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A(c) (1992).
86. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
87. Section 419A(b), in pertinent part, makes it illegal to "knowingly permit[ ] a minor
to engage as a subject in the production of obscene matter or... sexual conduct .... "
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A(b) (1992).
88. Section 419A(d) prohibits "knowingly promot[ing], distribut[ing], or possess[ing]
with intent to distribute any matter ... that depicts a minor engaged as a subject in sexual
conduct." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A(d) (1992).
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crime [in subsection (c)].'89 The court also noted that at the time of
the original enactment, the General Assembly had surveyed other
child pornography bills, several of which had express knowledge re-
quirements.9 ° It therefore concluded "that knowledge as to the mi-
nor's age is not an element of the offense."9"
The second part of the legislative intent analysis concentrated
upon the 1989 amendment of the statute.92 The court inferred from
the removal of the prohibition against the mistake of age defense that
the legislature intended to leave the viability of that excuse intact.93
The court concluded that "a defendant indicted under § 419A(c) [is
permitted] to argue that he was reasonably mistaken about a child's
age."94
c. Burden of Proving Mistake of Age and its Inapplicability to Out-
mezguine.-Although the court concluded that scienter is not an ele-
ment of the offense, the court ruled that mistake of age is still a
defense. 95 Outmezguine argued that the two positions were incom-
patible.96 However, the court characterized its determination that
"scienter is not an element but mistake of age is a defense which may
be raised by the defendant" as "not unreasonable."9 7 Both Out-
mezguine and the State agreed that the ultimate burden of persuasion
on this issue cannot be placed upon the defendant.9 Accepting this
position, the court adopted mistake of age procedures, articulated by
Judge Bell in his dissent to Garnett v. State, which state that:
89. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 45, 641 A.2d at 882. The court reinforced this conclusion
by noting the language of Article 27, Section 420. See i& at 45 n.15, 641 A.2d at 882 n.15.
90. Id. at 45, 641 A.2d at 882; see also Outmezguine v. State, 97 Md. App. 151, 162, 627
A.2d 541, 546 (1993) ("The question of whether to include such a requirement was thus
squarely before the Legislature, and, by enacting the bill that it did, it chose not to do
SO.").
91. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 45, 641 A.2d at 882-83.
92. See supra notes 61-65.
93. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 47, 641 A.2d at 883.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 49, 641 A.2d at 884.
96. Id.
97. Id. Outmezguine's position was that a mistake of age defense is possible only when
"a crime involv[es] a culpable mental state.... " Id The court responded that this conten-
tion was "erroneous," but did not expressly elaborate. Id. at 49, 641 A.2d at 885. Effec-
tively, the court's position infers a presumption, not that the defendant had per se
knowledge of the victim's age, but that the defendant intended to make a sexually-explicit,
visual reproduction of a minor. The defendant may produce enough evidence to raise a
mistake of age defense in an effort to rebut the initial presumption. At this point, the state
would assume the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's
knowledge.
98. Id. at 50, 641 A.2d at 885.
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Before the State's burden affirmatively to prove the defend-
ant's mental state kicks in, the defendant must have gener-
ated the issue by producing "some evidence" supporting his
or her claim of mistake of fact. If the defendant generates
the issue, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the act was committed without any mistake of fact-that
the defendant acted intentionally and knowingly.99
4. Analysis.-The primary holding in Outmezguine, that knowl-
edge of the victim's minority is not an element of the offense pro-
scribed by Section 419A(c) of Article 27,100 is a pragmatically
reasoned decision that preserves the legislative intent to create strict
criminal liability while at the same time recognizes the right of a de-
fendant to present a mistake of age defense. The court's conclusion
that First Amendment protections of free expression are not substan-
tially impaired by such an interpretation of Section 419A is supported
by well-established constitutional jurisprudence upholding statutory
proscription of child pornography."' The state's legitimate interest
in protecting children from sexual exploitation is sufficiently compel-
ling to withstand an overbreadth analysis.102 The relative ease with
which pornographers can modify their conduct so as to protect
against criminal liability fortifies the court's interpretation of the
statute. 1
0 3
99. Id. at 51, 641 A.2d at 885 (quoting 332 Md. at 594 n.3, 632 A.2d at 808 n.3 (Bell, J.,
dissenting)). The process discussed by Judge Bell in Garnett and now applicable to prose-
cutions under § 419A(c) stem from those utilized in self-defense cases. Id. Judge Bell
dissented in Outmezguine in order to affirm his position in Garnett regarding mistake of age
and to object to the majority's First Amendment holding. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 53, 641
A.2d at 886 (Bell, J., dissenting). Judge Bell also rejected the court's conclusion regarding
the defendant's failure to preserve the mistake of age issue. Id. at 54-55, 641 A.2d at 887-
88.
The majority's final determination on the matter was that Outmezguine failed to pre-
serve the mistake of age issue for appeal. 335 Md. at 51-52, 641 A.2d at 886. The court
reasoned that Outmezguine's defense was "I did not know how old she was," not " [I] rea-
sonably thoughtJennifer was 18 or older...." Id. The former statement was insufficient
to generate the issue of the defendant's knowledge of the victim's age. Id. at 52, 641 A2d
at 886. By failing "to raise the defense of reasonable mistake of age... [he] consequently
waived his right to appellate review on that issue." Id.
100. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 45, 641 A.2d at 882-83.
101. Id. at 34-41, 641 A.2d at 877-80; see, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990)
("Given the gravity of the State's interests in this context, we find that [a state] may consti-
tutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography."); Ferber v. New
York, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (stating, with respect to a child pornography law similar to
Maryland's, that "[w]e consider this the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legiti-
mate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications.").
102. Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 36-38, 641 A.2d at 879.
103. See id. at 37, 641 A.2d at 878.
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The objection may be raised that identification of age is easily
falsified and even a good-faith attempt to verify the information may
fail to reveal the deception of a minor.10 4 Such hoaxes have already
resulted in child pornography prosecutions in other jurisdictions.10 5
But the availability of a mistake of age defense renders such an objec-
tion virtually moot in Maryland prosecutions."0 6
There are, nevertheless, sound policy reasons that rebut the ob-
jections to the lack of a knowledge element in the offense. Surely,
minors who are desperate enough to lie about their age in order to
participate in this exploitative and dangerous industry are those most
in need of the protections that are derived from strict criminal liabil-
ity. As the dissenting opinion in District Court argued:
Congress intended to protect children like Traci Lords,
who try to pass themselves off as adults to appear in pornog-
raphy. Such children are in grave danger of sacrificing their
physiological, emotional, and mental health-more in dan-
ger as they have begun to accept the sordid world of child
pornography as a way of life. These children are inexperi-
enced and uneducated; most important, they lack the fore-
sight we attribute only to adults. Congress has chosen to
protect such children against their own immaturity, against
the unseasoned, desperate choices children are wont to
make. 10
7
The imposition of strict criminal liability on photographers who elect
to use victims of suspect age, regardless of the photographer's level of
knowledge, is the only realistic means to implement the legislative
purpose.
It is significant that the Court of Appeals concluded that a reason-
able mistake of age defense is available to a defendant charged under
Section 419A(c),108 notwithstanding Outmezguine's failure to pre-
104. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858
F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining how "purveyors of smut from coast to coast were
taken in by an artful, studied and well-documented charade whereby [the actress Traci]
Lords successfully passed herself off as an adult.").
105. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1992),
rev'd on other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994) (interpreting the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252, to require a knowledge element for the
prosecution of distributors of child pornography).
106. See Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 47, 641 A.2d at 883; see also infta notes 108-111 and
accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has also tempered the perceived injustice of strict
liability for such deceptions by minors by permitting a mistake of age defense. District
Court, 858 F.2d at 542.
107. District Court, 858 F.2d at 544 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
108. Outrrezguine, 335 Md. at 47, 641 A.2d at 883.
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serve this issue for review." 9 This dicta reflects the court's conclusion
that the legislative intent will be read to permit a reasonable mistake
of age defense, although it is not a final determination.'1 0 In practice,
a defendant tried for violating Section 419A(c) may now plausibly
raise a reasonable mistake of age defense, absent any further legisla-
tive amendment to the statute." 1
The court's opinion may also be read as a judicial message to the
General Assembly."' Deference to the Legislature has been integral
to the Court of Appeals's approach to strict statutory liability. 1 3
Although its conclusion that a mistake of age defense is available re-
mains dictum, the majority has informed the legislature of the court's
reading of the statute's history. If the court's view is correct, there
need be no legislative action and the defense will be available to fu-
ture defendants. 1 4 However, if the court is incorrect in its reading of
legislative intent, the General Assembly is invited to amend the statute
and proscribe the defense." 5
109. Id. at 52, 641 A.2d at 886. Because the issue was not before the Court of Appeals, it
is possible to construe Parts IV(B) and V of the majority opinion as advisory. See infra notes
112-115 and accompanying text.
110. See Outmezguine 335 Md. at 45, 47, 641 A.2d at 883, 885.
111. The defendant who raises the mistake of age defense is still required to offer some
evidence of a reasonable belief that the minor was at least 18 years of age. Ignorance of
the child's age is insufficient. Id. at 52, 641 A.2d at 886. The State will then have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the subject of the photographs was a
minor. Id. at 50-51, 641 A.2d at 885; see also Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 594 n.3, 632 A.2d
797, 808 n.3 (1993) (Bell,J, dissenting). This method of applying the defense is constitu-
tionally sound. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); cf. District Court, 858 F.2d
at 543-44 (accepting a mistake of age defense which requires the defendant to meet the
burden of persuasion upon the issue by clear and convincing evidence). Moreover, it is
compatible with the court's conclusion that the offense does not require knowledge of the
victim's age. See Outmezguine, 335 Md. at 49, 641 A.2d at 884-85. By adopting this proce-
dure, the court's decision still comports with the strict liability model: a defendant who
either knows that the victim is a minor or is ignorant of the child's age will be convicted
upon sufficient proof that the defendant produced sexually-oriented materials; however, a
defendant who attempted to work only with adult subjects will have the opportunity to
assert an affirmative defense.
112. The court sent a more overt dispatch with its Garnett opinion. See Garnett, 332 Md.
at 588, 632 A.2d at 805 ("Any new provision introducing an element of mens rea, or permit-
ting a defense of reasonable mistake of age.... should properly result from an act of the
Legislature itself, rather than judicial fiat.").
113. See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
114. See Outmerguine, 335 Md. at 50-51, 641 A.2d at 885-86.
115. The Outmezguine court was particularly careful to impress its position: "Therefore,
we hold that the First Amendment does not require scienter to be an element of the of-
fense, nor does it require that a reasonable mistake of age defense be available to defend-
ants . . . ." Id. at 38, 641 A.2d at 879; see also id. at 40-41, 641 A.2d at 880.
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5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals' conclusion that knowl-
edge of the child's age is not an element of a prosecution under Arti-
cle 27, Section 419A(c) is consistent with the court's long-standing
deference to legislative intent with respect to strict criminal liability.
The acceptance of a reasonable mistake of age defense is an essential
component of the court's decision and, absent legislative response to
Outmezguine, the defense will be available to a defendant charged
under Section 419A(c). Because the court relied upon a legislative
intent analysis rather than upon a constitutional analysis to reach its
decision, the way remains open for the General Assembly to reexam-
ine these issues.
MATTHEW G. ZALEs~i III
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Common-Law Tort Liability of Prior Lessees of Commercial Property
In Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co.,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a cause of action in strict liability, negligence, trespass,
or nuisance could be maintained against a prior lessee of commercial
property for economic losses sustained by a subsequent lessee as a re-
sult of the prior lessee's alleged chemical contamination of the prop-
erty.2 The court held that a subsequent lessee who fails to inspect the
property adequately before taking possession could not assert any of
these actions against a prior lessee.' In so holding, the court main-
tained the current status of the law by refusing to broaden the scope
of these tort claims.4
1. The Case.-Exxon Company, U.S.A. (Exxon) leased real
property in Prince George's County from 1951 until 1985.' Through-
out this thirty-four year period, Exxon sublet the property to in-
dependent dealers who operated a gasoline station on the site.6 Upon
the termination of its lease, Exxon removed the underground gaso-
line storage tanks that it had previously installed in 1951.'
Rosenblatt, who had intentions of opening an automotive quick
lubrication business, leased the same property "as is" in July 1986.
Rosenblatt's rental payments, however, remained contingent on his
receipt of the necessary building permits to construct a facility and on
a special exception to permit the operation of his proposed "Grease-
N-Go" business.9
After execution of the lease agreement, Rosenblatt requested and
paid for a geotechnical study of the property. 1° A report dated Janu-
ary 30, 1987, recommended that an environmental study of the prop-
erty be undertaken due to suspected hydrocarbon contamination of
the soil and groundwater." Rosenblatt, however, did not immediately
request this second study.1 2 In May 1988, Rosenblatt obtained the
1. 335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180 (1994).
2. Id. at 62-63, 642 A.2d at 182.
3. Id. at 75-80, 642 A.2d at 188-91.
4. Id.










special exception to operate the business and he began to pay rent the
following October.' 3
In January 1989, nearly two years after the date of the geotechni-
cal study, Rosenblatt informed Exxon about the possibility of hydro-
carbon contamination of the property. 4  Exxon denied any
responsibility because no environmental report existed to verify the
contamination. 5 Subsequently, in March 1989, Rosenblatt commis-
sioned an environmental study. 6 The report revealed "extensive pe-
troleum contamination of the soil and groundwater" 7 and the
Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) was notified.' 8
Shortly thereafter, Exxon began remediation of the site. 9 Rosen-
blatt's efforts to prepare the property for his lubrication business pro-
ceeded during remediation, although he had to coordinate the work
with Exxon's cleanup.2" Rosenblatt's bank, however, informed him
that it would not finance the project, due in part to the environmental
condition of the property.' Consequently, Rosenblatt was unable to
open his business.22
Rosenblatt sued Exxon in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County for the costs he incurred due to the petroleum contamination
of the property, as well as the loss of future profits. 23 Exxon moved
for summary judgment on the strict liability, negligence, trespass, and
nuisance claims.2 4 The circuit court granted the motion and held that
these actions were "available only to occupants of neighboring land or
others to whom a duty was owed by the defendant." 25 Rosenblatt ap-
pealed,2 '6 but before the Court of Special Appeals could review the





18. Id., 642 A.2d at 183.
19. Id. Although MDE required Exxon to do a hydrogeological study, id., Exxon's
remediation efforts were apparently voluntary. Brief of Appellees at 5, Rosenblatt v. Exxon
Co., 335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180 (1994) (No. 93-1364).
20. Rosenblatt 335 Md. at 64, 642 A.2d at 183.
21. Id. at 65, 642 A.2d at 183.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 64, 642 A.2d at 183.
24. Id. at 65, 642 A.2d at 183. After Rosenblatt filed the initial action in the circuit
court, Exxon successfully removed the case to the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland. Id. That court granted Exxon's motion for summary judgment on all
counts except the negligence, strict liability, nuisance, and trespass claims. Id. The district
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case, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari27 to consider the availa-
bility of these tort claims to a lessee of commercial property who in-
curs economic damages as a result of the prior lessee's toxic
contamination of that property.
28
2. Legal Background.-
a. Strict Liability.--In Yommer v. McKenzie 9 the Court of Ap-
peals embraced the modem rule ° that imposes strict liability on those
who carry on abnormally dangerous activities. 3 The Yommer court
adopted Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to determine
whether an activity would be considered abnormally dangerous. 2 In
applying the factors listed in Section 520, the court concluded that
27. Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 333 Md. 429, 635 A.2d 976 (1994).
28. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 62-63, 642 A.2d at 182.
29. 255 Md. 220, 257 A-2d 138 (1969).
30. The original rule was articulated over a century ago in the English case of Fletcher
v. Rylands. LR. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), affid, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L 330 (1868). The
Rylands rule has been stated as "[one] who for his own purposes brings on his lands and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequence of its escape." Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. at 279; see also Rosenblatt, 355 Md. at
69, 642 A.2d at 185; Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co., 176 Md. 197, 213, 4 A.2d 757, 765
(1939) (holding that the Rylands doctrine did not apply unless the defendant had control
over the land where the activity occurred); Baltimore Breweries' Co., Ltd. v. Ranstead, 78
Md. 501, 508, 28 A. 273, 274 (1894) (applying the Rylands doctrine to hold defendant
brewery liable for discharging water onto plaintiffs property).
The House of Lords, affirming the Exchequer Chamber, limited the Rylands doctrine
to "non-natural use" of the land. Rylands, L.R. 3 H.L. at 339. The modem doctrine of
strict liability considers non-natural use as a factor in considering whether an activity is
abnormally dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j (1977); see also infra
note 32.
31. Yommer, 255 Md. at 223-24, 257A.2dat 140. Section 519 of the Restatement provides:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 519.
32. Yommer, 255 Md. at 224-25, 257 A.2d at 141. Section 520 of the Restatement provides:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 520.
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the defendants' gasoline station was an abnormally dangerous activity
for which they were strictly liable, thus relieving the plaintiffs from the
necessity of proving negligence.33 The court strongly emphasized that
"the appropriateness of the activity in the particular place where it
[was] being carried on" was the "most crucial factor" in qualifying an
activity as abnormally dangerous.3 4
In Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacfic Co., ' a case that preceded the
explicit adoption of Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement, the court
limited the Rylands doctrine to those who occupy "land in the sense
that [their] occupancy is possession taken for the purpose of exercis-
ing control of the land."36 The Toy court held that the defendant was
not strictly liable for its dredging activities because it did not have the
requisite control over the land; it was merely depositing excavated ma-
terial onto land under the government's control.37 The court re-
stricted its application of the Rylands doctrine because of the great
potential for liability it imposed on property owners 8.3  Maryland
courts have subsequently limited the doctrine of strict liability to activ-
ities considered abnormally dangerous with respect to the location
where they were carried on and to actors who had control over the
land when engaged in the questionable activities.
b. Negligence.-The Court of Appeals has limited negligence
actions to the class of foreseeable plaintiffs to whom a defendant has a
duty.39 This policy choice to limit the potential liability is also evident
in the requirement that the cause of injury be proximate.4" To decide
whether to impose a duty the court also considers the relationship of
the actors.4" With respect to the parties to a commercial real estate
transaction, Maryland courts continue to require the general duty of
33. Yommer, 255 Md. at 224-27, 257 A.2d at 140-41.
34. Id. at 225, 257 A.2d at 140.
35. 176 Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939).
36. Id. at 213, 4 A.2d at 765; see also supra note 30.
37. Toy, 176 Md. at 213-14, 4 A.2d at 765.
38. Id. at 213, 4 A.2d at 765. In Kelly v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143
(1985), the Maryland Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding in Toy stating, "[t]his court
has refused to extend the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine to instances in which the
alleged tortfeasor is not an owner or occupier of land." Id. at 133, 497 A.2d at 1143.
39. Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 333-34, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340
(1986) ("[Foreseeability] is simply intended to reflect current societal standards with re-
spect to an acceptable nexus between the negligent act and the ensuing harm.").
40. Id. The court recognized that the limitations that foreseeability places on duty and
the limitations that proximity places on causation are similar. Id. at 334, 503 A.2d at 1340.
41. Council of Co-Owners v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 36, 517 A.2d
336, 346 (1986).
[VOL. 54:670
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
inspection that the doctrine of caveat emptor4 2 imposes on a lessee or
vendee.4" Under some circumstances, however, a vendor may be lia-
ble for known dangerous conditions on the property after the trans-
fer, but this exception "applies only where bodily harm is suffered."
44
c. Trespass and Nuisance. -Maryland courts recognize a
claim in trespass "when a defendant interferes with a plaintiffs inter-
est in the exclusive possession of the land by entering or causing
something to enter the land."45 While defendant's control or posses-
sion of the property adjacent to the plaintiffs land is not necessary,46
actions in trespass have only been permitted where the interference
was to land in possession of another.47 Nuisance is the interference
with an occupier's use and enjoyment of land. 48 Like trespass, nui-
sance has traditionally been applied only between contemporaneous
occupiers of land.49
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 352-53 (1965). The Restatement notes:
Under the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, the original rule was that, in the
absence of express agreement, the vendor of land was not liable to his vendee, or
a fortiori to any other person, for the condition of the land existing at the time of
transfer.... The vendee is required to make his own inspection of the premises,
and the vendor is not responsible to him for their defective condition, existing at
the time of transfer. Still less is he liable to any third person who may come upon
the land, even though such entry is in the right of the vendee.
Id. § 352 cmt a.
43. Council of Co-Owners, 308 Md. at 37-38, 517 A.2d at 346.
44. Id. at 38, 517 A.2d at 346. This exception is one of fairness. It is more fair to hold a
prior occupier of land, who knew or should have known of the dangerous condition, liable
when the current occupier could not have discovered the condition through a reasonable
inspection, but instead discovers the condition only when someone is physically injured.
The court in Council of Co-Owners, however, held that when a developer violates a building
code meant as a safety measure, the developer is liable merely for creating a risk of death
or bodily injury even if no actual injury has yet occurred. Id. at 40-41, 517 A.2d at 348.
45. Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 78, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (1994).
46. See Rockland Bleach & Dye Works Co. v. HJ. Williams Corp., 242 Md. 375, 385, 219
A.2d 48, 53 (1966) (holding that the plaintiff had presented a prima facie case of trespass
even though the defendants did not own the adjacent property).
47. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 78, 642 A.2d at 189.
48. Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 645, 197 A. 146, 148
(1938). A plaintiff may bring a claim in both trespass and nuisance based on the same
circumstances. Both causes of action are usually asserted in a toxic tort action because the
statute of limitations and the burden of proof may differ for each claim. Hershel J. Rich-
man et al., Toxic Tort Litigation: Theories of Liabilities and Damages, in ENVRONMENTAL LITIGA-
TION 90, 96-97 (Janet S. Kole et al. eds., 1991).
49. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 79-80, 642 A.2d at 190. But seeJim C. Chen & Kyle E. McSlar-
row, Application of the Abnormally Dangerous Activities Doctrine to Environmental Cleanups, 47
Bus. LAW. 1031, 1043 (1992) (distinguishing nuisance and trespass).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. Strict Liability.-The Rosenblatt court declined to extend
the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities to
prior lessees of land for economic damages sustained by current les-
sees of the same land.5" The court's holding rejected the reasoning
employed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in T & E Industries v.
Safety Light Corp." and emphasized the limited situations in which
Maryland courts have applied strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities.52 The court then reiterated policy reasons behind the strict
liability doctrine."
In T & E Industries, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
prior occupier whose abnormally dangerous activity contaminated the
land was liable to the current occupier for economic damages.54 The
T & E Industries court rejected the argument that an "as is" clause in
the sales contract amounted to an assumption of the risk by the buyer
that released the defendant from any liability55 and held that one can
only knowingly and voluntarily assume the risk of an abnormally dan-
gerous activity."
The Rosenblatt court rejected this reasoning and emphasized that
a cause of action in strict liability is available to adjacent landowners
because they are unable to protect themselves from the harm that
might result from neighbors who engage in abnormally dangerous ac-
50. Rosenblatt, 355 Md. at 73, 642 A.2d at 187.
51. 587 A.2d 1249, 1257 (NJ. 1991) (permitting a subsequent occupier of contami-
nated land to maintain an action in strict liability against the previous occupant).
52. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 72, 642 A.2d at 186. "[W]e have applied the doctrine only to
claims by an occupier of land harmed by the activity abnormally dangerous in relation to
the area, which is carried on by a contemporaneous occupier of neighboring land." Id.
53. See Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 69-76, 642 A.2d at 185-88. "We have taken care to limit
the application of this doctrine because of the heavy burden it places upon a user of land."
Id. at 73, 642 A.2d at 187.
54. T & E Indus., 587 A.2d at 1251, 1263; see also Hanlin Group, Inc. v. International
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 934 (D. Me. 1990) (denying defendant's mo-
tion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to a strict liability claim for disposal of
hazardous waste on property plaintiff purchased from defendant); Amland Prop. Corp. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1989) (denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment and holding the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities applicable to a former occupier who contaminated property during occupation).
55. T & E Indus., 587 A.2d at 1258-59; see also Prospect Indus. Corp. v. Singer Co., 569
A.2d 908 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (holding that caveat emptor does not bar a claim of
strict liability by an occupier of land who is unaware of the contamination caused by the
prior occupier's abnormally dangerous activity). Contra Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg.
Centers, 578 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that strict liability is not avail-
able to a vendee in a position to protect himself through "careful inspection and price
negotiation").
56. T & E Indus., 587 A.2d at 1259.
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tivities.57 Subsequent purchasers or lessees, on the other hand, are in
a position to avoid harm by "inspect[ing] adequately before taking
possession of the property."
5 8
The court strictly interpreted Section 519 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts to underscore its refusal to extend the abnormally dan-
gerous activity doctrine.59 Section 519 imposes liability on "[o] ne who
carries on an abnormally dangerous activity [which results in] harm to
the person, land or chattels of another."6 ° The court reasoned that
the harm caused by Exxon did not occur to the person or property "of
another" because Exxon occupied the property when it was contani-
nated.61 The court also noted that economic damages did not fall
within the scope of the Restatement because economic injury is not in-
jury to person or property.'
b. Negligence. -The Rosenblatt court held, as a matter of law,
that Exxon did not owe Rosenblatt a duty.6" In applying the "foresee-
ability of harm" test, ' the court concluded that there was no relation-
ship between the parties and therefore it was not foreseeable that
Exxon's acts or omission would harm Rosenblatt.65 The court empha-
sized the need to balance "the burdens... in avoiding harm" with the
right of occupiers of land to the unrestrained use of their property.'
The court reasoned that a lessee is in the better position to avoid the
57. Rosenb/at, 335 Md. at 73-74, 642 A.2d at 187-88.
58. Id. at 75, 642 A.2d at 188.
59. Id.
60. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 519.
61. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 73-74, 642 A.2d at 187-88. The Rosenblatt court found support
for this argument in Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93 (D.
Mass. 1990). Rosenblatt 335 Md. at 95, 642 A.2d at 187. The Wellesley court stated that "[i] t
would be nonsensical to even formulate a rule that an actor is strictly liable for harm in-
flicted on his or her own property or person." Id. at 102; see also Futura Realty v. Lone Star
Bldg. Centers, 578 So. 2d 363, 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (accepting the Wellesley Hills
Realty Trust analysis and affirming the lower court's summary judgment for defendant).
62. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 75, 642 A.2d at 188.
63. Id. at 78, 642 A.2d at 189; accord Welesley Hills Realty Trust, 747 F. Supp. at 93 (hold-
ing that no duty is owed to future owners and recognizing that the purchaser can avoid the
harm through inspection); Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626 (D.NJ. 1990) (same);
Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950 (R.I. 1994) (same).
64. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189; see supra notes 39-41.
65. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189. Presumedly, the relationship the court
found lacking was that of vendor/vendee or lessor/lessee.
66. Id.; accord Wellesley Hills Realty Trust 747 F. Supp. at 100 ("[S]uch a duty would
unreasonably interfere with a landowner's right of ownership; the right to do with his or




harm particularly where the "condition ... could have been discov-
ered with reasonable diligence prior to occupancy."67
c. Trespass and Nuisance.-The Court of Appeals noted the
lack of legal authority supporting Rosenblatt's arguments to broaden
actions in trespass or nuisance to include injuries to subsequent les-
sees of land.' The court rejected the rule set forth in Section 161 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states, "[a] trespass may be com-
mitted by the continued presence on the land of a structure, chattel
or other thing which the actor has tortiously placed there."69 The Ro-
senblatt court was persuaded by holdings of other courts that have re-
jected a subsequent occupier's action in trespass or nuisance against a
prior occupier.7 °
4. Analysis.71 -
a. Strict Liability.-In Rosenblatt, the Court of Appeals held
that a subsequent lessee of commercial land did not have a cause of
action in strict liability for economic damages against the former
lessee for alleged contamination of the land.72 The court's narrow
interpretation of Section 519 of the Restatement and its emphasis on
the rights of possessors to use land freely, precludes the use of strict
67. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189.
68. Id. at 78-80, 642 A.2d at 189-91.
69. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 161. The court reasoned that § 161 applies to the
land of another, and is not applicable to this case because Exxon contaminated the land
during its own occupation; consequently, Exxon's conduct was not tortious. Rosenblatt, 335
Md. at 78, 642 A.2d at 190.
70. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 78, 642 A.2d at 190; see Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules,
Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 314 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985) (holding that a cause of
action in negligence cannot be maintained against a prior vendor on the same land);
Mayor and Council v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1057-58 (D.NJ. 1993)
(holding that a successor landowner may not assert a nuisance claim against a predecessor
landowner); Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 780 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (S.D. Miss. 1991),
affd, 989 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Wilson Auto Enters. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F.
Supp. 101, 106 (D.R.I. 1991) (holding that Mobil's contamination of property during occu-
pancy could not amount to a trespass because it was not "an invasion of one person's
property by another person who has no right or privilege to enter"); Wellesley Hills Realty
Trust, 747 F. Supp. at 99 ("A trespass, however, requires an unprivileged intentional intru-
sion on land in the possession of another."); Hanlin Group, Inc. v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 935 (D. Me. 1990) (same).
71. This analysis will not examine the extension of trespass or nuisance doctrines to
claims for economic damages because of the unlikeliness that a court will allow such an
action to be asserted against a former lessee. See Chen & McSlarrow, supra note 49, at 1043-
44 (arguing that trespass and nuisance have limited application to environmental
problems between subsequent and prior property owners). Courts faced with these ques-
tions have overwhelmingly rejected these actions. See supra note 70.
72. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 75-80, 642 A.2d 188-91.
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liability by a subsequent lessee against a prior lessee for economic
loss. 73 The court reasoned that vendees and lessees can avoid harm by
adequately inspecting the property. 74 However, a subsequent lessee
who incurs noneconomic harm to person or property as a result of a
former lessee's abnormally dangerous activity may still be able to as-
sert a cause of action. Unlike the circumstances in Rosenblatt, if the
harm occurs to "the person, land or chattels of another," it would sat-
isfy the court's strict interpretation of Section 519. 75 Thus, if the sub-
sequent lessee completed an adequate inspection of the property
which did not uncover the prior lessee's abnormally dangerous activ-
ity, the strict liability claim should, theoretically, be available.76 In
practice, however, the claim will be precluded by the burden of in-
spection imposed under the doctrine of caveat emptor, which applies to
commercial real estate transactions.77
By embracing caveat emptor as the means by which subsequent les-
sees assume the risk of a prior lessee's abnormally dangerous activi-
ties,78 the court created a potential anomaly. It is possible that a
potential plaintiff, who may have had a strict liability claim if harmed
while the creator of the abnormally dangerous activity still occupied
the land, may lose it if the harm arises after the land has transferred
possession. For example, the court left open the question of whether
third parties may bring strict liability claims against prior occupiers for
injuries to their person or property caused by the prior occupiers' ab-
normally dangerous activity.79 It hardly seems likely, or fair, that the
current occupier, who has not carried on the abnormally dangerous
73. Id. at 75-76, 642 A.2d at 188.
74. Id. at 75, 642 A.2d at 188.
75. RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 519. In Rosenblatt, the court employed a temporal
argument to determine whether a subsequent lessee's person or property is harmed by a
former lessee's undetected abnormally dangerous activity. If the harm is to the person or
property, it is as if the former lessee still occupied the land. See Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 75,
642 A.2d at 188.
76. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 75, 642 A.2d at 188. The Rosenblatt court stated, "we have
applied the doctrine only to claims by an occupier of land harmed by an activity abnor-
mally dangerous in relation to the area, which is carried on by a contemporaneous occu-
pier of neighboring land." Id. at 72, 642 A.2d at 186. Note, however, that the court has
never held that the injured party must be a contemporaneous occupier of land. SeeJohn G.
Anderson, Comment, The Ryland v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous, U-
trahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 99, 105-06 (arguing that the Rylands
doctrine, though most often applied to contemporaneous landowners is not so restricted).
77. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 75 n.7, 642 A.2d at 188 n.7 (Under common law, absent an
"express agreement, the vendor of land was not liable to the vendee, or a fortiori to any
other person, for the condition of the land existing at the time of transfer."); see RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 30, § 352 cmt. a.
78. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 74, 77-78, 642 A.2d at 188, 189.
79. See supra note 76.
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activity, should be held strictly liable to a third party who incurs harm
as a result of the prior occupier's abnormally dangerous activity."
The better reasoned approach is that of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in T & E Industries. The New Jersey court rejected caveat
emptor and held that one can only knowingly and voluntarily assume
the risk of an abnormally dangerous activity." This approach makes it
difficult for those who carry on such activities to escape strict liability
for long-term consequences, and it encourages lessees of commercial
property to operate their businesses safely. 2
b. Negligence.-In applying the foreseeability of harm test,
the Rosenblatt court held that the lack of a relationship between the
parties prevented the imposition of a duty on the prior lessee, particu-
larly where the subsequent lessee should have known of the contami-
nation." However, if the subsequent lessee has no reason to suspect
contamination, and the risk is that of bodily harm, it is possible that
the court may relax the relationship requirement.
In Tadjer v. Montgomery County,' the prior lessee operated a land-
fill on leased land from 1950 until 1962 when it covered the landfill
and vacated the property.85 In 1977, after the property had changed
ownership several times, the plaintiff purchased it.86 In 1980, an ex-
plosion at the auto body repair shop built by the plaintiff on the site
caused bodily injury. 87 The injured party sued the plaintiff, now in
the position of a subsequent occupier, who then filed a third party
claim against the operator of the landfill alleging that methane gas
emitted from buried waste caused the explosion.8 8 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that,
80. The lack of a strict liability claim would not, of course, bar the injured party from
pursuing other theories of recovery that apply to occupiers of land. See discussion infra
Part 4.b.
81. T &Elndus., 587 A.2d at 1259.
82. The Rosenblatt court did not decide whether the gasoline station was an abnormally
dangerous activity; however, for the purpose of ruling on the defendants' summary judg-
ment motion, the trial court accepted Rosenblatt's allegations that it was abnormally dan-
gerous. Joint Record Extract at 12, Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180
(1994) (No. 93-1364).
83. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 78, 642 A.2d at 189. The court stated that one who leased
property knowing its former use as a gasoline station knew or should have known that
contamination was likely, and was therefore in a position to avoid the consequences of the
contamination. Id.
84. 61 Md. App. 492, 487 A.2d 658 (1985).
85. Id. at 494, 487 A.2d at 659.
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[If the prior occupiers of land] knew or should have known
that the artificial condition created by them involved an un-
reasonable risk of physical harm to others, then they have a
duty to make safe or warn of the dangerous condition.
Knowledge of the risk at the time the condition was created
is a prerequisite to liability.89
Thus, even though there was no vendee/vendor relationship, the
Court of Special Appeals imposed a duty on the prior lessee.
The Tadjer court relied, in part, on the holding set forth in Hussey
v. Ryan.9° In Hussey, the Court of Appeals held that the creator of a
dangerous condition on leased property could be held liable for dam-
ages caused by that condition even though the harm occurred after
the lessee had surrendered his leasehold.9" The injury in Hussey oc-
curred when a fence constructed on the property by the former ten-
ant collapsed and injured a passerby.92
In Tadjer, unlike Rosenblatt, the subsequent lessee did not know or
have reason to know of the property's former use as a landfill. How-
ever, in both Tadjer and Rosenblatt, there was no relationship between
the parties. A reading of the holding in Tadjer, which imposed a duty
even though there was no relationship between the parties, in con-
junction with the holding in Hussey, which imposed a continuing duty
on a prior lessee, suggests that a prior lessee's liability arguably ex-
tends to subsequent lessees and occupiers who are reasonably una-
ware of dangerous conditions on the property.93
5. Conclusion.-The court in Rosenblatt did not allow a subse-
quent lessee to sustain a cause of action in strict liability, negligence,
89. Id. at 502, 487 A.2d at 663 (citations omitted).
90. 64 Md. 426, 2 A. 729 (1886).
91. I. at 434, 2 A. at 731.
92. Id, at 426-27, 2 A. at 729. Because the former tenant constructed and continued to
own the fence and exercised the right to enter the premises, the court held that mere
relinquishment of the lot did not warrant an exception to the "general principle that the
originator of a nuisance is liable for injuries occasioned thereby." Id. at 434, 2 A. at 731.
93. Numerous cases that involved only toxic waste abatement and not bodily injury
influenced the Tadjer court's holding. See Tadjer, 61 Md. App. at 500-02, 487 A.2d at 662-
63.
In the vendor/vendee context the court has stated that "where the [dangerous] condi-
tion existed at the time of transfer, the vendor's duty to third parties and to the vendee will
survive the sale and transfer if the vendor knew or had reason to know of the condition
and of the risk involved, and failed to disclose that information to the vendee." Council of
Co-Owners v. Whiting-Turner, 308 Md. 18, 37, 517 A.2d 336, 346 (1986). The court noted
that if the vendor did not actively conceal the condition, the liability extended only until
the vendee had a reasonable amount of time to discover it, regardless of whether it was
discovered. Id at 37 n.6, 517 A.2d 346 n.6; see supra notes 42-44.
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trespass, or nuisance to recover economic damages resulting from a
prior lessee's contamination of the property. In so holding, the court
emphasized the traditional application of these actions between con-
temporaneous land owners, the lack of duty owed a subsequent lessee,
and the importance of occupiers of land to remain unburdened in the
use of their property. Because subsequent lessees can inspect prop-
erty before purchase or lease, they are in a better position than adja-
cent landowners to avoid the dangerous conditions created by prior
lessees. Rosenblatt, however, may have left open the possibility that a
subsequent lessee or a third party who suffers harm to person or prop-
erty can assert a cause of action in strict liability or negligence if a
reasonable inspection failed to uncover the danger and the prior
lessee knew or should have known of the potential risk.
RICHARD J. FACCIOLO
B. Compliance with Federal Court Order Not a Defense to State Law
Nuisance Action
In Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. CAE-Link Corp.,1 the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a common-law suit for nuisance
damages, which arose from activity taken by a bi-county water author-
ity (WSSC) to comply with federal court orders, was not preempted by
the federal environmental statute under which the federal court or-
ders were issued.2 The CAE-Link court held that such nuisance dam-
ages merely represented a part of the overall cost of compliance with
the federal court orders.' The court also reaffirmed that, under Mary-
land law, plaintiffs are not required to show negligence in nuisance
claims.4
1. The Case.-CAE-Link was the most recent case in a twenty-year
series of legal actions that followed upon violations of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act)5 at the Blue Plains
1. 330 Md. 115, 622 A.2d 745, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 288 (1993). The Washington
Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) is a bi-county commission chartered under Mary-
land law to manage the water and sewer needs of Montgomery County and Prince
George's County. MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, §§ 1-101 to -102 (1993).
2. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 132-42, 622 A-2d at 753-58.
3. Id. at 139, 622 A.2d at 757.
4. Id. at 124-32, 622 A.2d at 749-53.
5. See generally §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). When it
amended the Clean Water Act in 1972, Congress substantially overhauled the nation's sys-
tem of water pollution control by introducing strict pollution discharge limitations and
substantially increasing enforcement procedures. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1330. To improve
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sewage treatment plant, located near the Potomac River in Washing-
ton, D.C. 6
During this lengthy litigation, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia entered several orders that concerned the
development of a new sewage sludge composting facility.7 Pursuant to
the district court's order of May 18, 1978, Montgomery County identi-
fied an undeveloped parcel of land known as "Site 2" for a composting
facility.8 Montgomery County then was ordered by the court to ac-
quire and develop a sludge composting facility and have it operational
by July 1979.' Site 2 is located in the Montgomery Industrial Park
near the border with Prince George's County.1" Prince George's
County opposed the development of a composting facility at Site 2
and attacked the plan in several different forums. 1
As a result of these actions, the district court entered several addi-
tional orders. On April 25, 1980, the district court required WSSC to
restore funding for the project that had been removed by WSSC com-
missioners who represented Prince George's County.1 2 On June 27,
1980, in response to two state suits initiated by Prince George's
enforcement of the Clean Water Act, Congress authorized federal district courts to hear
private enforcement suits under the Act. See id. § 1365; see also infra note 23.
6. See United States v. District of Columbia, 654 F.2d 802, 803 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Prince George's County v. United States, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). In September
1973, the Virginia Water Control Board, Fairfax County, and the District of Columbia sued
the WSSC in federal district court for exceeding its allotted use of the Blue Plains plant
and causing the plant to discharge inadequately treated sewage into the Potomac River. Id.
at 803-04. The United States intervened as a party-plaintiff and alleged that excess un-
treated flow from the plant violated the Clean Water Act. Id. at 804. Montgomery County,
Prince George's County, and the State of Maryland intervened as parties-defendants. Id.
Before trial, the parties agreed to limit the flow of sewage to the plant, to develop a plan
for disposal of sludge generated by the plant byJune 30, 1976, and to implement the plan
by December 31, 1977. Id. The federal court incorporated this agreement into its Consent
Decree ofJuly 29, 1974. Id. After the parties failed to agree on a permanent sludge dispo-
sal plan, the United States filed another civil suit on November 9, 1977. Id. This suit
resulted in a consent order that required the parties to devise a permanent solution by
January 15, 1978. Id.
7. See supra note 6.
8. CAE-Link, 333 Md. at 120, 622 A.2d at 747.
9. Id. at 120, 622 A.2d at 748.
10. Id. At the composting site, wood chips would be mixed with the sludge and aerated
for 30 to 45 days. United States v. District of Columbia, 654 F.2d at 804.
11. United States v. District of Columbia, 654 F.2d at 805. Prince George's County
unsuccessfully appealed the issuance of the health permit for the facility granted by the
Maryland Department of Health and Hygiene. Id. The county also brought suit in the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County to enjoin the acquisition of Site 2 on the grounds
that it had not given the necessary approval for WSSC to fund the project. Id. In March
1980, the three WSSC commissioners from Prince George's County blocked funding for
Site 2 in the WSSC budget for fiscal year 1981. Id
12. CAE-Link, 333 Md. at 120, 622 A.2d at 748.
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County, the federal district court enjoined WSSC from complying with
state court injunctions and ordered WSSC to proceed expediously
with the development of the sludge composting facility. 3 The court
further enjoined all parties from initiating actions in state court that
would frustrate the district court's orders and ordered Prince
George's County to withdraw from the three state suits and to seek any
modification of its orders in the federal district court or the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1 4
Following the orders of the district court, WSSC began a condem-
nation action to acquire Site 2 in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County. 5 Shortly thereafter, WSSC filed a second suit in the circuit
court against neighboring landowners, including CAE-Link Corpora-
tion. This suit sought a declaratory judgment that the restrictive cove-
nants attached to Site 2 were not compensable property rights.' 6 The
neighboring landowners counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, nui-
sance.17 After the two cases were consolidated, the circuit court found
that the restrictive covenants were compensable property interests and
denied WSSC declaratory relief'" The trial court, however, granted
WSSC partial summary judgment on the nuisance claim and required
the defendants to prove that WSSC negligently created the nuisance. 9
The court found no evidence that the composting facility was negli-
gently constructed or operated, nor that there was substantial interfer-
ence in the use of the neighboring properties. ° The court then
granted WSSC's motion for judgment on the nuisance claim.2' The
neighboring property owners appealed; WSSC cross-appealed.22
The Court of Special Appeals held that the neighboring property
owners' state-law nuisance claims were not preempted by federal law
because of the Clean Water Act's savings clause.2" The court further
13. Id. at 120-21, 622 A-2d at 748.
14. Id. at 121, 622 A.2d at 748.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 121-22, 622 A.2d at 748.
17. Id. at 122, 622 A.2d at 748.
18. Id.
19. Id., 622 A.2d at 749.
20. Id. at 123, 622 A.2d at 749.
21. Id.
22. Id. The litigation over the use of Site 2 began in 1980 and continued through
1993. See id. at 121-23, 622 A.2d at 747-48.
23. CAE-Link Corp. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 90 Md. App. 604, 615,
602 A.2d 239, 244 (1992); 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Subsection 1365(e) provides: 'Nothing in this
section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard of limitation or to
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator) or a State Agency).' Id.
§ 1365(e).
[VOL. 54:670
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
held that nuisance law in Maryland was a matter of strict liability and
did not require a showing of negligence. 4 Both WSSC and the prop-
erty owners filed petitions for certiorari. 5 The Court of Appeals




a. Nuisance and Strict Liability.-
(i) The Restatement.-Section 822 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts states:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if,
his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's inter-
est in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the inva-
sion is either
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the
rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct,
27or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.
The Restatement considers private nuisance solely a matter of tort
liability.28 Nuisance, like tort liability in general, has moved away from
strict liability towards liability based on conduct.29 According to the
Restatement, confusion about the strict liability nature of nuisance is a
result of the distinction between the character of private nuisance (de-
fined by the property interest invaded) and negligence (defined by
the conduct that subjects an actor to liability).30 Under the Restate-
ment, intentional invasions of any sort must be "unreasonable" to be
actionable."1 With respect to the use and enjoyment of land, the rule
is likewise expressed in terms of unreasonableness and requires that
24. CAE-Link, 90 Md. App. at 616, 602 A.2d at 244.
25. CAE-Link, 333 Md. at 124, 622 A.2d at 749.
26. Id.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977).
28. Id. § 822 cmt. a.
The interest in the private use and enjoyment of land may be invaded by more
than one type of conduct. The invasion may be intentional and unreasonable. It
may be unintentional but caused by negligent or reckless conduct; or it may result
from an abnormally dangerous activity for which there is strict liability. On any of
these bases the defendant may be liable. On the other hand, the invasion may be
intentional but reasonable; or it may be entirely accidental and not fall within any
of the categories mentioned above. In these cases there is no liability.
Id.
29. Id. § 822 cmt. b.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 822 cmt. g. Comment g states:
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an intentional invasion be unreasonable before one is liable for caus-
ing it.32
(ii) Maiyland.-Maryland case law on nuisance has consist-
ently focused upon whether there has been a substantial and unrea-
sonable injury or interference with another's use and enjoyment of his
property and not on questions of negligence.33 It makes no differ-
ence, moreover, that the alleged nuisance is a business that is "lawful
and one useful to the public and conducted in the most approved
method." 4 Nevertheless, not every interference with the use or enjoy-
ment of land constitutes an actionable nuisance.35 The nuisance com-
plained of must interfere seriously with the ordinary comfort and
enjoyment of the property.36 Moreover, the nuisance must cause ac-
tual physical discomfort and annoyance to those of ordinary sensibili-
ties, tastes, and habits.3 7 In response to the specific question of
whether a defendant is liable for damages that result from the escape
of harmful gases or fumes from his premises, the Court of Appeals has
concluded that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove
negligence.38
Not every intentional and significant invasion of a person's interest in the use and
enjoyment of land is actionable .... Liability for damages is imposed in those
cases in which the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to be required to
bear under the circumstances, at least without compensation.
Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Bishop Processing Co. v. Davis, 213 Md. 465, 474, 132 A.2d 445, 449 (1957)
(finding that the odors complained of caused physical discomfort and injury to the appel-
lees' properties that was "of such a character as to diminish materially their value as dwell-
ings, and to interfere seriously with the ordinary comfort and enjoyment thereof.");
Gorman v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 159, 122 A.2d 475, 476 (1956) ("If noise causes physical
discomfort and annoyance to... the ordinary comfort and enjoyment of their homes, and
this diminishes the value of the use of their property rights, it constitutes a private nui-
sance."); Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 277, 20 A. 900, 901 (1890)
("Nor can any use of one's own land be said to be a reasonable use, which deprives an
adjoining owner of the lawful use and enjoyment of his property.").
34. Meadowbrook Swimming Club v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 645, 197 A. 146, 148 (1938).
35. Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123, 125-26 (1873) ("It is not every inconvenience, how-
ever, in the nature of a nuisance to a party's dwelling, especially in a large commercial and
manufacturing city, that will call forth the restraining power of a Court of Chancery by
injunction.").
36. See supra note 33.
37. Bishop Processing Co., 213 Md. at 474, 132 A.2d at 449.
38. See Susquehanna Fertilizer Co., 73 Md. at 276, 20 A. at 900 ("[A]n action will lie...
although the business may be a lawful business, and one useful to the public, and although
the best and most approved appliances and methods may be used in the conduct and
management of the business.").
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b. Federal Preemption. -The Supremacy Clause of the Consti-
tution provides that "the Laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme law of the Land."39 The Supreme Court has identified three
situations in which federal law preempts state law: when Congress has
"define[d] explicitly the extent to which its enactments preempt state
law,"' when state law seeks to regulate conduct in a field that Con-
gress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively,4 1 and
when state law actually conflicts with federal law.4"
Although the Supremacy Clause is most often cited for authority
to resolve conflicts between federal and state statutes or regulations,4"
federal law may also preempt state common-law causes of action." In
39. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
40. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990); see Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983) (concluding that New York's Human Rights Law and Disa-
bility Benefits Law were preempted by ERISA, "[gliven the plain language of § 514(a), the
structure of the Act, and its legislative history").
41. English, 496 U.S. at 79; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
("The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the infer-
ence that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."). State law may be pre-
empted implicitly: if federal regulation of the field is pervasive, Virginians for Dulles v.
Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 1972) (concluding that federal regulations and laws
concerning aircraft noise were so pervasive as to preempt federal common law of nui-
sance), afld in part and rev'd in part, 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976); if the federal interest is
sufficiently dominant to preclude state enforcement, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91, 105 n.6 (1972); or if the federal statutory goals and scheme indicate an intent to pre-
clude state authority, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981).
Preemption may also be inferred if it is impossible to comply with both state and
federal law, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); or
if state law is an obstacle to compliance with federal law, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941). Nevertheless, implicit preemption will not easily be inferred by the courts. City
of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 312-18 (stating that the analysis begins with an assumption that
the police powers of the states were not to be superseded without a clear and manifest
purpose of Congress).
42. English, 496 U.S. at 79; see also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43 ("A
holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into con-
gressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce.. . ."); Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 ("Our
primary function is to determine whether... Pennsylvania's law [requiring registration of
aliens] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress [in the federal Alien Registration Act].").
43. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt 475 U.S. 355, 363-70 (1986) (holding that part of
state Superfund law was explicitly preempted by federal Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act). But see Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier,
111 S. Ct. 2476, 2484 (1991) (holding that Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act did not implicitly preempt a local regulation).
44. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1742-43 (1993) (holding that
common-law negligence was preempted as a matter of law by compliance with federal regu-
lation); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620-22 (1992) (holding that
common-law negligence claim was preempted). But cf English, 496 U.S. at 87-89 (holding
state tort law was not preempted implicitly by federal Energy Reorganization Act of 1974);
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International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,4 5 Vermont property owners brought
a nuisance suit in a Vermont state court against the operator of a New
York pulp and paper mill.' The property owners alleged that pollu-
tants discharged by the New York mill made the water in Vermont
"foul, unhealthy, smelly, and unfit for recreational use," and thus,
constituted a "continuing nuisance."4 7 After removal of the action to
federal district court,4" the mill operator moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that the state-law action was preempted by the federal
Clean Water Act.49 The district court held, and the Supreme Court
affirmed, that federal courts can apply state common-law nuisance to
address interstate water pollution as long as the law applied is that of
the discharging state.5 °
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In CAE-Link, the Court of Appeals ad-
dressed two major issues: First, the court considered the appropriate
standard of liability under state nuisance law.5" Second, it considered
whether state-law nuisance claims were preempted by federal court
orders issued to enforce the Clean Water Act.52
To address the appropriate standard of liability under nuisance
law, the court began by reiterating Maryland's long-held rule that
"proof of nuisance focuses not on the possible negligence of the de-
fendant but on whether there has been unreasonable interference
with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his or her property.
Although it conceded that Maryland historically has employed a strict
liability analysis for nuisance claims, WSSC argued that the court
should create an exception because WSSC's actions were not volun-
tary but compelled by federal court orders.54 WSSC also argued that it
Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 332 (1883) (holding that
congressional act granting railroads authority to construct track and buildings did not pre-
empt property owners nuisance action against railroad).
45. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
46. Id. at 483.
47. Id. at 484.
48. Id.
49. I&
50. Itt at 493-97.
51. CAELink, 330 Md. at 119, 622 A.2d at 747.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 126, 622 A.2d at 750 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 126-27, 622 A.2d at 750-51. In particular, WSSC claimed that the district
court ordered it "to build and operate a specific type of sludge composting facility, at a
specific location and by a specific date." Id. at 127, 622 A.2d at 751. WSSC relied upon Toy
v. Atlantic Gulf& Pac. Co., 176 Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939), for the proposition that "[t]he
basic concept underlying the rule [of strict liability for maintaining a dangerous condition]
is that a person who elects to keep or bring upon his land something that exposes the
adjacent land or its owner or occupant to an added danger should be obliged to prevent its
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should not be placed in a position where good-faith compliance with
one court's order should cause it to be held strictly liable in another.55
The Court of Appeals responded that, while the federal district court
ordered WSSC to build a sewage sludge composting facility in Mont-
gomery County, it did not select the site nor mandate how the con-
struction should proceed.56 Those choices were made by WSSC.5 7
Finding no reason to change the traditional standard of proof, the
court held that WSSC was strictly liable for the nuisance it created.58
WSSC argued, in the alternative, that the court adopt the stan-
dard of liability found within Section 822 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.59 The court rejected this request and stated that the strict liabil-
ity standard for nuisance has a "pedigree of long standing in this state"
and that adoption of the Restatement by other jurisdictions was "not the
unanimous verdict."
60
The second major issue addressed in CAE-Link was WSSC's argu-
ment that federal court orders issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act
preempted state-law nuisance claims.6" WSSC first argued that the sav-
ings clause contained in Section 505 of the Clean Water Act,6 2 which
preserves the right of individuals to seek relief, did not apply to the
emergency federal court orders issued pursuant to Section 504 of the
Act.6" Relying on International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,' WSSC argued
doing damage." I&. at 213, 4 A.2d at 765 (emphasis added); see supra notes 8-9 and accom-
panying text.
55. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 127, 622 A.2d at 751.
56. I. at 131, 622 A.2d at 753.
57. Id.
58. See i&e The court cited Taylor v. Mayor of Baltimore, 130 Md. 133, 99 A. 900 (1917),
to support its decision. In Taylor, the plaintiff brought a nuisance claim after the City of
Baltimore, pursuant to state law, erected a sewage disposal plant 1500 feet from her prop-
erty. Id. at 135, 99 A. at 901. The Taylor court held that a municipal corporation could be
held liable for nuisance even if it acted pursuant to legislative authority. See id. at 145, 99
A. at 905. Applying the logic of Taylor to CAE-Link, the court concluded that "[t] he United
States District Court for the District of Columbia 'cannot be presumed, from general grant
of authority, to have intended to sanction or legalize any acts or any use of property that
will create a private nuisance which will injuriously affect the property of another.'" CAE-
Link, 330 Md. at 131-32, 622 A.2d at 753 (quoting Taylor, 130 Md. at 145, 99 A. at 905).
59. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 140-41, 622 A.2d at 757-58; see supra text accompanying note
27.
60. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 141-42, 622 A.2d at 758.
61. Id. at 133, 622 A.2d at 754.
62. See supra note 23.
63. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 133-34, 622 A.2d at 754. Section 504 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Administrator upon receipt
of evidence that a pollution source or combination of sources is presenting an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the wel-
fare of persons where such endangerment is to the livelihood of such persons,
such as inability to market shellfish, may bring suit on behalf of the United States
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that the savings clause applied only to Section 505 of the Act.6 5 The
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating that the Supreme
Court itself noted that "the savings clause specifically preserves other
state actions, and nothing in the Act bans aggrieved individuals from
bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State."66
WSSC also argued that the strict liability standard of Maryland's
nuisance law was preempted because the federal court orders made it
impossible for WSSC to comply with state law.67 The Court of Ap-
peals, however, found no conflict.68 The court noted that the federal
district court did not order WSSC to build and operate a composting
site that would emit obnoxious orders.69 It merely ordered WSSC to
comply with the Clean Water Act by developing a composting facil-
ity.7° The cost of compliance with state nuisance law was no different
in nature than those incurred in condemning the land or extinguish-
ing the restrictive covenants that previously benefitted the land.71
The court further reasoned that the elimination of odors, or the com-
pensation of those affected, was simply a cost of building a facility that
emitted obnoxious odors.72
4. Analysis.-
a. Strict Liability and Section 822 of the Restatement.-Although
seemingly limited to the facts of a complex case, CAE-Link is a signifi-
cant decision from a land-use perspective. The CAE-Link court af-
firmed the application of strict liability in nuisance actions under
Maryland common law, which heretofore was only implied in previous
in the appropriate district court to immediately restrain any person causing or
contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the discharge of pollutants causing
or contributing to such pollution or to take such other action as may be
necessary.
33 U.S.C. § 1364.
64. 479 U.S. 481 (1987); see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
65. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 137, 622 A.2d at 756.
66. Id. at 136, 622 A.2d at 755 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In
Ouellete, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that the savings clause pre-
served a state's right to regulate its waters and an injured party's right to seek relief under
any statute or the common law of the state in which the injury occurred. 479 U.S. at 492-
93. The Court did hold, however, that the Act only precluded a court from applying the
law of an affected state against an out-of-state source. Id. at 493-94.
67. CAE-Link, 333 Md. at 137-38, 622 A.2d at 756.
68. Id. at 138, 622 A.2d at 756.
69. Id., 622 A.2d at 756-57.
70. Id., 622 A.2d at 757.
71. Id. at 139, 622 A.2d at 757.
72. Id.
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case law, often through dicta.7" Of equal note, however, is the court's
emphatic attempt to distinguish the Restatement from Maryland's tradi-
tional nuisance liability standard, two positions that are not necessarily
irreconcilable."4
When it rejected WSSC's argument that the negligence-based
,standard of Section 822 of the Restatement was the appropriate rule,
the Court of Appeals simply reiterated that the controlling factor in a
nuisance claim is the unreasonable interference with the ordinary use
and enjoyment of a plaintiffs property.75 The court's requirement
that the invasion be unreasonable7" is not inconsistent with paragraph
(a) of Section 822 of the Restatement. Paragraph (a) states that one is
subject to liability if the invasion of another's land is "intentional and
unreasonable."77 Because the court implied that the invasion was "un-
reasonable,"" it would need only to have found that the invasion was
intentional for its opinion, and Maryland law, to accord with para-
graph (a) of Section 822 of the Restatement. The CAE-Link opinion
simply lacks a discussion of whether the intentional operation of the
composting site caused an invasion of noxious odors.
This oversight may be understood in the context of the court's
effort to reject WSSC's argument that paragraph (b) of Section 822,
which requires negligence, recklessness, or abnormally dangerous
conduct on the part of the defendant,79 should be the appropriate
standard. To rebut WSSC's assertion, the court had only to repeat its
conclusion in Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, that a plaintiff need
not show negligence in order to prevail in a nuisance action for the
invasion of noxious odors.8" The court wisely declined WSSC's invita-
tion to adopt the negligence standard of paragraph (b) because the
application of the strict liability standard of paragraph (a) was suffi-
cient and consistent with precedent as well as more appropriate to the
facts of the case.
b. Federal Jurisdiction and State-Based Nuisance Claims.-WSSC
argued that it built and operated the sludge composting facility
merely to comply with the order of the federal district court and,
therefore, that it should be granted an exception to the strict liability
73. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 27-32, 59-60 and accompanying text.
75. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 125-26, 622 A.2d at 750.
76. See supra notes 33, 36-37 and accompanying text.
77. RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 822(a).
78. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 139, 622 A.2d at 757.
79. RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 822(b).
80. 73 Md. 268, 276, 20 A. 900, 902; see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
1995] 809
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
provision of nuisance law."1 Because the federal court order followed
upon a set of options that WSSC had presented to that court, WSSC's
argument was disingenuous. The Court of Appeals properly rejected
WSSC's arguments because Montgomery County, not the federal dis-
trict court, chose the site and because WSSC, not the court, chose a
method of composting that resulted in the invasion of noxious fumes
onto the neighbors' property. The Court of Appeals noted that the
federal district court "can not be presumed, from a general grant of
authority, to have intended to sanction or legalize any acts or any use
of property that will create a private nuisance which will injuriously
affect the property of another."8 2
CAE-Link would also appear to represent an interesting post-Ouel-
lette test of the reach of the Clean Water Act over Maryland law and
whether, and to what degree, the Act preempts state-law remedies.
The Court of Appeals' holding in CAE-Link, however, should be nar-
rowly construed for two reasons. First, in contrast to Ouellette, the facts
of CAE-Link did not present an interstate jurisdictional dilemma.8 3
Consequently, the Court of Appeals' opinion strictly limited itself to
an analysis of the pervasiveness of federal regulation of water pollu-
tion within Maryland. Because the nuisance in CAE-Link was only a
secondary product of water pollution-sludge-and not a point-
source of water pollution, the court's conclusion that common-law
nuisance claims by the neighbors of Site 2 did not "thwart the goal of
the Clean Water Act" was understandable and justified.' It was not
impossible to obey both the federal court orders and Maryland nui-
sance law: "[E]limination of odors, or compensating those affected, is
... [simply an additional] cost of the facility if the plant emits the
odors."8"
Second, because Ouellette settled the issue of whether the savings
clause of Section 505 of the Clean Water Act preserves a state-law right
of action for private parties, the entire preemption analysis in CAE-
Link turned on whether the savings clause applied to emergency court
orders issued under Section 504 of the Act. The Court of Appeals
observed that, as a preliminary matter, federal court orders may be
insufficient to invoke the preemption doctrine.8 6 The court noted
81. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 126, 622 A.2d at 751.
82. Id. at 131-32, 622 A.2d at 752 (quoting Taylor v. Mayor of Baltimore, 130 Md. 133,
145, 99 A. 900, 905 (1917)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
84. CAE-Link, 330 Md. at 137, 622 A.2d at 756.
85. Id. at 139, 622 A.2d at 757.
86. Id. at 134, 622 A.2d at 754-55.
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that preemption applies to the "Constitution and the laws of the
United States."87 Moreover, the court did not have to decide whether
the federal court orders were issued under Section 504 of the Clean
Water Act, because it concluded that the savings clause was not lim-
ited to Section 505.88 The court appropriately concluded that, be-
cause common-law nuisance claims would not interfere with
Congress's intent to reduce water pollution, the claims fell within the
savings clause.' Therefore, there was no issue of federal preemption.
5. Conclusion.-In CAELink, the Court of Appeals held that
compliance with court orders, issued pursuant to the federal Clean
Water Act, was not a defense to state-law nuisance claims.9 0 Under the
circumstances of the case, the court held that nuisance damages rep-
resented merely part of the overall cost of complying with federal
court orders. 1 The court also reaffirmed that, in Maryland, nuisance
claims are based upon strict liability and require no showing of negli-
gence. 2 Accordingly, it appears that the key factor in Maryland nui-
sance claims will continue to be whether there has been an
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the plain-
tiffs property, and not whether there has been any negligence on the
part of the defendant.
JOHN B. O'LoUGHLIN, JR.
87. Id. at 134 n.l, 622 A.2d at 755 n.ll.
88. Id. at 137, 622 A.2d at 756.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 132-42, 622 A.2d at 753-58.
91. I& at 139, 622 A.2d at 757.




A. Residency Status Defined for Members of the Armed Services in
Divorce Proceedings
In Wamsley v. Wamsley,' the Court of Appeals held that an individ-
ual who had established a domicile in Maryland prior to entering mili-
tary service, but had not lived in Maryland since, met the jurisdictional
residency requirement to petition for divorce on grounds that oc-
curred outside the state.2 The court addressed Section 7-101 (a) of the
Family Law Article, which requires that one of the parties to a divorce
action must have resided within the state for at least one year prior to
the initiation of the action if the grounds for the divorce occurred
outside the state.' Recounting case law that equates "residence" with
"domicile" in a constitutional provision or statute,4 the court listed the
special circumstances that determine whether there is an intent to
abandon a domicile.5 The court held that a service member who
chooses Maryland as his "home of record" while in the military, regis-
ters to vote in the state, pays state income tax, registers a vehicle in the
state, and maintains a state driver's license is a resident within the
meaning of Section 7-101 (a).6
1. The Case.-In June 1981, seventeen-year-old Richard Wamsley
left his home in Allegany County, Maryland to join the United States
Navy.' In February 1985, Mr. Wamsley married Johanna Wamsley in
Harrison County, Mississippi. 8 During the following years, the couple
moved frequently due to changes in Mr. Wamsley's duty assignments.
In January 1986, they moved to Norfolk, Virginia; in April 1988, to
Sicily; and in July 1991, back to Norfolk where they lived with their
daughter and son until they separated on May 26, 1992.'
1. 333 Md. 454, 635 A.2d 1322 (1994).
2. Id. at 464, 635 A.2d at 1326-27; see infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
3. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 456, 635 A.2d at 1323. Section 7-101 (a) provides: "If the
grounds for the divorce occurred outside of this State, a party may not apply for a divorce
unless 1 of the parties has resided in this State for at least 1 year before the application is
filed." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-101(a) (1991).
4. See infra note 36.
5. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 460-61, 635 A.2d at 1325-26.
6. Id. at 463, 635 A.2d at 1326.
7. Id. at 456, 635 A.2d at 1322.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 456, 635 A.2d at 1323; see also Brief of Appellant at E-20-21, Wamsley v. Wam-
sley, 333 Md. 454, 635 A.2d 1322 (1994) (No. 78, Sept. Term, 1993).
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On May 21, 1992, while still living in Norfolk,"° Mr. Wamsley filed
for a limited divorce from Mrs. Wamsley and for the custody of their
minor children in the Circuit Court for Allegany County. 1 At trial on
March 9, 1993, the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction.' 2 By application of the general presumption that where a
person actually lives is his or her domicile, the trial court found that
neither party resided in Maryland for one year prior to the initiation
of the action as required by the statute. 3 The court thereupon dis-
missed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.14 Mr. Wam-
sley appealed to the Court of Special Appeals; but prior to review




a. Residency Requirement for Divorce. -In 1841, the Maryland
General Assembly enacted the state's first divorce statute. 6 This stat-
ute required that a petitioner to a divorce action be a state resident if
the grounds for divorce occurred outside the state. 7 As in the cur-
10. Brief of Appellant at 3, Warnsley v. Wamsley, 333 Md. 454, 635 A.2d 1322 (1994)
(No. 78, Sept. Term, 1993).
11. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 456, 635 A.2d at 1323. From the date of separation until the
date of trial, Mr. Warnsley had physical custody of the children. Brief of Appellant at 2,
Warnsley v. Wamsley, 333 Md. 454, 635 A.2d 1322 (1994) (No. 78, Sept. Term, 1993). The
grounds for divorce set forth by Mr. Wamsley were excessively vicious conduct and mental
cruelty. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 456, 635 A.2d at 1323; Cf MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 7-
102(a)(1)&(2) (1991).
12. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 456, 635 A.2d at 1323. Jurisdiction over divorce actions whose
grounds have occurred outside the state is found within MD. CODE ANN., FAM. Law § 7-
101(a) (1991). See supra note 3.
13. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 457, 635 A.2d at 1323.
14. Id. The trial judge stated:
The presumption of the law is that where a person actually lives is his domicile,
though this is a rebuttable presumption.
... [I]f the presumption in this State is that where a person personally actu-
ally lives is his domicile I cannot construe the State of Maryland as being the
domicile for either of these two people .... [Clertainly I recognize the gen-
tleman has made this his place to vote, hasn't changed that, registered cars, pays
taxes here. None of those factors it seems to me overcomes the basic presump-
tion that your domicile is where you live.
Id.; see also Brief of Appellant at E-45-46, Wamsley v. Wamsley, 333 Md. 454, 635 A.2d 1322
(1994) (No. 78, Sept. Term, 1993).
15. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 457, 635 A.2d at 1323.
16. Act of Mar. 1, 1841, ch. 262, 1841 Md. Laws 19-20. Prior to the 1841 statute, di-
vorce was exclusively a legislative function. See Thomas v. Thomas, 294 Md. 605, 609-15,
451 A.2d 1215, 1217-20 (1982) (reviewing the history of divorce and alimony in Maryland).
17. Section 5 of the 1841 Act provided that "no person shall be entitled to make appli-
cation for a divorce under this act where the causes for divorce occurred in another State,
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rent Family Law Article,1 8 the 1841 Act did not specifically require
that one of the parties to the divorce action be a Maryland resident if
the grounds for the action occurred within the state.19 It was not until
the turn of the century, in Adams v. Adams,"° that the Court of Appeals
addressed the question of residency as a general requirement in every
suit for divorce."1 In Adams, the wife, a five-month resident of
Dorchester County, brought a complaint for divorce on the grounds
of her husband's adultery."2 Although the adultery had occurred
within the State of Maryland, both wife and husband were, at that
time, residents of Delaware." Reversing the trial court's dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction, 4 the court held that for subject matter jurisdic-
tion to exist, at least one spouse must have a bona fide domicile in the
state at the time the complaint was filed.2 5 In 1993, in Fletcher v.
unless such person so applying shall have resided within this State for two years next pre-
ceding his or her application." Act of Mar. 1, 1841, ch. 262, § 5, 1841 Md. Laws 20.
18. See supra note 3.
19. SeeAct of Mar. 1, 1841, ch. 262, §§ 1-5, 1841 Md. Laws 19-20. In 1846, the Maryland
Legislature amended the law to permit the petitioner to bring the complaint "either in the
court of the county where he or she may reside, or in the court of the county where the
party against whom the divorce is sought may reside...." Act of Mar. 1, 1841, ch. 330, § 1,
1846 Md. Laws 47. Still, the two-year residency requirement for a complaint based on
grounds that occurred outside the state remained.
20. 101 Md. 506, 61 A. 628 (1905).
21. Id. at 508, 61 A. at 629. The Code existing at the time of Adams mirrored the 1841
Act: "No person shall be entitled to make application for a divorce, where the causes for
divorce occurred out of this State, unless the party plaintiff or defendant shall have resided
within this State for two years next preceding such application." MD. CODE art. 16, § 38
(1888); cf Act of Mar. 1, 1841, ch. 262, 1841 Md. Laws 19.
22. Adams, 101 Md. at 506-07, 61 A. at 628.
23. Id.
24. Id. Although the husband's adulterous conduct occurred in Maryland, the trial
court had dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that "the
cause of divorce really occurred in Delaware, and their marriage relations, if broken up or
destroyed, were broken up in Delaware." Id. at 507, 661 A. at 628 (quoting the trial court
judge).
25. Id. at 508, 61 A. at 629. Before announcing its holding, the Court of Appeals first
concluded that, because the husband's adultery occurred within Maryland, the statutory
two-year residency requirement did not apply. Id.; see supra note 19 containing pertinent
text of MD. CODE art. 16, § 38 (1888). The court then addressed the question of whether
there was any residency requirement. The court stated that the statutory provisions gov-
erning divorce
were enacted for the purpose of giving redress for conjugal wrongs only to those
who, as residents of this state are under the protection of its laws, or against those
who, as such residents, are amenable to our laws. This policy recognizes "the well-
settled principle of general law upon this subject that the tribunals of a country
have no jurisdiction over a cause of divorce, wherever the offense may have oc-
curred, if neither of the parties has an actual bona fide domicile within its
territory."
Adams, 101 Md. at 508, 61 A. at 629 (citations omitted). Finding that the wife was entitled
to gain her own domicile upon desertion by her husband, the court ruled that the appel-
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Fletcher, 6 a Maryland appellate court reexamined this jurisdictional re-
quirement for the first time since Adams. The Court of Special Ap-
peals held that changes in the law during the intervening years had
not sapped the "vitality of the Court's clear, fixed pronouncements in
Adams v. Adams."27 A majority of states share the Adams view that a
court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause for divorce if one of
the spouses has maintained a domicile within the state.2 8
b. Domicile of a Member of the Armed Services.-While the law
governing domicile is well-established in Maryland,' until Wamsley the
lant had acquired a bona fide domicile in Dorchester County for the purpose ofjurisdic-
tion. Id.
26. 95 Md. App. 114, 619 A.2d 561 (1993).
27. Id. at 122, 619 A.2d at 564. Before reiterating the holding in Adams, the Court of
Special Appeals briefly examined §§ 6-201 (a) and 6-202(1) of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article, which specify the county in which an action may be brought and Mary-
land Rule S70, which requires a bill of divorce to be "filed in a county where the plaintiff
resides, is regularly employed or has a place of business." MD. R. S70. The court con-
cluded that this statute and rule of the court "modified only the venue aspects of the 1845
law and did not serve to alter the holding and relevant pronouncements of the Adams
Court." Fletcher, 95 Md. App. at 124, 619 A.2d at 565.
28. See, e.g., McMillion v. McMillion, 497 P.2d 331, 333 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) ("It is
undisputed that in [this divorce] case, the matter of residence is jurisdictional and cannot
be waived by the parties."); Orejuela v. Orejuela, 494 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. CL App. 1986)
("Indiana law requires one of the parties to a dissolution proceeding to be a resident of
Indiana for at least six months before the filing of the petition for dissolution."); Crown-
over v. Crownover, 274 P.2d 127, 132 (N.M. 1954) ("[R]esidence for the required period of
time with domiciliary intent is a necessary jurisdictional prerequisite of divorce in New
Mexico."); Hager v. Hager, 607 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) ("To ensure the
court's jurisdiction over the [divorce action], it is therefore required that one of the
spouses be domiciled within the divorce-granting state."); Zinn v. Zinn, 475 A.2d 132, 133
& n.2 (Pa. Super. CL 1984) (stating that "bona fide residence" at the time the divorce
action is filed is necessary for subject matter jurisdiction under the Divorce Code); Wise-
man v. Wiseman, 393 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Tenn. 1965) ("To give jurisdiction to the courts of
this State in actions for divorce, one or both parties must be domiciled in the State."). But
see Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24, 25 (Alaska 1964) ("Domicile is not the sole
jurisdictional basis for divorce unless made so by statute.").
In In re Marriage of Thornton, 185 Cal. Rptr. 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), a California
court held that the jurisdictional requirement for a divorce action was met even though
the husband, a military officer, was not domiciled in California and the wife was a resident
of Australia. To reach this decision, the court noted that the husband was a resident of
California, the couple's last marital home was in California, the parties owned real prop-
erty in California, the wife submitted herself to personal jurisdiction in California by filing
for divorce, and an alternative forum was unavailable because the Florida divorce decree
obtained by husband was invalid under Florida law. Id. at 395.
29. In 1977, Judge Smith, in a helpful summary of Maryland domicile law, stated:
A person may have several places of abode or dwelling, but he can have only one
domicile at a time. Domicile has been defined as the place with which an individ-
ual has a settled connection for legal purposes and the place where a person has
his true, fixed, permanent home, habitation and principal establishment, without
any present intention of removing therefrom, and to which place he has, when-
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Court of Appeals had only twice considered the domicile of a member
of the armed services. In Walsh v. Crouse3 ° and Hawks v. Gottschall,
soldiers stationed at Fort Meade made claims against the Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fund as a result of accidents with uninsured mo-
torists.3 2 Applying the fundamental principle that an existing domi-
cile remains unchanged until a new domicile is acquired, 33 the court
ever he is absent, the intention of returning. The controlling factor in determin-
ing a person's domicile is his intent. One's domicile, generally, is that place
where he intends it to be. The determination of his intent, however, is not de-
pendent upon what he says at a particular time, since his intent may be more
satisfactorily shown by what is done than by what is said. Once a domicile is deter-
mined or established a person retains his domicile at such place unless the evi-
dence affirmatively shows an abandonment of that domicile. In deciding whether
a person has abandoned a previously established domicile and acquired a new
one, courts will examine and weigh the factors relating to each place. This Court
has never deemed any single circumstance conclusive. However, it has viewed
certain factors as more important than others, the two most important being
where a person actually lives and where he votes. Where a person lives and votes
at the same place such place probably will be determined to constitute his domi-
cile. Where these factors are not so clear, however, or where there are special
circumstances explaining a particular place of abode or place of voting, the Court
will look to and weigh a number of other factors in deciding a person's domicile.
Dorf v. Skolnik, 280 Md. 101, 116-17, 371 A.2d 1094, 1102-03 (1977). The WamsLey court
quoted this summary with approval. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 459, 635 A-2d at 1324.
30. 232 Md. 386, 194 A.2d 107 (1963).
31. 241 Md. 147, 215 A.2d 745 (1966).
32. Hawks, 241 Md. at 148-49, 215 A.2d at 746; Walsh, 232 Md. at 387, 194 A-2d at 108.
The Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund permitted Maryland residents to petition the
court for payment ofjudgments obtained against uninsured motorists who have no prop-
erty or assets to satisfy thosejudgments. MD. CODE ANN., art. 661/2, §§ 150-179 (1957, 1962
Supp.). Just four days prior to the trial court's judgment in Walsh, the Court of Appeals
held that the word "resident" as found in § 150(g) of the statute is equivalent to "domicili-
ary." See Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172, 179, 186 A.2d 482, 485 (1963).
33. Hawks, 241 Md. at 152, 215 A.2d at 748; Walsh, 232 Md. at 388, 194 A.2d at 108.
This principle is in accord with holdings in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Nora v. Nora, 494
So. 2d 16, 18 (Ala. 1986) (holding that a person inducted into military service retains
residence in the state from which he is inducted until initial residence is abandoned); In re
Marriage of Thornton, 185 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392 (Cal. CL App. 1982) ("One in military ser-
vice retains the domicile or residence in the state from which he entered the service, and
may institute a divorce action there until he establishes a new residence or domicile.");
Perry v. Perry, 623 P.2d 513, 515 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) ("Government employees, and par-
ticularly servicemen, may retain the residence from which they entered service no matter
how long they are physically away, so long as there is no intent to change."); Weintraub v.
Murphy, 244 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Ky. 1951) (holding that a military service member, because
he has no choice as to his assignment locations, cannot be said to have any home other
than that which he has left); Blessley v. Blessley, 577 P.2d 62, 63 (N.M. 1978) (holding that,
in the absence of an intention to change domicile, one's domicile is not affected by enter-
ing the military); Zinn v. Zinn, 475 A.2d 132,133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) ("[T]he domicile of
servicemen generally remains unchanged when temporarily stationed at a particular place
while in the line of duty."); Carroll v.Jones, 654 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (stating
that a member of the military does not acquire a new domicile merely by virtue of being
stationed in a particular place); cf. Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24, 25 (Alaska
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stated in both cases that a person does not automatically lose one
domicile and acquire another upon entry into military service, unless
there is an intent to abandon the existing domicile and adopt a new
one.34 Because neither soldier demonstrated sufficient evidence of
intent to abandon his domicile in his native state, the court found that
neither soldier had established a new domicile during his tour of duty
in Maryland. 5
3. Legal Reasoning.-In Wamsley, the Court of Appeals began its
analysis with an examination of the meaning of "reside" as found in
Section 7-101 (a) of the Family Law Article. As it had in prior interpre-
tations of constitutional provisions or statutes,"6 the court stated that
1964) (holding that a statute, which provides that a person in the military who has been
continuously stationed at a military base within the state shall be deemed a state resident in
good faith for purposes of conferring jurisdiction on a court in a divorce action, renders a
domicile requirement unnecessary); Crownover v. Crownover, 274 P.2d 127, 132 (N.M.
1954) ("The legislature has said, however, that a member of the military 'continuously
stationed' at a base in New Mexico for one year ... shall be deemed a resident of New
Mexico with the necessary domiciliary intent [to establish the court's jurisdiction]."). But
see Gordon v. Gordon, 369 So. 2d 421, 423 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that, although
couple was married in Florida and lived there for one and a half years before husband
entered the Air Force, and husband was assigned to an Air Force base in Plattsburgh, New
York by military orders, wife's complaint for divorce entered upon her return to Florida
after her separation from husband must be dismissed because, as her previous domicile
was New York, she had not resided within the state for six months as required by statute).
34. Hawks, 241 Md. at 152, 215 A.2d at 748; Walsh, 232 Md. at 388, 194 A.2d at 108.
35. In Walsh, the soldier left his home in Florida, where he lived with his mother and
stepfather, and enlisted in the Army. Walsh, 232 Md. at 387-88, 194 A.2d at 108. After boot
camp and a 17-month assignment in Germany, he was transferred to Ft. Meade where he
lived on post. Id. at 388, 194 A.2d at 108. Upon departing the service, he left Ft. Meade
and moved to Pittsburgh where his mother and stepfather had moved. Id. The court con-
cluded that "[t ] he record is devoid of any evidence, direct or inferential, that [the soldier]
intended to abandon his Florida domicile by entering the armed forces, and to acquire a
Maryland domicile." Id.
In Hawks, the soldier entered the Army from his home in Pennsylvania. Hawks, 241
Md. at 149-50, 215 A.2d at 747. At trial, he and his wife testified that during his assignment
at Ft. Meade, and before the accident with the uninsured motorist, he formed his intention
to abandon his domicile in Pennsylvania and reside permanently in Maryland. Id. at 150-
51, 215 A.2d at 747-48. The court noted, however, that the soldier retained his Penn-
sylvania driver's license and motor vehicle registration, continued to claim Pennsylvania as
his "home of record" in his Army personnel files, applied and received a war bonus re-
served for Pennsylvania residents who were Korean War veterans, and had provided a
Pennsylvania address in the State of Maryland accident report with the uninsured motorist.
Id. at 150, 215 A.2d at 747. Balancing the testimony at trial with the uncontradicted evi-
dence of his continuing ties to his native state of Pennsylvania, the court concluded that
the soldier had failed to demonstrate sufficient evidence that he had intended to acquire a
Maryland domicile at the time of the accident. Id. at 152, 215 A.2d at 748.
36. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 458, 635 A.2d at 1324 ("We have held consistently that 'the
words "reside" or "resident" in a constitutional provision or statute delineating rights, du-
ties, obligations, privileges, etc., would be construed to mean "domicile" unless a contrary
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"residence" is the equivalent of domicile. 7 Recognizing that entry
into military service is not enough to show an intent to abandon an
existing domicile and establish a new one, 38 and that the location of a
person's residence during a military tour of duty is not dispositive of
intent,3 9 the court looked to Walsh and Hawks to identify other, more
important factors that determine objective intent.' Based on the trial
court's findings that Mr. Wamsley was domiciled in Maryland at the
time he entered the Navy, had listed Maryland as his "home of record"
for military purposes, had maintained a Maryland driver's license and
automobile registration, was registered to vote within the state, paid
state taxes, and considered himself a Maryland resident throughout
his time in the service, the Court of Appeals concluded that Mr. Wam-
sley did not intend to abandon his Maryland domicile.41 Because Mr.
intent is shown.'" (quoting Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 496, 325 A.2d 393, 396 (1974)
(per curiam)).
37. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 458, 635 A.2d at 1324. The court also noted that "the Court of
Special Appeals had recently reached that same conclusion." Id. at 458-59, 635 A.2d at
1324; see Fletcher v. Fletcher, 95 Md. App. 114, 124, 619 A-2d 561, 565 (1993) ("'[B]ona
fide' residence, for the purpose of an action for divorce, is the equivalence of domicile.").
38. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 460, 635 A.2d at 1325.
39. Id. at 463, 635 A.2d at 1326. The court stated: "[A]lthough the location of an
individual's residence may be a strong indication of intent, it is not necessarily so." Id.
40. Id. at 460-61, 635 A.2d at 1325. "We see no reason why the same principle at work
in Hawks and Walsh should not be applied to a member of the military who originally
established a domicile in Maryland but who has lived elsewhere during his or her service."
Id. at 461, 635 A.2d at 1325.
41. Id. at 463-64, 635 A.2d at 1326.
Consistent with the Wamsley decision, otherjurisdictions have identified these and sim-
ilar factors to conclude that an armed service member had met the state jurisdictional
requirements necessary to maintain a divorce action. See, e.g., Eckel v. Eckel, 522 So. 2d
1018, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a retired Air Force serviceman who
transferred to West Germany as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense but who
still owned a house in the state, maintained an account with a credit union in the state, had
a current state driver's license, and voted by absentee ballot in the state was entitled to
maintain a divorce action within the state); Orejuela v. Orejuela, 494 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a Navy officer living in Norfolk, Virginia, at the time he filed
for divorce, was a resident of Indiana because he continued to vote in Indiana via absentee
ballot, paid Indiana state income tax, retained his Indiana state driver's license, listed Indi-
ana as his "home of record," and was considered by his university to be a resident of Indi-
ana, even though evidence was offered to show that he intended to accept employment
outside of Indiana upon retirement); Israel v. Israel, 121 S.E.2d 713, 713-16 (N.C. 1961)
(holding that the state of residence of a soldier in a divorce action remained the state
where he entered the service, even though he had been stationed in many different places
during his nineteen years in the Army, because he never intended to change his domicile);
Brunson v. Brunson, 472 P.2d 586, 587-88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that there was
substantial evidence to uphold a trial court's finding that a soldier who initiated an action
for divorce was a resident of Washington because his parents claimed Washington as their
domicile, he owned property in the state on two occasions, he listed his "home of record"
as Washington, and he stated that Washington had always been his home).
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Wamsley continued as a domicile of the state, the trial court had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the Section 7-101 (a) divorce action.4"
4. Analysis.-The first issue that the court faced in Wamsley was
the statutory construction of "reside" as found in Section 7-101 (a) of
the Family Law Article. Although it had not previously addressed this
issue in connection with divorce actions, the court looked to a sub-
stantial quantity of case law that interpreted "reside" in other statutes
and constitutional provisions.4" By applying this jurisprudence to Sec-
tion 7-101 (a), the Court of Appeals arrived at the logical result that,
unless the context clearly suggests otherwise, "reside" means "domi-
cile."' The Wamsley court's examination of this residency require-
ment is likely to be significant, moreover, for reasons other than
statutory construction.
Although stated matter-of-factly, the court recognized that the
residency requirement of Section 7-101 (a) must be met for subject
matter jurisdiction to exist.45 In support of this proposition, the court
cited its 1905 decision in Adams and the more recent decision of the
Court of Special Appeals in Fletcher.' In so doing, the court implicitly
affirmed its holding in Adams For subject matter jurisdiction to exist
in any divorce action, at least one spouse must be domiciled within
the state at the time the complaint is filed.47 For courts and practi-
tioners, determination of the spouses' domicile(s) remains a critical
element in a divorce action. When the domiciliary requirement is not
met, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction. Any judgment of
divorce rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void
Also consistent with the holding in Wamsley, other courts have applied these same and
similar factors to find that a member of the armed services was not a "bona fide resident"
of the state and so was not entitled to maintain a divorce action. See, e.g., Barry v. Barry,
606 So. 2d 1391, 1394-95 & n.3 (La. CL App. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not
possess subject matter jurisdiction over the divorce action brought by wife because she and
her husband had only lived within the state while he was assigned to a Louisiana Air Force
Base and, although having returned to the state, had failed to allege in any of her plead-
ings that she was domiciled in Louisiana at the time she filed her action); Barth v. Barth,
189 S.W.2d 451, 454-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945) (per curiam) (holding that an Army officer
was not a "bona fide" resident of Missouri for the purpose of a divorce action, even though
he was stationed in Missouri, had rented a hotel room for several months in Missouri, and
had obtained a Missouri driver's license).
42. Wasley, 333 Md. at 464, 635 A.2d at 1326-27.
43. See supra note 36.
44. Wamsley, 333 Md. at 458, 635 A.2d at 1324.
45. Id. at 457-58, 635 A.2d at 1323.
46. Id. at 458, 635 A.2d at 1323-24.
47. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
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and can be attacked directly and, occasionally, collaterally.48 Ancillary
48. See, e.g., Gregg v. Gregg, 220 Md. 578, 582, 155 A.2d 501, 503 (1959) (affirming the
trial court's ruling that a divorce obtained by the husband in Nevada from nonresident
wife, who was not personally served in Nevada and did not appear in the proceedings, was
null and void because the date at which the husband formed his intention to remain in
Nevada did not occur until two weeks prior to filing for divorce and therefore did not
satisfy the residency requirement of the Nevada statute); Brewster v. Brewster, 207 Md. 193,
201-02, 114 A.2d 53, 57 (1955) (affirming Chancellor's declaration that an Arkansas di-
vorce decree was void because the resident wife had met the burden of establishing that
her husband had not established a "bona fide" domicile in Arkansas); cf. Ewald v. Ewald,
167 Md. 594, 175 A. 464 (1934) (reversing trial court's decree nullifying a marriage on the
grounds that the wife's divorce from her first husband was void for lack of domicile when
suit was filed, because there was a reasonable basis for her to assert in the divorce action
that she was a Maryland resident when the suit was filed, even though additional evidence
produced twelve years later had convinced another Chancellor that the decree was errone-
ous in its determination of the jurisdictional fact of residency); Brody v. Midgette, 16 Md.
App. 647, 653, 299 A.2d 124, 138 (1973) (holding that a Florida divorce was valid because
the wife had established a home in Florida, entered her boys in school there, obtained
employment there, closed her Maryland bank account and opened a Florida account, reg-
istered her automobile in Florida, obtained a Florida driver's license, and never returned
to Maryland, where the marriage had taken place, even though she remained a few weeks
after the divorce and moved one month later to North Carolina where her new husband
had previously lived).
These views accord with those of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Passi-
ales, 494 N.E.2d 541, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (affirming the trial court's grant of a wife's
petition to set aside a divorce granted two years earlier because the plaintiff husband had
not met the Illinois one-year residency requirement); In re Marriage of Morton, 726 P.2d
297, 298 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that "a judgment is void if the court that rendered it
lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction"); Barth v. Barth, 189 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1945) ("[T]he court below was without jurisdiction to grant plaintiff a divorce,
and defendant is entitled to have the judgment granting him a divorce set aside.").
While permitting direct attacks on divorce decrees, Maryland courts are reluctant to
recognize collateral attacks. See Leatherbury v. Leatherbury, 233 Md. 344, 348, 196 A.2d
883, 885 (1964) ("This Court has given indication that one who was not a party to a divorce
decree granted in a case wherein husband and wife were before the court may not collater-
ally attack the decree."); cf Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 88 N.E.2d 135, 140 (Mass.
1949) (holding that the parties to the divorce proceeding, bound by res judicata, were
limited to making a direct attack on the decree while non-parties whose rights would be
impaired if effect were given to the decrees, could make a collateral attack).
Procedurally, a motion to rescind or amend ajudgment of divorce filed 30 days after
entry of judgment can only be made on the grounds of fraud, mistake, irregularity, or
clerical error. See MD. R. 2-535(b)&(d). A motion to rescind a judgment of divorce for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the equivalent of a "mistake" under the Rule. See
Home Indem. Co. v. Killian, 94 Md. App. 205, 217, 616 A.2d 906, 912 (1992) ("As used in
the Rule, a 'mistake' does not mean merely an error, or even an error of law. It is confined
to what have been termed 'jurisdictional' mistakes, i.e., where the court has no power to
enter the judgment."), cert. granted, 330 Md. 458, 624 A.2d 954 (1993); Hamilos v. Hamilos,
52 Md. App. 488, 450 A.2d 1316 (1982) ("Mistake... means a jurisdictional mistake."),
affd sub nom. Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md. 48, 465 A.2d 436, and afftd, 297 Md. 99, 465
A.2d 445 (1983). Although Rule 2-535(b) requires only a showing of fraud, mistake, or
irregularity, case law imposes upon the moving party the requirements of good faith, ordi-
nary diligence, and a meritorious cause of action or defense. See, e.g., Platt v. Platt, 302 Md.
9, 13, 485 A.2d 250, 252 (1984) ("[A] circuit court has revisory power and control over a
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matters contained within the divorce decree-such as alimony, child
support, and property division-that do not have an independent ba-
sis are likely void and subject to attack.49
To address the issue of a military service member's domicile, the
court placed Wamsley within well-established case law.51 While entry
into military service does not itself effect a change of domicile, the
Wamsley court identified numerous factors upon which a determina-
tion of intent to abandon an original domicile and adopt a new one
can be made.51 These factors include the state in which the individual
entered military service, the military "home of record," the state of
record for automobile registration and driver's license purposes, the
state in which the individual pays taxes, and the state considered the
individual's place of residence.52 Wamsley will assist both practitioners
and courts in determining the domicile of an armed service member
not only for the purpose of divorce, but for any statute that incorpo-
rates a residency requirement.
5. Conclusion. -Although Wamsley was not a difficult decision-
the court's holding is consistent with existing Maryland case law and
in accord with the decisions of many other courts- Wamsley's signifi-
cance is twofold. First, it implicitly acknowledges Maryland's long-
held rule that, for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction in a di-
vorce action, at least one party must be domiciled within the state at
the time the complaint was filed. Second, it identifies factors to assist
judgment only in case of fraud, mistake, irregularity or clerical error, provided that the
person seeking the revision acts with ordinary diligence and in good faith upon a meritori-
ous cause of action or defense.").
49. See, e.g., Barry v. Barry, 606 So. 2d 1391, 1393 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming the
trial court's judgment nullifying its prior order that granted the wife of a retired service-
man child support and alimony, because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the divorce action and the incidental demands of alimony and child support); Wyman
v. Wyman, 212 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1973) (holding that trial court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction to grant husband's counterclaim for divorce, which was filed when he
was no longer a resident of the state, because it asserted a new cause of action based on
grounds for divorce which did not exist at the time of original pleadings). Compare Wilson
v. Wilson (No. 86-J-38) 1988 WL 34621, *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the trial
court had subject matter jurisdiction over a sailor's counterclaim for divorce, although he
was not a resident of the state, because the wife, although no longer a resident of Ohio, was
a resident of the state at the time she filed her action for alimony).
50. See supra note 29.




courts and practitioners in determining the domicile of a member of
the armed services.
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B. Limiting the Scope of Equitable Adoption
In Board of Education v. Browning,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that an equitably adopted child was not entitled to inherit by
intestate succession from the sister of her equitably adoptive mother.'
In so holding, the court limited the reach of the doctrine of equitable
adoption in Maryland to the adoptive parent and child.3 The Brown-
ing decision, moreover, clarified the bounds of equitable adoption
within previously enumerated guidelines and underscored sound pol-
icy reasons for requiring strict compliance with formal adoption
procedures.
1. The Case.-Eleanor G. Hamilton, a resident of Montgomery
County, died without a will on August 19, 1990, and left an estate val-
ued at $394,405.57. 4 Because Hamilton died intestate and without
any legal heirs, the Board of Education of Montgomery County
(Board) claimed that it was entitled to Hamilton's estate pursuant to
Maryland escheat laws. 5 On May 21, 1991, Paula M. Browning was
appointed personal representative of Hamilton's estate.6
Browning was born out of wedlock as Pauline M. Gibbons on Oc-
tober 4, 1919, to Lawrence E. Hutchison and Martha Gibbons.7 In
1921, Hutchison, who resided in the District of Columbia, legally
1. 333 Md. 281, 635 A.2d 373 (1994).
2. Id. at 295, 635 A.2d at 380.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 283, 635 A.2d at 375.
5. Id. at 283-84, 635 A.2d at 375. "Escheat" is a term that describes the reversion of
property to the state when no individuals exist who are legally entitled to inherit the prop-
erty. See United States v. Board of Comm'rs of Pub. Sch., 432 F. Supp. 629, 630-31 (D. Md.
1977). Since 1798, Maryland statutes have provided that funds of a person who dies intes-
tate and without heirs revert to the state and its educational institutions. Id. The current
Maryland law of escheat, as set forth in the Estates and Trusts Article of the Maryland
Code, provides that "the net estate shall be converted to cash and paid to the board of
education in the county in which the [escheat] letters were granted, and shall be applied
for the use of public schools in the county." MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 3-105(a)
(1991).
6. Browning, 333 Md. at 283, 635 A.2d at 375.
7. Id.
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adopted Browning.8 Shortly after adopting Browning, Hutchison
married Marian E. Gibson (Marian), Hamilton's sister.9
Following her appointment as estate representative, Browning
filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for a
declaratory judgment that she was the equitably adopted child of Mar-
ian"° and, therefore, could inherit Hamilton's entire estate pursuant
to Maryland intestacy law." At the same time, Browning filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment.12 In support of her motion, Browning
submitted an affidavit in which she stated: (1) that throughout her
life she maintained a normal parent-child relationship with Lawrence
and Marian Hutchison; (2) that both when she was a child and later as
an adult, the Hutchisons told her they had adopted her; and (3) that
in 1984 Marian specifically told Browning that she had adopted her."
The Board answered with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted." The Board argued that
Browning had not alleged sufficient facts to establish equitable adop-
tion. 15 In the alternative, the Board contended that, even if Browning
were Marian's equitably adopted daughter, as a matter of law, she
could not inherit from the estate of her aunt by equitable adoption. 6
In December 1992, the circuit court granted Browning's motion
for summaryjudgment. 7 The court held that Browning, as an equita-
bly adopted daughter, could inherit from the estate of her equitably
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 284, 635 A.2d at 375. Browning maintained that she did not learn that Mar-
ian had not legally adopted her until 1992 when she was asked to produce proof of her
adoption for the instant litigation. Id.
11. Id. Browning argued that the District of Columbia's intestacy law should govern
the action because the relevant facts that give rise to her claim for equitable adoption
occurred in the District of Columbia, where Browning lived with the Hutchisons. Plain-
tiff's Response Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 23,
Browning v. Board of Educ., No. 92358 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. 1992). Indeed,
courts prefer to use the law of the state where the adoption occurred. See, e.g., In re Estate
of McConnell, 268 F. Supp. 346, 347 (D.D.C. 1967) (holding that the law of the site of the
alleged adoption takes precedence when determining whether equitable adoption oc-
curred), affd sub nom. Prather v. District of Columbia, 393 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Nev-
ertheless, the Court of Appeals looked to Maryland law to decide whether Browning could
inherit from Eleanor Hamilton. See Browming, 333 Md. at 290, 635 A.2d at 378.
12. Browning, 333 Md. at 284, 635 A.2d at 375.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Board asked the circuit court to dismiss and declare that: (1) Browning was
not entitled to inherit from Hamilton's estate; and (2) the estate escheated to the Board of
Education of Montgomery County. Id. at 285, 635 A.2d at 375.
15. Id. at 284, 635 A.2d at 375.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 285, 635 A.2d at 376.
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adoptive mother's sister.'" The Board appealed the decision to the
Court of Special Appeals. 9 Before the intermediate court could hear
the case, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own
motion to consider whether, as a matter of law, an equitably adopted
child has a right to inherit from an equitably adoptive parent's
sibling.20
2. Legal Background.-
a. Legal Adoption.-Unknown at common law, adoption is a
statutory creation in this country.2 ' In 1892, Maryland first enacted an
adoption statute, which conveyed upon the adopting parent and child
all the legal characteristics of a natural parent-child relationship.22
These attributes included "the rights to custody of the child and to his
earnings .. . .the duty to support the child .. .and provision for
inheritance by the child from the parent in the event of intestacy."23
Under current Maryland law, an adopted child continues to hold the
status of a natural child of the adoptive parents. 24 Accordingly, a le-
gally adopted child possesses the same inheritance rights as a natural
born child and inherits from and through his adopting parents in the
same manner as a child by birth.25
Legislatures and courts have always insisted on formal adoption
procedures. 26 Maryland law requires prospective parents to file a peti-
tion for adoption in circuit court and submit to a judicial review.27
18. Id., 635 A.2d at 375-76. The circuit court concluded that the Board had conceded
that Browning had been equitably adopted by Marian. Id., 635 A.2d at 375. The Board
maintained on appeal, however, that the circuit court's conclusion was erroneous because
the Board had specifically argued that Browning's complaint failed to allege sufficient facts
to support a finding of equitable adoption. Id. at 285 n.2, 635 A.2d at 375 n.2.
19. Id. at 285, 635 A.2d at 376.
20. Board of Educ. v. Browning, 331 Md. 178, 626 A.2d 967 (1993).
21. In reAdoption No. 9979, 323 Md. 39, 43, 591 A-2d 468, 470 (1991) ("[A]doptions
were unknown at common law and are permitted only by statute."); In reLynn M., 312 Md.
461, 463, 540 A.2d 799, 800 (1988) ("Adoptions... exist today solely because of statute.").
See generally John F. Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 332 (1922).
22. John S. Strahorn, Jr., Adoption in Maryland, 7 MD. L. REv. 275, 275 (1943).
23. Id.
24. See MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW § 5-308(b) (1991).
25. Id. The Court of Appeals has held:
[The laws of inheritance] do not distinguish between a legally adopted child and
a child by birth, to the end that such adopted child shall take from, through and
as a representative of its adopting parent or parents and the lineal or collateral
kindred of such adopting parent, or parents in the same manner as a child by
birth.
Gutman v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 198 Md. 39, 42, 81 A.2d 207, 208 (1951).
26. In re Lynn M., 321 Md. 461, 463, 540 A.2d 799, 800 (1988).
27. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (1991).
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Because the child's interests are paramount,"8 a legal adoption in
Maryland, "is not a contract alone between the parties," but requires a
"judicial determination of the advisability of permitting such ac-
tion."' When the court grants an adoption, it usually issues a formal
decree."0 The requirement for judicial approval of the adoptive par-
ent or parents reduces the chance that a young child will find a home
with unfit adoptive parents." In addition, an executed adoption
agreement in Maryland extinguishes all rights of the natural parents
to the child and frees them of all legal obligations.3 2 Finally, compli-
ance with statutory provisions ensures that all parties to the adoption
agreement realize the serious consequences of an adoption decree. 3
b. Equitable Adoption.-
(i) The Recognition of Equitable Adoption.-Courts formulated
the doctrine of equitable adoption because strict adherence to statu-
tory adoption procedures often impaired the allegedly adopted
child's inheritance rights.3 4 Because any deviation from the statutory
procedure allowed other heirs or collateral kin of the intestate adop-
tive parent to challenge the adoption, a defective adoption could ef-
28. See, e.g., In re Adoption No. 9979, 323 Md. 39, 57, 591 A.2d 468, 477 (1991) (El-
dridge, J., concurring) (explaining that the underlying concern of adoption proceeding is
the interest and welfare of the child); In re Lynn M., 312 Md. at 462-64, 540 A.2d at 800-01
(noting that the predominant theme of all adoption statutes is to preserve and protect the
interests of the child).
29. Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 544, 59 A.2d 499, 501 (1948). Although adoption
in Maryland is based on a court decree, some jurisdictions have discussed it in terms of a
contract to adopt. See id. (noting that adoptions are solely contractual in other states).
Such terminology can be misleading, however, since a legal adoption cannot be accom-
plished by a mere contract between the interested parties. Id. "In order to create the
status of adoption there must be some formal legal act; and as the common law knows no
such status, it can only be created in strict and formal conformity to the terms of some
statute. It cannot be created by contract or agreement." Menees v. Cowgill, 223 S.W.2d
412, 417 (Mo. 1949).
30. Menees, 223 S.W.2d at 417.
31. Harvey A. Schneider, Comment, Equitable Adoption: A Necessary Doctrine?, 35 S. CAL.
L. REV. 491, 497 (1962).
32. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-308(b) (1991).
33. See McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 240-41, 533 A.2d 690, 694 (1987) (explaining
that extensive statutory procedures reflect a belief that "as a matter of general policy, termi-
nation of the natural parental rights and the creation of a wholly new parent-child relation-
ship may be accomplished only by following elaborate and carefully devised statutory
procedures").
34. George C. Sims, Comment, Adoption by Estoppel: History and Effect, 15 BAYLOR L.
REv. 162, 164 (1963); see also Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 549, 59 A.2d 499, 504 (1948)
(noting that some courts will not recognize an adoption if statutory requirements are not
met); Strahorn, supra note 22, at 278 (outlining examples of the Maryland judiciary's ad-
herence to the statutory requirements for adoption).
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fectively deprive the "adopted" child of any inheritance right.3 5 In
response to this circumstance, the doctrine of "equitable adoption"36
permits the intestate inheritance of a child from a parent who in-
tended to adopt the child but for some reason did not comply with
formal adoption procedures. 37 Thus, equitable adoption is usually in-
voked to avoid an unfair result in the application of intestacy laws.38
The doctrine is recognized by Maryland 9 as well as a majority of
other jurisdictions.' ° Most courts base equitable adoption upon one
of two well-established theories: specific performance of the contract
to adopt or promissory estoppel.41 Courts that have applied specific
performance against the intestate estate of an equitably adoptive par-
ent have upheld the child's limited right of inheritance under con-
cepts drawn from contract law.42 Although courts will not enforce an
adoption agreement between the child's natural and adoptive parents
nor declare the legal validity of the adoption, courts do allow the child
to obtain specific enforcement of the benefits that would have ac-
crued from a legal adoption.43
35. Sims, supra note 34, at 164.
36. The doctrine is also referred to as "adoption by estoppel" or "virtual adoption."
McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 234, 533 A-2d 690, 690 (1987); see also Baker v. Henderson,
69 S.E.2d 278, 280 (Ga. 1952) (holding that virtual adoption allows children who were not
legally adopted to attain the same rights as if their parents had complied with adoption
statutes); Cavanaugh v. Davis, 235 S.W.2d 972, 973 (Tex. 1951) (recognizing that adoption
by estoppel served to prevent "those claiming under the adoptive parents [from denying]
the validity of the instrument of adoption").
37. Besche, 190 Md. at 547, 59 A.2d at 503.
38. Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. See Besche, 190 Md. at 547-48, 59 A.2d at 502-04 (recognizing the doctrine, although
declining to invoke the principle on the facts of the case); McGarvey, 311 Md. at 234-38, 533
A.2d at 690-92 (holding the doctrine to exist in Maryland but noting it does not operate to
reduce the inheritance tax for equitably adopted children).
40. See, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 215 So. 2d 585, 590 (Ala. 1967); Estate of Grace,
200 P.2d 189, 196 (Cal. 1948); Roberts v. Caughell, 65 So. 2d 547, 548 (Fla. 1953); Roberts
v. Sutton, 27 N.W.2d 54, 57-58 (Mich. 1947); Ashman v. Madigan, 122 A.2d 382, 383 (N.J.
1956);Jones v. Loving, 363 P.2d 512, 514-15 (Okla. 1961); Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust
Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 372 (W. Va. 1978).
41. See Menees v. Cowgill, 223 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Mo. 1949). Maryland does not favor
one theory over the other to substantiate equitable adoption. See &esce, 190 Md. at 547-48,
59 A.2d at 502-04; McGarvey, 311 Md. at 234-38, 533 A.2d at 690-92.
42. In re Estate of McConnell, 268 F. Supp. 346, 347 (D.D.C. 1967). To support a
finding of equitable adoption under the theory of specific performance, the claimant must
show: an agreement between the natural and adoptive parents; performance by natural
parents in relinquishing custodial rights; performance by the youth by residing with the
adoptive parents; part performance by the adoptive parents by giving the child a home and
acting like natural parents; and the intestacy of the adoptive parents without a will.
Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1973).
43. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Note, Equitable Adoption: They Took Him into Their Home and
Called Him Fred, 58 VA. L. Rnv. 726, 731 (1972). Jeffries explains that because equitable
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As an alternative to the theory of specific enforcement, some ju-
risdictions, most notably Texas, rely on the concept of promissory es-
toppel to support a finding of equitable adoption.' This "adoption
by estoppel" rests upon the notion that adoptive parents who receive
the benefits of love, affection, and filial obedience from a child can-
not deny the responsibilities incident to adoption by failing to file the
forms that the statute has prescribed.45 Moreover, because the adop-
tive parent's "promises, acts and conduct.... those claiming under or
through [the parent] are estopped to assert that a child was not legally
adopted or did not occupy the status of an adopted child."46
Whether a court relies on specific performance or estoppel to
support a finding of equitable adoption, two factors remain constant:
First, courts uniformly require a party to support a claim of equitable
adoption with a written or oral agreement showing the intentions of
all parties to the adoption by clear and convincing evidence.47 Sec-
ond, equitable adoption entitles the child to recover from the prom-
isor's estate whatever portion of the property the child would have
been entitled to receive under the laws of inheritance had the adop-
tion contract been fully executed.48 As the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia explained,
[The doctrine of] equitable adoption does not change the
status of the child to that of being legally adopted but is
merely a recognition by courts of equity... that the child is
entitled to receive upon the death of his.., parents, what he
would have received had their contract to adopt been car-
ried out during their lifetime. 9
adoption is often invoked after the parents are dead, courts cannot order specific perform-
ance of an adoption contract. Id. Some courts find "in the adoption agreement an im-
plied contract to leave a child's share of the estate. The implied contract is then subject to
specific performance." Id. In Menees, the Missouri court explained that a court will decree
specific performance when a person promises to adopt another as his child and the child
performs the duties of a child, but the adoption is not performed by the promisor during
his lifetime. MAenees, 223 S.W.2d at 415.
44. Jones v. Guy, 143 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Tex. 1940).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 548-49, 59 A.2d 499, 504 (1948).
48. Id. at 547, 59 A.2d at 503; see also In re Estate of McConnell, 268 F. Supp. 346, 348
(D.D.C. 1967) (holding specific enforcement of contract to adopt secures the adopted
child a share of intestate adoptive parent's estate); Pouncy v. Garner, 626 S.W.2d 337, 341
(Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that adoption by estoppel permits adopted child to inherit
from alleged adoptive parents).
49. In reJarboe's Estate, 235 F. Supp. 505, 507 (D.D.C. 1964).
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(ii) The Scope of Equitable Adption.-Courts have uniformly
invoked equitable adoption to permit an adopted child to inherit
from the estate of the child's adopting parent.50 The majority of the
courts that recognize equitable adoption, however, have declined to
use the doctrine to permit the equitably adoptive child to inherit from
a blood relative of the adoptive parent.5 ' These courts reason that
equitable adoption cannot extend to those who are not "in privity"
with the parties to the adoption agreement.52
In a similar recognition of the doctrine's limited applicability, the
Court of Appeals has held that equitable adoption does not entitle an
equitably adopted child to be taxed as a direct heir of the child's dece-
dent parent.53 In McGarvey v. State, an equitably adopted child argued
that her inheritance from her equitably adoptive parent should be
subject to a one percent lineal descendant tax rate as opposed to a ten
percent rate imposed on "collateral or nonlineal" descendants." The
court held that Maryland was entitled to its ten percent share because
an equitably adopted child was not a lineal descendent within the
meaning of both the Estates and Trusts Article and the Family Law
Article of the Maryland Code,55 even though the court recognized
that "an equitably adopted child may take property from an equitably
adoptive parent by intestate succession."56
In a lone exception to the prevailing jurisprudence on equitable
adoption, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held in First
50. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., In re Estate of Olson, 70 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn. 1955) (determining that
the alleged adopted child who had lived twenty-three years with the adoptive parent had
no enforceable rights in the estate of his adoptive parent's brother); Menees v. Cowgill,
223 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Mo. 1949) (holding that the equitably adopted child could not in-
herit from adoptive father's sister); Pouncvy, 626 S.W.2d at 342 (noting that a child adopted
by estoppel cannot inherit from "collateral kindred"). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips,
344 S.E.2d 201, 204-05 (W. Va. 1985) (allowing an equitably adopted child to inherit as if a
blood-related sister from other children of her equitably adoptive parent). See genera//y
George A. Locke, Annotation, Modem Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or Adoption ly
Estoppe4 97 A.L.R.3D 347, 366-67 (1977 & Supp. 1994).
52. See Pouncy, 626 S.W.2d at 342. As used in equitable adoption cases, privity is de-
fined as "the legal relationship between parties incident to succession on the part of [the
adopted child] to an estate or interest formerly held by the [adoptive parent]." Id. at 341
(citations omitted). For example, the natural child of a parent would have no legal rela-
tionship to a child equitably adopted by the same parent. The two children would not be
in privity and therefore, would be unable to claim an inheritance by succession through
each other.
53. McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 235, 533 A.2d 690, 691 (1987).
54. Id. at 234-35, 533 A.2d at 690-91.
55. Id. at 241-43, 533 A.2d at 694-95; see MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAw § 5-308(b) (3)
(1986); MD. CODE ANN., Esr. & TRUSTS § 1-207(a) (1984).
56. McGarvey, 311 Md. at 238, 533 A.2d at 692.
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National Bank in Fairmont v. Phillips" that an equitably adopted child
may inherit from another child of the adoptive parent."8 In Phillips,
the West Virginia court required no proof of an express or implied
contract to support an equitable adoption.59 Instead, the Phillips
court required that "the equitably adopted child.., prove by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence that he has stood from an age of
tender years in a position exactly equivalent to a formally adopted
child."6" Such an adoptive status qualified the adoptee to inherit
from a natural child of the equitably adoptive parent.61
3. Court's Reasoning.-In Browning, the Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether an equitably adopted child could inherit through her
equitably adoptive parent.62 After outlining the general history of eq-
uitable adoption, the court discussed the principles of specific per-
formance and promissory estoppel that underlie the doctrine.63
Within this context, the court acknowledged that Maryland recognizes
the doctrine of equitable adoption as it applies to the child who seeks
to inherit by intestate succession from the estate of an equitably adop-
tive parent.64
The court next examined the scope of equitable adoption in
Maryland. After a review of authority from other jurisdictions, the
court noted that the majority of jurisdictions have not expanded the
scope of adoption beyond that of the parent-child relationship and
have refused to allow an equitably adopted child to inherit from the
relatives of an adoptive parent.65 The court specifically rejected the
reasoning of the West Virginia court in Phillips, which permitted an
equitably adopted child to inherit through the children of her adop-
tive parents.66 The court further noted that the Phillips court ex-
57. 344 S.E.2d 201 (W. Va. 1985).
58. Id. at 204-05.
59. Id. at 205 (Brotherton, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 203. In essence, the Phillips court relied simply upon the fact that the equita-
bly adopted person was a lifetime family member involved in a loving parent-child relation-
ship in order to support its finding of equitable adoption. Id.
61. Id. at 204-05. The West Virginia court declined, however, to address "whether the
equitably adopted child would inherit from collateral kindred of the adoptive parent(s)."
Id. at 205 n.6.
62. Browning, 333 Md. at 286, 635 A.2d at 376.
63. Id. at 288, 635 A.2d at 377. For a discussion of the two theories, see supra notes 41-
49 and accompanying text.
64. Browning, 333 Md. at 288-89, 635 A.2d at 377-78.
65. Id. at 293, 635 A.2d at 379.
66. Id. "[I]n the area of equitable adoption, we have said that Maryland is 'surely not
prepared to go as far as West Virginia has gone.'" Id. (quoting McGarvey v. State, 311 Md.
233, 240, 533 A.2d 690, 694 (1985)).
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pressly limited its holding to the case at bar and declined to
determine whether an equitably adopted child could inherit from the
adoptive parents' relatives. 67
The court then concluded that Browning, as an equitably
adopted child, could not inherit from her adoptive mother's sister.'
The court explained that it would be unfair to permit Browning to
inherit from Hamilton because Hamilton, a collateral relative, made
no promises to Browning and was not a party to the adoption agree-
ment.69 Additionally, the court rejected Browning's claim that she
was the most logical heir of Eleanor Hamilton's property because "the
only other party seeking to inherit [was] the local Board of Education
through escheat laws." 7' Although it conceded that escheat is disfa-
vored at law,7 1 the court nonetheless denied Browning's claim be-
cause Maryland's law stipulates that the Board of Education inherits
property if an individual dies intestate and without legal heirs.7 2
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Eldridge argued that Browning
should inherit from Hamilton because "the equitably adopted child
who has served as a dutiful family member" has a greater claim to her
relative's estate than the state.7 3 Judge Eldridge asserted that it was
illogical to prevent Browning, an equitably adopted child who has
gained the entitlements of a legal heir, from inheriting Hamilton's
estate.7" He pointed out the inconsistency in the court's reasoning,
which would allow Browning to be the "legal heir" of Marian Hutchin-
son as her stepmother, but not a "legal heir" of Hutchinson's sister,
her "aunt."75 Judge Eldridge concluded that, presumably, Hamilton
67. Id.
68. Id. at 293, 635 A.2d at 380.
69. See id. at 293-94, 635 A.2d at 379-80. The court noted: "Under both contractual
and estoppel notions, the equities that clearly exist in favor of permitting an equitably
adopted child to inherit from an equitably adoptive parent do not exist when that child
seeks to inherit from a sibling of the child's adoptive parents." Id.
70. Id. at 294, 635 A.2d at 380.
71. Id.; see also United States v. 198.73 Acres of Land, 800 F.2d 434, 435-36 (4th Cir.
1986) (noting that society prefers to keep property within the family as most broadly
defined).
72. Browning, 333 Md. at 294-95, 635 A.2d at 380 ("Maryland is crystal clear that if no
legal heir exists, the decedent's property escheats to the local Board of Education.").
73. Id. at 297, 635 A-2d at 381 (Eldridge,J., dissenting). Eldridge conceded that a legal
heir would have inheritance priority over Browning, but pointed out that, "unlike those
who would be entitled to take as heirs, the State has no 'family' connection to the intestate
decedent." Id.
74. Id. at 297-98, 635 A.2d at 381.
75. Id. at 298, 635 A.2d at 381.
[VOL. 54:670
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
would have preferred her estate be left to Browning, a long-time fam-
ily member and legal heir of her sister.76
4. Analysis.-In Browning, the Court of Appeals held that an eq-
uitably adopted child could not inherit from her equitably adoptive
mother's sister.77 Although the Court of Appeals has consistently held
that equitable adoption permits an alleged adoptive child to inherit
from her intestate adoptive parent's estate, the court had never deter-
mined the effect of the doctrine on collateral relatives.7" By its refusal
to expand the scope of equitable adoption beyond the adoptive child
and parent, the Browning court strictly delineated the bounds of the
child's inheritance rights in Maryland.
In addition, the Browning decision accords with Maryland prece-
dent on equitable adoption. In McGarvey v. State, the court refused to
invoke equitable adoption against the state because the state was not
in privity with the parties to the adoption agreement.79 Based on this
logic, equitable adoption should not operate against Hamilton's estate
because she, too, was not a party to the adoption agreement.
Most importantly, the Court of Appeals in Browning underscored
the importance of strict compliance with Maryland's adoption stat-
utes, which, if followed, guarantee the legal rights of the adopted
child in accordance with public policy."0 The statutory requirement,
that all parties to an adoption agreement receive judicial approval,
protects the youth by helping ensure a proper home for the child and
impresses upon all parties the ramifications and responsibilities inci-
dent to the adoption agreement.8 '
Because equitable adoption permits a circumvention of statutory
adoption procedures, other jurisdictions have wisely limited its appli-
cation by requiring clear and convincing evidence of a binding con-
tract to adopt, 2 and by limiting its application to those in privity to
the adoptive agreement.8 " By its decision to follow the weight of au-
thority from other courts, the Browning court effectively limited cir-
cumvention of statutory adoption procedures and promoted the
underlying public policy. If the court had awarded Browning the sta-
tus of heir for all purposes, it would have, in effect, eliminated the
76. Id.
77. Id. at 295, 635 A.2d at 380.
78. See McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 238, 533 A.2d 690, 692 (1987).
79. Id. at 241-43, 533 A.2d at 694-95.
80. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
81. McGarey, 311 Md. at 240-41, 533 A.2d at 694.
82. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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need for formal adoption procedures. 84  As one Ohio court
explained:
If taking a child into a home, rearing such child, giving it the
family name, calling such a child a daughter, and holding
such child out to relatives and friends as a daughter, is suffi-
cient to establish a lawful adoption, then there would be no
need for any statutory authority or judicial proceedings.85
To allow an equitably adopted child to inherit from collateral relatives
to the adoptive parents could overburden courts with considerable lit-
igation.8 6 "In today's society, where divorce, remarriage and extended
households are commonplace, each such relationship could create
potential claims to the estates of numerous relatives."87
The court's denial of Browning's right to inherit from her aunt,
moreover, was not inconsistent with Browning's status as Marian's
stepdaughter. Her status as a stepchild, like that of an equitably
adopted child, did not provide Browning with unlimited inheritance
rights.88 Indeed, courts show considerable reluctance to allow partici-
pation in the estate of a stepparent on the basis of equitable adop-
tion.89 It is significant that, as a stepdaughter, Maryland law affords
Browning no right to inherit from the blood relatives of Marian,9"
which surely would undermine the same inheritance claims based on
equitable adoption.
5. Conclusion.-In Browning, the Court of Appeals narrowly lim-
ited the equitably adopted child's inheritance rights to an adoptive
parent's estate. The court's decision, moreover, clarified the scope of
equitable adoption in a manner consistent with prior Maryland juris-
prudence on the doctrine. Finally, by holding that Browning was not
entitled to inherit her aunt's estate, the Court of Appeals reinforced
the significance that Maryland's judiciary and legislature have tradi-
84. See Belden v. Armstrong, 113 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
85. Id.
86. Appellant's Brief at 17, Board of Educ. v. Browning, 333 Md. 281, 635 A.2d 373
(1994) (No. 94-50).
87. Id.
88. The Maryland Code states: "A child includes a legitimate child, an adopted child,
and an illegitimate child to the extent provided in §§ 1-206 through 1-208 of this title. A
child does not include a stepchild, a foster child, or a grandchild or more remote descen-
dant" MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-205 (1991) (emphasis added).
89. Jeffries, supra note 43, at 737.
90. See supra note 88.
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tionally placed upon strict compliance with the statutory procedures
for adoption.
ELIZABETH A. GAUDIO
C. Clarifying the Best Interest Standard in Maryland
In In re Adoption No. A91-71A,1 the Court of Appeals addressed
two issues: whether separate counsel must be appointed to represent
a child who is the subject of an independent adoption; and the proper
application of the best interest standard in terminating the rights of a
natural parent who contests the independent adoption.2 First, the
court held that under Section 5-323 of the Family Law Article, a court
must appoint counsel to represent an individual who is the subject of
an independent adoption proceeding.3 In so holding, the court reaf-
firmed the need for trial courts to appoint counsel, previously codi-
fied in Article 16, Section 77B(a) (4).4
Second, the court held that when a natural parent contests a
third party's adoption petition, the presumption that it is in the
child's best interest to remain with the natural parent is rebuttable.5
Evidence of parental unfitness or the existence of exceptional circum-
stances that could render it detrimental for the child's well-being to
remain with the natural parent may rebut the presumption.6 Specifi-
cally, the court held that under Section 5-312 of the Family Law Arti-
cle, behavior that is not extreme enough to render the natural parent
unfit may still be a potential factor that could give rise to exceptional
1. 334 Md. 538, 640 A.2d 1085 (1994).
2. The Court of Appeals also examined a third issue dealing with timing requirements
under § 5-312(b) of the Family Law Article. See infra note 7. Ernest, the biological father,
contended that the statute requires that the prospective adoptive parents maintain custody
of the child for six months and that the child be out of the natural parents' custody for one
year prior to the filing of the adoption petition. Based on the plain meaning of the lan-
guage used in § 5-312(b), the court held that the time periods refer to the granting of the
petition and not to the filing of the petition. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 565-66, 640
A.2d at 1098-99.
3. Id. at 559, 640 A.2d at 1095; see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-323 (1991). Section
5-323 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Certain appointments required-In a proceeding for adoption or guardianship,
the court shall appoint separate counsel to represent:
(4) in an involuntary termination of parental rights, an individual who is the
subject of the proceeding and an indigent parent.
Id. § 5-323(a) (4).
4. Washington County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Clark, 296 Md. 190, 199-200, 461 A.2d
1078, 1082 (1983) (holding that MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 77B (1957) is mandatory).




circumstances. 7 The court enumerated several factors8 that may
prove the existence of exceptional circumstances.9 By emphasizing
the importance of exceptional circumstances in terminating parental
rights, the court clarified the proper analysis of the best interest
standard.
1. The Case.-Ernest M. and Mellisa R., both unmarried, began
living together in June 1990.10 Shortly thereafter, Mellisa discovered
she was pregnant with Ernest's child.11 Mellisa then informed Ernest
of her pregnancy and her choice to put the baby up for adoption.12
With the help of an independent facilitator," Mellisa selected James
and Darlene D. as adoptive parents. 4 Initially, Ernest expressed no
7. Id. at 567, 640 A.2d at 1099; see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-312(b) (1991). Sec-
tion 5-312(b) provides:
(b) In general-Without the consent of the child's natural parent, a court may
grant a decree of adoption to a stepparent, relative, or other individual who has
exercised physical care, custody, or control of a child for at least 6 months, if by
clear and convincing evidence the court finds that:
(1) it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent's
rights as to the child;
(2) the child has been out of the custody of the natural parent for at least 1
year;
(3) the child has developed significant feelings toward and emotional ties
with the petitioner; and
(4) the natural parent;
(i) has not maintained meaningful contact with the child during the
time the petitioner has had custody despite the opportunity to do so;
(ii) has repeatedly failed to contribute to the physical care and support
of the child although financially able to do so; or
(iii) has been convicted of child abuse of the child.
Id. § 5-312(b).
8. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
9. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 562-64, 640 A.2d at 1097-98.
10. Id. at 543, 640 A.2d at 1088. At that time, Mellisa, 20 years old, was a stripper on
Baltimore's "Block" and had a six-month old child from a previous relationship. Id. at 544,
640 A.2d at 1088. Ernest, 21 or 22 years old, had a history of instability in living arrange-
ments, a sporadic employment record, numerous points on his driving record, and an
arrest and probation before judgment for cocaine possession. Id. at 546, 640 A.2d at 1089.
11. Id. at 544, 640 A.2d at 1088.
12. Id.
13. Id. Adoption occurs according to one of the following three methods: (1) a public
or state agency initiates the adoption; (2) an independent adoption agency initiates the
adoption, usually after the mother has consented to the adoption; and (3) independent
facilitators: friends, relatives, doctors, or attorneys, arrange the adoption between the bio-
logical parents and the prospective adopters. ConstanceJ. Miller, Comment, Best Interests of
Children and the Interests of Adoptive Parents: Isn't it Time for Comprehensive Reform?, 21 GONZ.
L. REv. 749, 752-53 (1985). Mellisa and the D.s' arrangement is in accordance with the
third method.
14. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 544, 640 A.2d at 1088. At the time of the adop-
tion, the D.'s had been married for approximately 15 years and had no children. Mr. D.,
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interest in Mellisa's pregnancy or her decision to put the child up for
adoption.' 5 Ernest later changed his mind, however, and informed
Mellisa's attorney that he would not consent to the adoption.1 6
On March 16, 1991, in the presence of Mrs. D., Mellisa gave birth
to a baby boy (Baby G.). 17 Two days later, with Mellisa's consent, the
D.s filed a complaint for Independent Adoption and Change of
Name." On the same day, the court granted the D.s temporary cus-
tody of Baby G.19
On April 9, 1991, Ernest filed a Notice of Objection, requesting
proof of his paternity and indicating that if the child was his he would
seek custody.20 The test results proved that Ernest was Baby G.'s bio-
logical father.2 ' In response, Mellisa filed a Conditional Revocation of
Consent to Independent Adoption, which stated that if the court re-
fused to finalize the adoption because of Ernest's non-consent, she
would revoke her consent and assume custody of Baby G.2 2
At the adoption hearing held from April 27 through 29, 1992, the
court denied the D.s' petition for adoption, but ordered Baby G. to
remain in the D.s' custody. 23 The court stated that under Section 5-
312 it had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence that
Ernest was unfit; therefore, the court could not hold that it was in
38 years old, had been in the construction business for 17 years, and Mrs. D., 37 years old,
was the manager of service representatives in a local company. Id. at 546 n.2, 640 A.2d at
1089 n.2. Carol Popham, a social worker employed by the Anne Arundel County Depart-
ment of Social Services, recommended that the D.s' petition for adoption be granted after
a court-ordered investigation of both the natural parents and the D.s. Id.
15. Id. at 544, 640 A.2d at 1088. In January and February 1991, Mellisa's attorney tele-
phoned Ernest concerning the upcoming adoption. Ernest told the lawyer, "If the bitch
wants to give it away, she can." Id. Subsequent correspondence between Ernest and Mel-
lisa's attorney confirmed Ernest's willingness to consent to the adoption. Id.
16. Id. The investigation revealed that Ernest's "sudden interest" in Baby G. seemed
the result of his mother's influence. Id. at 546, 640 A.2d at 1089.
17. Id. at 545, 640 A.2d at 1088.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id., 640 A.2d at 1089.
21. Id. In later testimony, Ernest revealed that he hoped the paternity test would let
him "off the hook." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 548, 640 A.2d at 1090. Previously, on December 20, 1991, the court held a
hearing to decide whether Ernest's request for custody and visitation and his motion to
dismiss the adoption petition should be granted. Id. at 547, 640 A.2d at 1089. The trial
court found: (1) while it did not have the authority to grant the adoption, it would not
dismiss it; (2) it was not in the child's best interest to grant Ernest custody or visitation




Baby G.'s best interest to terminate Ernest's parental rights.24 The
court also held that it had not been proven by clear and convincing
evidence that Ernest failed to contribute to the physical care and sup-
port of Baby G., a factor for consideration under Section 5-312.25
On June 10, 1992, the D.s filed a Notice for In Banc Review, pur-
suant to Article IV, Section 22, of the Maryland Constitution and
Maryland Rule 2-551.26 Three issues were raised by the D.s at the
review:
(1) whether the trial court erred by failing to appoint coun-
sel for [Baby G.] in violation of § 5-323; (2) whether under
§ 5-312, the trial court erred in equating the best interest
standard with Ernest's fitness; and (3) whether the court
erred in finding that Ernest had not failed repeatedly to con-
tribute to [Baby G.'s] support under § 5-312(b) (4) (ii). 2 7
The in banc panel held that although the trial court violated Section
5-323 by failing to appoint counsel for the child, Baby G.'s interests
had, nevertheless, been adequately represented at trial.28 The panel
further held that the trial court had focused solely on Ernest's fitness,
essentially had equated the best interest standard with Ernest's fitness,
and had neglected to analyze the child's best interest.' In addition,
the panel found that the D.s presented sufficient evidence at trial to
establish that Ernest had failed to contribute financially to Baby G.s°
24. Id. at 549, 640 A.2d at 1090. Evidence of Ernest's drug possession charge, his his-
tory of instability in living arrangements, and his abandonment of Mellisa when she be-
came pregnant were not enough to overcome the presumption favoring the natural father.
Id., 640 A.2d at 1091.
25. Id.; see supra note 7. At trial, Ernest testified that he had offered to make payments
to the D.s for Baby G.'s support by giving two checks to his attorney to tender to the D.s.
Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 549, 640 A.2d at 1091. The D.s testified that Ernest had
never offered to contribute financially to Baby G., and that they had never received any
checks from Ernest or anyone else on his behalf. Id. at 550, 640 A.2d at 1091.
26. Id.; see MD. R. 2-551 (1993). Rule 2-551 provides:
(a) Generally---When review by a court in banc is permitted by the Maryland Con-
stitution, a party may have a judgment or determination of any point or question
reviewed by a court in banc by filing a notice for in banc review. Issues are re-
served for in banc review by making an objection in the manner set forth in Rules
2-517 and 2-520. Upon the filing of the notice, the Circuit Administrative Judge
shall designate three judges of the circuit, other than the judge who tried the
action, to sit in banc.
Mo. R. 2-551.
27. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 550, 640 A.2d at 1091.
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Upon these findings, the panel reversed the trial court's judgment
and remanded the case with instructions to grant the adoption.3 '
Ernest appealed the decision to the Court of Special Appeals.
32
In an unreported opinion, the court held that the in banc panel did
not have the authority to make an independent finding as to Baby G.'s
best interest."3 The court concluded that it was unclear whether the
trial court had misconstrued the best interest analysis by an applica-
tion of the evidence presented at trial only towards a finding of fit-
ness, or whether it had permissibly applied evidence of Ernest's fitness
toward a finding of no exceptional circumstances.' The court re-
manded the case to the trial court to determine "by clear and convinc-
ing evidence based on the totality of the circumstances, that it is in the
best interest of [Baby G] to terminate [Ernest's] rights to the child."35
Ernest and the D.s filed separate petitions for writs of certiorari, which
the Court of Appeals granted. 6
2. Legal Background. -
a. Statutory Authority.-The power to decree an adoption is
purely statutory in Maryland."7 This power is granted to courts of eq-
uity by Sections 5-307(a) and 5-309(a) of the Family Law Article.
When read together, these sections expressly provide that "[a] ny indi-
vidual .. .may be adopted by [a]ny adult." 8 Section 5-308(b) states
that an adopted child "[is] the child of the petitioner for all intents
and purposes."3 9 Unless the natural parents' rights have been termi-
31. Id., 640 A.2d at 1092.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 552, 640 A.2d at 1092.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Court of Special Appeals did not address whether the trial court erred in
failing to appoint independent counsel to represent Baby G.'s interest. Id. at 553, 640 A.2d
at 1093.
36. In reAdoption No. A91-71A, 332 Md. 741, 633 A.2d 102 (1993).
37. Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 4, 497 A.2d 142, 143 (1985); Atkins v. Gose, 189 Md.
542, 548, 56 A.2d 697, 700 (1947).
38. Bridges, 304 Md. at 5, 497 A.2d at 144 (interpreting "[a]ny adult" to include a natu-
ral father who filed a petition to adopt his son born out of wedlock); cf Green v. Sol-
lenberger, 100 Md. App. 686, 691, 642 A.2d 324, 327 (1994) ("[D]espite the broad
unqualified language of Maryland's adoption statute, it was not the intention of the Legis-
lature that any individual may be adopted by an adult, totally without qualification or re-
striction concerning blood relationships."), affd, No. 94-102, 1995 WL 170268 (Md. Apr.
12, 1995).
39. MD. CODE ANN., Fm. LAw § 5-308(b) (1991); see Bridges, 304 Md. at 5, 497 A.2d at
144 (providing a general overview of Maryland's adoption statutes).
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nated by a judicial proceeding, an individual may not be adopted
without the consent of both natural parents under Section 5-311.4 o
When a natural parent expressly withholds consent to an in-
dependent adoption, Section 5-312 is applicable.4" Section 5-313 ap-
plies to a parental objection to a state or agency-arranged adoption.42
Upon meeting the statutory requirements, an adoption is permitted
without a natural parent's consent if it can be shown through clear
and convincing evidence that "it is in the child's best interest to termi-
nate the natural parent's rights as to the child."43 In all adoption
cases, the court must bear in mind the expressed will of the Maryland
legislature that a child should not be separated unnecessarily from its
natural parents.44
b. The Best Interest Standard in Mary/and. -Maryland courts
have long used the best interest standard to decide contested petitions
for adoption as well as custody disputes.45 Under the best interest
standard, the paramount consideration is the child's welfare and not
the parent's interest in raising the child.' When an adoption petition
by a third party is opposed by the natural parent, it is presumed to be
in the child's best interest to maintain the legal relationship with the
40. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-311 (1991). For a discussion of the rights of unwed
fathers, see Kirsten *Korn, Comment, The Struggle for the Child: Preserving the Family in Adop-
tion Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third-Parties, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1279, 1297-1306
(1994).
41. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-312 (1991); Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 543,
640 A.2d at 1087-88; see also Randall L. Hagen, Adoption, Developments in Maryland Law,
1987-88, 48 MD. L. REv. 711, 728 (1989) (discussing the court's application of §§ 5-312 and
5-313).
42. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-313 (1991); Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 557
n.3, 640 A.2d at 1095 n.3.
43. Bridges, 304 Md. at 5, 497 A.2d at 144; see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-312(b) (1)
(1991).
44. Id. § 5-303(b).
45. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 559, 640 A.2d at 1096; see also Washington County
Dep't of Social Servs. v. Clark, 296 Md. 190, 461 A.2d 1077 (1983) (holding that when the
state seeks to terminate parental rights without the consent of the natural parent in an
adoption proceeding, the matter should be determined according to the best interest of
the child); Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 148 A.2d 387 (1959) (explaining that it was in
the child's best interest to remain in the custody of her foster parents due to the length of
time she had lived in their home); Winter v. Director of Pub. Welfare, 217 Md. 391, 143
A.2d 81 (finding that statutes that dispense with a natural parent's need to consent are not
unconstitutional where the welfare and best interests of the child are the primary con-
cerns), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 912 (1958).
46. In Adoption No. A91-71A the court emphasized that promotion of the child's well-
being is a consideration of " 'transcendent importance.'" Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at
561, 640 A.2d at 1096 (quoting Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116, 43 A.2d 186, 191
(1945)); see also Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to
Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. Rv. 705, 708-26 (1986).
[VOL. 54:670
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
natural parent.47 "The justification for this presumption is the belief
that the parent's natural affection for the child creates a greater desire
and effort to properly care for and rear the child than would exist in
an individual not so related."48
To overcome the natural parent presumption, courts require evi-
dence that either the natural parent is unfit49 or that exceptional cir-
cumstances exist that would render a decision in favor of the natural
parent detrimental to the child.5" Courts often focus on the physical,
psychological, and economic needs of the child." In Alston v.
Thomas," the Court of Appeals granted an adoption over the natural
father's objection because the father had abandoned the child shortly
after birth and he was unable to provide adequate financial support to
the child.5" Likewise, in Atkins v. Gose,5 4 the court granted an adop-
tion over the objection of the natural mother.55 The court concluded
that because of the mother's crowded and unstable living quarters,
return of the child from the adoptive parent's home to his mother's
home would be detrimental to his welfare.56
Due to the finality of adoption proceedings, Maryland requires
that parental rights be terminated only upon a showing of clear and
convincing evidence.57 "Unlike awards of custody, . . . adoption de-
crees cut the child off from the natural parent who is made a legal
stranger to his offspring. [A] doption shall not be granted over paren-
tal objection unless that course clearly is justified.""8 A clear and con-
vincing standard is therefore required to protect the fundamental
rights of parents.59
47. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 561, 640 A.2d at 1096.
48. Id. at 560, 640 A.2d at 1096.
49. Id. Parental unfitness is a broad concept that can justify termination of parental
rights in situations where parental conduct falls short of abandonment, neglect, or nonsup-
port. JOAN H. HOLUINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.04(1) (iv) (1993).
50. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 560, 640 A.2d at 1096; Winter v. Director of Pub.
Welfare, 217 Md. 391, 396, 143 A.2d 81, 84, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 912 (1958).
51. Miller, supra note 13, at 759.
52. 161 Md. 617, 158 A. 24 (1932).
53. Id. at 620, 158 A. at 25.
54. 189 Md. 542, 56 A.2d 697 (1948).
55. Id. at 551, 56 A.2d at 701.
56. Id.
57. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-312(b) (1991). In 1982, the Supreme Court held
that due process requires that parental rights not be terminated in adoption proceedings
except upon clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); see
HOLINGER ET AL., supra note 49, § 2.10 (reviewing the Santosky decision to raise the stan-
dard of proof for the termination of parental rights).
58. Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275 (1960).
59. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 1394-95 (explaining that the liberty interests of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is a fundamental right).
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3. The Court's Reasoning. -Under Section 5-323 of the Family
Law Article,6" the Court of Appeals held that counsel must be ap-
pointed to represent the interests of the subject in a contested in-
dependent adoption proceeding.61 The court rejected Ernest's
argument that Section 5-323 only applies to state or agency-arranged
adoptions under Section 5-313.62 In interpreting Section 5-323, the
court followed the plain meaning rule of statutory construction: "[a]
plainly worded statute must be construed without forced interpreta-
tions designed to limit its applications. '63 The court reasoned that the
statute contained no language which would limit its application only
to Section 5-313.' The court further relied on the longstanding prin-
ciple that the word "shall" takes on a mandatory meaning when used
in a statute.65 Section 5-323 consequently requires appointment of
counsel whether the proceeding is arranged independently or
through an agency-arranged or state adoption.
To determine whether it would be in Baby G's best interest to
terminate Ernest's parental rights, the court stated that "in making
the best interest determination.., evidence can, and should, be con-
sidered not only with regard to [parental] fitness, but as a potential
factor which may give rise to exceptional circumstances warranting
the termination of parental rights." 66 Apart from the factors listed
under Section 5-312,67 the court for the first time enumerated excep-
tional circumstance factors drawn from past adoption and custody
case law.6" These factors include the length of time the child has
been with the prospective parents and the strength of the emotional
tie that has developed; 69 the stability of life with the adoptive parents
as compared with the natural parents;7" and the sincerity of the natu-
60. See supra note 3.
61. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 559, 640 A.2d at 1095.
62. Id. at 557, 640 A.2d at 1094-95.
63. Id., 640 A.2d at 1095.
64. Id. at 558, 640 A.2d at 1095.
65. Id. at 559 n.5, 640 A.2d at 1095 n.5.
66. Id. at 563, 640 A.2d at 1097.
67. See supra note 7. The court explained that while at least one of the three factors
listed in § 5-312 must be satisfied apart from the best interest determination, these factors
may also be considered to determine the best interests of the child. Adoption No. A91-71A,
344 Md. at 563 n.8, 640 A.2d at 1098 n.8.
68. Adoption No. A91-71A, 344 Md. at 562, 640 A.2d at 1097.
69. Id.; see King v. Shandrowski, 218 Md. 38, 42, 145 A.2d 281, 284 (1958) (remanding
the case to determine whether it would be in the child's best interest to remove her from
the home of her prospective adopted parents with whom she had lived for more than three
years).
70. See Atkins v. Gose, 189 Md. 542, 550-51, 56 A.2d 697, 701 (1948) (holding that the
adoption could be granted over the natural mother's objections because the child's life
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ral parent's desire to raise the child.71 The court also placed impor-
tance on the age of the child when the third-party assumed care of the
child and the emotional effect it would have on the child to remove
him/her from the care of the third-party.72 Finally, the court listed
three additional factors that could result in a finding of exceptional
circumstances based on the natural parent's behavior toward the
child: (1) the effect on the child's stability of having more than one
of the relationships continued,7" (2) abandonment by the father
before or after the birth," and (3) failure to support or visit the
child.7" While these three factors normally apply to findings of a natu-
ral parent's fitness, the court also found them relevant to exceptional
circumstances.76
After reiterating the exceptional circumstances factors of a best
interest analysis, the court examined the three alternative factors re-
quired under Section 5-312(b) (4) to grant a contested adoption.77
The court noted Ernest's failure to contribute monetary support for
the care of Baby G and found there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port Ernest's contention that he had tendered support checks to his
attorney.78 Even if Ernest had tendered the checks, the court rea-
with the adoptive parents would be more stable and promising than it would be with the
natural mother).
71. See Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 192, 372 A.2d 582, 594 (1977).
72. Id. at 191-92, 372 A.2d at 593-94 (finding that exceptional circumstances warranted
that the child remain in the nonparents' custody because the child had been living with
the nonparents for eight and a half years, there was a strong attachment between the child
and nonparents, and the stability of the natural parent's household was questionable); see
also Melton v. Connolly, 219 Md. 184, 148 A.2d 387 (1959) (holding that the strong emo-
tional tie between the child and the nonparent coupled with the length of time the child
had lived with the nonparent warranted a finding of exceptional circumstances); Dietrich
v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 43 A.2d 186 (1945) (denying the petition for custody by the
natural father because the child had lived with the foster parents for four years in a happy
and nurturing environment).
73. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 562, 640 A.2d at 1097; see Monroe v. Monroe, 329
Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993) (finding that the nonparent was the child's "psychological
parent" and it would be detrimental to the child's best interests to sever this emotional tie).
74. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 562, 640 A.2d at 1097; see Alston v. Thomas, 161
Md. 617, 158 A. 24 (1932) (concluding that the natural father had abandoned the child
when he made no attempt to find the child until four months after the child's birth. See
generally HOLLINCER ET AL., supra note 49, § 4.04(1)(a)(ii) (abandonment is grounds for
involuntary termination of parental rights).
75. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 562-63, 640 A.2d at 1097; see Walker v. Gardner,
221 Md. 280, 157 A.2d 273 (1960) (permitting the adoption because the natural father had
never contributed to the child's support).
76. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 563, 640 A.2d at 1097.
77. See supra note 7.
78. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 564-65, 640 A.2d at 1098.
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soned that the amount reflected only payment for medical bills and
not for the care and support of Baby G.7 9
Because it was unclear whether the trial court correctly applied
evidence of Ernest's fitness to a finding of no exceptional circum-
stances or whether it erroneously equated the best interest standard to
a finding of fitness, the court refrained from decreeing the adop-
tion."o Instead, the court remanded the case to the trial court in or-
der to appoint counsel to represent Baby G's interest, and then to
determine whether, under the best interest standard, exceptional cir-
cumstances warranted the termination of Ernest's parental rights."1
4. Analysis.-The court's determination that Section 5-323 re-
quires courts to appoint counsel to represent the interests of individu-
als who are the subject of an independent adoption proceeding is
consistent with prior Maryland case law decided under Article 16, Sec-
tion 77B, that related to agency-arranged and state proceedings.82
The court correctly and sensibly concluded that for the purposes of
Section 5-323 applicability, "[tlhere is no difference between a termi-
nation of parental rights prerequisite to the granting of an independ-
ent adoption and a termination of parental rights prerequisite to the
granting of an agency-arranged adoption."13 This ruling will ensure
more uniform treatment of independent and agency-arranged adop-
tions under Section 5-323. By providing separate counsel for the
child, the court's ruling further enhances the principle that the sole
focus in an adoption should be on the child and not on the interests
of the parents or the state.
In the matter of parental nonconsent, the court clarified the
proper analysis for determination of the best interest of a child in an
independent adoption. With respect to the child's best interest, the
court emphasized that parental fitness is not the only factor a trial
court must consider.8 4 A court must also examine factors to deter-
mine whether exceptional circumstances may warrant the termination
of parental rights.85 The court's distinction between fitness and ex-
ceptional circumstances is important, as a parent's behavior may not
79. Id. at 565, 640 A-2d at 1098. Under § 5-312(b)(4)(ii), financial support must in-
clude the cost of the child's physical care and support and not only the cost of medical
bills. Id.
80. Id. at 567-68, 640 A.2d at 1099-1100.
81. Id. at 568, 640 A.2d at 1100.
82. See supra note 4.
83. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 558, 640 A.2d at 1095.
84. Id. at 561, 640 A.2d at 1096.
85. Id. at 567, 640 A.2d at 1099.
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rise to the level of unfitness, but it may, however, give rise to an excep-
tional circumstance.8 6
Before Adoption No. A91-71A, courts had limited guidance as to
which factors to weigh in a best interests adoption analysis. Generally,
courts turned to past custody cases for guidance. 7 Consistent with
this approach, the Adoption No. A91-71A court listed several factors,
taken from past custody cases, for courts to apply in adoption cases.88
By its reliance on factors used in custody cases, the court's decision
provides trial courts with a uniform basis to adjudicate claims based
on a child's best interest, regardless of whether the dispute concerns
custody or adoption.
While the Adoption No. A91-71A decision will provide courts with a
set of guidelines, the court retreated from a strict formulaic approach
and noted that "a determination [into exceptional circumstances] de-
pends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. " ' The listed
factors are "simply factors to be considered in the best interest analy-
sis."90 Thus, the decision does not emphasize whether any factors
should be given greater weight or if the factors should be evaluated
equally. Trial judges will continue to exercise broad discretion in de-
ciding whether exceptional circumstances exist, depending on their
view of the evidence.
Although it clarified the best interest standard, the court failed to
stress that before an adoption petition can be granted where a natural
parent withholds consent, at least one of the three alternative factors
under Section 5-312(b) (4) must exist.91 Petitioners must prove: (1)
the natural parent did not maintain a meaningful relation with the
child despite the opportunity to do so, or (2) the natural parent did
not contribute financially to the care and support of the child, or (3)
86. Id. at 563, 640 A.2d at 1097.
87. Id. at 561, 640 A.2d at 1097. Factors considered relevant in past custody cases
included
the length of time the child has been away from the biological parent, the age of
the child when care was assumed by the third party, the possible emotional effect
on the child of a change of custody, the period of time which elapsed before the
parent sought to reclaim the child, the nature and strength of the ties between
the child and the third party custodian, the intensity and genuineness of the par-
ent's desire to have the child, [and] the stability and certainty as to the child's
future in the custody of the parent.
Id. at 561-62, 640 A.2d at 1097 (citing Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 191, 372 A.2d 582,
593 (1977)).
88. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
89. Adoption A91-71A, 334 Md. at 561, 640 A.2d at 1096.
90. Id. at 564, 640 A.2d at 1098.
91. Id.; see supra note 7.
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the natural parent abused the child.92 If the petitioner cannot prove
one of these factors, then the adoption decree will not be granted,
regardless of the child's best interest. 3 This requirement places an
extra burden of proof on petitioners and disregards the possibility
that, in certain circumstances, adoption may be in the child's best in-
terest regardless of whether the natural parent has maintained a rela-
tionship or sent the child financial support. In the future, the
legislature may wish to examine this issue and require judicial empha-
sis upon the best interest determination in cases of parental noncon-
sent to petitions for independent adoptions.
5. Conclusion.-The court in Adoption No. A91-71A held that
under Section 5-323 of the Family Law Article, a trial judge must ap-
point counsel to represent the interests of a child who is the subject of
an adoption proceeding, regardless of whether the proceeding is an
independent or agency-arranged adoption. The court also clarified
the proper application of the best interest standard in independent
adoption cases when a natural parent contests the adoption. While
the court failed to emphasize the importance of the three factors
listed under Section 5-312(b) (4), courts must still determine whether
it has been shown by clear and convincing evidence that one of these
alternative factors has been met before the court can grant an adop-
tion. Courts must then find that it is in the child's best interest to
terminate the natural parents' rights either by a showing of parental
unfitness or exceptional circumstances. By its clarification of the best
interest standard and the enumeration of several factors that may de-
termine exceptional circumstances, the court has provided useful
guidelines for future adjudication of adoption claims.
DANNA M. LUBRANI
92. Adoption No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 543, 640 A.2d at 1087-88 (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAw § 5-312(b)(4) (1991)).
93. Id. at 564, 640 A.2d at 1098.
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VI. LEGAL PROFESSION
A. Compensation of a Contingency-Fee Attorney Discharged Without Cause
In Skeens v. Miller the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the
question of at what point in time a contingent fee attorney's cause of
action for compensation of services will accrue when the attorney has
been released by the client without cause before the occurrence of the
contingency.2 In a case of first impression, the court held that an at-
torney discharged without cause from a contingent fee agreement
may upon .discharge immediately assert a claim in quantum meruit,3
despite the nonoccurrence of the contingency.4
In so holding, the court followed the New York rule, which pre-
vents a client who terminates a contingent fee agreement without
cause from later asserting the contingency term as a defense to a fee
claim of the discharged attorney.5 The Skeens decision reflects a well-
reasoned analysis of the contractual obligations of the parties to a con-
tingent agreement. As a result, the court's ruling provides greater
protection to attorneys, maintains adequate safeguards for clients, and
preserves the contingent fee agreement as a viable instrument that
provides legal services for those otherwise unable to afford them.
1. The Case.--On June 28, 1989, Helen Martha Miller retained
Edward John Skeens to represent her in a personal injury claim stem-
ming from an automobile accident that occurred a few days earlier.6
The written agreement consisted of a contingent fee arrangement by
which Skeens would be paid one-third of any recovery, whether by
lawsuit or settlement.7 The agreement was silent regarding any com-
pensation due Skeens should discharge take place prior to the occur-
rence of the contingency.'
In a letter dated October 31, 1990, Miller wrote Skeens to dis-
charge him as her attorney and request that Skeens forward her file
and a bill for costs incurred to another attorney.9 Responding by let-
1. 331 Md. 331, 628 A.2d 185 (1993).
2. Id. at 336-37, 628 A-2d at 188.
3. Quantum meruit is an equitable doctrine which allows the recovery of "reasonable
value for services, absent a clear and understood contract or... for partial performance
when an entire contract has been rescinded." Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. McIntire,
286 Md. 87, 93, 405 A.2d 273, 277 (1979).
4. Skeens, 331 Md. at 342, 628 A.2d at 191.
5. Id. at 344, 628 A.2d at 191.
6. Id. at 333, 628 A.2d at 186.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see Letter of dismissal from defendant dated October 31, 1990, Record at 35-36.
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ter dated November 19, 1990, Skeens wrote Miller to inform her that
he expected to meet with her new counsel that day and stated that he
expected payment for the reasonable value of work performed.'"
Skeens enclosed an itemized statement," and informed Miller that he
expected payment immediately, no matter the future success of her
claim.12 In the letter, Skeens further stated that if Miller lacked the
funds to pay him immediately, he would accept assignment of any set-
tlement proceeds Miller might obtain."3 Upon receiving neither pay-
ment nor assignment, Skeens sued Miller in the District Court of
Maryland for Prince George's County. 4 Skeens alleged that he was
dismissed without cause and based his claim solely in quantum meruit. 5
At trial on June 19, 1991, the district court granted Miller's mo-
tion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice and reasoned that
Skeens's claim could ripen only upon Miller's recovery on her under-
lying personal injury claim.16 On appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County affirmed on the grounds that the trial court's ruling
was not clearly erroneous.' 7 The circuit court held that Skeens's
cause of action would accrue "only upon the successful occurrence of
the contingency stated in the Attomey-Client Agreement."1 8 Skeens
appealed the decision to the Court of Special Appeals, which trans-
ferred the case to the Court of Appeals." The Court of Appeals there-
upon granted Skeens's petition for writ of certiorari.20
2. Legal Background.-
a. The Nature of the Attorney-Client Relationship.-It is firmly
established in Maryland that an attorney's authority to act for a client
10. Letter from Attorney Skeens to defendant dated November 19, 1990, Record at 37.
11. Skeens, 331 Md. at 333-34, 628 A.2d at 186. Skeens enclosed an itemized statement
of services rendered and asserted that a reasonable charge for those services (at a rate of
$150 per hour) was $2,740. Id. How Skeens arrived at this figure was somewhat unclear to
the court, as the 1090 minutes that Skeens spent on Miller's case when converted to hours
and multiplied by an hourly rate of $150 totals $2,725. Id. at 334 n.1, 628 A.2d at 186 n.1.
The court noted that Skeens apparently spent $42 in costs in furtherance of Miller's claim.
Id.





17. Skeens v. Miller, No. CAL 91-16575 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 1991).
18. Id. at 4.
19. Skeens, 331 Md. at 334, 628 A.2d at 187.
20. Id.
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is freely revocable at the will of the client.2 1 In Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Semmes,22 the Court of Appeals reasoned that public policy de-
mands that a litigant have the power to "compromise his suit accord-
ing to his own wishes or interest." s2 Commentators have noted that
public policy deems this right a necessity because the nature of the
attorney-client relationship is one based upon trust and confidence. 4
Once an attorney is discharged, it becomes necessary to deter-
mine whether the attorney is entitled to compensation. In Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Korotki,25 the Court of Appeals noted its agree-
ment with the prevailing rule that an attorney discharged for cause is
not entitled to compensation, 6 while an attorney released without
cause is so entitled.27 The rule further provides that an attorney who
justifiedly terminates a relationship is similarly entitled to
28compensation.
Once an attorney is deemed entitled to compensation, a deter-
mination is made regarding whether the attorney will be compensated
in quantum meruit or under the contract. A minority of jurisdictions
allow full recovery of the amount stipulated in the contract, either
upon the theory of constructive performance or contract damages.29
Most jurisdictions, including Maryland, follow the modern rule which
21. See Palmer v. Brown, 184 Md. 309, 316, 40 A.2d 514, 517 (1945); Boyd v. Johnson,
145 Md. 385, 389, 125 A. 697, 698-99 (1924); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Semmes, 73 Md.
17, 18, 20 A. 127, 128 (1890).
22. 73 Md. 17, 20 A. 127 (1890).
23. Id. at 19, 20 A. at 128.
24. See, e.g., F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964). MacKin-
non notes:
One of the basic features of the lawyer-client relationship is the fact that it is
terminable at will ... with or without cause. Courts view the relationship as one
peculiarly dependent upon the confidence of a client in his lawyer and believe
there is no reason to force a continuance of the relationship if this confidence no
longer exists.
Id. at 77.
25. 318 Md. 646, 569 A.2d 1224 (1990).
26. Id. at 669, 569 A.2d at 1235-36; accord Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 192, 517
A.2d 1092, 1097 (1986) (Rodowsky,J., concurring).
27. Korotki, 318 Md. at 670, 569 A.2d at 1236; accord Vogelhut 308 Md. at 192, 517 A.2d
at 1097 (Rodowsky, J., concurring); Palmer, 184 Md. at 316, 40 A.2d at 517; Boyd, 145 Md. at
389-90, 125 A. at 699; Semmes, 73 Md. at 20-21, 20 A. at 128.
28. Korotki, 318 Md. at 760, 569 A.2d at 1236.
29. See, e.g., Kaushiva v. Hutter, 454 A.2d 1373, 1375 (D.C.) (holding attorney who had
substantially performed, was at all times ready, willing, and able to perform, and was later
discharged by client without cause, was entitled to the full contingent fee set out in con-
tract), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983).
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permits compensation for the reasonable value of services performed
under the theory of quantum meruit.30
Jurisdictions that follow the modem quantum meruit rule prohibit
the recovery of contract damages on the ground that a contract be-
tween an attorney and client contains an implied term that allows the
client to discharge the attorney freely, with or without cause. 3' Be-
cause of this implied term, a client who discharges an attorney has not
breached the retainer contract, and therefore the attorney cannot col-
lect contract damages.32 In Korotki, the Court of Appeals similarly
commented that "the attorney is entitled to the reasonable value of
the services-not to a higher amount produced by a contingent fee
agreement."
33
b. When the Attorney's Cause of Action Accrues.-While it is
agreed that an attorney discharged without cause is entitled to com-
pensation in some form, no consensus exists regarding the point in
time at which such an attorney's cause of action accrues.3 4 Courts
presented with this question follow one of two schools of thought-
the California rule or the New York rule.35 In Fracasse v. Brent,36 the
Supreme Court of California held that a cause of action to recover for
services rendered before revocation does not accrue until the actual
occurrence of the contingency stated in the contract.37 Under this
30. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co., 237 N.W.2d 520, 524 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)
(noting although no Michigan court had decided the issue, the majority view is that an
attorney discharged without cause, or who rightfully withdraws, is entitled to compensation
for the reasonable value of services based upon quantum meruit); Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E.
46, 47-48 (N.Y.) (holding attorney hired under contingency fee arrangement in condem-
nation proceedings was entitled only to reasonable value of services rendered), modified,
115 N.E. 1044 (N.Y. 1917).
31. See Martin, 114 N.E. at 48.
32. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.5.2, at 546 (1986); Robert W.
Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partnes: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving 67 TEx.
L. REv. 1, 17 (1988); E. Randall Morrow, Note, Attorney's Right to Compensation When Dis-
charged Without Cause From a Contingent Fee Contract- Covington v. Rhodes, 15 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 677, 677-78 (1979).
33. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Korotki, 318 Md. 646, 670, 569 A-2d 1224, 1236
(1990); see alsoVogelhutv. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 192, 517 A.2d 1092, 1097 (1986) (Rodow-
sky,J., concurring) ("[T]he attorney is entitled to be compensated for the reasonable value
of the legal services rendered prior to termination."); Ethics Committee of the Maryland
State Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 79-19 ("It is the opinion of the Ethics Committee that [the
attorney] may not claim the entire ... contingent fee but may claim the reasonable value
of... time and services to date of... replacement.").
34. Skeens, 331 Md. at 336-37, 628 A.2d at 188.
35. Id. at 337, 628 A.2d at 188.
36. 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972).
37. Id. at 15; see also Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016, 1022 (Fla. 1982) ("We...
follow the California view that in contingency fee cases, the cause of action for quantum
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rule, a discharged attorney will be denied any compensation in the
event that a recovery is not obtained. 8 The Fracasse court gave two
reasons for the adoption of this rule. First, any determination regard-
ing attorney compensation before actual recovery is highly specula-
tive.39 Second, it would be too great a burden for a client to have an
absolute obligation to pay an attorney no matter the outcome of the
litigation.4"
Courts adopting the California rule have expanded upon the rea-
sons to postpone compensation until the occurrence of the contin-
gency. In Rosenberg v. Levin," the Supreme Court of Florida reasoned
that such a rule furthers public policy by allowing clients to discharge
their attorneys at will. 2 The Rosenberg court further noted that the
postponement of the cause of action does no damage to the attorney
because the attorney would not have collected anything until the con-
tingency actually occurred.43 For additional support, courts have
stressed that the rule promotes greater trust and confidence in the
profession44 and avoids the possible injustice that may result from a
premature recovery.4 5
With regard to the New York rule, the New York Court of Appeals
in Martin v. Camp"6 held that an attorney's cause of action accrues
meruit arises only upon the successful occurrence of the contingency."); Plaza Shoe Store,
Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Mo. 1982) ("[We] adopt[ ] the [California rule
whereby the fee is] payable only upon the occurrence of the contingency."); Clerk of
Super. Ct. v. Guilford Builders Supply Co., 361 S.E.2d 115, 118 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)
("[The] right to recover under the contingent fee contract does not accrue until the occur-
rence of the contingency."), cert. denied, 364 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. 1988); First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Bassett, 83 P.2d 837, 840 (Okla. 1938) ("[The] cause of action did not accrue
until a final recovery was had. .. ").
38. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 14; Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1022; Plaza Shoe Store, 636 S.W.2d at
59; Guilford Builders Supply Co., 361 S.E.2d at 118; Bassett, 83 P.2d at 840.
39. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 14.
40, Id.
41. 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
42. Id. at 1022. "We conclude that this approach creates the best balance between the
desirable right of the client to discharge his attorney and the right of an attorney for rea-
sonable compensation for his services." Id.; see also Plaza Shoe Store, 636 S.W.2d at 59
("While this theory may not comport with traditional contract law.., the broad public
policy objectives to be served by this method, plus the peculiar and distinctive features of
the attorney client relationship . . . more than defend and justify the position.").
43. Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1022.
44. Plaza Shoe Store, 636 S.W.2d at 60.
45. Bassett, 83 P.2d at 840 ("We would in such a case, [where the attorney was allowed
to recover upon discharge] have the inequitable situation where the claimant had recov-
ered.., for services decreed by the court to be necessary and beneficial, but which in the
ultimate end would have proved worthless.").
46. 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y.), modified, 115 N.E. 1044 (N.Y. 1917).
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immediately upon termination of the contingent agreement.47 Later,
in Tillman v. Komai the New York court advanced two reasons for the
adoption of this rule. First, the client cannot use the contingent fee
contract as a shield once that contract has been terminated. 49 Sec-
ond, the discharged attorney cannot be made to depend upon the
skill and ability of another attorney who may or may not be successful
depending upon individual competence.5 ° In In re Estate of Callahan,5"
the Supreme Court of Illinois offered three additional reasons for ad-
hering to the New York rule. First, quantum meruit is based upon an
implied promise to pay for valuable services, and the client would be
unjustly enriched if those services were not paid for.52 Second, the
eventual outcome of the litigation is not a necessary factor in deciding
the value of services rendered.5" Lastly, if the discharged attorney's
services were of little or no value to the client, injustice would be
avoided by little or no award.54
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Skeens, the Court of Appeals faced
the novel question of whether an attorney discharged without cause
from a contingent fee agreement may immediately bring an action to
recover the value of legal services rendered prior to discharge.55 The
court held that when a client discharges an attorney without cause,
"the attorney's claim in quantum meruit accrues immediately upon dis-
charge, notwithstanding the fact that the contingency has not
occurred."56
47. Id. at 48-49; see also Booker v. Midpac Lumber Co., 649 P.2d 376, 379 (Haw. 1982)
("The amount of [an attorney's] fee shall be determined ... upon consideration of all
relevant factors, at the time of, or prior to, the final disposition of [the] case .... "); In re
Estate of Callahan, 578 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ill. 1991) ("We have considered the rationale
supporting each approach and hold that an attorney's cause of action for a quantum meruit
fee accrues immediately after discharge."); Adkin Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Har-
well, 606 A.2d 802, 804 (N.H. 1992) ("We believe the better rule is stated in the New York
cases, and hold that the cause of action accrues upon the termination of the attorney's
services without cause, not upon the happening of the contingency.").
48. 181 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1932).
49. Id. at 75. "The client is entitled to cancel his contract of retainer but such an
agreement cannot be partially abrogated. Either it wholly stands or totally falls." Id.
50. Id. at 76. "A successor may be able to obtain far heavierjudgments than the efforts
of the original attorney could secure, or, on the other hand, inferior equipment of a differ-
ent lawyer might render futile an attempt to prove damage to the client." Id.
51. 578 N.E.2d 985 (11. 1991).
52. Id. at 988.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 989. "(lit is possible for someone to receive services and yet not be en-
riched in a tangible way at all." Id.
55. Skeens, 331 Md. at 336-37, 628 A.2d at 188.
56. Id. at 34344, 628 A.2d at 191.
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Writing for a sharply divided court, Judge Karwacki noted that an
attorney discharged without cause may recover the reasonable value
of legal services provided prior to the point of discharge." In support
of this proposition, the opinion quoted extensively from Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Semmes,58 which firmly established that although the
attorney is not entitled to collect the contingency amount once the
agreement has been canceled, the attorney is nevertheless entitled to
receive compensation for the value of legal services rendered prior to
discharge.59
After setting the attorney's right to compensation in a contractual
context, the majority discussed the effect of cancellation of a contrac-
tual agreement 0 and looked to Rodemer v. Henry Hazlehurst & Co. for
authority.61 Although Rodemer did not involve an attorney client rela-
tionship, it "provided equally salient reasoning,"62 when the court
stated that
once [a contract is] repudiated by the defendant, it cannot
bind one and not the other .... Where there is a special
contract, and the plaintiff has performed part of it according
to its terms, and has been prevented by the act or consent of
the defendant from performing the residue, he may in gen-
eral assumpsit recover for the work actually performed, and
the defendant cannot set up the special contract to defeat
him.63
The court then shifted its focus to the point in time when an
attorney's cause of action arises, drawing heavily upon its recent deci-
sion in Vogelhut v. Kandel. 4 In Vogelhut, the court reasoned that an
attorney discharged without cause could immediately assert the right
to a retaining lien on the client's files based upon the reasonable
57. Id. at 340-41, 628 A.2d at 190 (citing Palmer v. Brown, 184 Md. 309, 316, 40 A.2d
514, 517 (1945)); Boyd v. Johnson, 145 Md. 385, 389, 125 A. 697, 699 (1924); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Semmes, 73 Md. 17, 18, 20 A. 127, 128 (1890)).
58. 73 Md. 17, 20 A. 127 (1890).
59. Id. at 21, 20 A. at 128. "[T]he plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable compensation
for the work and labor actually done by them, but that they were not entitled to the contin-
gent compensation." Id. The Semmes court further noted that "[a] Ithough the defendant
had a right to terminate the litigation, yet the [attorneys] had rendered services to it, on
the faith of a contract. It was not intended by either party that these services should be
gratuitous." Id. at 20, 20 A. at 128.
60. Skeens, 331 Md. at 342, 628 A.2d at 190.
61. 9 Gill 288 (1850).
62. Skeens, 331 Md. at 342, 628 A.2d at 190.
63. Rodemer, 9 Gill at 293-94.
64. 308 Md. 183, 517 A.2d 1092 (1986).
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
value of services rendered.65 The relinquishment of those files pro-
vided sufficient consideration to enforce a successor attorney's prom-
ise to share the fee ultimately earned by the successor attorney.66
Based on the reasoning in Semmes, Rodemer, and Vogelhut, the Skeens
court concluded that "the unfulfilled contingency.., had no effect
upon the attorney's right to recover the reasonable value of the serv-
ices performed by the attorney pursuant to the agreement."67
Once the court placed the attorney-client relationship in this con-
tractual light, it reasoned that the New York rule6" was "consistent with
our view of the rights and liabilities of the parties to a contingent fee
agreement."6 9 Therefore, the attorney's claim in quantum meruit
would accrue immediately upon the client's repudiation of the con-
tract without cause.7 °
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Eldridge argued that the ma-
jority mischaracterized each of the cases it relied upon to support the
notion that an attorney may recover before the occurrence of the con-
tingency.7' The dissent asserted that these cases addressed the
amount an attorney is entitled to recover, rather than the point in
time when recovery may be had.72 The court's decision in Attorney
Grievance Commission v. Korotki"7 addressed neither the amount nor the
time when an attorney may recover in that Korotki was a disciplinary
proceeding concerned with the reasonableness of attorney's fees.74
The dissent argued that Rodemer v. Henry Hazlehurst & Co. 75 was inap-
plicable because it concerned neither a contingent fee agreement nor
65. Id. at 190-91, 517 A.2d at 1096.
66. Id. In Vogelhut, attorneys Vogelhut and Kandel entered into an agreement whereby
successor attorney Vogelhut agreed to pay discharged attorney Kandel 25% of any fee re-
ceived in return for Kandel's surrendering of the client's files. Id. at 186-87, 517 A.2d at
1094. The court held that such surrender was adequate consideration to support
Vogelhut's promise to pay Kandel. Id. at 188, 517 A.2d at 1095.
67. Skeens, 331 Md. at 343, 628 A.2d at 191.
68. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
69. Skeens, 331 Md. at 343, 628 A.2d at 191.
70. Id. at 343-44, 628 A.2d at 191.
71. Id. at 345, 628 A.2d at 192 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (citing Palmer v. Brown, 184 Md. 309, 40 A.2d 514 (1945); Boyd v.Johnson, 145
Md. 385, 125 A. 697 (1924); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Semmes, 73 Md. 17, 20 A. 127
(1890); Bull v. Schuberth, 2 Md. 38 (1852)). Judge Eldridge noted that each of these
cases, unlike Skeens, involved a recovery that was sought after the occurrence of the contin-
gency. Id.
73. 318 Md. 646, 569 A.2d 1224 (1990); see supra notes 25-28, 33 and accompanying
text.
74. Skeens, 331 Md. at 346, 628 A.2d at 193 (Eldridge, J., dissenting) ("[Korotki] con-
cerned the reasonableness of the contingent fee and the appropriate discipline.").
75. 9 Gill 288 (1850); see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
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an attorney-client relationship,76 and that the majority's discussion of
Vogelhut v. KandeF7 was completely inaccurate.
7 8
The Skeens dissent also disagreed with the majority's view of the
attorney-client relationship and argued that Maryland case law sup-
ports the notion that the "attorney-client relationship is an agency re-
lationship, governed by principles of agency law."79  The dissent
maintained that case law supports the view that an agent hired under
a contingency fee arrangement has no right to collect for services ren-
dered if the contingency does not occur.8 °
In arguing that the majority showed more concern for the inter-
ests of attorneys than for the interests of clients, the dissent suggested
two forms of protection already afforded attorneys. 81 First, an attor-
ney released without cause from a contingency contract may be enti-
tled to recover upon the happening of the contingency.82 Second, if
there is interference by a third party, the attorney may bring action
against that third party.8" Because client interests are "embedded in
the policies of this state,"84 as evidenced by Maryland Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 1.5,85 the dissent asserted that the New York rule is not
76. Skeens, 331 Md. at 347, 628 A.2d at 193 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
77. 308 Md. 183, 517 A.2d 1092 (1986); see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
78. Skeens, 331 Md. at 348, 628 A.2d at 194 (Eldridge,J., dissenting). The dissent noted
that the majority relied upon the reasoning of a concurring opinion. Id. The dissent
claimed that Vogeihut did not involve the right of the discharged attorney to immediately
assert a retaining lien, and that "the majority's inaccurate statement of the Court's reason-
ing leads it to an inaccurate characterization of the Court's holding." Id. at 348-49, 628
A-2d at 194.
79. Id. at 349-50, 628 A.2d at 194 (citing Switkes v.John McShain, Inc., 202 Md. 340, 96
A.2d 617 (1953)). The dissent noted that the principle that requires an attorney to wait
until the occurrence of the contingency in order to receive compensation may have previ-
ously been applied to an attorney in Keener v. Harrod, 2 Md. 63 (1852). Keener was re-
cently cited by the court in Childs v. Ragonese, 296 Md. 130, 136, 460 A.2d 1031, 1034
(1983), in which the court noted that "Keener does not indicate whether the 'agent' was a
real estate broker, auctioneer, attorney, or other type of agent." Id. at 136 n.3, 460 A.2d at
1034 n.3.
80. Skeens, 331 Md. at 350, 628 A.2d at 194-95 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The dissent
expressed general doubt that the principle of quantum meruit applies to contingent fee
agreements under Maryland law. Id. at 350 & n.2, 628 A.2d at 194-95 & n.2. "Under prin-
ciples of Maryland agency law, an agent who . . . is to be compensated from funds which
the agent is to assist the principal in recovering is not entitled to compensation until there
is a recovery." Id.
81. Id. at 350-51, 628 A.2d at 195.
82. Id. at 350, 628 A.2d at 195.
83. Id. at 350-51, 628 A.2d at 195 (citing Sharrow v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306
Md. 754, 511 A.2d 492 (1986)).
84. Id. at 351, 628 A.2d at 195.
85. The Rule states in part: "(a) A lawyer's fees shall be reasonable. The factors to be
considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: ... (4) the
amount involved and the results obtained." MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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in keeping with the public policy reflected in that comment.86 Finally,
the dissent noted that the court's holding is hardly in accord with the
common understanding, confirmed by public advertisements, that
contingency fee agreements entail no fee unless there is a recovery.8 7
4. Analysis.-The court's holding in Skeens reflects a well-rea-
soned analysis of the contractual rights and liabilities of the parties to
a contingent fee agreement. Presented with the issue of when a cause
of action arises, the court aptly applied the rationale of the New York
Court of Appeals which succinctly stated that "such an agreement can-
not be partially abrogated. Either it wholly stands or totally falls."88
To hold otherwise would allow the client to have her cake and eat it
too. The decision of the Skeens court to follow the New York rule was
only logical, as the California rule is inconsistent with basic contract
principles.89
a. Protections for Attorneys and Clients. -By viewing the attor-
ney-client relationship in a contractual context and allowing an attor-
ney's cause of action to accrue immediately, the Skeens court
eliminated the potential injustice by which a client could deny an at-
torney fair compensation. Under the California rule, which does not
allow a discharged attorney to collect until the contingency actually
occurs,90 a client could avoid payment of attorney compensation in a
Rule 1.5. The dissent pointed out that the comment to Rule 1.5 defines a contingent fee
agreement as
an agreement for legal services (1) made before the services are completed, and
(2) providing compensation of the lawyer which is contingent in whole or in part
upon the successful accomplishment or disposition of the legal matter and which
is either in a fixed amount or in an amount determined under a specified
formula.
Id. cmt
86. Skeens, 331 Md. at 352, 628 A.2d at 196 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Tillman v. Komar, 181 N.E. 75, 75 (N.Y. 1932).
89. See Morrow, supra note 32, at 686. In a strong dissent to the California rule, Justice
Sullivan of that state's supreme court noted:
Having deprived the attorney who is discharged without cause of his right to re-
cover according to the contract and having thereby ordained a disaffirmance of
all such contracts in such circumstances, the majority... further hold[s] that the
attorney's action for reasonable compensation accrues only when the contin-
gency stated in the original agreement (now disaffirmed) has occurred and the
client has recovered .... Here again the majority opinion does violence to the
basic principles of restitution . ...
Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 22 (Cal. 1972) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
90. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
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number of ways. 9 First, a client could elect to allow the statute of
limitations to expire on a cause of action by simply electing not to
pursue the matter any further.9" Second, a client could hire an attor-
ney who is unable to see the suit to successful fruition.9" Third, a
client could choose to proceed with the suit pro se and then lose.9 4 In
each instance, the discharged attorney, regardless of effort expended,
would not be entitled to any compensation. 95
It may be argued that a contingent fee agreement imposes upon
an attorney the reasonable risk that the suit may not lead to successful
settlement. However, it does not follow that in a contingent fee agree-
ment the attorney should expect a discharge without cause, much less
that the case will subsequently be entrusted to a successor attorney
who may be unsuccessful due to personal incompetence.96 These dif-
ficulties are solved under the New York rule; an attorney is entitled to
immediate compensation for the fair value of services rendered, re-
gardless of eventualities or client peculiarities.97
Concerning the potential injustice done to clients, several points
merit discussion. First, a client continues to have the right to dis-
charge an attorney for cause without having to pay compensation.98
The client who is legitimately dissatisfied with an attorney's ability will
not be forced to continue a relationship which is not in her best inter-
est. Only upon discharge without cause by the client, or for cause on
the attorney's behalf, will the client be responsible for compensa-
tion.9 9 Second, when a client is deemed liable for compensation, the
client retains some protection. If the suit is ultimately successful, the
client is responsible for compensation only in quantum meruit rather
than full contract damages.100
91. Michael L. Closen & Zachary A. Tobin, The Contingent Contingency Fee Arrangement:
Compensation of the Contingency Fee Attorney Discharged by the Client, 76 ILL. BJ. 916, 917-18
(1987) ("Unfortunately, [under the California rule] the client might well take any number
of steps which would result in no recovery being obtained.").
92. Id. at 918.
93. Id.; see also Morrow, supra note 32, at 686. Morrow also posits the converse situa-
tion, in which a discharged attorney of lesser ability will have the right to a fee salvaged by
the greater abilities of the successor attorney. Id.
94. Closen & Tobin, supra note 91, at 918.
95. Id.
96. See William D. Hunter, Note, Limiting the Wrongfully Discharged Attorney's Recovery to
Quantum Meruit-Fracasse v. Brent, 24 HASTNGS L.J. 771, 791 (1973).
97. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
98. Skeens, 331 Md. at 335, 628 A.2d at 187.
99. Id. at 336, 628 A.2d at 187.
100. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. Other factors may also protect the
client from excessive or unfair payment for attorney services. "IT]he sooner the client
discharges the attorney, the less he is required to pay. If the client discharged the attorney
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Finally, the New York rule protects one of the primary reasons for
the contingent fee agreement-providing legal services to those of
limited means.1"' Under the California rule attorneys may be discour-
aged from taking cases on a contingent fee basis because there is no
guarantee that they will receive reasonable value for services ren-
dered.10 2 The New York rule provides that, at a minimum, an attor-
ney will be immediately entitled to some form of compensation. The
Skeens decision protects the contingent fee agreement as a tool provid-
ing legal services to those otherwise unable to afford them.
b. Compensation of Agents.-The Skeens dissent maintained
that the attorney-client relationship is one of agency governed by
agency law,103 and contended that "[u] nder our cases, an agent hired
pursuant to a contingent fee contract is not entitled to be compen-
sated until the contingency has been fulfilled."10 4 The dissent as-
serted that the court in Childs v. Ragonese '5 held "that an agent could
not retain a sales commission because the sale was not actually con-
summated."10 6 The Childs court actually held that under Maryland
law, an auctioneer would not be afforded the same statutory protec-
tions provided real estate brokers regarding the time at which the bro-
ker is deemed to have earned their commission.1 0 7
Maryland law governing broker commission is set forth in Section
14-105 of the Real Property Article of the Annotated Code of Mary-
land.108 According to Section 14-105, unless there is an agreement to
before he had performed any services, the client would pay no fee." Morrow, supra note
32, at 686.
101. Id. at 681.
102. Hunter, supra note 96, at 793 ("The potential undesirable consequences [of the
California rule] include ... reluctance to enter into contingent fee contracts . . .");
Morrow, supra note 32, at 686-87 ("[C]ontingent fee contracts have appealed to the eco-
nomic interest of attorneys in order to provide legal services to those of limited means ....
[Since] he is not guaranteed that he will receive the reasonable value ... [the] attorney
may be discouraged from taking cases on a contingent fee basis.").
103. Skeens, 331 Md. at 349, 628 A.2d at 194 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
104. Id.
105. 296 Md. 130, 460 A.2d 1031 (1983).
106. Skeens, 331 Md. at 349, 628 A.2d at 194 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
107. Childs, 296 Md. at 136, 460 A.2d at 1034 ("We agree with the Court of Special
Appeals that § 14-105 of the Real Property Article has no application to an auctioneer.").
108. Section 14-105 of the Real Property Article provides in pertinent part:
In the absence of special agreement to the contrary, if a real estate broker em-
ployed to sell, buy, lease, or otherwise negotiate an estate, or a mortgage or loan
secured by the property, procures in good faith a purchaser .... and the person
procured is accepted by the employer and enters into a valid, binding, and en-
forceable written contract, in terms acceptable to the employer.... and the con-
tract is accepted by the employer and signed by him, the broker is deemed to
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the contrary, a real estate broker employed to sell property who pro-
duces a purchaser accepted by the employer, as evidenced by a valid
contract, earns the commission upon signing of that contract, whether
or not that contract is performed.1"9 Contrary to the point made by the
dissent, in some circumstances Maryland law allows for compensation
of agents whether a sale is ultimately consummated or not. Further-
more, it is not required that compensation come from proceeds which
the agent has assisted the principal in recovering or obtaining.
With regard to public policy, the dissent raised Maryland Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.5 and its comment to suggest that an attorney
cannot reasonably expect compensation until the occurrence of the
contingency.1 0 The comment following Rule 1.5 defines the contin-
gency agreement as an "agreement for legal services... providing com-
pensation . . . which is contingent . . . upon the successful
accomplishment.., of the legal matter.""1 ' The comment to Rule 1.5
pertains to an existing agreement between an attorney and a client. 112
If the 'agreement' has been rescinded in its entirety, any contractual
statements regarding when an attorney is entitled to compensation
are similarly rescinded." 3 Rule 1.5 does, however, bear upon the de-
termination of the amount due for reasonable value of services
rendered." 14
have earned the customary or agreed commission. He has earned the commis-
sion regardless of whether or not the contract entered into is performed, unless
the performance of the contract is prevented, hindered, or delayed by any act of
the broker.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 14-105 (1992).
109. Id. In Childs, § 14-105 was construed narrowly, and the court refused to apply the
protections afforded brokers to an auctioneer attempting to collect a fee on a contract of
sale which was not performed. Childs, 296 Md. at 135-36, 460 A.2d at 1033-34; see also Nily
Realty, Inc. v. Wood, 272 Md. 589, 595, 325 A.2d 730, 734 (1974) (noting that for cases
outside of§ 14-105, a commission is not earned until a valid contract for sale is executed by
the purchaser procured by the broker).
110. Skeens, 331 Md. at 351, 628 A.2d at 195 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
111. MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.5 cmt. (1993) (emphasis
added).
112. Id. The comment speaks only of contingency compensation for an attorney upon
the "successful accomplishment or disposition of the legal matter" and makes no mention
of compensation for an attorney discharged without cause. Id.
113. See Closen & Tobin, supra note 91, at 917. "[S]ince the contract is no longer in
existence after the client discharges the attorney, the contract no longer dictates the attor-
ney's compensation. The most appropriate method of calculating the discharged attor-
ney's fee, therefore, becomes the reasonable value of the services rendered by the attorney
prior to discharge." Id.
114. See infra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
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c. Application of Rule 1.5 on the Calculation of Services Pro-
vided.-Upon discharge, an attorney's compensation will be calcu-
lated based upon the reasonable value of services rendered."1 ' While
proponents of the California rule have argued that until the occur-
rence of the contingency "the amount of damages suffered by the at-
tomey [can]not be ascertained,"116 a survey of case law reveals a
number of relevant factors to the determination of compensation
prior to a recovery. 117 These factors closely resemble those listed in
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a)." 8
While not considered in Skeens, one factor deemed particularly
important to the determination of a reasonable fee is the time and
labor required. 9 Although not concerned with fees for discharged
attorneys, Maryland case law that has addressed the issue of attorney
fees has reasoned that the use of time records and hourly rates will
result in a bill which is reasonable."' Given the importance courts
place upon actual time spent, it is important for contingency attorneys
to maintain detailed time records of work performed on behalf of
115. Skeens, 331 Md. at 343, 628 A.2d at 191.
116. Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972).
117. Closen & Tobin, supra note 91, at 918. These factors include:
(1) the skill and standing of the attorney employed; (2) the nature of the cause;
(3) the novelty and difficulty of the question; (4) the amount and importance of
the subject matter; (5) the degree of responsibility involved in the management
of the cause; (6) the time and labor required; (7) the usual and customary
charges in the community;, and (8) the benefits resulting to the client.
Id.
118. Rule 1.5(a) provides:
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determin-
ing the reasonableness of a fee include the following-
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the question
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the partic-
ular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers perform-
ing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MARYLAND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1993).
119. Closen & Tobin, supra note 91, at 919-20. The trial court dismissed Skeens's com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Skeens, 331 Md. at
336, 628 A.2d at 187. The Court of Appeals did not consider the issue of whether or not
the charges put forth by Skeens were acceptable, and apparently left that issue for determi-
nation by the trial court on remand. See id. at 344, 628 A.2d at 191-92.
120. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Wright, 306 Md. 93, 102-03, 507 A.2d 618, 622
(1986).
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their clients. Other jurisdictions addressing the issue have stated that
generalized statements regarding time spent are insufficient and that
detailed time records itemizing both time spent and work performed
must be maintained. 12 1 Ordinarily, a contingency fee attorney would
have no reason to keep detailed time records because such records
are irrelevant to the contingency amount.1 22 The practice should nev-
ertheless be adopted in the event that the attorney is discharged
before recovery occurs.
5. Conclusion.-In Skeens, the Court of Appeals held that in a
contingent fee agreement, an attorney's cause of action in quantum
meruit accrues immediately upon discharge without cause. In so hold-
ing, the court followed the New York rule which provides that a client
cannot selectively raise a contractual provision from a contract which
the client has rescinded. While the court's ruling provides important
protection to attorneys, it retains the safeguards already available to
contingency fee clients. The ruling additionally preserves the contin-
gent fee agreement as an instrument for providing legal services to
those of limited means. Although the court did not address the issue
of computing the reasonable value of services provided, contingency
attorneys will likely be required to keep detailed and accurate time
records in order to receive fair compensation.
Louis J. FRANKE
121. See, e.g., Estate of Healy v. Tierney, 484 N.E.2d 890, 893 (Il. App. Ct. 1985)
("[D]etailed time records [must be] submitted.., to support the hours claimed .... ").
122. See Closen & Tobin, supra note 91, at 916. "[Iln order to receive full compensation
for their efforts, contingency fee attorneys should keep detailed time records even though,





A. Recovery for Property Loss under Theories of Negligence and Strict
Liability in Tort
In A.J Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,' the Maryland
Court of Appeals discussed the distinction between injury to property
and pure economic losses in a products liability action brought under
tort and contract theories.' Although it did not ultimately address the
warranty claims of plaintiff,3 the court held that purchasers of a defec-
tive product may recover under negligence or strict liability in tort for
loss or harm to physical property caused by the defective product.4 In
so holding, the court reviewed the circumstances in which recovery
for harm caused by a defective product is appropriate in both tort and
contract actions.5
1. The Case.-A.J. Decoster Co. (Decoster) is a commercial pro-
ducer of chicken and eggs.6 Its operation relies on electrically pow-
ered ventilation fans to provide air flow through its chicken houses.7
OnJuly 20, 1989, thunderstorms in the area caused Choptank Electric
Utilities, the supplier of three-phase electrical power to Decoster, to
lose phase "A" power.' Decoster had a generator-based backup power
system to supply power in the event of such an emergency.' On this
occasion, however, an allegedly defective transfer switch that was man-
ufactured by the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse)
failed to detect the power loss.1" As a result, the backup power system
1. 333 Md. 245, 634 A.2d 1330 (1994).
2. Id. at 249-60, 634 A.2d at 1332-37.
3. On appeal, Decoster argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment to Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Westinghouse) on its warranty claims. Id. at 261,
634 A.2d at 1337-38. The Court of Appeals declined to consider the trial court's grant of
summary judgment on the warranty claims for two reasons. See id. at 263, 634 A.2d at 1339.
First, Decoster failed to challenge the legal sufficiency of the affidavit that accompanied
Westinghouse's motion for summary judgment. Id.; see MD. R. 2-501(c) ("An affidavit sup-
porting or opposing a motion for summary judgment shall be made upon personal knowl-
edge. . . ."). Second, "Decoster failed to set forth facts controverting those proffered by
Westinghouse." Decoster, 333 Md. at 263, 634 A.2d at 1339; see MD. R. 2-501(b) ("The re-
sponse to a motion for summary judgment shall identify with particularity the material
facts that are disputed."). Accordingly, the court held that the trial court did not err in
granting summary judgment on the warranty claims. Decoster, 333 Md. at 263, 635 A.2d at
1339.
4. Decoster, 333 Md. at 249-51, 634 A.2d at 1332-33.
5. Id.
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did not activate." Operating on reduced voltage, the ventilation fans
overheated and shut down.'" Because of the lack of ventilation, more
than 140,000 chickens, valued at over $100,000, suffocated.1 3
On October 21, 1991, Decoster filed suit against Westinghouse
alleging negligence, strict liability in tort, breach of express warranty,
and breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
purpose.14 Westinghouse responded with a motion to dismiss or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment. 5 Finding that Decoster's
damages were solely economic losses not recoverable in tort, the trial
court dismissed the negligence and strict liability counts.1 6 Decoster
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. 7 Prior to review by the
intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari
on its own motion.1 8
2. Legal Background.-
a. Recovery for Economic Losses in Tort and Contract.-Eco-
nomic loss has been defined as "the diminution in the value of [a]
product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the
general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold."' 9 In gen-
eral there is no cause of action in tort for purely economic losses.2 °
Economic losses are redressable in a contract action for breach of war-
11. Id.
12. Id. at 247-48, 634 A.2d at 1331.
13. Id. at 248, 634 A.2d at 1331. The chickens were used primarily for egg production.
Id.
14. Id. Decoster purchased the switch from a third party who had incorporated it into
the back-up system. Joint Record Extract at 31, Decoster (No. 93-46).
15. Decoster, 333 Md. at 248, 634 A-2d at 1331. In support of its motion, Westinghouse
included the affidavit ofJames W. McGill, then a product line manager for Westinghouse,
stating that to the best of his knowledge the transfer switch at issue was manufactured and
sold to a distributor in 1979. Joint Record Extract at 15-16, Decoster (No. 93-46).
16. Joint Record Extract at 63, Decoster (No. 93-46). The trial court reasoned that be-
cause the loss of chickens constituted economic loss and because there was no risk of death
or personal injury, there was no recovery under a tort theory. Id. at 60-61.
17. Decoster, 333 Md. at 249, 634 A.2d at 1331-32.
18. Id. at 249, 634 A.2d at 1332.
19. Comment, Manufacturers'Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss"Damages-
Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv. 539, 541 (1966). Economic loss includes loss of value
or use of the product itself, cost of repair and replacement, and lost profits consequent to
loss of use of the product. See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66
COLUM. L. RE'. 917, 918 (1966).
20. See United States Gypsum Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145,
156, 647 A.2d 405, 410 (1994) ("Traditionally, in cases to recover damages because of
defective products, the loss of value or use of the product itself, and the cost to repair or
replace the product, have usually been viewed as economic losses."); see also W. PAGE KEE-
TON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 101, at 708 (5th ed. 1984) (ex-
plaining that products which do not have defects that endanger others may not be so poor
19951
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ranty.21 This distinction arises out of the different theories of liability
between actions brought in tort and those brought for breach of con-
tract." An action based in tort protects personal and property inter-
ests; an action based on contract, by contrast, protects the purchaser's
interest in receiving the benefit of his bargain, ensuring that the prod-
uct is suited for its intended purpose.2" Maryland recognizes two ex-
ceptions to the general rule. Recovery for economic loss may be
available for negligent misrepresentation 24 or for cases in which the
defendant's conduct creates a serious risk of personal injury or
death.2 5
b. Negligence Claims.-In Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo-
minium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.,26 the Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of the extent to which tort liability should be im-
in quality as to be unfit for sale and therefore the intent of the seller regarding the scope
any guarantees made as to the condition is controlling).
21. United States Gypsum, 336 Md. at 156, 647 A.2d at 410.
22. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 95-96, at 677-85.
23. Id.; see also 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.15, at 444-45 (2d ed.
1986) (explaining that strict liability tends to distribute the costs of manufacturing mishaps
fairly while warranty law is primarily aimed at controlling the commercial aspects of busi-
ness transactions).
A manufacturer has a duty to avoid creating unreasonable risks to the tangible prop-
erty interests of others. Note, supra note 19, at 919-20. Breach of this duty exposes the
manufacturer to liability under a negligence claim. Id A manufacturer may be subject to
strict liability in tort where it sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965); see infra note 40 for the text of § 402A. Where the loss is purely economic, how-
ever, the manufacturer is liable for its defective product not meeting the expectations of its
customer only when it is aware of those expectations and has agreed the product will meet
them. Note, supra note 19, at 920-26.
24. See, e.g., St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278
A.2d 12 (allowing client to recover losses incurred for reliance on mortgage broker's ad-
vice whose interests were adverse to those of client), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Brack
v. Evans, 230 Md. 548, 187 A.2d 880 (1963) (allowing recovery for losses incurred as a
result of negligent and incorrect advice from a stockbroker).
25. See, e.g., Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 35, 517 A.2d 336, 345 (1986) ("Where the risk is of death or
personal injury the [negligence] action will lie for recovery of the reasonable cost of cor-
recting the dangerous condition."); see also Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp.
641, 648 (D. Md. 1986) (holding that claim for negligent design and manufacture must fail
because plaintiff sought damages for purely economic losses); Copiers Typewriters Calcula-
tors, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 326 (D. Md. 1983) (holding no recovery in
tort for failure of copiers to perform adequately). But see Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md.
App. 124, 516 A.2d 990 (1986) (allowing recovery for economic loss to real property
caused by leaking gasoline storage tanks in absence of physical impact under nuisance,
negligence, and strict liability causes of action), cert. denied, 309 Md. 47, 522 A.2d 392
(1987).
26. 308 Md. 18, 517 A.2d 336 (1986).
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posed upon builders and architects for damages suffered by parties
not in contractual privity with them." The plaintiff brought suit
against a general contractor alleging that the contractor's negligent
construction caused a threat to the safety and welfare of the residents
of a condominium and to their property."8 The court specified a two-
part test to determine whether the plaintiff had a cause of action in
tort .2 9 First, a court must determine whether the plaintiff alleges phys-
ical harm to person or property or economic loss.3 ° If the claim al-
leges economic loss, the court must then determine whether the
defendant's negligence caused a dangerous condition creating serious
risk of death or personal injury to humans."' Because the defendant
contractor's negligence created a dangerous condition that created a
serious risk of death or personal injury to humans, the court held that
the plaintiffs could recover for the cost of repairing the condominium
even though no physical harm or personal injury had as yet oc-
curred.12 Thus, if the Whiting-Turner criteria are satisfied, tort recov-
ery may be available, even in the absence of actual personal injury.33
c. Strict Liability Claim.--Strict liability in tort developed out
of a recognition that warranty-based theories were inadequate to re-
27. Id. at 22, 517 A.2d at 338.
28. I&
29. See id.
30. Id. at 33-35, 517 A.2d at 344-45.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 35, 363 A.2d at 345 ("[T]he determination of whether a tort duty will be
imposed in this type of case should depend upon the risk generated by the negligent con-
duct, rather than upon the fortuitous circumstance of the nature of the resultant
damage.").
33. Id. at 35 & n.5, 517 A.2d at 345 & n.5. The court stated that the serious nature of
the risk is the basis of the cause of action in the absence of actual injury. The court con-
cluded that there was no merit in precluding recovery to one who suffers economic loss by
fixing a defective condition before it results in personal injury. Id. at 32-35, 517 A.2d at
344-45.
In Boatel Industries, Inc. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 308, 550 A.2d 389, 401 (1988),
the Court of Special Appeals denied recovery for the cost of repairs to the defective hull of
a boat under a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The result is somewhat curious be-
cause it was decided after Whiting-Turner and because the boat was found by the jury to be
unsafe, unseaworthy and to present a serious risk of death or personal injury. See id. at 308,
550 A.2d at 401. The Court of Special Appeals, however, elected not to extend Vhiting-
Turner to products liability cases that involve negligent misrepresentation. Id The court
said that the damages sought-the cost to rectify the dangerous condition-included the
damages recovered under the warranty counts. Id. That decision left the plaintiff, Hester,
in precisely the situation the Court of Appeals sought to avoid in Decoster. Hester was de-
nied recovery for the "lemon" he purchased because Boatel had effectively limited Hester's
remedies to repair or replacement of defective parts through a disclaimer. Id. at 289, 550
A.2d at 392; see infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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dress injuries to person or property.3 4 It was feared that consumers'
interests could be too easily frustrated by disclaimers, notice require-
ments, and statutes of limitation that are inherent to contract law.35
Strict liability in tort, moreover, is justified on a number of policy
grounds. It places the burden of the loss on the party best able to
absorb it, 6 induces greater care in the manufacturing process by elim-
inating the requirement to prove negligence, 7 and eliminates the
chain of legal actions which might otherwise arise.38
In Phipps v. General Motors Corp.,s9 the Court of Appeals adopted
strict liability as set forth in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.40 The court explained that strict liability in tort advances the
policy of requiring those who make and sell defective products to bear
the costs of the injuries that result therefrom. 41 In addition, strict lia-
bility in tort augments the often inadequate remedies found in the
warranty provisions of Maryland's Commercial Code.42 Furthermore,
the court found no indication that the Maryland General Assembly
34. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 98, at 692-93; see also 5 HARPER ET AL., supra note 23,
§ 28.15, at 451.
35. See Decoster, 333 Md. at 256, 634 A.2d at 1335.
36. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 98, at 692-93. The manufacturer can insure himself
against the risk of liability and treat the insurance premium as a cost of doing business.
Comment, supra note 19, at 926.
37. Comment, supra note 19, at 926; KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 98, at 693.
38. Comment, supra note 19, at 926. Under a theory of strict liability in tort, there is
no reason for the injured consumer to sue the retailer, who in turn would sue the manu-
facturer. Such a chain of actions could frustrate the consumer's recovery where there was
a contractual disclaimer between the retailer and manufacturer, id., or where the retailer
has gone out of business. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 310
(N.J. 1965) (permitting plaintiff, who purchased defective carpet from a retailer that later
went out of business, to bring suit directly against manufacturer).
39. 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976).
40. Id. at 344, 363 A.2d at 957. Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
41. Phipps, 278 Md. at 342-43, 363 A.2d at 958.
42. Id. at 348-51, 363 A.2d at 961-63.
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intended the warranty provisions of Maryland's Uniform Commercial
Code to preempt the field of product liability law. 43
3. The Court's Reasoning. -The Decoster court began its analysis by
reviewing the distinction between recovery for physical harm to per-
son or property and recovery for economic loss in products liability
actions.' Purchasers claiming physical harm to property may recover
in actions alleging negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of war-
ranty theories.45 Recovery for economic loss, on the other hand, is
ordinarily unavailable in negligence or strict liability actions and is
generally available only in breach of warranty actions.46 The court
stated, however, that Whiting-Turner recognized an exception to the
general rule of non-recovery in tort for purely economic loss.4 7
Where a defective product causes a dangerous condition creating a
serious risk of death or personal injury to humans, recovery of purely
economic loss under a tort theory will be permitted.48
Using the two-pronged rule it established in Whiting-Turner, the
court first considered whether Decoster's claimed loss amounted to
physical loss or economic loss.49 The court looked to the negligence
count contained within Decoster's complaint. In it, Decoster sought
recovery only for the loss of its property that was allegedly damaged by
the defective transfer switch.50 Decoster made no claim for economic
43. Id. at 350, 363 A.2d at 962.
44. Decoster, 333 Md. at 249-51, 634 A.2d at 1332-33.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 251, 634 A.2d at 1333.
47. Id.
48. Id
49. Id. at 251-52, 634 A.2d at 1333.
50. Id. at 252, 634 A.2d at 1333.
Westinghouse cited three cases to support its contention that Decoster's losses were
essentially economic. Id. at 252-54, 634 A.2d at 1333-34. The court considered and re-
jected each in turn. Id. The court distinguished Decoster from Copiers Typewriters Calcula-
tors, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312 (D. Md. 1983), because the plaintiff in that
case sought recovery only for failure of the defective copiers to perform adequately.
Decoster, 333 Md. at 252, 634 A.2d at 1333. Unlike Decoster, there was no claim for property
damage. Id. Similarly, in Wood Prods., Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641 (D. Md. 1986),
though the plaintiff made a claim for property damage, it was considered a claim for eco-
nomic loss because the damage complained of was associated with the repair and replace-
ment of a defective furnace. Decoster,; 333 Md. at 252, 634 A.2d at 1333.
The court also considered Winchester v. Lester's of Minnesota, Inc., 983 F.2d 992
(10th Cir. 1993), which involved a similar fact pattern to Decoster. A malfunction in a venti-
lation system resulted in the loss of hogs. Id. at 994. The Tenth Circuit noted that the loss
of hogs was property damage of a sort but concluded that because the plaintiff sought
recovery for extra labor, losses due to the sale of underweight hogs, extra veterinary bills,
lost profits, and expenses to correct the ventilation system, the essence of the plaintiff's
claim was the loss of the benefit of a properly ventilated hog house plus consequential
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losses.5" Because the damages alleged in Decoster's negligence claim
were solely property damages, the court held that the trial judge erred
in dismissing the negligence count.52
The court began its consideration of Decoster's claim in strict lia-
bility by noting that the Phipps court had applied Section 402A of the
Restatement to a case in which only physical harm to a person was
claimed.55 Phipps did not directly consider whether Section 402A of
the Restatement applies to physical harm to property alone. 4 Never-
theless, because Decoster's losses were property damage and not eco-
nomic losses, the court found that Section 402A of the Restatement
clearly applied.55 The court stated that "[i] t is beyond question that
Section 402A of the Restatement applies not only to accidental injuries
to consumers or users of a product, but also to injury to the property
of the user or consumer."56 The court's conclusion is supported by
the case law of many jurisdictions. 57 The Court of Appeals rejected
damages, in other words, economic loss. &L The Court of Appeals distinguished Winchester
on the ground that Decoster claimed only the loss of the chickens and none of the other
damages that might lead a court to find that the essence of the claim is for economic loss.
Decoster, 333 Md. at 253, 634 A.2d at 1334.
51. Decoster, 333 Md. at 253, 634 A.2d at 1334. Decoster did not claim the loss of the
value of the switch, costs for its repair or replacement, or lost profits. Id,
52. Id. at 254, 634 A.2d at 1334.
53. Id.; see infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
54. 278 Md. at 352-53, 363 A.2d at 963.
55. Decoster, 333 Md. at 255, 634 A.2d at 1334-35. Emphasizing that the language of
§ 402A of the Restatent expressly comprehends physical harm to property as well as to
person, the court rejected Westinghouse's contention that Decoster's remedies were lim-
ited to breach of warranty. I&
56. Id. at 258, 634 A.2d at 1336.
57. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 780 F.2d 1093, 1099 (3d Cir.
1986) (allowing recovery for accidental damages caused by the explosion of a defectively
repaired engine); Purvis v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 223 (4th Cir.
1982) (holding that, although a plaintiff may recover for property damage caused by a
defendant's defective, unreasonably dangerous product, a defective barn for curing to-
bacco is not unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff or his property); Mississippi Power &
Light Co. v. Branson Aircraft Corp., 797 F. Supp. 871, 873 (D. Colo. 1992) (allowing possi-
bility of recovery for damage to aircraft resulting from explosion in auxiliary fuel tank);
Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Elec., 744 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Ind. 1990)
(holding failure of electrical switch to ventilator that caused chickens to suffocate a prop-
erty loss and not an economic loss); Eastern Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations,
Inc., 658 F. Supp. 197, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (limiting recovery to property damage caused
by fires resulting from insulation failure upon startup of steam turbine); County of West-
chester v. General Motors Corp., 555 F. Supp. 290, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that physi-
cal damage to unrelated property may be recovered under strict liability for damage to
allegedly defective bus air-conditioning systems); Largoza v. General Elec. Co., 538 F.
Supp. 1164, 1168-69 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (denying motion to dismiss strict liability counts be-
cause destruction of plaintiffs residence and personal property resulted from fire in plain-
tiff's new refrigerator); Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150, 153
(Alaska 1984) (allowing recovery for damage to property owned by plaintiff which resulted
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Westinghouse's contention that the Maryland Commercial Code pro-
vides the sole remedy for commercial losses. 58 The court then re-
viewed the Phipps court's response to the same issue,59 and concluded
that strict liability in tort, as adopted in Phipps, applied to injury to the
property of the user or purchaser and was, therefore, an appropriate
theory on which Decoster could base a cause of action.6 °
4. Analysis.-The Decoster court reasoned that plaintiffs negli-
gence action was permissible because the loss of chickens was a prop-
from an overload caused by defendant's defectively repaired diesel generator); Salt River
Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 198, 209-
10 (Ariz. 1984) (allowing recovery for damage to gas turbine engine caused by defective
controller unit that was purchased separately from gas turbine); Bates & Assocs., Inc. v.
Romei, 426 S.E.2d 919, 921-22 (Ga. CL App. 1993) (holding that recovery is available for
physical damage but denying recovery for damages resulting from errors in specification
leading to increased overhead, delay damages, and erection expenses); State v. Mitchell
Constr. Co., 699 P.2d 1349 (Idaho 1984) (allowing recovery for property damage, but de-
nying recovery for repair or replacement of roof); Oak Grove Investors v. Bell & Gossett
Co., 668 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Nev. 1983) (holding that plaintiff stated cause of action for
property damage that allegedly resulted from defective plumbing and heating system in
apartment complex); Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 834 P.2d 980, 982
(Okla. 1992) (allowing recovery in strict liability for other property loss but denying recov-
ery for damage to a defective transformer that exploded).
The seminal cases in the area are Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965)
(holding no recovery permitted under a theory of strict liability for solely economic losses)
and Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965) (holding recovery for
economic losses permitted under a theory of strict liability). For a more complete descrip-
tion and analysis of Seely and Santor, see Comment, supra note 19, and Note, supra note 19.
58. Westinghouse claimed that the legislative enactment of the Maryland Commercial
Code preempted application of product liability law as between commercial parties. See
Decoster, 333 Md. at 255-56, 534 A.2d at 1335.
59. See id. at 255-60, 634 A.2d at 1335-37. The Phipps court had stated that, although
the Code eliminated the privity requirement, other obstacles to an action pursued under
contract law still existed. Id. at 256, 634 A.2d at 1335. These obstacles include the possibil-
ity of waiver or limitation of a warranty by the manufacturer's use of a disclaimer. See, e.g.,
Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 298, 533 A.2d 1316, 1324 (1987) (conclud-
ing that disclaimer of warranty was valid in an action to recover for injuries sustained dur-
ing a hold-up where burglar alarm allegedly failed to notify police in a timely manner, and
finding limitation of damages provision in contract was effective against action in
negligence).
The existence of a notice requirement for breach of warranty actions by actual buyers,
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-607(3) (1992), and the different limitations periods for
contract actions and tort actions further complicate the injured party's ability to recover.
Compare id. § 2-725(1) (1992 & Supp. 1994) (allowing four years to bring breach of con-
tract action), with MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 5-101 (1992 & Supp. 1994) (provid-
ing for a three-year limitation on actions unless Code provides otherwise). See also Decoster,
333 Md. at 256, 634 A.2d at 1335. In the interest of fairness, the court refused to allow
these procedural obstacles to permit a manufacturer who sells an unreasonably dangerous
product that results in injury to the property of the ultimate user or consumer to avoid
liability. Decoster, 333 Md. at 259-60, 634 A.2d at 1337.
60. Decoster, 333 Md. at 260, 634 A.2d at 1337.
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
erty loss, not a purely economic loss.61 If the essence of the plaintiff's
claim was for recovery of economic loss, however, there would be no
cause of action in tort.62 The court's use of the term "essence" may,
however, present a pitfall to the unwary. Plaintiffs seeking recovery in
tort for property loss should not risk the mischaracterization of their
claim as one in contract by seeking, in addition to recovery for the lost
property, such economic damages as lost profits, repair and replace-
ment costs, or compensation for the loss of the benefit of use of the
defective product. Actions to recover such economic losses should be
pursued under appropriate contract theories, and are then subject to
the limitations of contract actions.63
The Decoster decision holds manufacturers liable for personal in-
jury or property damage caused by their defective products by recog-
nizing a plaintiff's cause of action based either in negligence or strict
liability.64 These causes of action protect a purchaser's property and
personal interests by placing the burden of loss on the manufacturer
for breach of its duty to the buyer.65 In addition, because the recovery
is based on a tort theory, there are no impediments to recovery that
are inherent in actions based on warranties.' Though contractual
obstacles are removed by grounding recovery in tort, difficulties in
proving negligence may prove insurmountable to plaintiffs attempting
to redress injuries caused by defective products.67
To overcome the difficulty of proving negligence, a plaintiff
would be wise to bring a claim in strict liability as well, given Mary-
land's adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in
Phipps68 and its extension of Section 402A to property injury in
Decoster.69 The court, moreover, has made it quite clear that as a mat-
61. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
62. See discussion supra note 50.
63. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. There is also a statutory exception to the
privity requirement in the case of personal injury. See MD. CODE ANN, COM. LAw I §§ 2-314
to -318 (1992).
64. Decoster, 333 Md. at 249-60, 634 A.2d at 1332-37.
65. A manufacturer assumes a responsibility to the purchaser merely by placing on the
market a product which, if defective, might cause foreseeable harm to the purchaser or his
property. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 96, at 682-83.
66. Decoster, 333 Md. at 256, 634 A.2d at 1335.
67. See Phipps, 278 Md. at 343 & n.3, 363 A.2d at 962 & n.3 (explaining that the primary
focus of a negligence inquiry is the manufacturer's conduct, whereas in a case of strict
liability the focus is on the product itself). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 96,
99, 103 (discussing grounds on which to base a negligence action and the attendant diffi-
culties of proof).
68. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
69. Decoster, 333 Md. at 258, 634 A.2d at 1336. The court was careful to note, however,
that such recovery is not available if the loss constitutes economic loss. Id. The court
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ter of public policy, it would be unfair to allow manufacturers to es-
cape liability for injury caused to persons or property by defective
products that are unreasonably dangerous or to escape such liability
because of obstacles imposed by warranty law.70
5. Conclusion.-Decoster establishes that in Maryland an action in
tort does not lie where the damages claimed are purely economic in
nature unless there has been a serious risk of death or personal injury.
A manufacturer, however, may be held strictly liable for actual physi-
cal property damage suffered by a user or purchaser of a defective,
unreasonably dangerous product.
DAVID C. ISSACSON
B. The Applicability of the Fireman's Rule and the Shopkeeper's Duty to
Aid its Patrons
In Southland Corp. v. Griffith,' the Maryland Court of Appeals held
that a business employee must provide assistance to a business invitee
whom the employee knows is in peril, unless rendering such aid
would place the employee in the path of danger.' Additionally, the
Court of Appeals found that an off-duty, out-of-uniform police officer,
who enters a place of business that is open to the public, is a business
invitee and retains that status even after responding to a disturbance
on the premises in an official capacity.3
The Southland decision, however, fails to delineate the precise
scope of a business's responsibility to its visitors and may increase the
potential liability of businesses, although courts will probably interpret
this duty narrowly. By requiring a business to help individuals on its
premises who need assistance, the court impliedly recognized the cen-
tral role that morality must play in our legal system.
1. The Case.-Shortly after midnight on Saturday, May 15, 1988,
David Griffith, his fifteen-year-old son, and several friends arrived in a
pickup truck at a 7-Eleven convenience store located in Ferndale,
Maryland.4 The 7-Eleven store was owned by the Southland Corpora-
underscored its argument by citing over 25 cases from other jurisdictions that reach the
same conclusion. Id. at 258-59, 634 A.2d at 1336-37.
70. Id. at 259, 634 A.2d at 1337. A purchaser does not bargain for destruction to his
property any more than he bargains for personal injury. Id. at 259-60, 634 A.2d at 1337.
1. 332 Md. 704, 633 A.2d 84 (1993).
2. Id. at 719, 633 A.2d at 91.
3. Id. at 719-20, 633 A.2d at 91.
4. Id. at 707, 633 A.2d at 85.
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tion.5 After buying food in the 7-Eleven, Griffith, an off-duty and out-
of-uniform member of the Anne Arundel County Police Department,
went back to the pickup truck which was parked in Southland's park-
ing lot.6
As Griffith and his party ate their food in the truck, three teenag-
ers drove into the parking lot.7 The teenagers, Takovich, Palmer, and
Haynie, began acting in an unruly and boisterous manner and one of
them threw a beer can that hit Griffith's son on the arm.' Griffith
proceeded from the pickup truck to speak with the teenagers.
Takovich threw a beer can at Griffith that struck him in the face.9
Griffith then identified himself as a police officer and attempted to
arrest Takovich. 1° A scuffle ensued between Officer Griffith and
Takovich, during which Griffith instructed his son, Matthew, to enter
the 7-Eleven and tell the clerk to summon police assistance." The
other teenagers, Palmer and Haynie, began striking Officer Griffith
with a tire iron. 2
According to Matthew Griffith, he stuck his head through the
door of the 7-Eleven and yelled to the clerk to call the police because
a police officer needed assistance.'" Thirty seconds later, Matthew re-
turned to the store and requested that the clerk notify police that his
father needed assistance.14 The clerk ignored Matthew's request and
"laughed at him."15 Two to three minutes later, Matthew again en-
tered the 7-Eleven.16 This time, he jumped across the counter, called
911, shouted that there was a Code 1317 and instructed the clerk to






10. Id. at 707-08, 633 A.2d at 85.
11. Id. at 708, 633 A.2d at 85.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 709-10, 633 A.2d at 86.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 710, 633 A.2d at 86.
16. Id., 633 A.2d at 86-87.
17. A Code 13 notification signifies that an officer is in trouble and needs emergency
help. Id. at 709 n.4, 633 A.2d at 86 n.4.
18. Id. at 710, 633 A.2d at 86. In an affidavit submitted by the Southland Corp., the 7-
Eleven clerk stated that she called the police as soon as she became aware of the alterca-
tion in the parking lot. Id. at 709, 633 A.2d at 86. Because the trial court decided this case
on summary judgment, all factual inferences were resolved by the appellate court in favor
of Officer Griffith, the party who opposed the grant of summaryjudgment. Id. at 713, 633
A.2d at 87; see Rosenberg v. Helinski, 328 Md. 664, 674, 616 A.2d 866, 871 ("In reviewing a
disposition by summary judgment, an appellate court will consider primarily whether a
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Meanwhile, the altercation spilled into a gas station across the
street. 19 The attendant at the gas station called the police.2 0 He then
tried to lend further assistance to Officer Griffith but was attacked by
the teenagers.2 1 Police arrived approximately two minutes after Mat-
thew Griffith's third attempt to summon assistance from the 7-
Eleven 22 and arrested the three teenage assailants.2 1
Griffith sued the Southland Corporation for negligence in the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.2 4 Southland moved for sum-
mary judgment, claiming that Officer Griffith was precluded from a
negligence recovery under the common-law principle, known as the
fireman's rule, which prohibits firefighters and police officers from
bringing negligence actions for injuries suffered during the course of
their official responsibilities.25 Griffith countered that the fireman's
rule does not apply to an off-duty police officer "whose status was that
of a volunteer."
2 6
The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granted summary
judgment in favor of Southland.27 Judge Wolff reasoned that Griffith
lost his status as a business invitee when he announced that he was a
police officer and attempted to effectuate an arrest.28 Consequently,
the trial court found that under the fireman's rule Officer Griffith
could not recover damages from Southland.2 Griffith appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals. 0
The Court of Special Appeals, by a divided panel, reversed the
trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings.31
factual dispute exists, and in so doing resolve all inferences against the party making the
motion."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3041 (1993).




23. Id. at 708 n.1, 633 A.2d at 86 n.1. The three teenage assailants were charged and
convicted of criminal assault and battery. Id.
24. Id. at 708, 633 A.2d at 86. Griffith averred that the store clerk's failure to call 911
upon Matthew's first request had exacerbated Officer Griffith's injuries. Griffith v. South-
land Corp., 94 Md. App. 242, 245, 617 A.2d 598, 600 (1992). Griffith also sought monetary
damages from the three teenage assailants for assault and battery. Southland, 332 Md. at
708, 633 A.2d at 86. The trial court entered default judgments against the three teenage
defendants. Id. at 708 n.2, 633 A.2d at 86 n.2.
25. Southland, 332 Md. at 709, 633 A.2d at 86; see infra notes 47-62 and accompanying
text for further discussion of the fireman's rule.
26. Southland, 332 Md. at 709, 633 A.2d at 86.







The court concluded that the clerk's failure to call the police for
assistance was "an event in the nature of a hidden danger" and thus
constituted an exception to the fireman's rule." The court also rea-
soned that no provisions in Maryland law allow a business to ignore
requests for assistance that pose no risk of harm to the business owner
or employees. 3 In so ruling, the Court of Special Appeals explained
that its decision "merely cultivated and improved an area of Maryland
law that had previously been silent."34
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine the extent
of the legal duty, if any, a business open to the public owes to a busi-
ness visitor to call for emergency assistance when requested to do so
by a visitor who is in distress.35
2. Legal Background.-
a. Duty to Aid. -Historically, courts have hesitated to find li-
ability that inures from the failure of a party to act.3 6 Instead, the
common law firmly established that a person owes no legal duty to aid
another who is injured. 7 These same courts, however, have imposed
32. Id. at 710-11, 633 A.2d at 87; see Griffith, 94 Md. App. at 253, 617 A_2d at 603-04.
33. Griffith, 94 Md. App. at 257, 617 A.2d at 606. Judge Alpert wrote, "[T] here is no
precedent which permits a bystander to refuse to call 911 when not exposed to imminent
danger." Id.
34. Id. at 258, 617 A.2d at 606.
35. Southland, 332 Md. at 707, 633 A.2d at 85.
36. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Toil Liability, 56 U.
PA. L. REv. 217, 220 (1908) ("[T]he duty to take active care for others is not general in the
common law...."). Many commentators have suggested that the reluctance of the early
courts was grounded in the tremendous respect accorded the individual during this pe-
riod. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at
373 (5th ed. 1984) ("The highly individualistic philosophy of the older common law...
shrank from converting the courts into an agency for forcing men to help one another.");
3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.6, at 719 n.10 (2d ed. 1986) (stating
that in respect for individualism in society, courts did not hold individuals liable for their
omissions).
The law of torts differentiates between acts and omissions. Bohlen, supra, at 219.
Courts express the distinction in terms of misfeasance and nonfeasance. Id.; see also KEE-
TON ET A.L., supra, § 56, at 373-74. Misfeasance is "the improper performance" of an act,
while nonfeasance is "the nonperformance" of an act that a person is obligated to perform.
BLACK'S LAw DIcrrIONARY 1000, 1054 (6th ed. 1990).
37. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 56, at 375 ("[T]he law has persistently
refused to impose on a stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to the aid
of another human being who is in danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his
life."); HAPER ET AL., supra note 36, § 18.6, at 718-19 ("There is no legal duty to be a Good
Samaritan."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) ("The fact that the actor real-
izes or should realize that action bn his part is necessary for another's aid or protection
does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."); cf Lamb v. Hopkins, 303
Md. 236, 242, 492 A-2d 1297, 1300 (1985) (relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts to
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liability readily and with little attention to fault when an injury results
from the affirmative act of a party.
3 8
Over the years, courts have created certain narrowly defined ex-
ceptions to this general rule. The courts have recognized that there
are special relationships between individuals who are vulnerable in
some respect and other individuals, or businesses, who possess supe-
rior knowledge or the ability to render assistance.39 The most widely
adopted exceptions are for a common carrier to a passenger,' an inn-
keeper to a guest,41 and a shopkeeper to a business invitee.42
In particular, the exception for the shopkeeper to business invi-
tee requires a business open to the public to render aid to its business
visitors once the shopkeeper knows or has reason to know that the
visitor is ill or injured.43 Usually interpreted narrowly, the duty to aid
generally requires a business to do little more than seek emergency
assistance4' for its customers unless the provision of such assistance
support the proposition that an individual has no duty to act to control the conduct of a
third person).
38. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 56, at 383.
39. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 56, at 376. Section 314A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts recognizes the following special relationships that give rise to a duty to aid or
protect:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill
or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to
members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportu-
nities for protection is under a similar duty to the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
40. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 56, at 376; HARPER ET AL., supra note 36, § 18.6, at
722. Maryland courts have long accepted that the special relationship between a common
carrier and its passengers requires the common carrier to exercise the "highest degree of
care" toward its passengers. See, e.g., Tall v. Baltimore Steam-Packet Co., 90 Md. 248, 253,
44 A. 1007, 1008 (1899) (finding that a ship's captain "is not an insurer of the absolute
safety of his passengers; yet. .. a ship employment involves the safety of the lives and limbs
of his passengers, the law requires the highest degree of care which is consistent with the
nature of his undertaking.").
41. KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 56, at 376.
42. Id.
43. See id. § 61, at 426 ("The occupier must ... act reasonably to render first aid or
other care when he knows or should know that the invitee is ill or injured."); HARPER ET
AL., supra note 36, § 18.6, at 722-23 ("One who invites others on his premises has been held
bound to take reasonable steps to rescue them from perils that his negligence played no
part in creating.").
44. Commentators agree about the limited nature of the duty to aid. See, e.g., RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. f (1965).
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endangers the shopkeeper or his employees.45 Prior to Southland,
Maryland courts had not recognized the shopkeeper to business invi-
tee exception. 6
b. The Fireman's Rule. -The common-law doctrine, known as
the fireman's rule, precludes firefighters and police officers47 who are
injured in the course of their official duties from recovering tort dam-
ages from those whose negligence exposed them to the risk of
injury.48
[The defendant] is not required to take any action beyond that which is reason-
able under the circumstances. In the case of an ill or injured person, he will
seldom be required to do more than give such first aid as he reasonably can, and
take reasonable steps to turn the sick person over to a physician, or to those who
will look after him and see that medical assistance is obtained.
Id.; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, at 377.
Mostjurisdictions have limited the duty to aid. See, e.g., Breaux v. Gino's, Inc., 200 Cal.
Rptr. 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding, based in part on a California statute, that a restau-
rant fulfills its legal duty to assist a choking patron when it calls for medical assistance
within a reasonable time); Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, 418 N.W.2d 381 (Mich.
1988) (ruling that a drugstore owner has no duty to its customers to provide armed, visible
security guards to protect customers from the criminal acts of third parties).
However, some courts have taken a somewhat broader view of this duty. See, e.g., Taco
Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (holding that a restaurant had a
legal duty to take reasonable measures, which might include armed security guards, to
protect its customers from the consequences of criminal acts by unknown third parties);
McGill v. Frasure, 790 P.2d 379, 382 (Idaho CL App. 1990) (explaining that tavernkeeper
owes its business invitees "a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from reason-
ably foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons."); Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs
Moose Lodge, 271 S.E.2d 335 (W. Va. 1980) (concluding that the proprietor of a business
has a duty to render first aid after he knows or has reason to know that a business invitee is
ill or injured).
45. See, e.g., Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (hold-
ing that a convenience store employee has no duty to act where he has a reasonable fear
for his safety).
46. See Tucker v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 689 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Md. 1988) ("A
higher duty to protect a private person from the conduct of a third person arises under
Maryland law only when a special relationship exists .... The storekeeper and business
invitee do not have that special relationship."), affd, 872 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1989); South-
land, 332 Md. at 717, 633 A.2d at 90.
47. "All courts addressing the issue have taken the position that the standard of care
owed to firemen applies equally to policemen." Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Part-
nership, 308 Md. 432, 442 n.4, 520 A.2d 361, 366 n.4 (1987); Sherman v. Suburban Trust
Co., 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d 76 (1978) (same); KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 61, at 430-31.
48. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 61, at 430-31 ("[F] iremen, policemen and other
such persons professionally trained to deal with dangerous situations on a regular basis
must be held to assume the normal, apparent risks that are to be expected in encountering
such hazards .... ."). See generally Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occu-
pant of Premises to Fireman Coming Thereon in Discharge of His Duty, 11 A.L.R.4mT 597 (1982 &
Supp. 1993); Richard C. Tinney, Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occupant of Premises to
Police Officer Coming Thereon in Discharge of Officer's Duty, 30 A.L.R.4TH 81 (1984 & Supp.
1993).
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Maryland first recognized the fireman's rule in Steinwedel v. Hil-
bert.49 In Steinwedel, the Court of Appeals found that a member of the
Fire Insurance Salvage Corps of Baltimore," who suffered harm when
he fell down an elevator shaft in a burning building, could not recover
damages from the tenant or the owner of the building even though
both the tenant and owner were negligent in leaving the elevator shaft
open and unguarded.5 1 The court explained its decision on the basis
of premises liability,52 under which no duty arose on the part of the
tenant or proprietor to exercise reasonable care for a salvage corps
member's safety because he was a licensee when he entered the build-
ing in the performance of his duties.5"
In recent years, courts have grounded the fireman's rule more on
public policy than on premises liability.' For example, in Flowers v.
Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Partnership,55 the Court of Appeals reasoned that
the very nature of firefighting and police work limits the ability of
firefighters and police officers to recover tort damages for work-re-
lated injuries.56 Because firefighters and police officers are called
upon "to confront certain hazards on behalf of the public,"57 the
court in Flowers concluded that firefighters and police officers are pro-
49. 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925).
50. The Fire Insurance Salvage Corps of Baltimore was a private organization whose
members saved property threatened by fire. Id. at 123, 131 A. at 45. Members of a salvage
corps were essentially firefighters for purposes of determining liability under the fireman's
rule. Id.
51. Id. at 122-23, 131 A. at 45.
52. Premises liability depends on the status of the injured visitor upon the owner or
occupier's land. "[T]he liability of a property owner to an individual injured on his prop-
erty is... contingent upon a determination of the individual's status while on the prop-
erty, i.e., whether he is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser." See Sherman v. Suburban Trust
Co., 282 Md. 238, 241-42, 384 A.2d 76, 79 (1978). "An invitee is in general a person invited
or permitted to enter or remain on another's property for purposes connected with or
related to the owner's business.... ." Id. at 242, 384 A.2d at 79. On the other hand, "[a]
licensee is generally defined as one who enters the property with the knowledge and con-
sent of the owner but for his own purposes or interest...." Id. Courts have held generally
that an invitee is owed a duty of reasonable care, while a licensee is only protected from
willful and wanton misconduct. See id.
53. Steinwedel 149 Md. at 123-24, 131 A. at 45,
[A]ccording to the great weight of authorities the general rule of common law is
that a fireman entering premises to put out fire is a licensee only, and not an
invitee, and that the owner or occupant of the premises is not under any duty of
care to keep his premises prepared and safe for a fireman.
Id.
54. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 61, at 430-31. For a discussion of the justifica-
tions of the fireman's rule in various jurisdictions, see Tinney, supra note 48, §§ 3-4, at 88-
98, and Scheafer, supra note 48, §§ 3-5, at 602-07.
55. 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).
56. Id. at 450, 520 A.2d at 370; see KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 61, at 430-31.
57. Hoe, 308 Md. at 447, 520 A.2d at 368.
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scribed from recovering for injuries resulting from the negligence
that brought them to the scene.5" Hence, firefighters and police of-
ficers, by their choice of employment, assume the risk of injury.
While the fireman's rule limits the liability of owners and occupi-
ers of land, the fireman's rule does not provide an absolute bar to
recovery. 9 The rule allows firefighters and police officers to sue for
injuries from.perils that are not reasonably foreseeable occupational
risks.6" Accordingly, actors may be liable for independent negligent
occurrences that happen after the firefighter or police officer arrives
on the scene.61 In addition, an owner or occupier of the land must
inform the firefighter or police officer of pre-existing hidden dangers
if the owner or occupier of the land knows about the dangers and
possesses an opportunity to warn.62
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Southland, the Court of Appeals
held that a business must help an injured business visitor if the busi-
ness is aware of the injury and can provide assistance without danger
to the owner or employees of the business.6" Chief Judge Murphy
wrote that the fireman's rule did not apply in Southland6 4 but rejected
the Court of Special Appeals's assertion that the fireman's rule did
not apply because "the clerk's failure to call 911 was an event in the
nature of a hidden danger or an unanticipated risk."6 5 Judge Murphy
explained that hidden dangers normally relate to the physical condi-
tion of land, rather than to the acts or omissions of individuals. 66 Fur-
thermore, the court noted that in modern society it is not
58. Id. at 447-48, 520 A.2d at 368.
59. Courts ordinarily find that
the fireman's rule ... appl[ies] when the firefighter or police officer is injured
from the very danger, created by the defendant's act of negligence, that required
his professional assistance and presence at the scene in the first place, and the
rule will not shield a defendant from liability for independent acts of misconduct
which otherwise cause the injury.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 61, at 430-31.
60. Flowers, 308 Md. at 448, 520 A.2d at 369; KEETON ET AL., supra note 36, § 61, at 431.
61. Flowers, 308 Md. at 448, 520 A.2d at 369. The Flowers court noted several cases from
other jurisdictions where defendants owed firefighters and police officers a duty of reason-
able care because their injuries resulted from unanticipated risks such as criminal acts or
arson. See id. at 448 nn.8-9, 520 A.2d at 369 nn.8-9.
62. Id. at 448 & n.7, 520 A.2d at 369 & n.7.
63. Southland, 332 Md. at 719, 633 A.2d at 91.
64. Id. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 715 n.6, 633 A.2d at 89 n.6 (pointing out that "property defects or the storage
of hazardous chemicals" are examples of hidden dangers).
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unforeseeable that individuals will refuse to seek assistance for a po-
lice officer in distress.67
Instead, the court found it unnecessary to invoke the fireman's
rule because Officer Griffith was simply a business invitee at the 7-
Eleven.68 The court explained that Griffith became a business invitee
when he originally entered Southland's property to buy food.69 He
did not lose that status when he announced that he was a police of-
ficer and tried to arrest his assailants.
7 °
The Southland court then considered whether a business open to
the public owes a duty to visitors who enter the premises of the busi-
ness.71 In accord with other authority on this matter,72 the court ex-
pressly adopted Section 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts73 and
held that a shopkeeper must help business invitees who need assist-
ance unless rendering aid endangers the shopkeeper.74 Because Of-
ficer Griffith was a business invitee and Southland owed a legal duty to
aid him when requested, the Court of Appeals refused to uphold the
dismissal of Griffith's suit against Southland Corporation and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.75
67. Id. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89. Contra Griffith, 94 Md. App. at 253, 617 A.2d at 603-04
(concluding that 7-Eleven's "refusal to act was an event... that no police officer in this day
and age could possibly anticipate.").
68. Southland, 332 Md. at 715-16, 633 A.2d at 89.
69. Id. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89.
70. Id. at 720, 633 A.2d at 91.
71. Id. at 717-20, 633 A.2d at 90-91.
72. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 36, § 18.6, at 722-23; KEETON ET AL., supra note 36,
§ 61, at 426. The Southland court relied heavily on two cases from other jurisdictions. In
Drew v. Lejay's Sportsmen's Cafe, Inc., 806 P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1991), the Wyoming Supreme
Court considered the scope of a restaurant owner's duty to aid a choking patron. Id. at
301. Rejecting the argument that the proprietor owed a duty to provide first aid, the court
held that the restaurant owner satisfied his responsibility by requesting medical assistance
in a timely manner. Id. at 305-06. In so deciding, the Wyoming Supreme Court took into
account the small number of annual choking deaths and the burden that a first aid re-
quirement would place upon restaurants and other businesses. Id. at 305.
In Jones v. Kwick Karol and Ginalco, Inc., 490 So. 2d 664 (La. Ct. App. 1986), the
Louisiana Court of Appeals held that a convenience store attendant had a duty to take
affirmative action to protect a patron from an impending attack. Id. at 666. The court
suggested that the attendant could have satisfied his duty to aid if he had called police,
observed the incident more carefully, threatened to call the police, or ordered the suspi-
cious patrons to depart. Id.
73. Southland, 332 Md. at 719, 633 A.2d at 91; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314A(3); see also supra note 39.
74. Southland, 332 Md. at 719, 633 A.2d at 91.




a. Police Officer as Business Invitee.--The Court of Appeals de-
termined that Officer Griffith remained a business invitee even after
he attempted to effectuate an arrest because he had entered the busi-
ness as a patron.76 The court rejected the contention that Griffith lost
his status as a business invitee once he assumed the role of a police
officer.77 In essence, the conclusion of the court was once a business
invitee always a business invitee.
Such a seemingly simple holding, nevertheless, raises questions
about the future viability of the common-law fireman's rule. Courts
adopted the fireman's rule to shield individuals and businesses from
liability for injuries suffered by police officers when officers encounter
danger on behalf of the public.78 When Officer Griffith attempted to
arrest the teenagers, he encountered danger on behalf of the public.
By allowing Griffith to sue the Southland Corporation for negligence,
the Court of Appeals has disregarded the public policy behind the
fireman's rule and, thereby, increased the businesses' liability
exposure.
The Southland decision has also clouded the application of the
fireman's rule. According to Southland, businesses must assist police
officers who are off duty.7 9 Yet, it may be difficult for shopkeepers to
distinguish between on-duty and off-duty police officers. For example,
a plain clothes officer may enter a business while working on an un-
dercover assignment, in which case the fireman's rule should shield
the business from liability. In practice, the court's decision will re-
quire businesses to seek emergency assistance for any patron without
regard to whether an injured person is a police officer, firefighter, or
a business invitee.
In the final analysis, the court acted appropriately in allowing
Griffith to proceed with his suit against the Southland Corporation.
Most Marylanders would be appalled by the failure of a clerk to call
the police in the face of a vicious assault. Furthermore, the public
would undoubtedly find it unfair for a shopkeeper to avoid all finan-
cial responsibility simply because the victim of an attack on the store's
premises was a police officer. As a matter of public policy, off-duty
officers should be encouraged to respond to threats to public safety.
76. Id., 633 A.2d at 91.
77. Id.
78. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
79. See Southland, 332 Md. at 89, 633 A.2d at 716-17.
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b. Applicability and Limitations on the Duty to Act. -The failure
of the court in Southland to delineate with any specificity the proper
scope of the shopkeeper's duty to aid a business invitee may cause
some uncertainty among business owners about what procedures they
should adopt to protect themselves from liability. The court provided
some guidance when it explained that, at a minimum, businesses have
a legal duty to call 911 when it is apparent that a patron is sick or
injured. 0 Additionally, the court's adoption of Section 314A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests that a shopkeeper's duty to aid will
be limited to calling for help or, possibly, administering such basic
first aid as the shopkeeper knows."1 The experience of other states
indicates that Maryland courts will probably interpret the duty to aid
narrowly."2 If Maryland courts so rule, businesses will only have to
bear fairly limited costs.
In any case, the strong public policy concerns that underlie the
Southland decision outweigh the additional costs on businesses. In a
significant shift of policy on tort liability, the Court of Appeals refused
to allow a business to escape liability when a store clerk failed to sum-
mon assistance for an injured patron, even though calling for help
posed no risk to the employee. This ruling contravenes the common
law's reluctance to require people to take affirmative action to help
each other.8 3 The court, thus, implicitly recognized the role of moral-
ity in our legal system.8 4 As Niccolo Machiavelli wrote: "Ilust as good
morals, if they are to be maintained, have need of the laws, so the
laws, if they are to be observed, have need of good morals.""5
80. See id. at 720, 633 A.2d at 91 ("Southland... owed [Griffith] a legal duty to aid (call
the police) .... ").
81. Id. at 720 n.8, 633 A.2d at 91 n.8. The court quoted the Restatement commentary to
emphasize that:
In the case of an ill or injured person, [the defendant] will seldom be required to
do more than give such first aid as he reasonably can, and take reasonable steps
to turn the sick man over to a physician, or to those who will look after him and
see that medical assistance is obtained.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. f (1965). Courts in other jurisdictions have
split on whether calling 911 is enough or whether a restaurant has to provide first aid. See
generally FrankJ. Wozniak, Annotation, Duty of Retail Establishment, or Its Employees, to Assist
Patrons Choking on Food, 2 A.L.R.5TH 966 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
82. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
84. The responsibility of individuals to help one another is central to virtually all moral
and religious traditions. See, e.g., Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 22:39.
85. Nicccoo MACaIAvELuj, DiscouRsEs ON THE FiRsT DECADE OF Tirus Livius 271 (Al-
lan Gilbert, trans. 1965).
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5. Conclusion.-In Southland Corp. v. Griffith, the Court of Ap-
peals imposed a new tort duty in Maryland. A business now has a legal
duty to aid a business invitee if the business or its employee has knowl-
edge that the invitee is injured and can provide assistance without risk
of danger.86 The court also ruled that an off-duty, out-of-uniform po-
lice officer who enters a business as a business invitee is not prevented
by the fireman's rule from recovering in tort for injuries sustained
while later acting in an official capacity on the premises.87
The court's decision may cause some initial uncertainty as to the
scope of the duty to aid and increase the liability exposure of busi-
nesses. The public policy concerns that underlie Southland, however,
outweigh such concerns. The Southland court moves Maryland tort
law in a sensible direction, implicitly recognizing the interdependency
of law and morality by imposing a duty on shopkeepers to help pa-
trons in need.
WILLIAM T. MATHIAS
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur and Expert Testimony: Less is Better
In Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann,1 the Maryland Court of Appeals
considered whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied in
cases where direct evidence of negligence is available through expert
testimony such that a plaintiff is capable of making out a prima facie
case of negligence. The court held that when expert testimony has
provided a complete explanation of the specific cause of an accident,
a plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.2
The court's holding is the inevitable consequence of a contempo-
rary world which takes for granted the availability of expert testimony
to explain the causes of accidents. The use of expert testimony makes
reliance on res ipsa loquitur increasingly problematic for both plaintiffs
and courts. Because a direct inference of fault may be drawn from
this testimony, the proper cause of action is one in simple negligence.
As a result, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has become more a relic of
legal history than a practical tool for contemporary litigators.
1. The Case.--On February 2, 1987, David Swann, the plaintiff,
injured himself while attempting to board an elevator that allegedly
86. Southland, 332 Md. at 720, 633 A.2d at 91-92.
87. Id. at 715, 633 A.2d at 89.
1. 334 Md. 231, 638 A.2d 762 (1994).
2. Id. at 262, 638 A.2d at 777.
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failed to level properly with the floor.3 The elevator, which was lo-
cated in the office building where Swann was employed, stopped
"[s]omewhere around a foot" or "[s]omewhat greater than about a
foot" from the level of the floor, causing Swann to stumble and strike
his back against the rear wall of the car.4 The building in which the
elevator was located was leased from Prudential Insurance Company
of America (Prudential) and managed by Carey Winston Company
(Carey Winston).' The Dover Elevator Company (Dover), petitioner
in this appeal, manufactured, installed, and exclusively maintained
the elevator.6
On November 21, 1988, Swann filed a complaint against Pruden-
tial and Dover in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.7 Swann
pleaded causes of action based in negligence and products liability,
and claimed that he suffered three million dollars in damages.' Carey
Winston was later included as a defendant in the action by amended
complaint.9 The products liability claim was dismissed with respect to
all three defendants and, in January 1992, a two-week jury trial heard
the negligence claims.'
At trial, Swann offered the testimony of an expert witness, Donald
Moynihan (Moynihan), an elevator consultant and engineer." Moy-
nihan conducted an inspection of the elevator and reviewed all of Do-
ver Elevator's available maintenance records. Those records indicated
that numerous service calls were made to correct misleveling
problems on the elevator between December 1986 and February
1987.12 He testified that Dover Elevator was negligent in four re-
spects: first, in filing and cleaning the elevator's contacts-instead of
replacing them-resulting in an irregular current running between
the contacts; second, in failing to spend adequate time servicing the
elevator; third, in keeping deficient maintenance records; and fourth,
in failing to maintain a supply of replacement parts in the elevator's
machine room. 3 Ronald Bothell, a maintenance repairman for Do-
ver Elevator, testified that Dover Elevator had been advised of the mis-





8. Id. at 234-35, 638 A.2d at 764.







leveling problems with the elevator.1 4 A repair order dated three
weeks before the accident indicated that the "14 and 15 contacts were
'burned closed,' and that Bothell cleaned the contacts." 5 According
to Bothell, cleaning rather than replacing these contacts was proper
because they were not welded together. 6
After a trial on the merits, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
all defendants. 7 Swann appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
which affirmed the verdict as to Prudential and Carey Winston, but
reversed the verdict with respect to Dover.'8 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to determine whether Swann was precluded from
use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish Dover's negligence.' 9
2. Legal Background.-The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
means "the thing speaks for itself," originated in the famous case of
Byrne v. Boade ° concerning a barrel of flour that fell without explana-
tion from a window and hit a passing pedestrian. In a res ipsa loquitur
case, the jury may reasonably infer negligence from the happening of
an accident, but the defendant may rebut this inference.2 1
There are three elements that must be shown in order to invoke
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. First, "the injury [must be] of a nature
that would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence;"22 sec-
ond, the injury must be caused by an instrumentality within the de-
fendant's exclusive control;2' and third, it must appear from the
evidence that no action on the part of the plaintiff or a third party or
other intervening force might plausibly have caused the injury.24 " To
invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must prove these
three elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 5
Upon proof of these three elements of res ipsa loquitur, the bur-
den of persuasion does not shift to the defendant. Rather "the de-
14. Swann v. Prudential Ins. Co., 95 Md. App. 365, 373-74, 620 A.2d 989, 993 (1993).
15. Id. at 374, 620 A.2d at 993.
16. Id.
17. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 235, 638 A.2d at 764.
18. Swann, 95 Md. App. at 418, 620 A.2d at 1015.
19. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 234, 638 A.2d at 763-64.
20. 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 299 (1863).
21. See id. at 301.
22. Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App. 342, 360, 517 A.2d 1122, 1131 (1986).
23. Id.
24. Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md. 37, 42, 273 A.2d 412, 415 (1981). Although the
precise language of the elements of res ipsa loquitur has varied over the years, the require-
ments have substantively remained the same. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Hicks, 25
Md. App. 503, 516, 337 A.2d 744, 752 (1975).
25. Hicks, 25 Md. App. at 530, 337 A.2d at 760.
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fendant has the duty of going forward with the evidence to explain or
rebut, if possible, the inference that he failed to use care."26 In Bene-
dick v. Potts,2 7 the Court of Appeals stated that the doctrine "is not an
attempt to infer negligence from an apparent cause, but to infer the
cause of the injury from the naked fact of injury, and then to super-
add the further inference that this inferred cause proceeded from
negligence." 28 Res ipsa loquitur permits the jury to infer negligence
from the facts, but this inference is not required.' The jury weighs
the circumstantial evidence, but may not accept it as sufficient.3"
Prior Maryland decisions have indicated that res ipsa loquitur is
precluded when the cause of an accident has been proven by the
plaintiffs testimony.3' This concept was extended in Coastal Tank
Lines, Inc. v. Carrots2 to include testimony that has been introduced by
the defendant.3  Maryland cases also indicate that res ipsa loquitur is
precluded where there is an attempt to establish specific grounds of
negligence.34
In Meda v. Brown,35 the court explained that when the doctrine is
applied
26. Munzert v. American Stores Co., 232 Md. 97, 103, 192 A.2d 59, 62 (1963). See
generally STUART M. SPEISER, RES IPSA LOQUITUR § 6:35, at 303 (1972) (stating that the de-
fendant can rebut an inference of negligence by introducing evidence that other factors
caused the plaintiffs injuries).
27. 88 Md. 52, 40 A. 1067 (1898).
28. Id. at 58, 40 A. at 1069.
29. See Potts v. Armour & Co., 183 Md. 483, 487, 39 A.2d 552, 554 (1944).
30. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. m (1965) ("In the ordi-
nary case the great majority of courts now treat res ipsa loquitur as creating nothing more
than a permissible inference, which the jury may draw or refuse to draw, unless the facts
are so compelling that no reasonable man could reject it.").
31. See, e.g., Nalee, Inc. v.Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 532, 180 A.2d 677, 680-81 (1962) (stat-
ing that when a plaintiff shows how the accident happened the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
may not be invoked); Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 202 Md. 253, 263, 96 A.2d 241, 245
(1953) (finding that because the plaintiffs proved the details of the event, they could no
longer rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur).
32. 205 Md. 137, 106 A.2d 98 (1954).
33. See id. at 146, 106 A.2d at 102. Since all of the facts leading to the injuries were
known, there was no longer a reason for an inference of negligence. Id. at 144, 106 A.2d at
100; see also Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md. 37, 46, 273 A.2d 412, 417 (1971) (-If...
everything relative to the case is known, and . . .the injury might have been caused by
something other than defendant's negligence .... then the plaintiff will not be allowed to
avail himself of the doctrine.").
34. See, e.g., Nalee, 228 Md. at 532, 180 A.2d at 681; Coastal Tank Lines, Inc., 205 Md. at
145, 106 A.2d at 101; Hickory Transfer Co., 202 Md. at 262-63, 96 A.2d at 245. There is a
difference between a case involving res ipsa loquitur and one where there is a direct infer-
ence of negligence to be drawn from the facts. The latter circumstance involves an addi-
tional showing of causation. Na/es, 228 Md. at 531-32, 180 A.2d at 680-81.
35. 318 Md. 418, 569 A.2d 202 (1990).
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the jury will be permitted to infer negligence on the part of a
defendant from a showing of facts surrounding the happen-
ing of the injury, unaided by expert testimony, even though
those facts do not show the mechanism of the injury or the
precise manner in which the defendant was negligent.
36
Meda involved a case of medical malpractice in which two experts testi-
fied on behalf of the plaintiff.3 7 The court declined to apply the doc-
trine because the only relationship that the case had to res ipsa loquitur
was the inferential reasoning employed by the experts to conclude
that the injury was unlikely to occur unless there was negligence.38
Res ipsa loquitur involves an inference of negligence founded on
the belief that accidents do not usually happen in the absence of neg-
ligence.3 9 The underlying rationale for the doctrine rests upon the
theory that the defendant is in a better position to explain how the
accident happened because the defendant had exclusive control of
the instrumentality causing the injury.4" While useful to plaintiffs, the
doctrine has been a source of great confusion. According to Prosser,
"the problems of [res ipsa loquitur's] application and effect have filled
the courts of all our states with a multitude of decisions, baffling and
perplexing alike to students, attorneys and judges."4" This confusion
is manifest in the difficulty encountered by courts in their determina-
tion of when the plaintiff either had the ability to explain the cause of
an accident or simply presented sufficient direct evidence with respect
to its cause to preclude invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-The Court of Appeals in Do-
ver Elevator Co. considered two issues. First, could the plaintiff, who
presented direct evidence with respect to the specific cause of his inju-
ries, also seek recovery under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur?42 Sec-
ond, if res ipsa loquitur was appropriate, did the trial court's failure to
36. Id. at 425, 569 A.2d at 205.
37. Id. at 419, 569 A.2d at 202.
38. Id. at 424-25, 569 A.2d at 205. The court explained that if the plaintiff had offered
no expert testimony but had merely shown an injury, the jury would have been able to
infer negligence from the facts alone. Id. at 428, 569 A.2d at 206.
39. Short v. Wells, 249 Md. 491, 496, 240 A.2d 224, 227 (1968).
40. Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 19, 264 A.2d 851, 856 (1970).
41. William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 183, 183 (1949).
ChiefJudge Bond also expressed dissatisfaction with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stating
that "[i]t adds nothing to the law, has no meaning which is not more clearly expressed for
us in English, and brings confusion to our legal discussions. It does not represent a doc-
trine, is not a legal maxim, and is not a rule." Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33,
40, 152 A. 633, 636 (1930) (Bond, CJ., dissenting).
42. Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann, 334 Md. 231, 234, 638 A.2d 762, 763 (1994).
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so instruct the jury constitute error?43 The court concluded that the
plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
therefore, the trial court committed no error.44
a. Reliance on Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The Court of Appeals con-
fronted the question of whether Swann, by his attempt to prove the
cause of his accident, was precluded from relying on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.45 Although the court explained that Swann did not
furnish a complete explanation for how the accident happened,
Swann's expert witness furnished a complete explanation of the spe-
cific causes of the elevator's misleveling, thereby precluding reliance
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.46 In effect, the issue before the jury
became whether Dover was negligent for cleaning rather than replac-
ing the electrical contacts that regulated the elevator's leveling.47
To reach its conclusion in Dover Elevator Co., the court relied in
large part on the case of Smith v. Bernfeld,4" which held that res ipsa
loquitur was inapplicable when the plaintiff attempted to establish spe-
cific grounds of negligence.49 The Dover Elevator Co. court further as-
serted that res ipsa loquitur did not apply because the jury was not
allowed to draw its own inference of negligence.5" All of the infer-
ences were drawn by the plaintiffs expert and then presented to the
jury as expert testimony.5 ' Instead of drawing an inference from cir-
cumstantial evidence, the jury merely had to decide whether or not it
believed the expert testimony.5" Thus, as in Meda v. Brown,5" the ex-
pert in Dover Elevator Co. used the inferential reasoning process to ar-
rive at his conclusion that Dover was negligent.54
The court in Dover Elevator Co. explained that the case where res
ipsa loquitur is appropriate is one in which
43. Id, 638 A.2d at 764.
44. Id. at 261-62, 638 A-2d at 777.
45. Id. at 238, 638 A.2d at 765-66.
46. Id. at 239, 638 A.2d at 766.
47. Id. at 245, 638 A.2d at 769. Both Swann's expert and Dover's technician agreed
that the misleveling was caused by the contacts, however, Dover's witness disagreed that he
acted negligently when he failed to replace the contacts. Id. at 248-49, 638 A.2d at 771.
48. 226 Md. 400, 174 A.2d 53 (1961).
49. Id. at 409, 174 A.2d at 57; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
50. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 249, 638 A.2d at 771.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 318 Md. 418, 425, 569 A.2d 202, 205 (1990).




"the jury will be permitted to infer negligence on the part of a defend-
ant from a showing of facts surrounding the happening of the in-
jury, unaided by expert testimony, even though those facts do not
show the mechanism of the injury or the precise manner in which the
defendant was negligent. ' 5
The Dover Elevator Co. court also relied on B & K Rentals and Sales Co.
v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.,56 in which the court held that res ipsa
loquitur is inapplicable where the testimony of experts provides direct
evidence of negligence.57 The Dover Elevator Co. court reasoned that
because the plaintiffs expert drew his own inference and presented
testimony to the jury that the misleveling would not have occurred if
Dover had exercised due care, res ipsa loquitur could not apply. 8 The
instant case was distinguished from the situation in which res ipsa loqui-
tur would have been appropriate because this case involved a direct
inference of negligence drawn from specific facts. 9
On appeal below, the Court of Special Appeals sought to rely
upon Blankenship v. Wagner" and Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs"1 to reach the
conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction on res
ipsa loquitur because "an attempt to prove specific acts of negligence
does not necessarily preclude reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur." " The Court of Appeals in Dover Elevator Co., on the other
hand, found Blankenship and Nalee distinguishable. 63 The court ex-
plained that plaintiffs in those cases offered very little, if any, direct
evidence of negligence." Blankenship followed the reasoning of the
court in Potts v. Armour & Co.:65
Thejustice of the rule permitting proof of negligence by cir-
cumstantial evidence is found in the circumstance that the
principal evidence of the true cause of the accident is accessi-
55. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 251-52, 638 A.2d at 772 (quoting Meda, 318 Md. at
424-25, 569 A.2d at 205).
56. 324 Md. 147, 596 A.2d 640 (1991).
57. Id. at 162, 569 A.2d at 647.
58. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 252, 638 A.2d at 773.
59. Id. at 253, 638 A.2d at 773.
60. 261 Md. 37, 273 A.2d 412 (1971).
61. 228 Md. 525, 180 A.2d 677 (1962).
62. Swann v. Prudential Ins. Co., 95 Md. App. 365, 393, 409-10, 620 A.2d 989, 1002-03,
1011 (1993).
63. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 245, 638 A.2d at 769.
64. Id. In Blankenship the plaintiff offered evidence that he injured his back while car-
rying a refrigerator up steps which subsequently collapsed. Blankenship, 261 Md. at 39-40,
273 A.2d at 413-14. The plaintiff did not, however, explain why the steps collapsed. Id. at
45, 273 A.2d at 416. In Nalee, the plaintiff was injured when part of a bench at the defend-
ant's hotel fell on his foot. Nalee, 228 Md. at 526, 180 A.2d at 677.
65. 183 Md. 483, 39 A.2d 552 (1944).
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ble to the defendant, but inaccessible to the victim of the
accident. The rule is not applied by the courts except where
the facts and the demands of justice make its application es-
sential, depending upon the facts and circumstances in each
particular case.'
Dover Elevator Co. was not, however, a case in which the cause of the
accident was available to the defendant but not the plaintiff.67 The
purpose for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur rests upon its application
to cases where the instrumentality causing the injury is within the ex-
clusive control of the defendant and, therefore, the defendant is in a
better position to explain how the accident happened.6" In the in-
stant case, the plaintiffs expert attempted to explain precisely how
the negligence caused the misleveling of the elevator.69 Because the
cause of the accident could be ascertained by the plaintiff, "the facts
and the demands of justice" did not require that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur be invoked.7" To allow an instruction on res ipsa loquitur
where evidence was available to the plaintiff would therefore contra-
dict the reason for the doctrine.71
The Dover Elevator Co. court agreed with the reasoning of Nalee
that a plaintiff was precluded from relying on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur where the plaintiffs evidence "did not stop at the point of
showing the happening of the accident under circumstances in which
negligence of the defendant was a permissible inference."72 In both
Blankenship and Nalee the court recognized the inapplicability of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases where direct evidence of negli-
gence was offered.73
Res ipsa loquitur will not apply in a case involving a complex issue
that cannot be resolved without the aid of expert testimony. 74 Accord-
ing to the court in Orkin v. Holy Cross Hospital, Inc., to decide whether
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been properly applied, the courts
must distinguish between those instances in which an inference of
negligence can be drawn by an expert, but not by a lay person, and
those instances in which an inference of negligence can be drawn by a
66. Id. at 488, 39 A.2d at 555.
67. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 246, 638 A.2d at 769.
68. Id, at 237, 638 A.2d at 765; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
69. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 246, 688 A.2d at 769-70.
70. Id. at 247, 638 A.2d at 770.
71. Id. at 253-54, 638 A.2d at 773.
72. Nalee 228 Md. at 532, 180 A.2d at 681.
73. See Blankenship, 261 Md. at 45, 273 A.2d at 416; Nalee, 228 Md. at 532, 180 A.2d at
680.
74. See Orkin v. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc., 318 Md. 429, 433, 569 A.2d 207, 209 (1990).
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
lay person without expert testimony.75 In the first instance, "the thing
speaks for itself' only from the perspective of the expert, thus res ipsa
loquitur is inapplicable.76
In Dover Elevator Co., Swann's expert admitted that elevators often
experience problems even without negligence. 77 The expert testi-
mony in this case differed from traditional expert testimony because
"instead of testifying that a particular act or omission constituted a fail-
ure to exercise due care, the expert testifie[d] to the probability that
the injury was caused by the failure to exercise due care." 78 But in the
instant case, it would have been difficult for the jury to make a ra-
tional inference that elevators do not normally mislevel in the absence
of negligence. The way that an elevator works is not common knowl-
edge and most jurors do not have the ability to make an inference of
negligence in a case where the evidence is technically complex.
The reasoning in Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed 9 resolved the issue
presented to the court in Dover Elevator Co.80 The court reasoned that
Swann had proved too much to rely on res ipsa loquitur.81 Yet at the
same time that the expert testimony explained the cause of the eleva-
tor's misleveling, it failed to persuade the jury that Dover was negli-
gent-Swann had proved too little.82 The consequences of the court's
result is plain enough: if a plaintiff could rely on res ipsa loquitur for
any negligence case, there would be an incentive for the plaintiff to
withhold evidence in order to avoid proving too much. Had the court
75. Id. at 431, 569 A.2d at 208 (holding that res ipsa loquitur can only be applied in
those cases where an inference of negligence can be drawn from the facts alone).
76. Id.
77. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 255, 638 A.2d at 774. Chief Judge Wilner, in his
dissent from the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, stated that "[m] echanical, elec-
trical, and electronic devices fail or malfunction routinely-some more routinely than
others." Swann v. Prudential Ins. Co., 95 Md. App. 365, 419, 620 A.2d 989, 1015 (1993)
(Wilner, C.J., dissenting); see also Harris v. Otis Elevator Co., 92 Md. App. 49, 54, 606 A.2d
305, 308 (1992) (involving an action against an elevator service company for failure of an
elevator to level properly in which the court found that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did
not apply because the defendant did not have exclusive control of the elevator, and the
accident could have been caused by the malfeasance of others).
78. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 254, 638 A.2d at 773.
79. 202 Md. 253, 263, 96 A.2d 241, 245 (1953) (holding that when a plaintiff relies on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it must not appear from the plaintiff's own evidence that
something else was the cause of the injury).
80. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 253, 638 A.2d at 773.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also Hickory Transfer Co., 220 Md. at 263, 96 A.2d at 245 ("[T]he plaintiffs
themselves proved the details of the happening, foregoing reliance on res ipsa loquitur, and,
having undertaken to prove the details, they failed to show negligence on the part of the
defendants. Indeed, they explained away the possible inference of negligence. Paradoxi-
cally, the plaintiff proved too much and too little.").
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allowed the alternate instruction on res ipsa loquitur in this case, the
instruction would open the door to secondary or back-up instructions
in virtually every negligence case.
The Dover Elevator Co. court explained that res ipsa loquitur should
not be applied in cases where an inference of" 'negligence on the part
of the defendant could have properly been drawn by the jury from the
evidence ... without resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur."'84 To
conclude that res ipsa loquitur did not apply, the court found that
Swann purported to establish more than an inference of the defend-
ant's negligence.85 Through the direct evidence presented by his own
expert witness, Swann established a prima facie case of negligence;
therefore, an instruction on res ipsa loquitur would have been im-
proper.86 The Dover Elevator Co. court held that because expert testi-
mony was used, Swann was precluded from reliance on res ipsa
loquitur.
8 7
b. Instructions to the Juty.-The court also discussed whether
it would have been reversible error to fail to instruct the jury on res
ipsa loquitur had the instruction been applicable.88 Although some ju-
risdictions consider it reversible error to refuse to give a res ipsa loqui-
tur instruction, 9 decisions from Maryland and other jurisdictions
hold that where res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable, it is error for the trial
judge to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur.9 ° In at least one jurisdic-
tion, the decision whether to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur in a
83. Dover E/evator Co., 334 Md. at 253, 638 A.2d at 773.
84. Id. at 248, 638 A.2d at 770 (quoting Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 533, 180
A.2d 677, 681 (1962)).
85. Id.
86. Id., 638 A.2d at 770-71.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 256, 638 A-2d at 775. In light of the court's holding, this discussion was obiter
dicta, but the court felt compelled to devote substantial space to the issue in view of the
finding by the Court of Special Appeals that the failure to give the instruction constituted
reversible error. See id. at 256-57, 638 A.2d at 774-75 (citing Swann v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
95 Md. App. 365, 409-10, 620 A.2d 989, 1011 (1993)).
89. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 788 P.2d 726,
731 (Alaska 1990) (holding that "when there is sufficient evidence ... [such] that ajury
reasonably could conclude that the elements of res ipsa loquitur may be established, the
plaintiff is entitled to [an instruction] on res ipsa loquitur"); Davis v. Memorial Hosp., 376
P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1962) (holding that it is error to refuse to instruct the jury on res ipsa
loquitur because it is a question of fact that must be left to the jury under proper
instructions).
90. See, e.g., B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 324 Md. 147, 162,
596 A.2d 640, 647 (1991); Potomac Edison Co. v. Burdette, 70 Md. App. 566, 576, 521 A.2d
1276, 1281, cert. denied, 310 Md. 129, 527 A.2d 50 (1987); see a/soJones v. Davis, 359 S.E.2d
187, 189 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
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case in which its applicability is uncertain is within the discretion of
the trial judge.9 1 According to the court in Turtenwald v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co.,92 there are two conditions that will make it an error
for a trial judge to give an instruction on res ipsa loquitur first, when
the plaintiff has proved too little such that there is not enough evi-
dence to make the question of causation a permissible inference; sec-
ond, when the plaintiff's evidence is too substantial in that a complete
explanation of the event has been offered.9"
The Dover Elevator Co. court, however, found no Maryland cases
that held a trial judge must instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur or that
reversed a judge for failing to do so. 4 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that res ipsa loquiturwas not applicable in this case and the trial
judge committed no error in refusing to give the requested
instruction.95
4. Conclusion.-Legal scholars have argued that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is nothing more than the application of an inference
and circumstantial evidence.9 6 But as the Court of Appeals stated in
Orkin v. Holy Cross Hospital, Inc.,97 "not every inference of negligence
involves res ipsa loquitur."98 The Court of Appeals in Dover Elevator Co.
correctly determined that it would be error to extend the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to those instances where direct evidence of negligence
is available to the plaintiff.
TACEYJ. NUSBAUM
91. See Turtenwald v. Aema Casualty & Surety Co., 201 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Wis. 1972) ("In
some cases the adequacy of the proof is a close question and in those instances giving the
instruction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court."); Fehrman v. Smirl, 131
N.W. 2d 314, 317 (Wis. 1964) ("Sometimes the question as to the adequacy of the proof of
negligence will be a close one; it will be within the sound discretion of the trial judge to
determine whether the giving of the instruction will be redundant.").
92. 201 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1972).
93. Id. at 6.
94. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 258, 638 A.2d at 775. Under the Maryland Rules, a
court "need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions
actually given." MD. R. 2-520(c).
95. Dover Elevator Co., 334 Md. at 262, 638 A.2d at 777.
96. See Prosser, supra note 41, at 184-85; see also Maryann Cohea, Note, The Res Ipsa
Loquitur Doctrine and Medical Malpractice Cases, 50 MD. L. REX,. 1175, 1184 (1991); William
M. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 MINN. L. REv. 241, 258-59 (1936).
97. 318 Md. 429, 569 A.2d 207 (1990).
98. Id. at 431, 569 A.2d at 208.
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Recent Developments
The Maryland General Assembly
VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. A New Exception to Noncompellability of Spousal Testimony in
Criminal Proceedings: The Domestic Violence Act of 1994
In 1994, the General Assembly passed an omnibus bill entitled
"Domestic Violence Act of 1994." ' Among its many components, the
Act provides an additional exception to the noncompellability of
spousal testimony in criminal proceedings, commonly known as
spousal privilege.2 Following a brief overview of the Domestic Vio-
lence Act (Act), this Note will review the history of and justification
for the spousal privilege and outline some of the practical difficulties
that the new exception will likely present for prosecution, defense at-
torneys, and domestic violence victims. The Act supports a broad ap-
plication of the "abuse of a child" exception when construed in light
of the development of the statutory privilege and its common-law
predecessor. Finally, the language and purpose of Maryland's spousal
privilege permit the state to use a missing witness inference, in certain
cases, where defendants fail to call their spouses as witnesses.
1. Background.-
a. The Domestic Violence Act of 1994.-House Bill 630 was in-
troduced at the urging of the Maryland Network Against Domestic
Violence with the aim of increasing legal protections for domestic vio-
l. Ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3232.
2. Effective October 1, 1994, the new exception to noncompellability of spousal testi-
mony is codified at § 9-106 of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article. Section 9-106
provides:
The spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be compelled to testify as an
adverse witness unless the charge involves:
(1) The abuse of a child under 18; or
(2) Assault and battery in which the spouse is a victim if.
(i) The person on trial was charged with assault and battery of the spouse
within 1 year of the current charge;
(ii) The spouse was sworn to testify at the previous trial; and
(iii) The spouse refused to testify on the basis of the provisions of this
section.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1994).
Under the former statute, spousal testimony was compellable only when the "charge in-
volve[d] the abuse of a child under 18." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PRoc. § 9-106 (1989
& Supp. 1994).
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lence victims.' In addition to modifying the spousal privilege, the Act
extends protections against domestic violence-previously available
only to married victims-to individuals living with or sharing a child
with their aggressor.4 The Act also modifies the circumstances under
which an individual may be prosecuted for marital rape by changing
the period of spousal separation necessary for such a prosecution
from six months to three months in cases where there is no written
separation agreement.5
The Domestic Violence Act significantly impacts law enforcement
by expanding arrest powers and increasing police duties to victims of
domestic violence. Previously, officers could make warrantless arrests
on probable cause that individuals had battered their spouses or co-
habitants only if there was evidence of physical injury, or a danger that
a suspect would flee or cause further injury or property damage, and
if police made a report within two hours of the incident.6 The Act
increases this time period to twelve hours.7 The Act also allows a po-
lice officer to arrest an individual if there is probable cause to believe
the person is in violation of an ex parte order or a protective order.'
The Act requires that law enforcement officers responding to re-
quests for assistance from domestic violence victims-for example, to
remove clothing and personal effects from the family home-give vic-
tims written notice that they may request that the district court com-
missioner or state's attorney's office file criminal charges. The officer
must also inform victims that they may file for civil relief under the
3. DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE, 1994 SESSION RMEW 212 (reviewing legis-
lative developments of the Maryland General Assembly).
4. Victims of spousal assault may request the assistance of a local law enforcement
agency to accompany them to the family home to remove their clothing, necessary per-
sonal effects, and any children in their care. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 1 IF (1992 & Supp.
1993). The Act changes the tide of Article 27, § 1 IF from "Spousal Assault" to "Domestic
Abuse" and extends this protection to persons eligible for relief under § 4-501 of the Fam-
ily Law Article. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3234-35.
The Domestic Violence Act amended §§ 4-513 to -515 of the Family Law Article by
changing the heading from "Battered Spouses" to "Victims of Domestic Violence." The
Act also extends the Department of Human Resources' program of shelters, counseling,
and rehabilitative services to current or former cohabitants as defined in § 4-501 of the
Family Law Article. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3240-42.
5. Id. at 3236.
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594B (1992 & Supp. 1993).
7. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3236.
8. Id. at 3240. This provision modifies § 4-509 of the Family Law Article. Previously,
an officer could arrest an individual for violation of an ex parte order or a protective order
only when that officer actually observed a violation. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509
(1991 & Supp. 1993).
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Family Law Article.9 An officer must provide victims with the tele-
phone number of any available local domestic violence program.10
When an incident report is filed subsequent to a request for assist-
ance, a copy of the report must be given to the Maryland State Police
and, if requested, to the victim without the victim first obtaining a
subpoena."
The Act also modifies the definitions of "abuse" and "neglect" of
a child in four ways. First, mental injury is explicitly included in the
definition of child abuse. 2 Second, the qualifier "significantly" modi-
fying the word "harmed" has been deleted from the definition of child
abuse.1 3 Third, the Act deletes the exemption from child abuse of
nonmedical religious remedial care and treatment.14 Finally, the Do-
mestic Violence Act expands the category of individuals who can be
"neglectors" to include those who have permanent or temporary care,
custody, or responsibility to supervise a child. 5
b. History of the Spousal Privilege. -Maryland's statutory
noncompellability of spousal testimony is rooted in the common-law
rule of incompetence of one spouse to testify for or against the other
in a civil or criminal proceeding. 6 This incompetency rule evolved
9. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3236-37. Although law
enforcement officers are required to provide victims with this written notice, they may not
be held civilly liable for failure to do so. Id. at 3237.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 3242. This provision modifies § 5-701 of the Family Law Article. The Act
defines mental injury as "observable, identifiable and substantial impairment of a child's
mental or psychological ability to function." Id. at 3244.
13. Id. The revised language of § 5-701(b) now reads:
(b) Abuse.-"Abuse" means:
(1) The physical or mental injury of a child by any parent or other person
who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision
of a child, or by any household or family member, under circumstances that indi-
cate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being
harmed; or
(2) sexual abuse of a child, whether physical injuries are sustained or not.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-701(b) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
14. Id. at 3243. Prior law provided that "(2) 'Abuse' does not include, for that reason
alone, providing a child with nonmedical religious remedial care and treatment recog-
nized by State law." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-701 (1988).
15. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3244. Previously, only a
child's parents, guardians or custodians could be charged with neglect. MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAw § 5-701 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
16. See M. Peter Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal
Cases, 15 MD. L. REv. 16, 18 (1955) (detailing the common-law antecedent of Maryland's
statutory spousal privilege).
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from the proposition that husband and wife were legally one entity. 7
The common-law proscription against spousal testimony has long
been held inapplicable to crimes by one spouse against the other.
1 8
This exception, based in the doctrine of necessity, 19 has been applied
in jurisdictions where the common law controls2" as well as in those
where incompetence of spousal testimony is statutory.21 Judicial inter-
pretations of the exception, both at statutory and common law, are
expansive and include injuries to the spouse's child 22 and to third par-
ties where the witness spouse is in the zone of danger.23 The weight of
authority holds that where spouses are competent by virtue of the
common-law exception, they are also compellable.24
In 1888, the Maryland Legislature eliminated the common-law in-
competence of spousal testimony in criminal proceedings.2 5 Despite
the absence of a statutory prohibition from 1888 until 1965, Maryland
17. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228, at 214 (McNaughton rev., 1961). "Husband and
wife cannot be admitted to be witness for each other, because their interests are absolutely
the same; nor against each other, because contrary to the legal policy of marriage." Id.
(quoting J. BULLER, INTRODUCrION TO THE LAW RELATwE TO TRAIS AT Nisi Piuus 270
(1767), 286a (7th ed., Bridgman 1817)).
18. Moser, supra note 16, at 19.
19. Id.; see, e.g., Hanon v. State, 63 Md. 123, 127 (1885) (holding that where the wife is
the victim of the crime, the injustice of barring her complaint of the crime outweighs the
policy reasons for the rule of incompetency).
20. See, e.g., Bassett v. United States, 137 U.S. 496, 506 (1890) (recognizing the excep-
tion but holding it inapplicable to a wife's charge of polygamy); Merritt v. State, 339 So. 2d
1366, 1370 (Miss. 1976) (holding that the rule allowing one spouse to testify against the
other for crimes of personal violence includes the murder of their child); State v. Wood-
row, 52 S.E. 545, 546 (W. Va. 1905) (holding that a husband's alleged murder of his infant
child, although not a crime against the wife, triggered the exception).
21. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sapp, 14 S.W. 834, 836 (Ky. 1890) (holding that a victim-
spouse is competent to testify despite the absence of statutory exception).
22. See Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wyo. 1978) (interpreting statutory excep-
tion for a "crime committed by one against the other" as applicable to wrong against the
child of the witness spouse); State v. Kollenbom, 304 S.W.2d 855, 864 (Mo. 1957) (inter-
preting the common-law exception for crimes committed by one spouse against the other
as including violent crimes against the child of the witness spouse). But see State v. Wood-
row, 52 S.E. 545, 546 (W. Va. 1905) (interpreting the statutory exception strictly and hold-
ing that crimes against the child of the witness spouse are not crimes against "the person"
of such spouse).
23. See, e.g., Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 650 (Alaska 1980) ("The assault for which
the defendant was convicted was a crime against his wife in the sense that he forcibly en-
tered her residence without permission, and surely put her in fear by shooting her guest
five times at close range. Because she was physically present, she was within the zone of
danger, and she could have apprehended violent injury to herself from the attack.").
24. Moser, supra note 16, at 20-24.
25. Act of April 5, 1888, ch. 545, § 1, 1888 Md. Laws 895. The incompetence of spousal
testimony in civil proceedings had been removed in 1864. Act of March 2, 1864, ch. 109
§§ 1, 3, 1864 Md. Laws 136.
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courts were reluctant to compel such testimony,26 even in cases where
the crime involved the injury of one spouse by the other.2 , The his-
toric aversion to compulsory spousal testimony may be explained
either by a fear of the "danger of causing dissension and of disturbing
the peace of families,"2 8 or a "natural repugnance in every fair-minded
person to compel a wife or husband to be the means of the other's
condemnation, and to compel the culprit to the humiliation of being
condemned by the words of his intimate life partner."29
Maryland codified the noncompellability of adverse spousal testi-
mony in 196530 and later created one exception-"when such pro-
ceedings involves [sic] the abuse of a child under sixteen years
pursuant to Section 1 lA of Article 27 of this Code .... ."1 In Mulligan
v. State,s2 the defendant unsuccessfully argued that because he was
charged with murder of a child-rather than a Section 1 A charge of
mistreating a child under sixteen-his spouse was not compellable as
an adverse witness."3 The legislature subsequently removed the refer-
ence to Article 27 and enacted Section 9-106 of the Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings Article, which provides that a spouse may be
26. See, e.g., Raymond v. State ex reL Younkins, 195 Md. 126, 130, 72 A.2d 711, 713
(1950) (holding that spousal privilege, if it existed, was vested in the witness spouse and
that defendant spouse could not raise this evidentiary issue for the first time in a habeas
corpus proceeding); Richardson v. State, 103 Md. 112, 117, 63 A. 317, 319-20 (1906) (stat-
ing in dictum that wife was a competent witness against her husband "although she could
not have been compelled to testify.").
27. Raymon4 195 Md. at 127, 72 A.2d at 712. Most jurisdictions, however, have inter-
preted statutory removal of spousal incompetence as rendering the witness spouse compel-
lable. See, e.g., State v. Antill, 197 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio 1964). The Antili court held that
where the wife was competent by statute, she was compellable in an action against her
husband for assault upon her.
It is an overgenerous assumption that the wife who has been beaten, poisoned or
deserted is still on such terms of delicate good feeling with her spouse that her
testimony must not be enforced lest the iridescent halo of peace be dispelled by
the breath of disparaging testimony. And if there were, conceivably, any such
peace, would it be a peace such as the law could desire to protect? Could it be
any other peace than that which the tyrant secures for himself by oppression?
Id. at 551 (quoting 8 WIGMO.E, EVIDENCE § 2239, at 242, 243 (McNaughton rev., 1961)).
28. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 17, at 216. Wigmore continues: "[T]he peace of families
does not essentially depend on . . . immunity from compulsory testimony, and.., so far as
it might be affected, that result is not to be allowed to stand in the way of doing justice to
others." Id.
29. Id. at 217.
30. Act of April 14, 1965, ch. 835, § 1, 1965 Md. Laws 1322.
31. Act of April 14, 1967, ch. 176, 1967 Md. Laws 291.
32. 6 Md. App. 600, 252 A.2d 476 (1969).




compelled to testify when the "charge involves the abuse of a child
under 18.""4
2. The 1994 Limited Exception for Assault and Battery of the Witness
Spouse.-As of October 1, 1994, section 9-106 of the Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings Article allows a prosecutor to compel a defendant's
spouse to testify as an adverse witness when the charge involves
"[a]ssault and battery in which the spouse is a victim." 5 The defend-
ant spouse, however, must also have been charged with an additional
assault and battery of the witness spouse within one year of the cur-
rent charge.3 6 The witness spouse must have been "sworn to testify at
the previous trial" and have asserted the spousal privilege.37
As originally presented, House Bill 630 would have created an
exception to both the spousal privilege of noncompellability3 8 and the
marital communications privilege39 for crimes committed by one
spouse against the other.' The legislature's hesitation to create an
exception for marital communications appears to be an affirmation
that the marital relationship is private and that it is in society's interest
to foster open communication between spouses without fear of public
disclosure.
34. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1989 & Supp. 1994). The Maryland
spousal privilege statute differs from those in most jurisdictions in at least two ways. First,
at common law and in many jurisdictions, the spouse is compellable as an adverse witness
in a proceeding for abuse of the witness spouse's child on the theory that abuse of the
child is a vicarious injury to the spouse. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 488 (J. Chadbourn rev.,
1979). Second, the common law and most statutory exceptions to the spousal privilege
require that the charge involve abuse of a child of either of the spouses. Id. The Maryland
statute denies the privilege in cases involving the abuse of any child. MD. CODE ANN., CTs.
&JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1989 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
35. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3239. The proposed excep-
tion to the spousal privilege against compulsory testimony was for "any criminal defense in
which the spouse is a victim." Id.
39. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-105 (1980). The marital communica-
tions privilege renders spouses incompetent to testify as to any confidential communica-
tion that occurred between them during their marriage. Id.
40. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3239. The proposed excep-
tion to the marital communications privilege was that where "the confidential communica-
tion occurs during the commission of a crime committed by one spouse against the other
or pertains to a crime committed by one spouse against the other," the testimony is compe-
tent. Id. This proposal did not survive the bill's passage, and the marital communications
privilege remains a privilege without exception. See generally State v. Enriquez, 327 Md.
365, 372, 609 A.2d 343, 346 (1992) (holding that until the legislature acts to the contrary,
there is no exception to the marital communications privilege).
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The new statutory authority to compel spousal testimony repre-
sents a compromise between differing views of the privilege. 41 Prose-
cutors have found that, in practice, the spousal privilege often inhibits
otherwise willing and truthful testimony from a victim spouse. 42 Typi-
cally, the defendant, when informed by counsel of the spousal privi-
lege, pressures the victim spouse not to testify. This pressure may be
in the form of threats, or by promises to seek counseling and refrain
from abusive behavior. 4' Even in the absence of pressure from the
defendant spouse, the prospect of an affirmative decision to testify,4 4
coupled with the sense of powerlessness that an abused spouse often
feels,45 may influence the victim spouse to invoke the privilege.
Proponents of the spousal privilege assert that the principal justi-
fication for the privilege-preservation of marital harmony-applies
to the domestic violence context.46 They further argue that the abro-
gation of the privilege is paternalistic because it takes the choice to
testify away from the victim spouse4 7 and may expose the spouse to
further victimization.4" When the General Assembly created a limited
exception for cases involving assault and battery of the witness spouse,
it recognized that, at least where the relationship is one of cyclical or
repeated violence, the value of prosecuting violent defendants out-
weighs any benefit of the privilege.4 9
41. Telephone Interview with Steve Bailey, Unit Chief, Family Violence Unit, Baltimore
County State's Attorney's Office (Sept. 19, 1994).
42. Id.
43. Telephone Interview with Dorothy Leonnig, Legal Director, House of Ruth, Balti-
more, Maryland (Sept. 20, 1994).
44. In many counties, the court will advise the victim spouse of the privilege not to
testify in the presence of the defendant and then ask the victim spouse if they wish to
testify. Id.
45. See genera/y SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982).
46. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. The decision to testify voluntarily,
however, is likely to damage a relationship more than compelled testimony. Section 9-106
confronts victim spouses with a difficult, and perhaps unfair, choice between preserving
their marriage and taking what may be the only available steps to stop domestic violence.
For example, a promise to seek counseling would more likely be kept when it is a condition
of probation. Moreover, the negative impact of voluntary testimony by a victim spouse
could be softened by the offer of mitigating evidence; for example, that the incident was
the first abusive act or that the defendant has apologized or sought counseling.
47. This argument is weakened by the fact that the legislature has not sought to extend
this choice to unmarried domestic violence victims.
48. Telephone Interview with Dorothy Leonnig, supra note 43. Many critics of compul-
sory spousal testimony view it as an endangerment of the victim spouse where the defend-
ant spouse has used threats and may retaliate for adverse testimony. Others fear that
unwilling and fearful victims will be held in contempt for failure to appear or for refusal to
testify. Id,
49. Telephone Interview with Steve Bailey, supra note 41.
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3. Implications for Practitioners.-
a. Retroactive Versus Prospective Application. -The language of
the newly created exception to the spousal privilege clearly indicates
that the General Assembly sought to prevent the privilege from shield-
ing chronically abusive spouses from prosecution." There is, how-
ever, some confusion with respect to the significance of the October 1,
1994, effective date. The statute could be read to allow prosecutors to
compel testimony, as of October 1, 1994, when the conditions of the
statute are met. Alternatively, the statute could be interpreted to al-
low compulsion of spousal testimony when, after October 1, 1994,
there are two cases of spousal assault and battery within a year of each
other and the witness invokes the privilege in the trial of the first
charge." a Similarly, the exception could be construed to mean that if
a defendant is charged with assault and battery after October 1, 1994,
and, within one year prior to that charge was charged with assault and
battery, and in the first case the witness spouse invoked the privilege,
the prosecutor may compel the spousal testimony in the second
proceeding. 52
The first interpretation seems most consistent with the purposes
of the legislature because it allows compulsory testimony in trials of
repeat offenders after October 1, 1994. The application of the effec-
tive date of the amendment to the trial, rather than the charge, is also
consistent with the Court of Special Appeals ruling in Mulligan v.
State." In Mulligan, the court noted that the newly created abuse of a
child exception to the spousal privilege applied to the defendant's
wife because the defendant's trial was subsequent to the effective date
of the amendment.54 This "retroactive" application of the exception,
however, may be largely moot as prosecutors only recently have begun
noting and tracking the assertion of the privilege.5
b. Technical Difficulties in the Enforcement of the Exception.-
Prosecutors and defense attorneys, in many cases, may be unable to
ascertain whether the victim spouse is a compellable witness. Because
it often takes six to nine weeks to obtain a transcript of a district court
proceeding, the use of such transcripts is an impractical means of es-
50. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3240.
51. Telephone Interview with Donna Smith, Domestic Violence Advocate, Victim/Wit-
ness Assistance Unit, Carroll County Office of the State's Attorney (Oct. 1, 1994).
52. Telephone Interview with Steve Bailey, supra note 41.
53. 6 Md. App. 600, 252 A.2d 476 (1969).
54. Id. at 615, 252 A.2d at 485.
55. Telephone Interview with Steve Bailey, supra note 41.
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tablishing that a spouse has previously asserted the privilege. 56 It may
prove helpful for the state's attorney's office in each county to main-
tain its own records regarding the privilege. Unfortunately, there is
no guarantee that any two charges of assault and battery that involve a
couple will be brought in the same county. Because defense attorneys
also need access to the information, a statewide tracking method is
necessary.57 Perhaps the most efficient means of ensuring that attor-
neys have access to the information is to require that the clerks of the
various courts note the assertion of the privilege on the docket.58 The
necessity of obtaining certified copies of docket entries would, how-
ever, undoubtedly increase the time requirements and economic cost
of both the prosecution and the defense of domestic violence cases.
c. Probable Increase in the Number of Trials for Domestic Violence
Cases. -The statutory requirement that witnesses must invoke the priv-
ilege after being sworn to testify in assault and battery cases against
their spouses in order to compel spousal testimony in future proceed-
ings probably will lead to far more domestic violence trials. Prosecu-
tors will be less likely to offer a "stet" for a first-time offender on a
relatively minor charge when it forecloses the opportunity to compel
spousal testimony on a future, perhaps more serious charge.59 Simi-
larly, the value of the agreed to statement of facts' as a plea bargain-
ing tool and trial expedient may be outweighed, in some cases, by the
necessity of preserving the future compellability of the witness
spouse.6" This increased case load may pose little or no problem in
those counties with relatively few domestic violence cases.6 2 In Balti-
more City63 and counties with a high volume of domestic violence
cases, however, the increased burden on the courts and prosecutors
may inhibit prosecutors in the use of the exception.64
56. Id.
57. Telephone Interview with Donna Smith, supra note 51.
58. Id.
59. Telephone Interview with Steve Bailey, supra note 41.
60. When parties proceed on an agreed to statement of facts, defendants waive their
right to a trial in exchange for prosecutors' recommendation of more lenient sentences.
Prosecutors then read the statement of charges into evidence and judges decide the cases
on the basis of that evidence alone. There are, therefore, no witnesses.
61. Telephone Interview with Steve Bailey, supra note 41.
62. Telephone Interview with Donna Smith, supra note 51. Carroll County courts, for
example, handle approximately 300 domestic violence cases per year. Id.
63. Baltimore City courts handle more than 3000 domestic violence cases per year. Id.
64. While the newly created exception to the spousal privilege may profoundly change
prosecution in some counties, many counties now have "no drop" policies for domestic
violence cases. As Judge Cathell noted in Clark v. State, 97 Md. App. 381, 629 A.2d 1322
(1993):
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:891
d. Broadening of the Abuse of a Child Exception.-With the dele-
tion of the language referring to Article 27, Section 1 A of the Code,
the 1980 amendment of the spousal privilege arguably broadens the
definition of "child abuse" under the spousal privilege statute.65 De-
pending on the facts of the particular case, two arguments can be ad-
vanced for compelling spousal testimony when the defendant spouse
is charged with a crime of violence against the witness spouse and the
crime occurs in the presence of either of their children.
First, an analogy can be made to the extension of the crimes
against the other spouse exception to cases where third parties are
injured and the witness spouse was within the zone of danger.66 For
example, if the defendant spouse fires a weapon at the witness spouse
in the presence of a child, it would endanger the child." The Gen-
eral Assembly enacted .the exception for abuse of a child to protect
children.68 Therefore, it is consistent with that purpose to compel
testimony in such a case, especially where the defendant spouse, if
unpunished, may present a future danger.69
Second, the General Assembly extended the definition of child
abuse to include mental abuse.7" A recent American Bar Association
We .. . acknowledge the significant improvements we feel have occurred in the
Maryland courts as prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and their staffs have
become more sensitized to the problems of the battered cohabitant. As we un-
derstand it, in some Maryland jurisdictions prosecutors have formed intra- office
victim assistance programs, provided special training for prosecution and staff on
the subject, and have adopted more stringent and vigorous prosecution poli-
cies.... Some prosecutors attempt to prosecute without the victim's assistance by
using 911 generated evidence, police reports, and other documentary matter,
other witnesses testimony, etc.
Id. at 392 n.6, 629 A.2d at 1328 n.6.
65. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (1980); see also supra text accompanying
notes 31-34.
66. See Loesche v. State, 620 P.2d 646, 649-50 (Alaska 1980) (noting that where witness
spouse was present when defendant spouse fired five shots at a third party, the crime was
within the exception for "crimes against the other" spouse).
67. See e.g., State v. Whitaker, 544 P.2d 219, 224 (Ariz. 1975) (holding that the trial
court had not abused its discretion by allowing a spouse to testify against her estranged
husband after he fired into the residence she, her child, and a male roommate occupied).
68. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3242.
69. In the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination of Janet Reno as
Attorney General, Chairman Biden noted:
Children [in] cases where there is domestic violence in the home... [in which]
the child[ren] witness . . . a spouse or a live-in boyfriend beating the wife or
girlfriend... [are] 1,500 times as likely to be the victim[s] of abuse within that
household as they are in a household where domestic violence between the adults
does not take place-il,500 times.
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, THE REUTER TRANscR'r REP. (Mar. 9, 1993).
70. Domestic Violence Act of 1994, ch. 728, 1994 Md. Laws 3242.
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report on the impact of domestic violence on children "concludes
'children can suffer grievous harm by merely observing or hearing the
domestic terrorism of brutality against a parent at home."'71 The re-
port states that "children who live in homes where there is domestic
violence are more likely than others to become batterers of their part-
ners when they become adults. They also view violence among inti-
mate companions as an acceptable or inevitable norm."72 Recent
studies suggest that children who witness violence suffer adverse ef-
fects in many areas, "including their ability to function in school, emo-
tional stability, and orientation toward the future.""3 It is arguable
that the term "abuse of a child" in the spousal privilege exception
means "injury to a child" rather than statutory child abuse. Had the
legislature intended to limit the exception to statutory child abuse, it
could have explicitly provided that limitation.74
e. Prosecutorial Comment on and Inference from Defendant's Fail-
ure to Call Spouse as Witness.-Under Maryland law, "[t]he failure to
call a material witness raises a presumption or inference that the testi-
mony of such person would be unfavorable to the party failing to call
him."" This inference will not apply "where the witness is not avail-
able, or where his testimony is unimportant or cumulative, or where
he is equally available to both sides."76 The "missing witness infer-
ence" may arise either through a request that the judge instruct the
jury on the operation and availability of the inference or by calling it
to the attention of the finder of fact77 during closing arguments. 78
For example, in Bruce v. State,79 the prosecutor argued in closing:
The defense has no obligation, ladies and gentlemen, to put
on a defense, but when they do start to put on a defense and
71. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Children Hit Hard by Domestic Violence BAR BULLETIN (Md.
State Bar Ass'n Newsletter), Sept. 15, 1994, at 2 (quoting A.BA. Report, The Impact of
Domestic Violence on Children (1994)).
72. Id.
73. Betsy M. Groves et al., Silent Victims: Children Who Witness Volence, 269 JAMA 262
(1993).
74. In 1980, the General Assembly removed the reference to Article 27, § l1A of the
Code, which supports the conclusion that it intended an exception broader than statutory
child abuse. See supra notes 12-15, 34 and accompanying text.
75. Christensen v. State, 274 Md. 133, 134-35, 333 A.2d 45, 46 (1975).
76. Id. at 134, 333 A.2d at 46.
77. Although the missing witness inference is most often used injury trials, prosecutors
also may argue the applicability of the inference in bench trials.
78. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 52, 633 A.2d 867, 877 (1993) (upholding the
trial court's grant of permission to the prosecutor to argue a missing witness inference in
closing).
79. 318 Md. 706, 569 A.2d 1254 (1990).
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leave somebody out, somebody who is important, somebody
who can be crucial to supporting what the defendant said,
then you may draw inferences from that. 0
In other jurisdictions, there is a split of authority on the availabil-
ity of the missing witness inference where the witness in question is a
spouse and the spousal privilege is available. s Jurisdictions in which
an adverse inference from defendant's failure to call a spouse as a
witness have been held improper generally bar spousal testimony for or
against the defendant spouse. 2 The witness is simply unavailable to
both the defendant spouse and the prosecution.
Maryland's spousal privilege statute states that only "adverse" tes-
timony is privileged.8 3 Witness spouses are unavailable to the prosecu-
tor by their assertion of the privilege, 4 but remain available to the
defendant spouse."s Where the defendant did not call the witness
spouse, a missing witness inference would be appropriate if the wit-
ness spouse's testimony was material and noncumulative.8 6 In cases
80. Id. at 729, 565 A.2d at 1266. The Court of Appeals held that this argument was
proper because of the close relationship between the missing witness and the defendant
and the relative importance of her testimony. Id. at 730, 569 A.2d at 1267.
81. See generally 79 A.L.R.4TH 694, 697-99 (collecting and analyzing how the courts in
various jurisdictions have interpreted and applied the missing witness inference).
82. See, e.g., Simpson v. State, 497 So. 2d 424, 428 (Miss. 1986) (holding that prosecu-
tor's comments on defendant's failure to call his wife as a witness were improper as the
spouse was not a competent witness for the defendant). Mississippi law provides that a
spouse is not a competent witness against the other spouse. MIss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5
(1993); see also Casey v. State, 306 S.E.2d 683, 684 (Ga. 1983) (holding that the failure of
defendant's wife to testify is not a legitimate subject matter of argument for counsel where
statute provides that "husband and wife shall be competent but shall not be compellable to
give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against each other"); Gossett v. Common-
wealth, 402 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Ky. 1966) (stating that a husband or wife cannot be com-
pelled to testify for or against the other). But see Wynn v. State, 308 S.E.2d 392, 394 (Ga.
App. 1983) (holding that it is not harmful error for state to comment upon fact that it has
no power to call defendant's spouse by virtue of the spousal privilege where defendant
relies upon words and actions of nontestifying spouse).
83. MD. CODE ANN., CIS. &JuD. PROC. § 9-106 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
84. The assertion of the privilege is not, however, necessary for the state to prove that
the spouse is unavailable to the prosecution. Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 731, 569 A.2d
1254, 1267 (1990). The Bruce court held that the witness's status as girlfriend of the de-
fendant was sufficiently close that she was more available to the defendant than the prose-
cution. Id.
85. The witness spouse is available to the defendant spouse because there is no statu-
tory prohibition against compelling exculpatory testimony from one's spouse. In order for
the prosecution to use the inference, however, the defendant must put on an affirmative
defense and raise the issue that the witness spouse's testimony would be exculpatory, for
example, that the incident did not occur or that the defendant acted in self defense. See 79
A.L.R4m 694, 708-11.
86. Bruce, 318 Md. at 731, 569 A.2d at 1267. The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Fort-
ner v. State, 835 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1992), interpreted a statute where the witness spouse was
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that involve marital domestic violence, it is difficult to imagine an in-
stance where the witness spouse's testimony would not be material.
f Defendant's Right to Have Spousal Privilege Invoked Outside
Presence of the Jury.-Although the prosecutor may comment on the
failure of a defendant to call a spouse as a witness, once the defendant
has raised the issue that the spouse would be an exculpatory witness, it
is improper for the prosecutor to comment upon the spouse's exer-
cise of the privilege. 7 Many courts have held that calling the spouse
to the stand for the sole purpose of having her invoke the privilege
before the jury is prejudicial."8 As the Court of Appeals of Georgia
stated:
Being required to make an election in the presence of
the jury was tantamount to having her testify that she knew
certain things against her husband, she yet refused, under
her rights as a wife, to testify against him. All of this was most
harmful to defendant, and should have been conducted only
in the absence of the jury.89
The newly amended spousal privilege, however, mandates that the
prosecutor call the spouse to the stand for the sole purpose of invok-
ing the privilege.9" Where the trial is before a jury, case law in other
jurisdictions suggests that the election to invoke the spousal privilege
should be made outside the presence of the jury.91
4. Conclusion.-The newly created exception to the spousal priv-
ilege under the Domestic Violence Act of 1994 is a much needed step
in the direction toward abrogation of the privilege in the context of
available to the defendant but not to the prosecutor and where the prosecutor was allowed
to comment on the defendant's failure to call his spouse as a witness. The court stated:
"We recognize that where a witness is equally available to both parties, the failure to call
the witness is not the proper subject of comment. We have recognized an exception where
the witness is the defendant's spouse and can assert the marital privilege because she is
then available to the defendant but not to the government." Id. at 1157.
87. See, e.g., George v. State, 644 P.2d 510, 511 (Nev. 1982) (holding that a prosecutor
cannot comment on the husband's failure to call his wife to testify). Because the privilege
is vested in the witness spouse and, therefore, its exercise is beyond the control of the
defendant spouse, any comment relating to the privilege would be improper.
88. See, e.g., Terry v. State, 540 So. 2d 782, 783 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), overruled on other
grounds byJ.D.S. v. State, 587 So. 2d 1257 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) ("It is improper for the
prosecution to call as a witness one it knows will certainly invoke the privilege against testi-
fying as a witness, with the sole purpose of having the jury observe that invocation."); Hyl-
ton v. State, 688 P.2d 304, 305 (Nev. 1984) ("It is improper for a prosecutor to force the
invocation of the spousal privilege in the presence of the jury.").
89. Colson v. State, 228 S.E. 2d 154, 158 (Ga. App. 1967).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
91. See supra note 88.
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domestic violence.92 The General Assembly appears to have reluc-
tantly conceded that the purposes of the spousal privilege-to pre-
serve marital harmony and protect the marital relationship from the
perceived dangers of securing a conviction based on spousal testi-
mony-do not always outweigh the public need to prevent and punish
violent crimes in the domestic setting. As amended, the spousal privi-
lege will likely increase the cost to the court system and the legal com-
munity in terms of time and money. In the future, the General
Assembly may find that whatever marital harmony is preserved be-
tween domestic violence victims and their aggressors through the
noncompellability of spousal testimony is not worth this price.
M. KAY ScANLAN
B. Strengthening the System: Omnibus Child Support Act of 1994
Acting under federal mandate, the 1994 session of the Maryland
General Assembly passed an omnibus measure designed to increase
child support collection and ensure adequate medical coverage for
children in single parent homes. Collectively known as the Omnibus
Child Support Act (Act),' the new law makes several modifications
that relate to establishment of paternity, including a requirement that
courts issue default judgments when alleged fathers fail to appear for
paternity hearings after being summoned or giving bond.2 The Act
also compels courts to view laboratory reports that establish at least a
ninety-nine percent statistical probability of a defendant's paternity as
a rebuttable presumption of paternity.' Maryland courts also must
give full faith and credit to determinations of paternity made by other
states or by administrative processes that include a right to appeal to a
court.4
The Act seeks to improve children's access to health care by au-
thorizing courts to include in a support order a provision that re-
quires either parent to provide health insurance for the child if the
parent can obtain coverage through an employer or group health in-
92. Telephone Interview with Dorothy Leonnig, supra note 43.
1. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249.
2. Id. at 1253.
3. Id. at 1254-55.
4. Id. at 1255. Presumably, this enactment is a recognition of the trend toward admin-
istrative procedures in dealing with child support enforcement and paternity establish-
ment. See CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., SUPPORTING CHILDREN; RAISING HoPEs,
Addendum (1993) (noting that 19 states and the Virgin Islands employ administrative
processes for at least part of their child support enforcement).
904 [VOL. 54:891
MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
surance at a reasonable cost.5 Provisions that outline the responsibili-
ties of employers6 and insurance companies7 have been added to the
Act to simplify this process and ensure that children will not be de-
nied coverage. In addition, the Act authorizes interception of a child
support obligor's state income tax refund to recover medical assist-
ance payments made by the Department of Health and Mental Hy-
giene (DHMH) if the obligor receives payments from an insurer for
the cost of health services provided to the child but fails to reimburse
the Department.8
In view of the Child Support Act's social context, its impact on
prior law, and its legislative and political history, the legislation has
not radically transformed the law. Yet, the Act makes incremental
changes that, in the aggregate, should provide greater economic se-
curity for single parents and their children.
1. Sources and Background of the Law.-
a. Social Context.-A growing proportion of children under
eighteen live in single-parent homes. In 1990, 24% of Maryland
households were headed by a single parents, up from 14% in 1970.'
Of the estimated 61.3 million children in America in 1988, 25% lived
with only one parent even though all but one million had two living
parents.10
The correlation between single-parent homes and poverty is well-
established: Seventy-six percent of Maryland families living in poverty
in 1990 were headed by single parents," and 71% of those parents
were women. 12 Moreover, a congressional report released in 1990
found that 90% of all individuals eligible for Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) became eligible because of nonpayment of
child support.' 3 The cost to support those families totaled more than
$53 billion, or $24,187 for each family. 14 Consequently, enhanced
child support measures have become a politically popular cornerstone
of welfare reform plans.
5. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1272-73.
6. Id. at 1273-75.
7. Id. at 1276-79.
8. Id. at 1275.
9. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 4, at 3.
10. SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE CHILD
SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: POLICYAND PRACTICE, H.R. Doc. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (Comm. Print 1989).
11. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 4, at 4.
12. Id.
13. ELAINE M. FROMM ET AL., CHILD SUPPORT: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 15 (1993).
14. Id. at 15-16.
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Streamlined provisions for the determination of paternity are
closely linked to the elimination of the child support debt in Mary-
land,15 which in 1993 amounted to an unprecedented $500 million. 6
Moreover, approximately 30% of all births reported in the 1990 Mary-
land census were to unmarried women.' 7 That figure rose to 36% in
Prince George's and Caroline Counties, 49% in Somerset County, and
59% in Baltimore City.' Nationally, paternity is established in less
than one-third of nonmarital births, which is considered the primary
reason why fewer than 20% of never married women have child sup-
port awards, as opposed to more than 80% of divorced women. 9 Un-
til paternity is conclusively established, the fathers of children from
nonmarital unions generally do not pay child support.2 °
The Child Support Act is structured to improve health care cover-
age for children by demanding greater financial accountability from
noncustodial parents. 2' Of the 17,097 support orders established in
Maryland in 1993, approximately 78% had provisions for obligor-pro-
vided health insurance for the child.22 Obligors, however, often fail to
comply with these provisions, contributing to the eight million chil-
dren nationally who are without adequate health care.23 Although the
Family Support Act of 198824 requires state child support enforce-
ment agencies to enforce court ordered health insurance coverage for
dependent children, many parents still fail to provide the coverage
even when it can be acquired at a reasonable cost through an em-
ployer.26 Moreover, some insurance carriers refuse to accept claims
filed by the custodial parent on behalf of the employee's depen-
dents27 or refuse to provide dependency coverage unless the child
15. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 4, at 6, 14.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 14 (quoting data from the American Public Welfare Association).
20. Id. at 6.
21. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1271-76.
22. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 4, at 17.
23. President Clinton's Budget Proposals in the Human Resource Area: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 25
(1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Margaret Campbell Haynes) (quoting CHI-
DREN'S DEFENSE FUND, SPECIAL REPORT: CHILDREN AND HEALTH INSURANCE (1992)). The
Children's Defense Fund estimates that 25 million children from two-parent or single-par-
ent homes lack employer-provided insurance. Eighteen million children do not have any
form of private insurance, while eight million children have neither private nor public
insurance such as Medicaid. Id.
24. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).




lives with the employee.28 States were rendered powerless to respond
to these problems by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA),29 which preempts state regulation of health insur-
ance plans where the employer bears the risk of loss. Approximately
two-thirds of employer-provided insurance plans were exempted from
regulation under this provision. 0
b. Federal Mandate: The 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act.-Most of the child support legislation passed in the 1994 session
of the General Assembly was required under President Clinton's 1993
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)31 and substantially mir-
rors its stipulations. In addition to the legislative provisions previously
discussed, 2 OBRA included health plans formerly excluded under
ERISA among those bound by the new law.33
The child support measures in OBRA received little attention
from either Congress or the public. At the hearing before the House
Ways and Means Committee's Subcommittee on Human Resources,
testimony did not focus on areas that affected the Family Support Act
of 1988 nor on improvements to child support collection. The few
references to the paternity and health insurance measures, however,
were favorable.'
c. Legislative and Political History. -The General Assembly re-
ceived Senate Bill 312 from Governor Schaefer under a threat of los-
ing $30 million in federal child support enforcement funds if it failed
to comply with OBRA mandates.35 Despite external pressures, legisla-
tors struggled with the bill's paternity by default judgment provision 36
because they were hesitant to restrict judicial discretion and feared
some men would be declared fathers without sufficient evidence.3 7 At
the Schaefer Administration's request, the Senate Judicial Proceed-
28. Id. at 25.
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
30. Hearings, supra note 23, at 26.
31. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1396g-1.
34. See Hearings, supra note 23, at 22 (stating the need for both the paternity and health
insurance provisions).
35. John Roll, Md. Child Support Enforcement Bill Called Controversial But Inevitable, DAILY
RECORD (Baltimore), Feb. 4, 1994, at 11. The $30 million represents 60% of the total
budget for Maryland's Child Support Enforcement Administration. Id.
36. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1253.
37. Roll, supra note 35, at 11 (quoting Senator Walter Baker as saying "I have a real
problem with telling a court they've got to issue a judgment when the defendant doesn't
show up. Suppose there is no evidence [of paternity?]").
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ings Committee amended Senate Bill 312 so that a court is only re-
quired to issue a default judgment that adjudicates paternity "if the
court is satisfied by the evidence presented by the petitioner.""8 De-
spite this mitigating language, and contrary to OBRA, the House Judi-
ciary Committee amended the section to make default judgments
once again optional. The Senate refused to concur with this and
other House amendments, and a conference committee restored the
original mandatory language of the provision.
Notwithstanding Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee Chair-
man Walter Baker's fears that the bill would "blow [insurance costs]
out of the water,"39 insurance companies supported the legislation,
but did suggest several "clarifying amendments" that ultimately were
rejected.' Anticipating objections from employers, however, the leg-
islation included provisions that forbid the use of an order that re-
quires health insurance coverage as grounds for retaliatory action
against employee-parents or as the basis for failure to hire or promote
them.4"
The initial version of Senate Bill 312 included several independ-
ent gubernatorial initiatives that would have placed Maryland among
the more progressive states for child support enforcement. Legisla-
tors, however, opted for a more cautious approach, and eliminated
virtually every proposal except the federal requirements and a few
technical changes.42 The scant opposition to the bill dissipated upon
38. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1253.
39. Roll, supra note 35, at 11.
40. Letter from Fran Tracy, Vice President, Government Affairs, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Maryland, to Senator Walter M. Baker, Chairman, Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee (Feb. 28, 1994) (on file with author). Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland
offered a provision that would allow the child to be disenrolled upon "non-payment of
premium or loss of child status under the terms of the insurance policy." Id. OBRA re-
quires that when a parent obtains family health coverage pursuant to a court or administra-
tive order, coverage for the child will be eliminated only when either the order is no longer
in effect or the child will be enrolled in comparable health insurance. 42 U.S.C. § 1396g-1
(1993).
41. Child Support Act, ch. 113, Md. Laws 1249, 1274-75.
42. The original version of Senate Bill 312 allowed the Motor Vehicle Administration
to suspend the driver's license of a child support obligor who was more than 60 days in
arrears and issue a work restricted license. S. 312, 1994 Sess. Although Maryland has the
authority to attach a delinquent parent's wages, 66% of noncustodial parents in 1993 failed
to pay court ordered child-support. Child Support, 1994: Hearings on S.B. 312 Before the
SenateJud. Proc. Comm., Maryland Gen. Assembly 5 (1994) (statement of Meg Sollenberger,
CSEA). The license provision would have reached those parents who earned income
through means other than attachable earnings. Id. Similar statutes have been enacted in
Illinois, Florida, Maine, South Dakota, but current Maryland law does not authorize
driver's license suspension for behavior unrelated to driver safety. See id. at 5-6.
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elimination of the Governor's proposals, and on final passage, re-
ceived unanimous approval.4"
2. Impact of the Act on Prior Law.-
a. Paternity Establishment.-Under the Act, "unless there is
good cause to the contrary," courts are required to proceed with a
hearing on a paternity complaint and to issue a default judgment ad-
judicating paternity if the defendant fails to appear after being sum-
moned or giving bond." The court, however, must be satisfied by
petitioner's evidence before it can issue a judgment against the de-
fendant. The court retains the discretion to issue any other order that
is "just and proper."45 Previously, courts were allowed, but not re-
quired, to proceed with the hearing and issue any order that was just
and proper.
The Act also establishes that a laboratory report received into evi-
dence with a 99% statistical probability of the alleged father's pater-
nity constitutes a rebuttable presumption of his paternity.' Before
the Act, no particular evidentiary weight was assigned to a laboratory
report.47 The Act does not alter the requirement that a laboratory
report of an alleged father's blood test must be received into evidence
if "definite exclusion is established" or if "the testing is sufficiently ex-
tensive to exclude 97.3% of alleged fathers who are not biological fa-
thers, and the statistical probability of an alleged father's paternity is
at least 97.3%."48
b. Health Insurance. -Prior to the Act, Maryland courts were
authorized to order a parent to obtain health insurance for a child
only if the parent was insured by a plan that offered family coverage.49
The Act amends this provision so that courts may include health insur-
ance in the support order, either through a wage withholding order
The legislation also would have permitted a court to issue a child support award for an
unmarried child over the age of 18 who was enrolled for at least 4 credits of secondary
school education. S. 312, 1994 Sess. The award would continue until the first to occur of
the child's marriage, graduation, disenrollment in secondary school, or upon reaching the
age of 19. Id. Courts presently lack authority to award child support for persons over 18
years old. The House Judiciary Committee killed both of these provisions.
43. VOTING RacoRD, S. 312, Maryland Gen. Assembly (Apr. 10, 1994).
44. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1253.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1254-55. Under OBRA, states have the option of regarding such genetic test-
ing as conclusive determination of paternity if they so choose. 42 U.S.C. § 666.
47. SENATEJUD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP., S. 312, Maryland Gen. Assembly 1 (1994).
48. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1254-55.
49. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
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or as a separate order, if the parent can obtain employer-provided
insurance or any form of group health coverage at a reasonable cost."
A parent or child enforcement agency must send a certified copy
of the court order to the child support obligor's employer, who upon
receipt must permit either the parent, a child support enforcement
agency, or DHMH to enroll the child in the parent's health insurance
coverage regardless of enrollment season restrictions.51 The em-
ployer is then required to deduct premiums from the parent's earn-
ings.5" If it is involved in collection, employers must notify the child
support agency and both parents of the date of enrollment or of any
reason for failure to comply with the order.5 All parties also must be
given notice within fifteen days if the health coverage is terminated. 4
Either a parent or the support enforcement agency may bring civil
suit against an employer who willfully violates the health insurance
provisions of the Act.55 These provisions are binding on a parent's
present and future employers if they have received a copy of the
order.5
6
The law imposes duties on insurers who are prohibited from de-
nying the child's enrollment on the grounds that the child was born
out of wedlock, was not claimed as a dependent on the insuring par-
ents tax returns, or does not reside in the service area of the insurer or
with the insuring parent.5" The insurer may not disenroll the child
without written evidence that: the court order is no longer in effect,
the child will receive comparable health insurance elsewhere, the em-
ployer no longer employs the parent, or the employer has eliminated
coverage for all employees.5" Both employers and insurers must
honor administrative orders for coverage "to the same extent" asjudi-
cial orders issued in Maryland.59 Previously, the law imposed no spe-
cific obligation on employers or insurance companies other than
compliance with the terms of court orders.6" Now, however, ERISA
50. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1272-73.
51. Id. at 1273. Health insurance companies typically have designated enrollment peri-
ods during which employees must make all desired changes in their coverage for the next
year.
52. Id. at 1274.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. This civil suit provision is not federally mandated.
56. Id. at 1275.
57. Id. at 1277.
58. Id. at 1278.
59. Id. at 1275.
60. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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group health plans are included among the insurers bound by the
Act.61
The Act allows the interception of the child support obligor's
state income tax refund to recover medical assistance payments made
by DHMH when the obligor receives payment from an insurer for the
child's health services and fails to reimburse the Department.62 For-
merly, a state income tax refund could be intercepted only if the obli-
gor was more than $150 in arrears of support payments.6"
c. Child Suppot.-Among the nonfederally mandated initia-
tives in the Act is a provision that establishes a presumption in favor of
retroactive award of child support to the date the request was filed."
The law targets noncustodial parents who delay court proceedings to
avoid paying support in the interim. Prior law applied the presump-
tion only to pendente lite awards, so that other awards only became
effective on the date of the actual order.65 The Act also expands the
definition of child support to include medical and hospital costs asso-
ciated with "pregnancy, confinement, and recovery," and neonatal
expenses. 66
3. Analysis.-The new legislation is likely to succeed in closing
off some of the gaps in the current child support system that have
contributed to economic hardship for many children of single-parent
homes. It also validates the national push toward child support en-
forcement as an element of welfare reform. According to the Mary-
land Department of Human Resources, the paternity default provision
will eliminate the three-month delay caused by reissuing summonses
for individuals who fail to appear in court and thus is likely to increase
AFDC related child support payments by $100,794 in 1995.67 Estab-
lishing a blood test probability of 99% or more as rebuttable presump-
tion of paternity eliminates another two-month delay caused by trial
61. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1277.
62. Id. at 1275-76.
63. SENATE JuD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP., supra note 47, at 2.
64. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1281.
65. SENATE Jut. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP., supra note 47, at 7.
66. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1281.
67. DEPARTMENT OF FIscAL SERVICES, FiscAL NOTE ON S. 312, REPORT TO MARYLAND GEN.
ASSEMBLY, at 1 (1994). The Department, however, does not indicate to what extent, if any,




requests, and could increase AFDC support payments in 1995 by
$20,410.68
Making court orders for child support retroactive to the date of
filing should generate a $546,825 increase in AFDC child support pay-
ments.69 DHMH also projects a $706,320 savings in Medicaid expend-
itures in 1995 because of the health insurance provisions. 70 After
outlays of about $334,265 for administrative costs, 71 the Act will pro-
duce a net savings that should approach nearly $1.7 million by 1999.72
Despite this positive financial impact, the health insurance provi-
sions of the Act will not universally benefit all single parents who need
assistance. The new law fails to help those Marylanders who are
among the nation's five million female-headed households without
child support orders.73 While the paternity establishment provisions
will reduce this figure somewhat,74 the Act should not be seen as a
panacea for the inadequate level of health care available to children.
Moreover, although the law requires employers and insurers to recog-
nize administrative orders for health insurance coverage from other
jurisdictions "to the same extent" as judicial orders issued in Mary-
land, 75 the law does not regulate out-of-state insurance companies, but
only "commercial insurer[s], nonprofit health service or health main-
tenance organization[s] operating in this state under a certificate of
authority issued by the Maryland Insurance Commissioner."76  Be-
cause of this provision, a potentially significant loophole remains in
the insurance portion of the Act.
68. Id. In 1994, 192 AFDC cases were delayed by trial requests, of which only approxi-
mately 65 fathers would pay their average $157 monthly support obligations. Id.
69. Id. As discussed supra in note 67, it is unclear to what extent, if at all, the projected
increase from retroactive support orders overlaps that from paternity provisions.
70. Id. at 2. Because Medicaid cost savings are divided evenly between the state and
federal government, Maryland's general fund expenditures would be reduced by $354,731
in 1995. Id.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. This figure includes $690,800 in revenues and a $1,006,000 reduction in ex-
penditures. Id.
73. FROMM ET AL., supra note 13, at 14. This figure represents half of America's female-
headed households. Id.
74. For example, Washington County Department of Social Services estimated that, as
of January 1994, it had 800 cases pending establishment of paternity or an initial court
order that would be affected by paternity provisions. This represented 17% of potential
paying cases and yearly collections of $900,000. Letter from Edward J. Maloy, Assistant
Director, Washington County Department of Social Services, to Senator Walter Baker,
Chairman, Judicial Proceedings Committee 2 (Jan. 28, 1994) (on file with author).
75. Child Support Act, ch. 113, 1994 Md. Laws 1249, 1275.
76. Id. at 1277.
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4. Conclusion. -Unquestionably, the Child Support Act provides
additional economic security for Maryland's single-parent families.
Yet, as the Act is a combination of federal mandates and state legisla-
tive initiatives, it has created a patchwork of changes. Although these
changes are largely incremental and do not address the root of the
current child support crisis, they will fulfill their limited intent and




A. The Application of the Cap on Noneconomic Damages to Wrongful
Death Actions
After strenuous lobbying by the medical insurance industry and
victims' rights advocates, the Maryland General Assembly reversed the
Court of Appeals' 1993 ruling in United States v. Streidel' and passed
legislation that declared noneconomic damages in wrongful death
suits subject to the statutory cap applicable to personal injury awards
since 1986.2 The cap now applies collectively to all plaintiffs who
claim injury through the tort victim,' rather than to each person indi-
vidually as recently maintained by the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland in Bartucco v. Wright.4 The legislation pro-
vides, however, for the statutory cap to rise to 150% of the mandatory
limit when there are two or more claimants; the cap applies prospec-
tively to cases arising after October 1, 1994.' The new law raises the
existing cap for personal injury cases from $350,000 to $500,000 and
provides an annual adjustment for inflation to this limit for both per-
sonal injury and wrongful death suits.6 While extending the cap to
wrongful death cases may be sound public policy, the law as written
presents serious problems for families irreparably harmed by tortious
conduct.
1. Sources and Background of the Law.-
a. Legal Context.-In reaction to a perceived insurance "cri-
sis" in 1986, 7 the General Assembly established a $350,000 cap as the
maximum amount recoverable for noneconomic damages in personal
injury cases.8 The legislature hoped that the cap would add "predict-
ability" to damage awards and make the Maryland market "more at-
1. 329 Md. 533, 537, 620 A.2d 905, 907 (1993) (holding that the legislature intended
the cap on noneconomic damages to apply only to awards for personal injury and not to
awards for wrongful death).
2. Judgments-Limitations on Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws
2292 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., (Ts. &JUD. PROC. §§ 11-108, 11-109 (Supp.
1994)).
3. Id. at 2293.
4. 746 F. Supp. 604, 612 (D. Md. 1990).
5. Judgments-Limitations on Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws
2292, 2293.
6. Id.
7. Streide4 329 Md. at 549, 620 A.2d at 913; see also Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342,
368-69, 601 A.2d 102, 114-15 (1992).
8. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (1989 & Supp. 1994).
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tractive to underwriters" by controlling the category of damages most
subject to emotion and resistant to objective valuation. 9
While not specifically articulated prior to United States v. Streidel,
courts followed a general interpretation of the General Assembly's
broad use of personal injury in the statute to include wrongful
death." Less well-settled, however, was the question of whether to
enforce the cap against each individual claimant or all parties collec-
tively. In Simms v. Holiday Inns, Inc.," the federal district court de-
cided to apply the limit to each tortious occurrence, but the same
court later held in Bartucco v. Wright 2 that the cap applied to each
plaintiff individually in a wrongful death action."
Although damage limits have been struck down in other states,'14
the cap statute survived a constitutional challenge in Maryland in Mur-
phy v. Edmonds.5 In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals used a
rational basis test to determine that the statute did not violate equal
protection of the laws under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.1
6
9. Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (D. Md. 1989) (quoting
GovERNOR's TASK FORCE TO STUDY LIABILITY INSURANCE, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF
1986 3-4 (1985)).
10. See, e.g., Simms v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 596 (D. Md. 1990) (recognizing
application of the cap to wrongful death as Maryland law); Potomac Elec. Power Go. v.
Smith, 79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768 (basing application of cap to wrongful death on the
fact that the Wrongful Death Act had been amended in 1969 to include nonpecuniary
damages), cert. denied, 317 Md. 393, 564 A.2d 407 (1989), overuled by United States v.
Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993).
11. 746 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D. Md. 1990).
12. 746 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1990).
13. Id. at 612.
14. State constitutions in Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Montana restrict the legislature's
ability to limit damages recoverable in tort actions. See HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE Cosrs, 103d
ong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1993). Other states without specific constitutional provisions have
reviewed damage caps under an equal protection analysis and have applied an intermedi-
ate or strict level of scrutiny to overturn caps on damages. See, e.g., White v. State, 661 P.2d
1272, 1275 (Mont. 1983) (holding that statutes limiting recovery warrant strict scrutiny
under equal protection analysis because all individuals have a "fundamental right" under
the Montana Constitution to have a remedy for every injury). But see Morris v. Savoy, 576
N.E.2d 765, 772 (Ohio 1991) (holding that a damage cap statute did not violate equal
protection under a rational basis test, when it could be supported by "any conceivable set
of facts").
15. 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992).
16. Id. at 370, 601 A.2d at 116. But see id. at 378-79, 601 A.2d at 120 (Chasanow, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he right to recover full and fair compensation from a tortfeasor is an
important personal right" that merits review under intermediate scrutiny and only in medi-
cal malpractice cases would a cap survive such analysis.). See generally Lynn A. Dymond, The
Constitutionality of Maryland's Non-economic Damage Cap, Developments in Maryland Law 1991-
92, 52 MD. L REv. 545 (1993) (reviewing the court's decision in Murphy).
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One year after Murphy came the Streidel decision, which disturbed
the settled statutory interpretation that the General Assembly in-
tended the cap to apply to wrongful death cases.17 The Streidel court
examined the statute's requirement that juries itemize awards for
"personal injury" actions in order to indicate how much they have al-
located for past and future lost earnings, medical expenses,
noneconomic damages, and other damages, and pointed out that
such categories of damages do not apply to recoveries in wrongful
death actions."8 The court found, moreover, nothing in the available
legislative history that indicated the cap on noneconomic damages
would apply to wrongful death cases. 9 Given this finding, the court
saw no need to reach the question certified before it: whether the
damage cap would apply individually or in the aggregate to plaintiffs
in the wrongful death action.2°
b. Legislative and Political History.-The legislative proposal
to reverse Streidel was assigned to the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee, chaired by the Bill's sponsor, Senator Walter Baker (D-
Cecil).21 A member of the conference committee that formulated the
1986 cap, Senator Baker believed that, contrary to Streidel's analysis,
the legislature always intended the damage ceiling to cover wrongful
death actions.22 This belief reflected the fear of many legislators and
insurers that medical malpractice rates, presumably stabilized by the
1986 cap, would soar in the face of wrongful death damage awards no
longer restrained by law.2"
Insurance industry representatives joined forces with the state's
medical community to support the legislation.24 One insurance com-
pany cited a Baltimore County case, in which a plaintiff received
nearly $6,000,000 in noneconomic damages, in order to show the dan-
ger of leaving the jury to its own devices.25 Moreover, malpractice
17. Streide4 329 Md. at 537, 620 A.2d at 907. See generally Catherine M. Giovannoni, The
Inapplicability of the Cap on Noneconomic Damages to Wrongful Death Actions, Developments in
Maryland Law, 1992-93, 53 Mo. L. Rav. 999 (1994) (reviewing the court's decision in
Streidel) .
18. Streidel, 329 Md. at 544, 620 A.2d at 911.
19. Id. at 546, 620 A.2d at 912.
20. Id. at 537, 620 A.2d at 907.
21. Patty Reinert, Showdown Over Damage Caps Expected in General Assembly, DAILY RECORD
(Baltimore), Mar. 26, 1994, at 1.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 13.
24. Id.
25. Hearings on S. 283 before SenateJud. Proc. Comm., Md. Gen. Assembly, exhibit 4, at 3
(1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Medical Mut. Liability Ins. Soc'y of Md.).
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rates that had doubled in Maryland between 1984 and 1987 remained
essentially constant from 1988 to 1993, at least in part, because of the
cap. 2
6
Despite a proposed raise in the statutory ceiling from $350,000 to
$450,000 and an allowance for yearly increases for inflation, 27 victims'
rights groups and the plaintiffs bar objected.2 8 They denied any cor-
relation between caps on noneconomic damages and medical mal-
practice premiums while insisting insurers were simply trying to
protect their substantial profit margins.2 1
The proposed legislation emerged from the Senate Committee by
the slimmest of margins.30 In addition to the primary issue of whether
to extend the cap to cover wrongful death, the Judicial Proceedings
Committee wrestled with the Bill's retroactive application to wrongful
death suits still pending."1 Proponents of retroactivity argued that un-
til Streide4 insurance rates were set with the assumption that wrongful
death was already included by law.3 2 Premiums had been collected to
reflect the presence of the cap, and would have to be increased imme-
diately to cover possible noneconomic awards exceeding the old
26. Id. at 1-2 (supporting legislation to apply the cap on noneconomic damages in
wrongful death actions).
27. SENATEJUD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP., S. 283, Maryland Gen. Assembly (1994).
28. See, e.g., CITIZEN AcTION, DEBUNKING THE MYTHS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE
CONSUMER PERSPECTIVE (1993) (submitted to Delegate Joseph F. Vallario, Chairman,
House Jud. Comm., Mar. 1, 1994, by Leigh Hauter); NATIONAL INSURANCE CONSUMER OR-
GANIZATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 1985-1991 CALENDAR YEAR EXPERIENCE (sub-
mitted to Senator Walter Baker, Chairman, Senate Jud. Proc. Comm., Mar. 16, 1994, by
Leigh Hauter) (copy on file with author); see also Hearings, supra note 25 (statement of
Maryland Trial Lawyers Ass'n) (agreeing that the original law was intended to cover both
injury and death, but objecting primarily to the application of a single cap to all plaintiffs)
(copy on file with author).
29. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 25 (testimony of Izzy Firth, Association of Trial Law-
yers of America) ("There is no correlation between the Maryland cap on noneconomic
damages, and cost and availability of medmal insurance in the state.") (copy on file with
author). According to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Maryland medical mal-
practice insurers paid out 32 cents for every dollar of premium earned in 1992, as opposed
to the national average of 54 cents. Id. at 2. In 1991, Maryland insurers earned profits of
42.5% of premiums, compared to 29% nationally. Id.
30. The Committee vote was six to five in favor of passage. S. 283, SENATEJUD. PROC.
COMM., COMMIrrTEE VOTING RECORD (copy on file with author).
31. Medical Mutual estimated that it had 141 wrongful death claims that would be
potentially uncapped. Letter from David L. Murray, President of Medical Mutual Liability
Insurance Society of Maryland, to Delegate Joseph F. Vallario, Chairman, House Jud.
Comm. 1 (Feb. 28, 1994) (on file with author).
32. Hearings, supra note 25, exhibit 4, at 3 (statement of Medical Mut. Liability Ins.
Soc'y of Md.) ("Because Streidel 'uncapped' seven years of death cases that insurers had
thought were capped-with rates set accordingly, the legislation should apply to pending
cases to the extent constitutionally permissible.").
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cap.3 3 Although the Attorney General advised that there was no con-
stitutional bar to the retroactivity provision, the Committee ultimately
opted to amend the legislation to apply only to causes of action arising
after October 1, 1994. s4
The Bill required application of the cap amount to the tort victim
and "all persons who claim injury by or through that victim,"35 thus
answering the question that was never addressed by the Streidel
court.3 6 The Senate Committee agreed to increase the limit in wrong-
ful death actions to 150% of the proposed limit when two or more
33. David Funk, a lobbyist for Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland,
predicted doctors would see an additional 15 to 20% rise in malpractice insurance rates, in
addition to the 20% increase from the higher cap. Reinert, supra note 21, at 13.
34. Judgments-Limitation on Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws
2292, 2293. The Attorney General's office advised legislators that while the State's Due
Process Clause, found in Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, is interpreted in
pari materia with the federal provision, the Court of Appeals has not adopted the federal
rule regarding retroactive legislation, but has followed an older rule that asks whether the
proposed retroactivity encroaches upon "vested rights." Tort actions, however, even when
filed, are not considered "vested rights" until they are reduced to final, unreviewablejudg-
ments. Since the legislation did not affect such judgments, vested rights were not adversely
impacted and the retroactivity provision would be upheld unless deemed "irrational and
arbitrary." See Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assistant Attorney General, to Delegate Ken-
neth H. Masters, Member, HouseJud. Comm. 2 (Mar. 17, 1994) (copy on file with author).
A finding of arbitrariness or irrationality would be unlikely given the legislation's role in
reducing uncertainty in damage awards, which is the purpose of the cap.
Despite this advice, the Attorney General disagreed with an application of the cap
retroactively as a matter of policy.
If this bill is being made retroactive simply to show the Court of Appeals that it
was wrong when it decided the Streidel case the way it did, I submit little is to be
gained by sending the Court such a message. In fact, more will be lost in terms of
needless litigation and the resulting lack of certainty in this area of the law.
Letter from J. Joseph Curran, Attorney General of Maryland, to Senator Walter Baker,
Chairman, Senate Jud. Proc. Comm. 2 (Feb. 16, 1994) (copy on file with author).
35. SENATEJUD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP., S. 283, Maryland Gen. Assembly (enacted in
Judgments-Limitation on Noneconomic Damages, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws 2292, 2293).
36. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. Opponents of this measure cited
Bartucco v. Wright, 746 F. Supp. 604, 609-10 (D. Md. 1990), to point out that while Mary-
land's Wrongful Death Statute requires all claims to be brought in one action, those with a
cause of action for wrongful death still retain their right to recover damages. See, e.g.,
Hearings, supra note 25 (statement of the Maryland Trial Lawyers Ass'n) ("[T] he Wrongful
Death Statute is procedural and only ... protect[s] a wrongdoer from having to defend
multiple suits;Juries are not required to bring in a single verdict but should determine the
injuries suffered on an individual basis."); see also Bartucco, 746 F. Supp. at 609-10 ("This
procedural choice, made over a century ago, was meant to protect a defendant from sev-
eral suits, not from several judgments or awards to several prevailing plaintiffs.").
This argument ignores the legislature's need to address different policy concerns in
subsequent enactments. Whether the original caps were intended to apply on a per occur-
rence or on a per claimant basis, as argued under Bartucco, has become irrelevant in view of
changing demands in public policy.
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claimants existed, but retained a single cap for all plaintiffs in a per-
sonal injury claim.37
This proposed legislation was referred to a conference committee
after the House re-inserted a retroactivity provision in its version of
the Bill that applied to wrongful death actions still pending after Oc-
tober 1, 1994.38 The House also increased the limit for multiple
claimants to 200% of the statutory ceiling and raised the damage ceil-
ing itself to $500,000.19 For personal injury cases, it sought to apply
the cap to each plaintiff, whereas the Senate's version imposed the
limit on all claimants.' In conference, the Senate conceded the
$500,000 ceiling, but prevailed on all other points.4" The revised Bill
passed in both chambers by wide margins.4"
2. Impact of the Statute on Current Law.-The new statute notably
raises the cap for noneconomic damages in personal injury cases aris-
ing after October 1, 1994 from $350,000 to $500,000 with subsequent
annual increases of $15,000. 4" Because the original statute capping
noneconomic damages did not provide for inflation, this is the first
increase in the cap since its imposition in 1986." More importantly,
in reversing Streidel the law applies the same limit to suits for wrongful
death as for personal injury, but does not cover suits arising before the
October 1, 1994, implementation date.45
Because courts prior to Streidel uniformly treated the cap as appli-
cable to wrongful death cases, this legislation largely codifies what,
until last year, had been judicial precedent. The prospectivity provi-
sion of October 1, 1994, however, allows Streidets brief span as Mary-
land law to provide a window of opportunity for plaintiffs in pending
wrongful death cases to collect damages exceeding the cap. While
37. SENATEJUD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP. ON S. 283, Maryland Gen. Assembly (1994).
38. The retroactivity provision stated that the Act would "not apply to any wrongful
death action in which a final judgment [was] entered in favor of one or more beneficiaries
by a circuit court or other court of original jurisdiction before October 1, 1994." HOUSE
JUD. COMM., AMENDMENTS TO S. 283, at 7 (1994).
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id.
41. The Bill also retained the Senate's flat $15,000 annual increase for inflation, as
opposed to the three percent raise favored by the House, Judgments-Limitation on
Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws 2292, 2293.
42. See S. 283, SENATE AND HOUSE VOTING REcoRDs (copy on file with author).
43. Judgments-Limitation on Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws
2292, 2293.
44. This inflation provision brings Maryland in line with most other states that cap
damage awards. Hearings, supra note 25 (statement of the Maryland Trial Lawyer's Ass'n).




insurance companies are expected to raise premiums in anticipation
of this situation, the number of wrongful death cases that historically
have collected more than the limit is very small.'
The law also eliminates ambiguity over the number of caps per-
mitted in a suit by its declaration that the limit applies to all plaintiffs
in the aggregate rather than to each claimant individually.47 In
wrongful death actions where there are two or more claimants, the
court may award up to 150% of the $500,000 cap, for a maximum
allotment of $750,000.48 Awards to multiple claimants that exceed the
cap are reduced proportionally.49 In the same language as the law for
personal injury cases, jurors in a wrongful death suit may not be in-
formed of the statutory limit.5" The trier of fact, however, must item-
ize the award to show the allocation between various economic
damages and noneconomic damages. 1 Formerly, only personal in-
jury cases required this form of itemization. The statute, moreover,
defines "noneconomic damages" for wrongful death to mirror the
Wrongful Death Act5 2  in order to distinguish them from
noneconomic damages in personal injury actions.53
3. Analysis.-As a matter of public policy, the issue of caps on
noneconomic damages in Maryland has been addressed both legisla-
tively and through the judiciary.54 Questions remain, however,
46. See Hearings, supra note 25 (statement of the Maryland Trial Lawyers Ass'n) (noting
that "the previously mandated Closed Claim Summary to the Maryland Insurance Commis-
sioner from 1987-91 . . . shows an average of eight cases per year with possible
noneconomic damages exceeding Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars .... ").
47. Judgments-Limitation on Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws
2292, 2293.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2294.
50. Id. at 2293.
51. Id. at 2294.
52. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-901 to -903 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
53. This clarification eliminates the contrast between the description of damages
found in the Wrongful Death Act and the former cap statute which had convinced the
Bartucco court to apply the limit to each plaintiff individually. See Bartucco v. Wright, 746 F.
Supp. 604, 607-08 (D. Md. 1990).
54. This is not to conclude that such caps are necessarily desirable. The jury's discre-
tion to compensate tort victims fully should not be infringed except in extreme circum-
stances, as such restraints may harm the most severely injured plaintiffs. Of the available
tort reforms, however, the damage cap is the only one found to reduce malpractice cost
indicators consistently. See HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra
note 14, at 64-65 (outlining studies that suggest damage caps reduce payments per paid
claim and, thus, reduce malpractice insurance rates, but have no effect on the frequency of
claims). While maintaining access to affordable malpractice insurance is a valid legislative
goal, Maryland law exceeds this purpose when it applies the cap to all sources of injury.
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whether wrongful death claims should be included in this policy and
whether the recently adopted statute embodies its most sensible form.
As a matter of equity, a cap for noneconomic damages for wrong-
ful death actions eliminates a potential disparity in award allocation. 55
AsJudge Chasanow noted in his Streidel concurrence, a victim left alive
but rendered a brain-damaged, quadriplegic could recover only up to
the statutory ceiling for her anguish, but the plaintiff who makes a
claim through a dead victim could be allowed an unlimited award. 56
Similarly, the prohibition against informing jurors of the cap57 pre-
vents the jury from viewing the cap as the "price" for only the most
lamentable circumstances and setting all other awards below the statu-
tory limit.58
Given that the extension of the cap to wrongful death actions
merely codifies what both courts and malpractice insurers already in-
terpreted as the General Assembly's original intent, the failure to
make the law retroactive seems odd. Both Maryland courts and the
legislature, nevertheless, have become wary of the retroactive applica-
tion of law in recent years and follow the notion that "'[a] construc-
tion which produces that kind of interference with substantive rights,
whether or not the interference is of a constitutional magnitude, is to
be avoided."'59 But the retroactive application of the new statute
would not have upset "settled expectations" since, until Streidel, wrong-
ful death was assumed to have been included under the cap.6°
More troubling is the application of a single cap to all plaintiffs in
the aggregate rather than to each claimant individually. Although the
statutory limit rises to $750,000 when there are at least two claimants,
that same amount must apply no matter how many plaintiffs are in-
volved.61 As a result, plaintiffs who belong to large families will not be
compensated as fully as those from smaller families, although the de-
gree of anguish is arguably the same or greater. Adequacy of compen-
For claims other than those arising from medical malpractice, the law should rely on the
discretion ofjudges to set aside unreasonable awards.
55. Streide4 329 Md. at 553-54, 620 A.2d at 916 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. See supra text accompanying note 50.
58. Judgments-Limitation of Noneconomic Damages Act, ch. 477, 1994 Md. Laws
2292, 2293.
59. Letter fromJ.Joseph Curran, Attorney General, to Senator Walter M. Baker, supra
note 34, at 2 (quoting WSSC v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 559, 520 A.2d 1319, 1326
(1987)).
60. Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Asst. Attorney General, to Delegate Kenneth H. Mas-
ters, supra note 34, at 4.
61. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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sation may be further reduced when attorneys' fees are subtracted
from the award.
It is doubtful, moreover, whether applying the cap to individual
plaintiffs would create a genuine need to raise malpractice rates.
While Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland6 2 esti-
mated that applying caps to two claimants would increase rates by
30% and three caps by more than 40%, its calculations assumed that
all potential wrongful death plaintiffs would receive the maximum
award and that each case would have two or three plaintiffs.63
According to a Johns Hopkins University closed claim study
through 1992, only 15% of medical malpractice claims involved more
than two claimants.' A summary of closed claims from the Maryland
Insurance Commissioner showed an average of only eight cases per
year with noneconomic damages potentially exceeding $350,000 be-
tween 1987 and 1991.65 Because these cases all arose before the im-
plementation of the cap statute, each wrongful death beneficiary
would have been eligible for an unlimited award. Assuming, as Medi-
cal Mutual does, that between 25% and 40% of its claims are for
wrongful death," this would mean that only two to four cases per year
would have exceeded the cap, even if awards were calculated per
beneficiary.67
62. Medical Mutual insures more than 70% of Maryland's private practice physicians.
Hearings, supra note 25, exhibit 4, at 2 (statement of Medical Mut. Liability Ins. Soc'y of
Md.).
63. Medical Mutual analyzed cases where the cause of action arose after July 1, 1986,
the date the cap for wrongful death suits became effective, and those cases where it paid
out awards between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1993. It provided all of the data to
the HouseJudiciary Committee. Out of some 1130 cases, Medical Mutual selected 50 cases
for which the highest payments were made, an average of $647,149 for 14 death and 36
nondeath cases. Letter from David L. Murray to DelegateJoseph F. Vallario, supra note 31,
at 3. In a two-cap scenario, the company estimated it would have paid out $650,000 more
for each of the wrongful death cases, $150,000 from raising the statutory limit from
$350,000 to $500,000 and $500,000 from application of the second cap. Id. Medical Mu-
tual claimed the cost of raising the cap for the wrongful death cases would have totalled an
additional $14,500,000 for these cases plus an additional $2,405,498 in defense costs. Id.
In addition to the assumption that each case would have automatically received a higher
award, these figures suppose that Medical Mutual would have paid the extra amount in
one year rather than over the four year period it analyzed. See id Medical Mutual failed to
explain why it would cost more to defend the same cases.
64. Telephone Interview with Faye Malitz, Research Associate, School of Hygiene and
Public Health, Johns Hopkins University (Mar. 24, 1995).
65. MARYLAND INSURANCE COMMISSIONER REPORTS TO THE LEGISLATIVE PO"CY COMMIT-
TEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACrICE CLOSED CLAIMS SURVEYS 1988-1991, MARYLAND CLOSED CLAIM
SUMMAR. NONECONOMIC DAMoEs 16 (copy on file with author).
66. Hearings, supra note 25, exhibit 4, at 2 (statement of Medical Mut. Liability Ins.
Soc'y of Md.).
67. Id. at 2; see also id. (statement of Maryland Trial Lawyers Ass'n).
922 [VOL. 54:891
MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
While insurers could justifiably increase rates to anticipate unlim-
ited wrongful death awards in pending cases, there is no such reliance
argument as applied to multiple caps. Unlike the statute's extension
of the cap to wrongful death, it was by no means settled law that the
cap would apply to multiple claims in each cause of action.6" Either
insurers already have set rates that assume a per plaintiff award or
have seriously miscalculated their former business costs.
The boost in the statutory cap from $350,000 to $500,000 and the
allowance for annual increases makes the new statute more palatable
to plaintiffs, but inflation inevitably will erode the impact of the
$15,000 annual raise. While this effect may not be felt for some time,
the problem could be avoided by applying the percentage-based raise
that the House Judiciary Committee suggested.69
4. Concluion.-The legislative reversal of Streidel is a laudable
compromise that balances the demands of two powerful interest
groups, trial lawyers and the insurance industry. While insurers ex-
pressed dissatisfaction that the law would not apply to pending cases, 70
trial lawyers objected to the single claim limit71 and, in principle, the
extension of the cap to wrongful death altogether. 7 Not surprisingly,
each side made political concessions: retention of the single cap for
insurers and inflationary increases in the cap with prospectivity for the
plaintiffs bar. The rejection of Streidel is also significant because it will
preserve the stabilizing effect that the damage cap has had on mal-
practice rates, despite a one-time insurance rate increase to offset the
prospectivity provision of the cap and its increased limit.
On the negative side, the law will mean inadequate compensation
for those who have suffered the greatest of losses: the needless death
of a loved one from another's tortious conduct. The application of
the cap to the entire claim penalizes larger families who have suffered
the same loss as a smaller family.
DIANA M. SCHOBEL
68. Compare Simms v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 596, 597 (D. Md. 1990) (finding
that the damage cap applied to a wrongful death action as a whole) with Bartucco v.
Wright, 746 F. Supp. 604, 607-08 (D. Md. 1990) (holding that the damage cap applied to
each plaintiff individually).
69. See supra note 41.
70. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.




A. Protecting Young Children from Old Paint: The Lead Paint Poisoning
Prevention Act
In 1994, the General Assembly of Maryland enacted House Bill
760, the Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (the Act),' a controver-
sial statute expressly designed to bypass the sometimes problematic
tort liability system' and institute a remedial program aimed at lessen-
ing children's exposure to lead in rental properties.3 The Act's stated
purpose is the reduction of "the incidence of childhood lead poison-
ing, [and the maintenance of] the stock of available affordable rental
housing."4 While under consideration, the legislation gave rise to ac-
rimonious debate between property owners and child welfare advo-
cates, a debate that continues even as the regulations are drafted to
implement the statute.' Although it is impossible to predict with cer-
1. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, 1994 Md. Laws 1282.
2. Experts have found that negligence suits against property owners for lead-caused
injuries may not automatically lead to a plaintiff's recovery of money damages because
landlords' insurance policies typically contain "lead exclusions" which avoid coverage for
damages caused by lead. REPORT OF THE LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION, PREPARED
FOR: Gov. WILLIAM DONALD SCHAEFER AND THE MARYLAND GEN. ASSEMBLY of 1994, at 5
(1994) [hereinafter LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION]. The Commission noted that
[M]ost standard lines insurers in Maryland since the mid- to late-1980s have ex-
cluded coverage of lead hazards from policies insuring older housing. The un-
availability of liability insurance covering lead risks in turn has decreased the
marketability of these properties and prevents owners from obtaining loans (us-
ing the property as collateral) which may be needed to finance abatements or
other improvements.
Id. The Commission's research demonstrated that only one insurer subject to regulation
in Maryland writes coverage without a lead exclusion. Id. at 5 n.8. Furthermore, most
owners of affected properties "currently do not have insurance coverage applicable to lead
risks." Id. n.8 (citing LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION, supra, at E-6, E-10, E-18, E-21, E-
29).
3. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-802, 1994 Md. Laws 1311.
4. Id.
5. Telephone Interview with Robert Smith, Counsel for the House Environmental
Matters Committee of the Maryland General Assembly (Sept. 14, 1994); see Timothy B.
Wheeler, Veto Threatens Bill Requiring Lead Screening, THE SUN (Baltimore), Apr. 18, 1994, at
B1; Timothy B. Wheeler, Lead Paint "Compromise"Draws Fire, THE SUN (Baltimore), Mar. 16,
1994, at B3 (discussing child advocates' strong dissatisfaction with the legislative process);
see also Letter from Anne Blumenberg, Executive Director, Community Law Center, to
Hon. Virginia M. Thomas, Maryland House of Delegates (Feb. 9, 1994) (outlining in detail
concerns of advocates with respect to the "compromise" proposal that eventually passed);
Letter from Donald G. Gifford, Chair, Lead Paint Poisoning Commission to Hon. Ronald
A. Guns, Chair, House Environmental Matters Committee (Mar. 14, 1994) (same); Letter
from Lisa A. Kershner, Executive Director, Lead Paint Poisoning Commission, to Hon.
Ronald A. Guns, Chair, House Environmental Matters Committee (Mar. 28, 1994) (same)




tainty the long-term ramifications and enforcement potential of this
complex piece of legislation, it is nevertheless clear that the Act signi-
fies a fundamental change in the tort law of Maryland.
Part 1 of this Note will provide an overview of the societal con-
cerns that led to the Act's passage. Part 2 will discuss briefly the ex-
isting state and federal laws that address lead-based paint in
residential housing. In Part 3, the Note will examine the treatment of
lead poisoning in Maryland common law, with particular attention
given to recent case law. Part 4 reviews the provisions of the Act that
will impact most significantly on providers of rental housing and their
tenants. Finally, in Part 5, the Note will examine the Act's effect on
landlord liability.
1. The Social Context.-Child advocates consider lead poisoning
"the number one preventable environmental disease affecting chil-
dren in the United States."6 Lead-poisoned children frequently suffer
permanent injuries, including brain damage, that threaten their intel-
lectual, psychological, and economic well-being.7 These injuries may
include cognitive impairment, learning disabilities, and loss of I.Q.8
The federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have reported
that lead poisoning is a serious environmental health threat to young
One continuing point of contention between child welfare advocates and property
owners is the fact that the Act does not mandate lead dust testing to ensure adequate
cleanup of dust on floors and woodwork. Timothy B. Wheeler, Lead Law Begins Tomorrow,
but Rules Questioned, THE SUN (Baltimore), Sept. 30, 1994, at BI [hereinafter Lead Law
Begins Tomorrow]. Child advocates contend that the state should conduct lead-dust tests of
treated homes, even if the landlords are not required to perform such testing. Id. at B8.
At this writing, the final regulations have not been issued by the Maryland Department
of the Environment (MDE), notwithstanding the Act's October 1, 1994 effective date.
Emergency regulations proposed by MDE are set to be scrutinized by a joint legislative
committee of the General Assembly. See Timothy B. Wheeler, Lead Poison Law Remains in
Limbo, THE SUN (Baltimore), Feb. 20, 1995, at B1; see also Memorandum prepared by Rena
Steinzor et al., University of Maryland School of Law Environmental Law Clinic, for Round-
table on Lead Poisoning Prevention Program Act, University of Maryland School of Law
(Sept. 12, 1994) (discussing draft regulations circulated to "concerned members of the
public" by MDE). Because the rulemaking process is ongoing, a detailed discussion of the
proposed regulations is beyond the scope of this Note.
6. LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 2.
7. See Martha R. Mahoney, Four Million Children at Risk: Lead Paint Poisoning Victims
and the Law, 9 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 46, 49-53 (1990) (discussing the sources and effects of lead
poisoning, the definition of elevated levels of lead in the blood, and the extent of lead
poisoning).
8. LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 2; see also Mahoney, supra note
7, at 53 ("In 1988, a Baltimore, Maryland housing and community development official




children.9 CDC statistics for 1992 indicate that "four million children
are affected [by lead poisoning] nationwide, and as many as 500,000
Maryland dwellings are potential lead poisoning risks."' °
The public health system has been criticized widely for not re-
sponding effectively to the problem of lead poisoning. In Maryland,
for example, the vast majority of lead poisoning cases are diagnosed in
Baltimore City, where the system is so overwhelmed that case manage-
ment services generally are not provided until a child's blood lead
level has reached at least 25-30 micrograms per deciliter (ug/dL).
By way of comparison, the CDC has recommended that blood lead
levels as low as 10-14 ug/dL should trigger "community-wide child-
hood lead poisoning prevention activities," and that nutritional and
educational intervention should take place if a child's blood lead level
is between 15 and 19 ug/dL.'2
Most victims of lead poisoning are poor, inner-city children,"3
many of whom are exposed to lead via dust from deteriorating lead-
based paint in older housing stock.' 4 Perhaps due to the lack of polit-
ical muscle of the affected persons, current public health services re-
lated to childhood lead poisoning are largely reactive. 5 Few
resources are devoted to prevention; thus, a family generally will re-
ceive no instruction regarding the identification of lead hazards,
methods to minimize exposure, and information on nutrition, screen-
ing, or medical follow-up until a child has been poisoned. 6
9. HOUSE ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS COMMITTEE, HOUSE BILL 760: LAD POISONING
PREVENTION PROGRAM 6 (1994).
10. Id.
11. LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 2. Guidelines adopted by the
CDC in 1991 call for case management to be provided by a public health nurse or other
health professional starting at blood levels of 20 ug/dL. Id. at 2 n.4. The Commission
noted, however, that nursing case management currently is not provided in Baltimore City
until a child's blood lead level reaches approximately 45 ug/dL. Id.
12. Id. at 18.
13. Mahoney, supra note 7, at 52 (citation omitted).
14. LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 3.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id. The Commission noted that "[m] ore than 1,338 cases of children with blood
lead levels between 20 and 24 ug/dL receive no outreach, confirmation, or environmental
investigation until the child's blood lead level rises to at least 25 or 30 ug/dL .... A lead-
poisoned child in Baltimore City may not receive any services for months following diagno-
sis unless the blood lead level is 30 ug/dL or above." Id. at 16-17; see aLso Catherine A.
Potthast, Lead Paint Regzlation and Your Clients, MD. BAR J., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 17-18. Ms.
Potthast, an attorney practicing in Baltimore City, notes that lead poisoning is a reportable
disease under state health regulations. Id. (citing MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26, § 02.06.02
(1994). Upon finding a child with an elevated blood lead level, a physician must notify the
local health department, which, in turn, assigns a specialist to monitor the child's medical
status. Id. In addition, the health department will assign an investigator to conduct an
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For some families, the system's lack of preventative mechanisms
has produced tragic results.17 Personal injury suits against individual
landlords are one potential avenue of relief."i These suits may result
in large awards for plaintiffs,19 but as with all litigation, they bring no
guarantee of success.2"
2. Existing Legislation.-The Act takes effect against a backdrop
of existing state and federal laws that currently address lead-based
paint in residential housing."' Maryland banned the use of lead-based
environmental investigation to ascertain the source of the child's lead exposure. Id. While
the Maryland program has been lauded as a step toward increasing public awareness of the
importance of lead poisoning prevention, it has been criticized because action is not "trig-
gered" and no medical or environmental intervention occurs unless a child is identified as
having an elevated blood lead level. Id.
17. See, e.g., Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 96 Md. App. 330, 335, 625 A.2d 326,
328 (1993) (describing two children exposed to lead-based paint who were diagnosed with
brain damage), affid in part and rev'd in part, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994); Caroline
v. Reicher, 269 Md. 125, 127, 304 A.2d 831, 832 (1973) (describing a child who suffered
permanent blindness, mental retardation, and neurological handicaps as a result of lead
poisoning).
18. See generally Sonja Larsen, Annotation, Landlord's Liability for Injury or Death of Ten-
ant's Child ftom Lead Paint Poisoning 19 A.L.R.5T 405 (1994) (summarizing lead paint
cases against landlords founded on negligence and other theories). Tenants also have
turned to consumer protection statutes in order to hold their landlords liable for lead
poisoning. Id. In Maryland, however, the Court of Appeals has held that Maryland's con-
sumer protection law is limited to "material misstatements and omissions at the inception
of the lease rather than during the full term of the lease." Richwind, 335 Md. at 685, 645
A.2d at 1159.
19. See Timothy B. Wheeler, July Awards $1.5 Million to Lead-Poisoned 3-Year-Old, THE
SUN (Baltimore), Mar. 18, 1994, at B14.
20. Mahoney, supra note 7, at 58. Mahoney acknowledges that "[ s ] uccess of landlord-
tenant suits in gaining damages depends in part on what statutory duties are imposed by
state laws, local health codes, and housing ordinances." Id. "[L]itigating individual suits
shifts the burden of enforcing lead paint poisoning prevention onto the victims, whose
resources are limited." Id. at 59. While contingency fee arrangements may alleviate the
financial burden faced by most plaintiffs, a personal injury action cannot result in any
relief for the plaintiff unless an injury already has occurred. Hence, personal injury litiga-
tion does little to foster prevention of injury. Because plaintiffs in personal injury suits do
not uniformly prevail, it is questionable whether the threat of tort liability is a useful deter-
rent to landlords whose properties may contain lead-based paint. See, e.g., Hayes v. Ham-
bruch, 841 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1994) (denying relief for lead poisoning injuries because
plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the landlord had "reason to suspect" that the
leased premises contained lead paint); Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 645 A.2d 1160
(1994) (finding landlord not negligent as a matter of law because "there was no notice of
flaking lead-based paint and no reasonable opportunity to correct the condition"); see also
infra note 62 and accompanying text.
21. See Fishkind Realty v. Sampson, 306 Md. 269, 275-79, 508 A.2d 478, 481-84 (1986)
(reviewing state and local laws concerning lead paint in dwellings); see also Potthast, supra




paint in residential dwellings in 1971.22 In the same year, Congress
enacted the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act,23 which pro-
hibited the application of lead-based paint in federally-assisted resi-
dential housing.24 In 1978, the Consumer Product Safety Commission
banned the sale of lead-based paint for residential use. 3 In 1992,
Congress enacted the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction
Act,26 popularly known as Title X, which set renovation standards and
requires, in part, that purchasers and tenants of housing built prior to
1978 be warned about the hazards associated with lead paint.27 In
Maryland, the Act is intended to operate independently of Title X.28
In addition, a number of state and local laws govern the existence
of hazards, including lead-based paint, in residential rental properties.
These laws provide tenants with possible remedies for unsafe condi-
tions. From the tenant's perspective, perhaps the most significant of
these are the state and local "rent escrow" provisions.' On the state
level, the rent escrow statute enables a tenant, irrespective of any oral
or written agreements with the landlord, to deposit rent into a judi-
cially administered escrow account if the landlord fails to remove lead-
based paint from any interior or exterior surface that is easily accessi-
ble to a child.30 Local laws governing the maintenance of rental prop-
erty include specific provisions addressing lead-based paint.
Baltimore City landlords, for example, are required to keep their
22. Act of May 17, 1971, ch. 495, 1971 Md. Laws 1105; see Fishkind Realty, 306 Md. at
275-79, 508 A.2d at 481-84 (discussing the language of the 1971 Maryland statute and later
modifications).
23. Pub. L. No. 91-695, 84 Stat. 2078 (1971) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4831(b) (1988)).
24. See Potthast, supra note 16, at 17.
25. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1303.1 to 1303.5 (1994).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4851-4856 (Supp. V 1993); see also Potthast, supra note 16, at 18-19
(discussing the main provisions of this act).
27. SeeJames B. Witkin & Charles N. Schilke, Warning About Lead-Paint Hazards: New
Law Gives Landlords Duty to Protect Tenants, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 25, 1993, at S32-33 (discussing
the impact of Title X on buyers, sellers, landlords, tenants, real estate agents, and various
other parties).
28. Telephone Interview with Robert Smith, Counsel for the House Environmental
Matters Committee of the Maryland General Assembly (Sept. 14, 1994).
29. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211.1(a) (1988); BALTIMORE, MD., CODE OF PUB.
Loc. LAws § 9.9 (1980).
30. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-211.1 (1988); see Fishkind Realty v. Sampson, 306
Md. 269, 285-86, 508 A.2d 478, 487 (1986) (holding that § 8-211.1 is intended to supple-
ment and coexist with § 9.9 of the Code of Local Laws of Baltimore City, that permits
tenants to pay rent into escrow if a landlord fails to correct the existence of paint contain-
ing lead pigment on surfaces within the dwelling, provided that the landlord has notice of




property in good repair and to correct hazardous conditions.3 1 With
respect to these laws, the Act expressly states that it will not affect
"[t]he duties and obligations of an owner of an affected property to
repair or maintain the affected property as required under any appli-
cable state or local law or regulation."3 2
3. The State of the Common Law With Respect to Lead Poisoning.-
Because the Act limits tort liability in exchange for compliance, 3 it
must be considered in the context of the existing Maryland tort law
governing landlord liability. Nationally, the majority of lead paint
cases founded on negligence, and not involving injuries sustained in
common areas, require that a landlord have notice or knowledge of a
hazard before liability can attach.' This principle was recently articu-
lated by the Maryland Court of Appeals in RichwindJoint Venture 4 v.
Brunson.3 The Richwind court considered the liability of a property
owner for lead paint hazards in a rental unit.36 The court's discussion
of the common law and statutory provisions relating to lead-based
paint hazards emphasized the common law requirement that, before
liability will be imposed on a landlord, the landlord must have notice
and a reasonable opportunity to repair the defective condition of the
property.3 7
31. BALTIMORE, MD., HOUSING CODE §§ 702, 703, 706 (1983). Section 702 provides that
every building in Baltimore City that is occupied as a dwelling must be "kept in good re-
pair, in safe condition, and fit for human habitation." Section 703(2) (c) defines one of
the standards for good repair as maintaining "[a]ll walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and
windows.., clean and free of any flaking, loose or peeling paint and paper." Section 706
specifically states that "[n]o paint shall be used for interior painting of any dwelling...
unless the paint is free from any lead pigment." See also RichwindJoint Venture 4 v. Brun-
son, 335 Md. 661, 672, 645 A.2d 1147, 1152 (1994) (discussing the Baltimore City Code
provisions in relation to a tenant's suit for negligence).
32. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-822(A)(1), 1994 Md. Laws 1282. The Act states
further that it will not change "[Ithe authority of a state or local agency to enforce applica-
ble housing or livability codes or to order lead abatements in accordance with any applica-
ble state or local law or regulation." Id. § 6-822(A) (2).
33. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
34. Larsen, supra note 18, at 418-24. But see Hardy v. Griffin, 569 A-2d 49, 50-51 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1989) (holding a landlord strictly liable for permanent damages suffered by a
six-year-old as a result of the landlord's violation of state and local ordinances pertaining to
the use of lead-based paint); Bencosme v. Kokoras, 507 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Mass. 1987)
(holding that an owner of residential property is strictly liable for lead poisoning injuries
where the owner failed to remove lead-based paint from the premises as required by state
law).
35. 335 Md. 661, 674, 645 A.2d 1147, 1153 (1994).
36. Id. at 670-82, 645 A.2d at 1151-57.
37. Id. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1152. The court did not discuss the integration of H.B. 760
into the existing legal framework, because the Act, by virtue of its October 1, 1994 effective
date, was inapplicable. Id. at 680 n.7, 645 A.2d at 1156 n.7.
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Richwind involved a suit filed against a property owner by a ten-
ant, whose two children allegedly suffered injuries as a result of their
exposure to lead-based paint." The president of the corporation that
managed the rental property testified that although he knew that the
property was of a vintage that made it likely to contain lead-based
paint, he had no specific knowledge that the premises in fact did con-
tain lead-based paint at the time his company assumed manage-
ment. 9 The tenant alleged negligence, nuisance, and violation of the
Maryland's Consumer Protection Act (CPA).4'0
In addressing the allegations of negligence, the Court of Appeals
first examined the statutory requirements imposed on landlords by
the Baltimore City Code41 and concluded that violations thereof "may
be the basis for a negligence action."42 Turning to the issue of notice,
the court observed that the Code explicitly requires that a landlord be
given notice of any code violations.4" Thus, the court stated, the city
code sections providing that a landlord must be served with notice
and subsequently provided with a "reasonable opportunity to correct"
38. Id. at 669, 645 A.2d at 1150.
39. Id. at 667, 645 A.2d at 1150. The property manager, a former Baltimore City hous-
ing inspector, managed the facility for 16 years. Id.
40. Id. at 669, 645 A.2d at 1150. The Court of Appeals, reversing the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals, held that the plaintiff did not have a remedy under the CPA, as set
forth in MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw H §§ 13-101 to -501 (1990). Richwind, 335 Md. at 667,
645 A.2d at 1149. The court noted that it has "only applied the CPA in landlord/tenant
cases where the unfair or deceptive practice occurred during the establishment of the land-
lord/tenant relationship between the parties." Id. at 683, 645 A.2d at 1157. The court
concluded that the landlord's "[r]enting a premises with intact, lead-based paint is not in
itself a violation of the CPA." Id. at 668, 645 A.2d at 1159.
41. See supra note 31.
42. Richwind, 335 Md. at 671, 645 A.2d at 1152. The Restatement (Second) of Poperty
states:
A landlord is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the tenant and others
upon the leased property with the consent of the tenant or his subtenant by a
dangerous condition existing before or arising after the tenant has taken posses-
sion, if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to repair the condition and the
existence of the condition is in violation of.
(1) an implied warranty of habitability;, or
(2) a duty created by statute or administrative regulation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 17.6 (1977). The Richwind
court thus concluded "that a private cause of action in a landlord/tenant context can arise
from a violation of any statutory duty or implied warranty created by the Baltimore City
Code." Richwind, 335 Md. at 671-72, 645 A.2d at 1152.
43. Richwind, 335 Md. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1152 (citing BALnMORE, MD., HOUSING CODE
§ 301 (1983).
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defective conditions are consistent with the common law of the
state.4
The court's analysis of Maryland common and statutory law with
regard to liability of property owners emphasized the past efforts to
distinguish between the terms "reason to know"4 5 and "should
know."46 The court noted that the latter implies a "duty to inspect."47
The court refused to impose such a duty on property owners, stating
that "[k ] nowledge of a condition which involves unreasonable risk of
physical harm to persons on the land may not be imputed to a land-
lord merely from general knowledge that other properties of like age,
construction, or design might possibly contain such hazardous condi-
tions."48 The court concluded that a landlord is under no duty to
inspect the premises in order to determine whether hazardous condi-
tions exist.
49
Turning to the merits of the case, the court held that the provi-
sions of the Baltimore City Code dealing with lead-based paint do not
"alter or supersede the common law concerning a landlord's knowl-
edge of a defective condition on the premises."5" Thus, under
44. Id. at 673-74, 645 A.2d at 1153; see also Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d
548, 554 (1976); Katz v. Holsinger, 264 Md. 307, 311-12, 286 A.2d 115, 118 (1972); State v.
Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 29-34, 113 A.2d 100, 104-06 (1955).
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965). Section 358 states that a lessor
must have "reason to know" of a hazardous condition to be subject to liability for "physical
harm caused by the condition after the lessee has taken possession." Id.; see also Hayes v.
Hambruch, 841 F. Supp. 706, 710 (D. Md. 1994) (noting that Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 358 has been adopted in Maryland).
46. Richwind, 335 Md. at 676-77, 645 A.2d at 1154. In Feldstein, the Court of Appeals
held that:
"reason to know" implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor whereas
"should know" implies that the actor owes another the duty of ascertaining the
fact in question. "Reason to know" means that the actor has knowledge of facts
from which a reasonable man of ordinary intelligence or one of the superior
intelligence of the actor would either infer the existence of the fact in question or
would regard its existence as so highly probable that his conduct would be predi-
cated upon the assumption that the fact did exist. "Should know" indicates that
the actor is under a duty to another to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the
existence or non-existence of the fact in question and that he would ascertain the
existence thereof in the proper performance of that duty.
207 Md. at 33, 113 A.2d at 105-06.
47. Richwind, 335 Md. at 676-77, 645 A.2d at 1154.
48. Id. at 677, 645 A.2d at 1154-55.
49. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 cmt. b (1965)); see also Kleiman
v. Mono of Maryland, Inc., 254 Md. 548, 553-55, 255 A.2d 393, 396-97 (1969) (stating that a
landlord is under no duty to inspect property unless contractually obligated to do so).
50. Richuind, 335 Md. at 676, 645 A.2d at 1154. Specifically, the court expressed its
agreement with the amicus curiae brief of the Apartment Builders and Owners Council of
the Home Builders Association of Maryland, which stated that "the landlord's common law
right to notice and an opportunity to correct a particular defect is reinforced, not super-
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Richwind, unless the plaintiff is able to prove that a landlord knew or
had reason to know of the existence or danger of lead-based paint in a
particular home, the landlord may not be held liable for related inju-
ries.51 While the Richwind rule has yet to be applied, the court's care-
fully-chosen language indicates that, in cases falling outside the
framework of the Act, owners of lead-contaminated rental housing
may resist liability by arguing that they had no independent knowl-
edge of the existence of a hazard.52 The court expressly left this possi-
bility open, by stating that "knowledge of the fact that older homes
often contain lead-based paint, without the knowledge that the paint
in a particular older home is actually peeling or flaking, may be insuf-
ficient by itself to hold a landlord liable.""
The Richwind court did not articulate a standard for determining
when a landlord has notice of a hazardous condition. Such a determi-
nation is likely to focus on the facts of each case. For example, in
determining whether the property owner in Richwind had reason to
know of the potential hazards, the court paid particular attention to
the fact that during the period at issue (the mid-1980s), the potential
for lead poisoning from peeling paint in older buildings was "com-
monly known."54 The court further noted that the property manager
had sixteen years of experience in the housing market and had testi-
fied that he knew: (1) that older houses contained lead-based paint,
(2) that the building in question was old, and (3) that peeling lead-
based paint presented dangers to children.55
Prior to the Court of Appeals' decision in Richwind, the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland held in Hayes v. Ham-
bruch56 that, "[a]bsent notice to a landlord of the existence of lead-
based paint in leased premises, the landlord cannot be expected to
reasonably foresee the lead poisoning of a child living in those prem-
ises."57 The district court's application of Maryland tort principles
paralleled that of the Richwind court.58 It should be noted, however,
seded, by the provisions of the Baltimore City Code and the Bait. Pub. Local Laws." Id. at
675, 645 A.2d at 1154.
51. Id. at 678, 645 A.2d at 1155.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 679, 645 A.2d at 1155-56.
54. Id. at 678, 645 A.2d at 1155.
55. Id. at 678-79, 645 A.2d at 1155.
56. 841 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1994).
57. Id. at 711.
58. Id. at 710-12. The Hayes court declined to impose, under the Housing Code of
Baltimore City, "strict liability upon a landlord for a/ damages resulting from a known
housing code violation, whether or not such damages are reasonably foreseeable by the
landlord." Id. at 712.
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that the factual situation in Hayes differed in one significant respect
from that in Richwind: in Hayes, the lead poisoning occurred in the
mid-1970s. 59 According to the Hayes Court, "lead poisoning was not a
well known problem at that time. Thus, there is no evidence that de-
fendant was unreasonable in not being aware of the potential danger
resulting from paint in the leased premises."6
Cases decided concurrently with Richwind confirm that unless a
property owner (or an agent of the owner) either personally observes
chipping or peeling lead-based paint on the rented premises, or re-
ceives written or oral notice of those conditions from a tenant, it is
unlikely that the tenant will prevail on a negligence claim.6 1 In several
unreported cases decided the day after Richwind, the Court of Appeals
took the same position.62 This position is bolstered by the Richwind
court's statement that "general knowledge" of potential defects in
properties of similar age, construction or design may not be the basis
for imputing to the landlord specific "[k]nowledge of a condition
which involves unreasonable risk of physical harm."63  In effect,
Richwind imposes an obligation on the tenant to inform the landlord
of the presence of deteriorating paint. The importance of Richwind
rests upon these standards of liability which will govern cases that are
not subject to the Act's immunity provisions.
59. Id. at 711 n.2; see also Richwind, 335 Md. at 678, 645 A.2d at 1155 (differentiating
the facts of each case).
60. Hayes, 841 F. Supp. at 711 n.2. The court noted that "[a] different case might be
presented if plaintiffs had shown that the potential for lead poisoning was a danger that
landlords in general should have been aware of at the time of the alleged lead poisoning."
Id.
61. See Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 688, 693, 645 A.2d 1160, 1162-63 (1994). In Scrog-
gins, the plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that notice should be imputed to the property
owner because the owner had notice of a hole in the wall of the premises, and if he had
come to the apartment to repair the hole, he would have seen the flaking paint. Id. at 692,
645 A.2d at 1162. The Court of Appeals held that the landlord had not been given notice
and a reasonable opportunity to correct the lead hazard. Id. at 693, 645 A.2d at 1162-63.
In a case decided the same day as Scroggins, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims because
they never informed the landlords of the existence of chipping paint and "never requested
the premises be painted." Davis v. Stollof, 335 Md. at 695, 645 A.2d at 1164.
62. See, e.g., White v. R & S Constr. Co., No. 93-140 (Md. filed Aug. 23, 1994) (affirming
summary judgment for the landlords because they had no knowledge of any paint
problems until after child had been hospitalized and treated for severe lead poisoning);
Taylor v. Estate of Klotzman, No. 93-135 (Md. filed Aug. 23, 1994) (reversing summary
judgment on the issue of notice because the landlord's agents actually saw peeling paint
while on the premises).
63. Richwind, 335 Md. at 677, 645 A.2d at 1154.
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4. Analysis of Key Provisions of the Act.-
a. Covered and Exempted Properties and Persons.--The General
Assembly articulated the Act's three primary goals: the compensation
of persons at risk of lead poisoning, the improvement of rental hous-
ing containing lead-based paint, and the limitation on the liability of
property owners who comply with the Bill's requirements. 65
The Act's scope is broad, addressing all pre-1950 rental dwelling
units in the state,66 and those post-1949 units for which an owner
elects to "opt-in."67 The Act exempts property that is not expressly
covered.6" Affected property is also exempt if it is owned by a federal,
state, or local governmental unit and is subject to lead standards that
are at least equivalent to those contained in the new statute.69 The
Act further excludes affected property that has been certified "lead-
free" under Section 6-804.70 Finally, the Act defines a "person at risk"
to be "a child or a pregnant woman who resides or regularly spends at
least 24 hours per week in an affected property."71
b. Registration of Affected Property, Risk Reduction Standards,
and Notice to Tenants.-The Act contains three sets of requirements for
property owners. First, as of December 31, 1994, the owner of an af-
64. Because of the detailed nature of the legislation, this Note will not attempt to com-
prehensively summarize all of its provisions. For comprehensive summaries of the entire
Act, see HOUSE BILL 760, supra note 65 (on file with the House Environmental Matters
Committee, Lowe House Office Building, Annapolis, Md.); THE PROPERTY OWNERS Associ-
ATION OF GREATER BALTIMORE, INC., RENTAL PROPERTY OWNERS AND MANAGERS MANUAL:
LEAD POISONING PREVENTION PROGRAM (1994); University of Maryland Law Clinic, Sum-
mary of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Program Act (Sept. 7, 1994) (copies available from
the Law Clinic).
65. HOUSE ENVIRONMENTAL MAI-rERS CoMMrIrEE, HOUSE BILL 760: LEAD POISONING
PREVENTION PROGRAM (1994) (third reading file copy); see Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114,1994
Md. Laws 1282.
66. It is estimated that approximately 160,000 apartments and rental homes in the state
were built before 1950, and thus are subject to the Act, regardless of the "opt-in" provision.
Wheeler, Lead Law Begins Tomorrow, supra note 5, at BI.
67. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-801(B)(1), 1994 Md. Laws 1282. Excluded from
the definition of "owner" is "a trustee or beneficiary under a deed of trust or a mortgagee."
Id. § 6-801(0) (3).
68. Id. § 6-803(B) (1). Property not expressly covered is non-rental property, property
built after 1949, or property for which an owner has not elected to "opt-in" to the provi-
sions of the new law. Id. § 6-801(B).
69. Id. § 6-803(B) (2).
70. Id. § 6-803(B) (3). To obtain a "lead-free" certification, a property owner must sub-
mit to the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) an inspection report that:
(1) indicates that the affected property has been tested for lead-based paint in accordance
with MDE standards and procedures; (2) states that all exterior and interior surfaces of the
property are lead-free; and (3) is verified by an MDE-accredited inspector. Id. § 6-804.
71. Id. § 6-801(P).
934 [VOL. 54:891
MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
fected property must have registered that property with the MDE. 72
The registration of an affected property must be renewed annually
and updated periodically. 7' An owner who first acquires an affected
property after December 1, 1994, must register the property under
Section 6-811 within thirty days of the acquisition.' 4 The registration
provisions are equipped with a built-in enforcement incentive: own-
ers who fail to register or renew their registration under Section 6-812
will lose the protection from tort liability provided in Section 6-836.'
The second requirement, set forth in Section 6-815, provides
that, no later than the first change in occupancy in an affected prop-
erty on or after October 1, 1994, and before the next tenant moves in,
the owner of the affected property must either pass a test for lead-
contaminated dust, or perform specified "lead hazard reduction treat-
ments. " 7'6 At each change in occupancy thereafter, and before the
next tenant occupies the property, a landlord must satisfy a partial risk
reduction standard by passing a test for lead-contaminated dust set
72. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-811(A)(1), 1994 Md. Laws 1282. Registration con-
sists of providing the MDE with the following: (1) the name and address of the owner; (2)
the address of the affected property; (3) the name and address of each property manager
employed by the owner to manage the affected property; (4) insurance information; (5)
the name and address of a resident agent, or contact person with respect to the affected
property; (6) the date of construction; (7) the date of the last change in occupancy; (8) the
dates and nature of treatments performed to attain a risk reduction standard under §§ 6-
815 or 6-819 of the statute; and (9) the latest date, if applicable, on which the property has
been certified to be in compliance with the provisions of § 6-815 of the statute. Id. § 6-
811 (B); see infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
While under consideration, H.B. 760 was amended to add a confidentiality provision
by which MDE may disclose whether the owner has met the percentage of inventory re-
quirements as specified in § 6-817, but may not disclose "an inventory or list of properties
owned by an owner." Id. § 6-811 (C) (2).
73. Id. § 6-812(A)(1).
74. Id. § 6-812(B).
75. Id. § 6-813(A). "A person who willfully and knowingly falsifies information filed in
a registration or renewal under [§ 6-812] is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is
subject to a fine not exceeding $1000." Id. § 6-813(B).
76. Id. § 6-815(A). Section 6-815(A) (2) delineates what is known as the "full risk re-
duction standard" that must be met by all properties, beginning on October 1, 1994, when
the first change in occupancy occurs and before the next tenant moves in. The lead haz-
ard reduction treatments consist of the following: (1) visual review of all exterior and
interior painted surfaces; (2) removal and repainting of chipping, peeling, or flaking paint
on exterior and interior surfaces; (3) repair of structural defects that cause paint to chip,
peel, or flake, of which the owner knows or should know; (4) stripping and repainting,
replacing, or encapsulating all interior windowsills; (5) ensuring that caps are installed in
all window wells to make the wells "smooth and cleanable"; (6) fixing in place the top sash
of non-treated and non-replacement windows to eliminate friction caused by movement of
the top sash; (7) rehanging doors to prevent friction with other lead-painted surfaces; (8)
making bare floors "smooth and cleanable"; (9) covering kitchen and bathroom floors
with a smooth, water-resistant covering; and (10) washing and vacuuming the interior of
the dwelling with a high-efficiency particle air (HEPA) vacuum. Id. § 6-815(A) (2).
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forth in Section 6-816,"' or by repeating certain lead hazard reduction
treatments specified in Section 6-815(A) (2), and ensuring that other
lead hazard reduction treatments remain in effect.78
The Act sets up an elaborate timetable for the number of proper-
ties that must satisfy either the "full" or "modified"79 risk reduction
standard.80 The most significant provision mandates that at least half
of an owner's affected properties must satisfy the full risk reduction
standard specified in Section 6-815 by October 1, 1999, regardless of
the number of properties that have had a change in occupancy.81 By
October 1, 2004, an owner who has been notified in writing of the
presence of a "person at risk" on the premises must ensure that the
property satisfies the full risk reduction measures. 82 By October 1,
2004, an owner must also ensure that the modified risk reduction
standards are met at all affected properties. 8 An owner who fails to
meet the compliance deadlines risks losing immunity from tort
liability.8 4
After September 30, 1994, owners must meet the modified risk
reduction standards within thirty days of receiving written notice stat-
ing that (1) a person at risk who resides in the property has an ele-
vated blood lead level (EBL) of 15 ug/dL or above; or (2) a "defect"
exists at the property and a person at risk exists at the property.85
Prior to December 1, 1995, owners of more than 300 affected proper-
ties are given extensions to the thirty-day period.86
The Act's final requirement states that owners of affected prop-
erty must furnish tenants with notification of the tenant's rights under
Sections 6-817 and 6-819.87 Section 6-820(A) sets up a timetable by
which notification must be provided according to a specified percent-
77. "The [MDE] shall establish procedures and standards for the optional lead-con-
taminated dust testing by regulation." Id. § 6-816. At this writing, the final regulations
have not been promulgated. See supra note 5.
78. Id. § 6-815(B) (2); see supra note 76.
79. Id. § 6-819(A). The "modified" standard is similar to the "full" standard, but it does
not require that all bare floors be made smooth and cleanable, and it limits HEPA-vacuum-
ing and phosphate washing to only treated areas, Id.
80. Id. § 6-817.
81. Id. § 6-817(A)(1).
82. Id. § 6-817(B)(1).
83. Id. § 6-819(E).
84. Id. §§ 6-817(A)(2)(I), (B)(2)(I).
85. Id. § 6-819(C)(1).
86. Id. § 6-819(C) (2) (II). Specifically, if the owner received notice of the existence of
a person at risk on the premises, the owner has 60 days to clean up the property. If the
notice states only that there is a defect, the owner has 90 days to comply. Id.
87. Id. § 6-820. Owners must also disclose to prospective purchasers an obligation to
fulfill either a modified or full risk reduction. Id. § 6-824.
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age of an owner's tenants. 8 8 For example, at least twenty-five percent
of an owner's tenants must receive notification by January 1, 1995.89
All of an owner's tenants must receive notification by October 1,
1995.90
c. Limitations on Tort Liability. -The most hotly debated pro-
vision of the Act is a quid pro quo mechanism that provides owners of
dwelling units built prior to 1950 with immunity for lead poisoning
injuries discovered after October 1, 1994, if they comply with the Act's
registration, cleanup, and notification provisions. 1 Specifically, a per-
son may not sue a landlord who is in compliance with the Act for
damages arising from injury to a person at risk caused by his or her
ingestion of lead that is first documented by a test performed after
September 30, 1994, showing an elevated blood level (EBL) of 25 ug/
dL or more, unless two conditions are met: (1) the owner must have
been given written notice of the EBL of the person at risk and (2) the
owner must have been given the opportunity to make a "qualified of-
fer" as provided in Section 6-831.§2 This limitation on tort liability is
broad, but applies only prospectively to "all potential bases of liability
for alleged injury or loss to a person caused by the ingestion of lead by
a person at risk in an affected property. "93
Another controversial aspect of the statute is the mechanism by
which owners may extinguish their tort liability-the "qualified of-
fer."9 4 The offer is the landlord's agreement to pay for relocation and
medically necessary treatment for a person at risk (usually a child)
88. Id. § 6-824.
89. Id. § 6-820(A).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 6-836. Section 6-836 states that:
An owner of an affected property is not liable, for alleged injury or loss caused by
ingestion of lead by a person at risk in the affected property, to a person at risk or
a parent, legal guardian, or other person authorized under § 6-833 of this subtitle
to respond on behalf of a person at risk who rejects a qualified offer made by the
owner or the owner's insurer or agent if, during the period of the alleged ingestion of
lead by the person at risk, and with respect to the affected property in which the
exposure allegedly occurred, the owner [has met the registration, risk reduction,
and notification requirements of the statute].
Id. For a discussion of the qualified offer, see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
92. Id. § 6-828.
93. Id. § 6-827. The Act's prospective application, by virtue of the specification of the
cutoff date of October 1, 1994, for test results, means that claims arising out of the inges-
tion of lead before the statute's effective date are preserved unless the ingestion of lead
occurred before the effective date but the testing was not performed until October 1, 1994,
or later. See University of Maryland Law Clinic, supra note 64, at 16.
94. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, §§ 6-826 to -841, 1994 Md. Laws 1282.
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who has sustained lead-related damages.9 5 An offer that has not been
accepted within thirty days of its receipt by the parent or guardian of
the person at risk is considered rejected. 6 Acceptance of a qualified
offer "discharges and releases all potential liability" of the offeror.
9 7
Likewise, an owner is not liable if the person at risk rejects a qualified
offer and the owner of the property was in compliance with the statu-
tory requirements of registration, risk reduction, and notice.9"
5. Effect of the New Statute on Landlord Liability.-While the Act
explicitly extinguishes landlords' tort liability for lead paint injuries
under specific circumstances, an owner remains subject to existing
tort law if he or she does not comply with the Act.9 In addition, the
Act does not apply to cases arising from test results that showed ele-
vated blood lead levels before the Act became effective."' 0 The Act
thus codifies the common-law notion that a landlord must have notice
and a reasonable opportunity to correct a hazardous condition,10 ' and
envisions the tenant triggering the obligations of the landlord
through provision of such notice. First, the tenant in an affected
property may notify an owner of a defect and thereby trigger the land-
lord's obligation to comply with the modified risk reduction stan-
dards.10 ' Second, the tenant's provision of written notice to the
landlord is required before the landlord will initiate the "qualified
offer."1 0
3
In cases to which the Act applies, a tenant's potential damages
are greatly reduced, but in return, the legal consequences of a ten-
ant's notice to the landlord may force compliance with the Act.'
Upon receipt of notice, landlords who wish to avail themselves of the
Act's immunity must make a qualified offer within thirty days.' 015 As a
result, tenants have the ability to force the landlord to address the
95. Id. § 6-839. The aggregate maximum cap for relocation expenses is set at $9500.
Id. § 6-840(A) (2). Medical expenses are capped at $7500. Id. § 6-840(A) (1). Thus, the
total amount of the landlord's liability under a qualified offer is $17,000.
96. Id. § 6-834(C).
97. Id. § 6-835.
98. Id. § 6-836. For the text of § 6-836, see supra note 91.
99. Id. § 6-828; see supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of
Appeals' articulation of the landlord's standard of care in Richwind).
100. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-828(B), 1994 Md. Laws 1329; see supra notes 91-93
and accompanying text.
101. Richwind, 335 Md. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1152-53; see aiso RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTS § 358 (1965).
102. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-819(C), 1994 Md. Laws 1322.
103. Id. § 6-828(B)(1).
104. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
105. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-831(C)(1), 1994 Md. Laws 1330.
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presence of deteriorating lead-based paint or forego statutory immu-
nity. Significantly, one action the landlord must take in connection
with the qualified offer is the provision of relocation expenses to the
tenant. 1 06 This provision represents an important opportunity for ten-
ants to prevent repeated or prolonged lead exposures that may, in
fact, provide a far more effective remedy than could be obtained
through an action in tort.10 7
The Act also alters the traditional cause of action in negligence
against landlords who do not comply with its provisions.108 Specifi-
cally, a landlord, who has not met the risk reduction standard for an
affected property during the period in which a person at risk resided
on the property, is presumed to have failed to exercise reasonable
care with respect to lead hazards in a subsequent negligence action.109
The property owner, rather than the plaintiff, then has the burden of
rebutting the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.'
The Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, in response to a
challenge to the Act's constitutionality,' summarized the qualified
offer provisions of the Act as follows:
If accepted, a qualified offer bars all further action unless the
owner subsequently fails to meet its terms. If the offer is re-
jected, all further action is also barred unless the owner has
failed to comply with the requirements of the law at any time
during the residence of the child or pregnant woman on
whose behalf the claim is made. 1 2
The Attorney General's office recognized that the Act results in a con-
siderably altered cause of action for claimants whose injuries are diag-
nosed after the Act's effective date. 1 ' While the Act limits damages
106. Id. § 6-839(A)(1).
107. See LEA PAIr POISONING COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 3 ("[T]he primary means of
both preventing and treating lead poisoning is placement in (or relocation to) lead-safe
housing.").
108. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-828, 1994 Md. Laws 1329.
109. Id. § 6-838.
110. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-838(B), 1994 Md. Laws 1333.
111. A question arose during consideration of H.B. 760 as to whether the provisions of
the legislation extinguishing the tort rights of some plaintiffs presented a violation of equal
protection principles. See Letter from Kathryn M. Rowe, Assistant Attorney General, to
Hon. Ronald A. Guns, Chair, House Environmental Matters Committee (Mar. 17, 1994)
(on file with the House Environmental Matters Committee, Lowe House Office Building,
Annapolis, Md.). Rowe stated that the Constitution "does not forbid the creation of new
rights or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law to obtain a permissible
legislative object." Id. at 2 (quoting Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929)).




under qualified offers, it creates strict liability." 4 Where the property
owner is not in compliance, the tenant is under no obligation to ac-
cept a qualified offer; in this situation, the bill "creates a presumption
of failure to exercise reasonable care and places no limit on
damages."1 15
The Act incorporates another powerful inducement to property
owners to remediate lead hazards. Under Section 6-830, the ingestion
of lead will be presumed to have occurred at some other property if
test results of 25 ug/dL occur within thirty days after the person at risk
begins residing or regularly spending at least twenty-four hours per
week at an affected property, provided the property has been cleaned
up in accordance with Section 6-815.116 By cleaning up a rental prop-
erty in compliance with the Act, the landlord, in effect, has purchased
a form of insurance against the potential liability for lead poisoning in
a tenant's child.
6. Conclusion.--Given the questionable efficacy of the current
system of tort liability and the companion goals of preventing cases of
lead poisoning and maintaining the stock of affordable housing, the
Maryland General Assembly has gambled on a revolutionary measure
to further these two goals. If the Act functions as intended, increasing
numbers of property owners will undertake to clean up lead hazards
in their rental properties. The Act is structured, moreover, so that
tenants may use the provision of notice to their landlords as a sword to
force action before injuries occur. The Act's requirement that tenants
be provided with notice of their rights under the new statute is partic-
ularly critical in this regard.
The Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention Act contains powerful in-
centives for property owners to comply with its provisions. Noncom-
pliance destroys the opportunity for statutory immunity. Although
lead paint plaintiffs in tort actions do not uniformly prevail, property
owners should realize that a single substantial recovery mayjeopardize
their businesses, or, at a minimum, result in significant financial dis-
tress.117 Property owners may gamble with noncompliance, but those
who face tort liability as a result will carry the additional burden of
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 114, § 6-830, 1994 Md. Laws 1329-30. After September 30,
1999, the presumption applies when the EBL is 20 ug/dL or greater. Id.
117. Large recoveries in lead paint suits are not unprecedented. See, e.g., RichwindJoint
Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 687, 645 A.2d 1147, 1160 (1994) (affirming jury's
award of compensatory damages of $518,444 to plaintiffs); see also supra note 19.
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The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit
XI. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Exploring the Boundaries of Section 1983 and Title VII
In Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a case-specific
finding of fact was required to determine whether a private volunteer
fire company qualified as either a state actor or an employer subject to
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or under Title VII. 2 In so ruling, the
court upheld the broad remedial purposes of civil rights statutes and
opened new possibilities to volunteers in organizations who seek re-
covery for workplace discrimination. Courts should not, however, mis-
interpret Haavistola as reserving all such definitional questions for the
fact finder. Particularly in Section 1983 cases, judges must analyze dif-
ficult issues to promote clarity and uniformity in the law.
1. The Case.-Paula Haavistola and Kenneth Truitt were both
volunteer members of the Community Fire Company of Rising Sun
(Fire Company),' a private corporation that receives twenty to forty
percent of its annual budget from the State of Maryland.4 Although
the fire fighters receive no salary for their work, they do receive a
number of statutory benefits in return for their services.5
Haavistola claimed that Truitt sexually assaulted her on March
24, 1990, while both of them were on duty.6 At the next Fire Com-
pany board of directors meeting, Haavistola reported the alleged as-
1. 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993).
2. See id. at 221-22.
3. Id. at 213.
4. Id. at 218.
5. Id. at 221. Haavistola received the following benefits pursuant to membership: A
state-funded disability pension, survivors' benefits for dependents, scholarships for depen-
dents upon disability or death, group life insurance, tuition reimbursement for courses in
emergency medical and fire service techniques, coverage under Maryland's Workers Com-
pensation Act, tax-exemptions for unreimbursed travel expenses, ability to purchase (with-
out paying extra fees) a special commemorative registration plate for private vehicles, and
access to a method to obtain certification as a paramedic. Id.
6. Id. at 213. Haavistola initially communicated the charge to the Assistant Fire Chief,
who told her to present her claim to the Fire Company's board of directors. Id.
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sault.7 The board asked her to leave the room and questioned Truitt
separately.' Haavistola then returned to the meeting and repeated
the charge to Truitt, who denied all of the allegations.9 After consid-
ering the matter, the board voted to suspend Haavistola and Truitt
from membership indefinitely. 10
Dissatisfied with the board's response, Haavistola filed a criminal
complaint against Truitt in state court." Truitt was cleared of the
criminal charges, and reinstated with "good standing." 2 The Fire
Company refused to reinstate Haavistola, but did not terminate her.
1 3
On April 25, 1990, Haavistola filed a discrimination charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.14
Later, Haavistola filed suit against the Fire Company in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland 5 and alleged
discrimination under Section 198316 and under Title VII.' 7 The Fire
Company moved for summary judgment on both counts.18 The dis-
trict court dismissed the Title VII claim and held that Haavistola was
not an employee within the meaning of Title VII because she "volun-
teered" at the fire department. 19 The court then granted summary
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 213-14.





15. Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1379, 1381 (D.
Md. 1993).
16. Id. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
17. Haavistola, 812 F. Supp. at 1381. Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
in pertinent part
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national orign ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
18. Haavistola, 812 F. Supp. at 1381-82.
19. Id. at 1389-90. The court noted that "[o]ne who volunteers, and therefore donates
her time, is widely understood to be the opposite of one who is employed, and is compen-
sated for her time." Id. at 1389. Tide VII governs employers with 15 or more employees.
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judgment on Haavistola's Section 1983 claim against the Fire Com-
pany because it was not a "state actor." °2 Haavistola thereupon ap-
pealed the district court's decision.21
2. Legal Background.-
a. Motions for Summary Judgment. -Because summary judg-
ment standards require that the court view all evidence "in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion, "22 courts rarely dis-
posed of employment discrimination cases on summary judgment.23
Recently, in a trio of landmark cases, 24 the Supreme Court has at-
tempted to liberalize standards that govern the grant of summary
judgment and to encourage its usage to dispose of appropriate
cases. 2  Despite the Supreme Court's encouragement to dispose of
cases on summary judgment, courts remain constrained to try genu-
ine issues of material fact.26 "
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Because the district court found that volunteer fire fighters were not
employees, the Fire Company did not possess the requisite number of employees to fall
within Tide VII. Haavistola, 812 F. Supp. at 1389.
20. Haavistola, 813 F. Supp. at 1390-400. To be liable under § 1983, an organization
must qualify as a "state actor." Id. at 1390. Haavistola alleged that the Fire Company was a
state actor for any one of four reasons:
(1) [T]he Fire Company is subject to extensive regulation by the State, (2) the
Fire Company receives extensive public funding, (3) the Fire Company performs
a public function traditionally exclusively reserved to the State, and (4) attributes
of sovereignty are attached to the Company's firefighting function.
Id. at 1391. The district court found that because the "public function [doctrine] has been
given a 'narrow scope' in past decisions in [the Fourth] circuit," Maryland volunteer fire
departments operate in a "gray area" and are not state actors. Id. at 1398. See infra notes
27-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of a § 1983 claim.
21. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 213.
22. Id. at 214 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587-88 (1986)).
23. See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203, 206 (1993) ("Before the
summary judgment trilogy, courts had been reluctant to grant summary judgment to a
defendant in a civil rights case where questions of motive, intent and credibility existed.").
24. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (holding that the moving
party succeeds on summary judgment merely by pointing to an absence of evidence to
support an essential element of the nonmoving party's case); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (concluding that "there is no issue for trial unless there is
sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party."); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (holding that once a moving party has demon-
strated an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden reverts back to the non-
moving party to demonstrate "specific facts" showing a genuine issue for trial).
25. See generallyJohn V.Jansonius, The Role of Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimi-
nation Litigation, 4 LA. L.J. 747 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court's 1986 decisions
encourage federal courts to award summary judgment).
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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b. Liability under Section 1983.-
(i) Elements of Section 1983.-Proof of a Section 1983 claim
involves two elements: (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a
right secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States and
(2) the defendant acted "under color of law." 2' Rights secured by the
Constitution encompass privileges afforded through the Fourteenth
Amendment.28 The Supreme Court has interpreted the second ele-
ment, "under color of law," as equivalent to the "state action" require-
ment under the Fourteenth Amendment.' Accordingly, under
Section 1983, a private entity is only liable for those actions that are
"fairly attributable to the State."" °
The Supreme Court has developed three separate analyses to de-
termine when a private party's actions constitute state action. The
Court enunciated the "symbiotic relationship" test in Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority."1 This test examines whether "[t]he state
had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
[the defendant] that it must be recognized as a joint partici-
pant.... "2 Under the current interpretation of this test, courts only
find state action if the private entity is a lessee of state-owned prop-
erty.3" In a second line of cases, the Court has found state action
where the state has encouraged or coerced the behavior of the private
defendant to such an extent that the actions are considered those of
27. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1830 (1992); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 937 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
28. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-38 (1982) (explaining that Congress
enacted § 1983 to enforce "the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the states from
denying federal constitutional rights and which guarantees due process.... ."). The Four-
teenth Amendment provides that "[n] o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. RendeU-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838 ("'In cases under § 1983, "under color of law" has
consistently been treated as the same thing as the "state action" required under the Four-
teenth Amendment.'" (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966));
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 928.
30. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; Rendel-Baker, 457 U.S. at 830; see also Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at
156 ("[A plaintiff] must establish not only that [defendant] acted under color of the chal-
lenged statute, but also that its actions are properly attributable to the State."); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) ("[A § 1983] inquiry must be whether
there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regu-
lated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.").
31. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
32. Id. at 725.
33. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358 (refusing to find state action where the defendant did not
rent its facilities from the state); Burton, 365 U.S. at 726 (concluding that a restaurant that
leased state property was a state actor).
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the state.3 4 Lastly, the Court has found state action by employing the
"public function doctrine."35
(ii) The Public Function Doctrine.-In order to become a
"state actor," the public function doctrine requires that private actors
must both serve a public function and perform a traditionally exclu-
sive responsibility of the state.3 ' Because courts have found it difficult
to determine when the public function doctrine applies, the public
function doctrine has created liability only in a small category of
cases.
37
At the heart of the difficulty with the public function doctrine is
the Supreme Court's inability to state clear standards under which the
doctrine may be applied. In Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,38 the Court cre-
34. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) ("Our precedents indicate that
a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert,
that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."); see also Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970) (explaining that the plaintiff could establish a claim
by proving that the police supported and encouraged a policy of segregation in the local
restaurants).
35. For discussions of the public function doctrine, see Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842;
Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 158-59;Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-53. For a restrictive view of the test,
see Joseph W. Little, Section 1983 Liability of Municipalities and Private Entities Operating Under
Color of Municipal Law, 14 STETSON L. REv. 565, 587 (1985). Little notes:
Under this restrictive [public function] test, the provision of public or govern-
mental 'services' by a private entity is never found to constitute a 'public function'
except when the particular act is closely tied to the police powers of the state. If
history shows that the service had been provided by a private entity independently
of governmental authority, the service fails to satisfy the test.
Id.
36. The question is "not simply whether a private group is serving a 'public func-
tion'..... [T]he question is whether the function performed has been 'traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State.'" Rende-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (quotingJackson, 419 U.S.
at 353).
37. To date, the Supreme Court has invoked the public function doctrine only in cases
involving elections and "company towns." In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953), the
Court held that a political party running the county elections exercised state power. In
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946), the Court held that a private company
town performed the same functions as other towns.
More frequently, the Court has rejected application of the public function doctrine.
See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (declining to apply the public function doctrine to a
school for maladjusted students); Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-64 (refusing to use the doc-
trine in a case involving a warehouseman's proposed sale of goods that state statute en-
trusted to him for storage); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353-57 (refusing to find that a public utility
performed a public function).
38. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). Pursuant to New York's commercial law, a warehouseman
threatened to sell the plaintiffs goods because storage costs had not been paid. See id. at
151-52. The Court held that the public function doctrine did not make a warehouseman's
proposed sale of goods "state action." Id. at 163.
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ated confusion about the definition of an exclusive state activity. Ini-
tially, the Court indicated a narrow reading of the term "exclusive"
when it noted that "while many functions have been traditionally per-
formed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to
the state.'"3 9 In subsequent language in the opinion, the Court
"note [d] that there are a number of state and municipal functions...
which have been administered with a greater degree of exclusivity by States
and municipalities . .. ."4 The court recognized the possibility that
private entities who, for example, teach children or fight fires may be
state actors" even though such functions have never been solely re-
served to the states.42
(iii) Fire Fighting as a Public Function.--The Supreme Court
and the Fourth Circuit have never determined whether a private fire
company serves an exclusive state function. In Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.,43 the Supreme Court held that a private utility company
was not a state actor because the utility did not exercise a traditional
municipal power that was "required" of the state." Similarly, the 7agg
Bros. Court did not determine fire fighting was a required public func-
tion, although it raised this possibility in dicta.45
In Adams v. Bain,46 the Fourth Circuit concluded that whether a
private fire company should be treated as a state actor requires an in-
depth factual analysis and cannot be determined solely from the
39. Id. at 158 (quotingJackson, 419 U.S. at 352).
40. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
41. See id. at 163-64 (pointing out that "education, fire and police protection, and tax
collection" are government functions but declined to determine whether private parties
who perform these activities are state actors under the Fourteenth Amendment).
42. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 438, 489-90 (1954) (reviewing the history of
education in the United States and noting that education was only a function of the state
in our recent history); RONNY J. COLEMAN, OPPORTUNrIES IN FIRE PROTECTION 5 (1990)
(explaining that fire fighting has a long tradition of private volunteers dating back to the
colonial days).
Justice Stevens points out the inconsistency of the Court's two positions in his dissent
in Flagg Bros. "[The Court's] notion of exclusivity simply cannot be squared with the wide
range of functions that are typically considered sovereign functions... ." Flagg Bros., 436
U.S. at 173 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Simply put, if the test involves identifying state
functions "traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state," education and fire protection
would not be covered under the doctrine.
43. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
44. Id. at 352-53.
45. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 163-64.
46. 697 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1982). The court ruled on a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) and did not reach the merits of the case: "We need
not decide whether the VFD is a private organization and, if so, whether fire fighting per se
is an activity 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.'" Id. at 1218 (quoting
Rendel-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842).
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pleadings in a case.4 7 Two years later, in Kreiger v. Bethesda-Chevy Chase
Rescue Squad,4" the court considered whether privately organized res-
cue support and back-up services for on-duty fire fighters could be
called fire fighting services.49 While explaining that emergency assist-
ance did not constitute fire fighting,5 ° the court added in dicta that,
"[u]nquestionably firefighting is traditionally an exclusively public
function."'1 The court, however, provided no authoritative support
for this assumption. Few other circuits have addressed the question of
whether private volunteer fire companies are state actors, but those
courts that have considered the matter have found no state action on
the part of these private entities.52
c. Liability under Title /I.-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
"race, color, religion or national origin."" As a threshold matter, to
state a viable cause of action under Tide VII, plaintiffs must demon-
strate they are "employees" within the meaning of the Act.5 4 Courts
have addressed this question in two contexts. One line of case law
addresses whether plaintiffs qualify as employees or independent con-
tractors. In this context, the Fourth Circuit follows a combination of
the "economic realities"55 test and the common law "right-of-control"
47. Id. at 1218-19.
48. 599 F. Supp. 770 (D. Md. 1984), affid, 792 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1986).
49. Id. at 773.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 341 (5th Cir.) (taking "judicial
notice of the fact that there are a variety of private sector fire fighting alternatives; and fire
fighting is not generally an exclusive government function" and holding that volunteer fire
department did not qualify as a state actor under the public function doctrine), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 79 (1993); Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 856 F. Supp. 966, 974-75 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(declining to label a private fire company a state actor because "[a]lthough [companies]
perform a valuable public function, they generally do so independently of the governmen-
tal unit under whose authority they are organized."); cf Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer
Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 21-25 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that a volunteer fire department was
a state actor under provisions of a statute that declared the volunteers state employees and
relying on the "symbiotic relationship" test as well as the public function doctrine to find
state action).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
54. The Act defines employee as "an individual employed by an employer." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(f). Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day.. .. " Id. § 2000e (em-
phasis added).
55. First employed in Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947), the "economic reali-
ties" test defines employees as "those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent
upon the business to which they render service." Id. at 130.
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test.56 In Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc.," the court enumerated eleven
factors to be considered when determining whether a plaintiff is an
independent contractor or an employee for purposes of liability
under the Act.58
The second line of case law considers whether volunteers who
receive nonmonetary benefits are employees for the purposes of Title
VII. The Fourth Circuit has never addressed this question, but other
circuits that have spoken on this issue have not found liability in cases
where the volunteers received no salary or minimal fringe benefits in
exchange for their services.59 In Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo
Ass'n, Inc.,6" the Eighth Circuit held that because members of a female
rodeo association were volunteers, receiving no cognizable compensa-
tion, a man excluded from the Women's Professional Rodeo Associa-
tion (WPRA) could not sue under Title VII.61 The court explained
that "[c]entral to the meaning of [employer and employee relation-
ship] . . . is the idea of compensation in exchange for services ....
[This compensation may be paid] directly or indirectly, [as] wages or
a salary or other compensation."6 2
56. The common-law "right-to-control" test is derived from principles of agency and
'emphasizes the importance of the employer's control over the individual." Garrett v. Phil-
lips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1983). In Garret, the Fourth Circuit elected to
use "a combination of both the 'economic realities test' and the common law right-of-
control test" to determine whether a plaintiff is an employee under Tide VII. Id. at 981.
57. 721 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1983).
58. The court explained:
Under this test, control is still the most important factor to be considered,
but it is not dispositive. Other important considerations include:
(1) the kind of occupation with reference to whether the work usually is
done under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without
supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular occupation; (3) whether
the "employer" or the individual in question furnishes the equipment used
and the place of work; (4) the length of time during which the individual has
worked; (5) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the
manner in which the work relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or both
parties, with or without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is
afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the "em-
ployer"; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10)
whether the "employer" pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of
the parties.
Id. at 982 (quoting Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
59. See infra notes 60-64.
60. 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990).
61. Id. at 72-73. The court noted, "[T]he relationship between WPRA and its members
categorically resists classification as 'employment' according to the ordinary usage of that
term.... Members of WPRA receive no compensation from WPRA or from any other
source by reason of being members of WPRA." Id.
62. Id. at 73.
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Similarly, in Hall v. Delaware Council on Crime and Justice,6" the
Third Circuit found that members of the Delaware Council on Crime
and Justice were not employees under Title VII because "reimburse-
ment for some work-related expenses and free admittance to an an-
nual luncheon [did not] constitute compensation significant enough
to raise a volunteer to the status of employee."64 In these circum-
stances, courts that have decided cases involving uncompensated vol-
unteers, or volunteers who receive minimal fringe benefits, have not
allowed plaintiffs to proceed under Title VII.
3. Court's Reasoning.-The Fourth Circuit reviewed the Haavis-
tola record de novo and determined that summary judgment was inap-
propriate in the instant action.65 In view of the elements to be proved
in a § 1983 claim, the court first examined whether the Fire Company
was a state actor.6 The court identified the three "situations" in
which the Supreme Court has determined a private entity to be a state
actor: when the private entity (1) enjoys a "symbiotic relationship"
with the state; (2) operates under expansive state regulation; or (3)
performs activities traditionally carried out by the government.67 The
court dismissed the first two situations as completely inapplicable to
the case at bar.68 The court then focused on the "public function
doctrine" and whether fire protection is a "traditionally exclusive pre-
rogative of the State." 69
The court reviewed Fourth Circuit jurisprudence for guidance to
determine whether fire protection constitutes state action under the
public function analysis. Because prior case law raised the possibility
that fire fighting is a public function,7 ° the court rejected the district
court's cursory disposal of this issue on summary judgment.71 The
court further recognized that the Supreme Court had raised questions
63. 780 F. Supp. 241 (D. Del.), affd, 975 F.2d 1549 (3d Cir. 1992).
64. Id.
65. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 214.
66. Id. at 214-15.
67. Id. at 215.
68. Id. at 215-16. The court first explained that because the Fire Company owned all
of its own "buildings, vehicles, and equipment.., it is not engaged in any type of leasing
arrangement with a governmental unit that would give rise to a symbiotic relationship." Id.
at 215. The court found that "state regulation will convert private actions into state actions
... [only when] the regulatory scheme [impacts] directly the alleged constitutional viola-
tion." Id. Because the State of Maryland did not in any way regulate the Fire Company's
employment or volunteer relationships, there was no state action. Id. at 216.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1982); Krieger v. Bethesda-Chevy
Chase Rescue Squad, 599 F. Supp. 770 (D. Md. 1984).
71. Haavisto/a, 6 F.3d at 218.
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as to whether fire fighting was a public function in its Flagg Bros. deci-
sion.7" Ultimately, the court concluded that a public function analysis
is a "factually intense analysis" and "its outcome hinges on how a given
state itself views the conduct of the function by the private entity.""
Accordingly, the Haavistola court decided that further fact finding was
necessary and that the plaintiffs claim could not be resolved on sum-
mary judgment.74
With regard to Haavistola's Title VII claims, the court also found
the district court's grant of summary judgment premature.75 The
court characterized the essential issue as whether a fire company
member, who receives certain benefits pursuant to membership, is an
employee. 6 The court first surveyed the applicable law for finding
employer liability under Tide VII.77 The court found that existing
case law dealt with two circumstances: (1) whether a salaried individ-
ual was an employee or an independent contractor, 7' and (2) in-
stances in which an individual received no salary or benefits from the
alleged employer. 79 Because Haavistola received benefits but no sal-
ary from the Fire Company," the court held that Haavistola's situa-
tion did not clearly fall within either category as a matter of law."'
The court rejected the district court's characterization of Haavistola as
a volunteer who donates her time12 and held that a determination of
whether "benefits received by Fire Company members are insufficient
to make them employees under Title VII involves the resolution of a
disputed material fact."8" Before the judge can determine the appro-
priate precedent to apply, the fact finder must decide whether the
benefits received by this volunteer member of the Fire Company con-
stituted "compensation. " '
72. The court explained that "[a]t best, the language in F/agg Bros. shows the Supreme
Court acknowledgment that the fire protection may be an exclusive state function, but not
that it must be an exclusive state function." Haavisto/a, 6 F.3d at 216 n.1 (emphasis added);
see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
73. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 218.
74. Id. at 219.
75. Id. at 222.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 219-20.
78. This situation has been decided under the principles outlined in Garrett v. Phillips
Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
80. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221; see supra note 5.
81. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 221.
82. Id. at 221-22.
83. Id. at 221. The court noted that "[b]ecause compensation is not defined by statute
or case law, . . . it cannot be found as a matter of law." Id. at 221-22.




a. Extending the Reach of Title VII and Section 1983.-In
Haavistola, the Fourth Circuit provided a new opportunity for volun-
teer organizations to fight discrimination. By its recognition that pri-
vate fire companies could be state actors,85 the court extended the
potential reach of Section 1983 to volunteer fire fighters. Because
Flagg Bros. recognized that education could be a public function,"b vol-
unteers in private educational institutions might be able to rely on
Haavistola as well. 7
With respect to Title VII, Haavistola could extend to volunteers
outside of the limited area of fire fighting and education. Because the
issue of compensation cannot be determined as a matter of law, 8 the
court has opened the door for individuals who do not receive tradi-
tional salaries to argue that Title VII applies to them. Of course,
Haavistola does not guarantee success on the merits, but it makes it
more likely that litigants will advance beyond the summary judgment
stage. At a minimum, an organization may be more willing to settle a
claim, rather than risk facing a jury trial. The Haavistola decision also
contravenes a trend, evidenced in some circuits, of frequent summary
judgment awards in civil rights claims to free up overburdened dock-
ets. 9 Additionally, some courts grant summary judgment because
they fear that a broad reading of civil rights statutes may bankrupt
private companies who lack the resources to pay substantial
judgments. 90
85. Id. at 218.
86. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978).
87. Because the public doctrine only applies if the private entity performs an activity
that has traditionally been an exclusive state responsibility, few organizations qualify as
state actors under § 1983. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982). The F/ag
Bros. opinion also mentions police protection and tax collection as candidates for consider-
ation under the public function doctrine. 436 U.S. at 163-64.
88. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 211-12.
89. See McGinley, supra note 23, at 203. Professor McGinley points out that "[c]ivil
rights are under siege" by certain federal judges who have interpreted the liberalized sum-
mary judgment standards as a license to award summary judgment "in cases where plain-
tiffs' claims appear weak or unpersuasive." Id. at 207. These judges may use summary
judgment in borderline cases to reduce the large volume of discrimination lawsuits in fed-
eral courts. See genera/y Jonsonius, supra note 25, at 747. In fact, "[c] ivil rights actions
constitute one of the most significant components of the federal courts' dockets ....
During the twelve-month period endingJune 30, 1987, for example, plaintiffs filed 43,359
civil rights complaints . . . constituting more than 18% of the total cases commenced."
Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil
Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARv L. Rkv. 935, 935 (1990).
90. The district court in Haavistola wrote that, if faced with Title VII liability, private
fire companies may not be able to survive. Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 812 F. Supp.
1379, 1400 (D. Md. 1993). The district court declared:
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These proponents of judicial efficiency fail to appreciate the seri-
ous and important scope of civil rights statutes. Civil rights statutes
are remedial in nature and intended to be liberally construed.91
When a judge narrowly construes statutes in order to reduce the
number of cases on the federal docket, the overall scope of the stat-
utes is narrowed. As a consequence-contrary to the intention of the
legislature-the remedial promise of the statutes goes unfulfilled.
The Haavistola court's decision attempts to fulfill the promises of civil
rights statutes, not narrow them.
b. Allocation of Decision-making Between the Judge and the Jury.-
Although the Fourth Circuit refused to decide the appellant's claims
as a matter of law, the court did not direct trial courts to place the
definitional issues raised in Haavistola unilaterally in the hands of the
jury.92 Such issues of fact may be decided by the judge or the jury.
More particularly, submission of state action questions to the jury is
problematic. First, the application of the public function test involves
a complicated analysis that may be difficult for a jury to compre-
hend.9 Additionally, jury instructions fail to convey the full meaning
and intricacy of legal doctrine. 4 Because different juries may decide
[p]ublic policy demands that this Court recognized the realities of small commu-
nity fire department operation. Such companies play a vital role in the communi-
ties which they serve and, when possible, their continued existence should be
encouraged .... Placing [a burden of liability] upon voluntary community as-
sociations might well force them to abandon their core mission: to provide qual-
ity, cost-effective fire protection to the rural communities of Maryland.
Id.
91. See Linda L. Holdeman, Civil Rights in Employment: The New Generation, 67 DENV. L.
REv. 1, 46 (1990) (noting that after Title VII was enacted in 1964, the Supreme Court
carried out congressional intent to end discrimination "by its willingness to place ajudicial
thumb on the scales in favor of disadvantaged groups, when doing so would assist Title VII
plaintiffs to fulfill their roles as private attorneys general.").
92. It is possible that future courts could misinterpret the Haavistola holding to require
submission of questions of state action or employee status to a jury. For instance, on re-
mand, the district court in Haavistola directed the jury to determine whether "[Haavistola]
was an employee of the fire company and whether [the Fire Company] acted under state
law." Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 839 F. Supp. 372, 373 (D. Md. 1994). In an un-
published concurrence to Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 1994 WL
233356 (4th Cir. May 31, 1994), Judge Wilkinson expressed concern that the interpreta-
tion of Haavistola "implies that this state action issue is one of triable fact to be submitted
to juries seriatim." Id. at *2 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
93. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. But see Haavistola v. Community Fire
Co., 839 F. Supp. 372, 372-73 (D. Md. 1994) (finding by jury that fire company volunteers
are not employees acting under state law).
94. SeeJohn M. Baker, The Shrinking Role of the Juiy in Constitutional Litigation, 15 WM.
MrrCHELL L. REv. 697, 707 (1990) ("In theory, it may be possible to quote the Court's test
in an instruction and hope that the jury's application of it will reflect the interests and
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differently on similar facts, similarly situated fire companies will be
subjected to differing liability.95 Without uniform standards gov-
erning their behavior, fire companies will be uncertain how to pro-
ceed. Consequently, to ensure equal application of this complex
doctrine and to further public understanding of the doctrine's appli-
cation, it would be desirable to allocate state action determinations to
judges who must support their findings in full judicial opinions.
5. Conclusion.-By enabling Haavistola to move beyond sum-
maryjudgment to ajury question, the Fourth Circuit has provided an
important opening for volunteers who face discrimination in the
workplace. By the same token, judges are better positioned to deter-
mine Section 1983 state action issues than juries. The determination
of state action questions by judges, moreover, would help clarify the
public function doctrine and better ensure its fair application to all
similarly situated litigants.
MAuRA L. DEMouy
values which the Supreme Court had in mind. In practice, however, something will be lost
in the translation.").
95. In Goldstein, Judge Wilkinson elaborated on this problem:
I fear, however, that the upshot of turning state action into ajury question will be
that volunteer fire companies whose circumstances are indistinguishable will find
themselves irreconcilably labelled....
This concern for uniformity that underlies the state action doctrine has been
well-served by treating state action questions as questions of law to be determined
by judges, rather than as questions of fact to be decided by juries.
Goldstein, 1994 WL 233356 at *2-3 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
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XII. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. RCRA Consent Order Preempts State-Law Injunction
In Feikema v. Texaco, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA),2 or an administrative consent order en-
tered pursuant to it,3 preempted state common-law causes of action
for nuisance and trespass.4 In the matter of common-law compensa-
tory damage claims, the court held that neither RCRA nor the consent
order, which made no provision for the payment of damages, pre-
empted such state law claims.5 However, because the consent order of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had not yet been ful-
filled or terminated, the request for injunctive relief was preempted.6
In so holding, the court fashioned a narrow holding limited to those
cases involving a prior consent order.
The Feikema holding conforms with the legislative intent of RCRA
and other federal environmental laws. Feikema leaves some room,
however, for claims of injunctive relief under RCRA where, for exam-
ple, the EPA or the "state authority"7 has yet to take any action, or
where the injunctive relief requested will not conflict with any prior
official action.
1. The Case.-By 1990, it became apparent to Mr. and Mrs.
Feikema, and several other residents of their Fairfax, Virginia neigh-
borhood (collectively, the Homeowners), that a leak of petroleum
products8 from a nearby petroleum "tank farm" had moved under-
1. 16 F.3d 1408 (4th Cir. 1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. V 1993). RCRA was enacted in 1976 to
amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act which had been in existence since 1965. Substantial
amendments were added through the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,
the Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, and the Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (Short Tides).
3. RCRA § 7003, provides that "[t]he Administrator may also, after notice to the af-
fected State, take other action under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such
orders as may be necessary to protect public health and the environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6973(a).
4. Fekema, 16 F.3d at 1410.
5. Id. at 1418. The defendants conceded that "if the complaint were construed as one
for damages... the RCRA does not preempt the damages claims." Id. at 1417.
6. Id. at 1416.
7. States may seek authorization from the EPA to administer and enforce a hazardous
waste program pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6926. Such programs must be consistent with the
federal program and must be either equivalent to or more stringent than the federal pro-
gram. See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).
8. The types of petroleum products were described in detail in another action arising
from the same leak. See Adams v. Star Enter., 851 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Va. 1994). The court
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ground and within close proximity to their homes.9 The source of the
leak was a petroleum distribution terminal owned by Texaco, Inc.1 0
The leak formed a plume of oil which was flowing underground
through a "'recharge' area of an aquifer."" Although the Virginia
State Water Control Board had taken action to control the leak, the
situation worsened.1 2 Thereafter, the EPA was brought in to imple-
ment a more rigorous program to eliminate and recover the released
petroleum.13
On September 23, 1991, pursuant to Section 7003 of RCRA,"4 the
EPA and Texaco entered an administrative consent order (consent
order) .5 The consent order required, inter alia, that Texaco contain
and clean the oil which had contaminated the creek, and that Texaco
excavate and remove contaminated soils.16 Additionally, the consent
order required Texaco to develop and submit a corrective action plan
to be implemented under an EPA-approved schedule.1 7
In March 1993, the Homeowners filed a diversity action against
Texaco in federal district court alleging nuisance and trespass under
Virginia common law. 8 The Homeowners prayed for injunctive relief
in the form of greater remedial measures to contain and clean up the
leak. 9 In addition, they sought compensatory damages for the actual
contamination of their property.20 Texaco moved to dismiss on
grounds of improper pleading of diversity and federal preemption of
state law.21 The district court dismissed the complaint on preemption
grounds, and the Homeowners appealed.22
described the leak as a " ' major discharge' of oil in excess of 100,000 gallons" which con-
sisted of diesel fuel, jet fuel or kerosene, and gasoline. Id. at 771.
9. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1410. The Homeowners alleged to have noticed a visible sheen
of oil upon a nearby creek. Id.
10. Id. Texaco, Inc., Texaco Refining and Marketing (East), Inc., Saudi Refining, Inc.,
and Star Enterprises (collectively, Texaco) had all been named defendants in the Home-
owners' action. Id. at 1408.
11. Id. at 1410. An "aquifer" is an underground layer of porous rock which usually
contains water. WEBSTER'S NEW WoRD DIcrIoNARY 29 (1990).
12. See Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1410-11.
13. Id. at 1411.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 6973.
15. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1411. The EPA determined that the leak "might present an







21. Id. at 1410, 1412.
22. Id. at 1411.
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2. Legal Background.-
a. Diversity and the "Amount in Controversy" Requirement. -A
party properly invokes federal diversity jurisdiction by establishing di-
versity of citizenship and by alleging the necessary amount in contro-
versy.2" Where the case involves more than one plaintiff, the amount
in controversy may be pleaded either by attributing damages of over
$50,000 to each plaintiff or by aggregating the plaintiffs' claims to
meet the required amount.24 Aggregation of claims among plaintiffs,
however, is generally limited to those cases where the plaintiffs share
"a common and undivided interest."15 Thus, in Eagle v. American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co.," aggregation was allowed among the minority
shareholders of Pacific Telephone and Telegraph (PT&T) who
brought suit against AT&T in its capacity as the majority shareholder
of PT&T.27  The minority shareholders alleged that AT&T had
breached its fiduciary duty, resulting in considerable depreciation in
the value of PT&T stock.28 The Eagle court concluded that the minor-
ity shareholders had suffered an indirect injury and that the source of
the shareholders' claim was the common and undivided interest each
shareholder had in the corporation's assets. 29
The test set forth in Eagle was derived from the Supreme Court's
ruling in Snyder v. Harris.3° In Eagle, the court maintained that the
status of claims as "common and undivided" is determined by inquiry
into the "character of the interest asserted.""' In addition, "the char-
acter of the interest asserted depends on the source of plaintiffs
claims."12 Claims are deemed common and undivided when their
source and derivation is from rights which the plaintiffs' hold in
"group status."33
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
24. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
25. Id.
26. 769 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denie4 475 U.S. 1084 (1986).
27. Id. at 546-57.
28. Id. at 542-43.
29. Id. at 546-47 (maintaining that wrongful depletion of corporate assets is an injury
to the corporation which only results in an indirect injury to shareholders).
30. Id. at 546; see Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
31. Eage, 769 F.2d at 546.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Potrero Hill Community Action Comm. v. Housing Auth., 410 F.2d
974, 978 (9th Cir. 1969)).
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b. Preemption of State Common-Law Causes of Action.-Gener-
ally, preemption of state law is disfavored.14 Nevertheless, Congress
has the power to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause. 5
Various reasons have been suggested to explain the necessity for fed-
eral preemption, such as the need for uniformity, 6 the elimination of
dual systems of regulation, 7 and the realization of benefits to be de-
rived from a centralized federal agency which can boast specialized
knowledge and experience.3 8 These reasons are generally set forth in
response to the central concern in preemption cases-the fulfillment
of congressional purpose.3 9 Concomitant with the threshold inquiry
in regard to congressional purpose is an additional inquiry into the
scope or "domain expressly preempted" by the legislation at issue.40
Historically, the scope of preemption has been sufficiently broad
to allow preemption of state legislative enactments.'" The Supreme
Court has further established that regulations promulgated by a fed-
eral agency may have preemptive effect on state laws to the extent that
the agency has acted within its statutory authority but has not acted
34. SeeJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) ("'[W]e start with the as-
sumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'") (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
35. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that "the Laws of the United States... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding").
36. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959) ("We
have necessarily been concerned with the potential conflict of two law-enforcing authori-
ties, with the disharmonies inherent in two systems, one federal the other state, of inconsis-
tent standards of substantive law and differing remedial schemes.").
37. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 234 (holding that the United States Warehouse Act preempted
state law as an exclusive system of federal regulation of warehouses licensed under the Act
except where the Act expressly provides for state regulation in particular phases of the
warehouse business). But cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 218-19, 233 (1983) (finding that dual regulation in
nuclear industry was permissible since the state nuclear waste disposal statute focused on
the economic impact of further growth in the nuclear power industry rather than safety,
which was the focus of the federal regulation).
38. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246 (holding that state court lacked authority to award
damages for economic injury resulting from the peaceful picketing at plaintiffs lumber
business where the National Labor Relations Board had specifically declined to act on the
matter pursuant to the authority of the National Labor Relations Act).
39. See, e.g., Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103
(1963) ("The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone."); Garmon, 359 U.S. at 240
(stating that courts must "carry[ ] out with fidelity the purposes of Congress").
40. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992).
41. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06, 436 (1819) (holding
that the Supremacy Clause rendered unconstitutional a Maryland law designed to impose a
tax on the Bank of the United States).
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arbitrarily in so doing.42 As a final matter, the Court has determined
that the preemption doctrine may extend to common-law damage ac-
tions because such actions can be "regulatory" in effect.43
Once the threshold inquiries into congressional purpose and the
scope of preemption are satisfied, the courts must next establish the
mechanism through which preemption occurred. Preemption of
state laws and regulations may occur in a number of ways.' First,
Congress may expressly preempt state laws.45 Second, preemption
may arise by implication: where the inference can be made that Con-
gress intended to "occupy the field" through comprehensive legisla-
tion.' Lastly, state law may be preempted "to the extent it actually
conflicts with federal law."47 Conflict preemption occurs where "it is
[either] impossible to comply with both state and federal law, " " or
"where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 49
42. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984); see also Fidelity Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982).
43. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247 ("The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is
designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy."); accord
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620 (recognizing that state law includes common law in addition to
state statutes and regulations because "'[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted
through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief") (quoting Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. at 247).
44. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992)
(finding that there are three methods of preemption: (1) express preemption; (2) "field"
preemption; and (3) "conflict" preemption); see also Caroline E. Boeh, Note, Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.: One Step Closer to Exterminating the FYFRA Pre-emption Controversy, 81 Ky.
L.J. 749, 756-57 n.64 (1993) (asserting that there are four means by which Congress may
preempt state law). While the number of ways in which preemption may occur is subject to
debate, the practical application of proper preemption analysis should reveal that similar
results are achieved, regardless of how one labels the type of preemption.
45. See, e.g., Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618-19 (holding that the express language of the
Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act of 1965 "did not pre-empt state law dam-
ages actions").
46. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) ("In
the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress's intent to pre-empt all state law in
a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supple-
mentary state regulation.") (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)). Preemption by implication is not to be "lightly infer[red]" by courts. Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987).
47. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (holding that an award for






3. The Court's Reasoning. -Feikema presented the Fourth Circuit
with a question of first impression: whether RCRA, or a consent order
entered pursuant to it, preempted state common-law causes of action
for nuisance and trespass where the plaintiffs sought both compensa-
tory and injunctive relief.5" As a threshold matter, the court consid-
ered whether the Homeowners properly pleaded diversity
jurisdiction. 5' Although the court concluded that diversity jurisdic-
tion was improperly pleaded,52 the court granted permission to
amend the complaint on remand in accordance with the liberal
amendment provisions of the Federal Rules.53
With regard to preemption, the court first noted that there was
no express provision in RCRA which "mandate[d] comprehensive
preemption of all state laws."54 The court then focused on whether
RCRA was comprehensive and pervasive enough to be considered an
implicitly preemptive regulation through occupation of the field or
whether RCRA was in conflict with the state causes of action.55 The
court concluded that RCRA did not negate the state's authority to reg-
ulate in the field of hazardous waste.56 The court similarly found
nothing in the plain language of the Act" nor in the legislative history
50. Feikema v. Texaco, Inc., 16 F.3d 1408, 1410 (4th Cir. 1994).
51. Id. at 1412.
52. Id. The court found that, although the plaintiffs had claims arising from a single
cause, they were divisible "with respect to the several properties." Id. The court thus distin-
guished the Homeowners' position from that of the plaintiffs in Eagle v. American Tel. &
Tel.. Id See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
53. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1412 (suggesting that the Homeowners' claims would meet the
jurisdictional amount in controversy and accepting as true the Homeowners' assertions
that each suffered damages amounting to approximately $156,250); see FED. R. CIV. P.
15(a).
54. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1413. The preemption provision of RCRA is limited and pro-
vides that "no State or political subdivision may impose any requirements less stringent
than those authorized under this subchapter .... Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to prohibit any State ... from imposing any requirements . . . which are more
stringent than those imposed by such regulations." 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988).
55. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1413.
56. Id. Although "RCRA is national in scope and universal in coverage," it calls for "a
cooperative effort" among the federal and state governments and provides that states may run
their own waste management programs with federal approval. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6902(a)(11), 6943).
The Homeowners argued that RCRA's savings clause, found at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(0,
negated the inference that Congress had meant RCRA to occupy the field. Id. at 1413-14.
However, the court correctly found that the "natural reading of the phrase, 'nothing in this
section shall restrict'" which appears in RCRA's savings clause applies only to the "citizen-
suit" provisions, in which § 6972(0 appears. Id. at 1414 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (f)).
Therefore, the court did not find the general savings clause determinative of whether Con-
gress intended RCRA to occupy the field of hazardous waste laws. Id.
57. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6973). Section 6973(a), tided "Authority of Administrator,"
provides in pertinent part:
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that suggested Congress intended 42 U.S.C. § 6973 "to be the sole
remedy against violators of the RCRA."5 8
The court reasoned that the consent order, like the Act itself,
derived preemptive authority from the Supremacy Clause.59 There-
fore, the consent order could also preempt state law actions which
conflicted with the Order.6" The court then applied the conflict pre-
emption test and determined that it would be impossible for Texaco
to comply with both the Homeowners' requested injunctive relief and
the EPA's consent order.6" Injunctive relief was necessarily pre-
empted by the consent order.62
Finally, as to the damages claims,6" the court relied upon past
precedent, ' legislative history,65 and application of the conflict pre-
emption test to hold that the Homeowners' damages claims were not
preempted by RCRA.66 Because the district court had dismissed the
complaint without consideration of whether the Homeowners had ad-
[U]pon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage . . .or
disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may
bring suit on behalf of the United States .... The Administrator may also, after
notice to the affected State, take other action under this section including, but
not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect public health
and the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 6973(a).
58. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1415. The court noted that the legislative history demonstrated
that the broad authority of the EPA to act in response to an imminent hazard situation was
complemented by "other efforts and remedies." Id.
59. See id. at 1416.
60. See id.
61. Id. The court acknowledged that Texaco was still operating under the consent
order and focused on the remedial measures contained in the consent order, particularly
upon a provision which required that any corrective action be submitted to and approved
by the EPA. Id. Because the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs specifically cov-
ered the same geographic area and the same or similar remedial measures, the court con-
cluded that to allow injunctive relief prior to termination of the consent order would be
tantamount to substituting the court's judgment for that of the EPA. Id.
62. Id.
63. Texaco argued that the Homeowners' complaint made no claim for damages or, in
the alternative, that the Homeowners had abandoned their damages claims. Id. at 1416.
However, the court found that the plaintiffs continued to assert actual damages and that
they had not waived the claim for damages. Id. at 1416-17 (noting that the Homeowners'
complaint included an ad damnum clause).
64. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
65. Feikema, 16 F.Sd at 1417 (citing H.R. REP. No. 198, Part III, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1983) and noting that pursuant to RCRA, the EPA is only given power to seek an injunc-
tion or other similar equitable relief); see also supra note 54.
66. Id. at 1418.
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equately pleaded actions for nuisance and trespass, the court re-
manded to allow the Homeowners to pursue those actions. 67
In a concurring opinion, Judge Mumaghan wrote to emphasize
that a consistent preemption analysis was applied to both the damages
claims and the injunctive relief.68 In recognition that damages actions
may be preempted to the same extent as injunctive suits,69 Judge
Murnaghan reasoned that the Homeowners' damages claims could be
preempted to the extent that they arose from conduct already regu-
lated by the consent order.7 °
4. Analysis.-
a. Damages and Injunctions Not Generally Preempted.-In
Feikema, the Fourth Circuit faced federal legislation that was not silent
as to preemption. RCRA has an express preemption provision which
preempts state requirements that are less stringent than those author-
ized under RCRA.71 Nor does 42 U.S.C. § 6929-the general savings
clause of RCRA-preempt state common-law actions, whether for
compensatory damages or for injunctive relief.72 Therefore, as to the
general preemptive effect of RCRA on state common-law claims, it was
unnecessary to look beyond the express language of the statute. 73 If
the initial inquiry in Feikema had been whether the compensatory
damages and the injunctive relief sought would "impose any require-
ments less stringent than those authorized under [the Act]," 74 the
court could have plainly concluded that, because RCRA only autho-
rizes injunctive relief,75 a request for damages under state law would
not be preempted because damages are plainly a more stringent re-
quirement than those imposed by the Act.
67. Id.
68. Id. (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 1418; see, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498 n.19
(1987).
70. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1419. Judge Murnaghan declared: "[W]e would not allow the
plaintiffs to gain indirectly, through the threat of monetary damages, what we have ex-
pressly prevented them from gaining directly through an injunction .... " Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 6929; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 54; see also Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1419 (Murnaghan,J., concurring) ("As
with injunctive relief, the plaintiffs' claim for damages is preempted on/y to the extent that
those damages arise from conduct regulated by the EPA's Consent Order.").
73. The court chose instead to focus on implicit field preemption and actual conflict
preemption at the initial stages of its preemption analysis. See id. at 1412-13.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 6929; see supra note 54.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a). There are no provisions in RCRA that authorize the EPA
to seek or declare compensatory relief.
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On the other hand, application of express preemption analysis to
claims for injunctive relief necessarily requires a detailed case-by-case
analysis to establish whether the relief requested imposes require-
ments less stringent than those authorized under RCRA. Because it
gave the express preemption analysis only a cursory review, the Feikema
court overlooked the possibility that, under certain circumstances,
neither compensatory damages nor injunctive relief will be pre-
empted by RCRA.76 However, because the provisions of RCRA call for
cooperation among federal, state, and local governments, 77 it is neces-
sary to analyze whether state laws, which purport to regulate in con-
junction with an EPA consent order, are preempted under RCRA.78
b. Preemption Due to Terms of Consent Order.-Under RCRA,
there is no express preemption of state common-law damage claims or
claims for injunctive relief. As the concurring opinion correctly
points out, both forms of relief are preempted "only to the extent that
[they] arise from conduct regulated by the EPA's Consent Order."79
The court in Feikema held that a non-arbitrary consent order negoti-
ated under the statutory authority of RCRA has the same supremacy
power and preemptive effect as a federal regulation or law.80 Thus,
under a preliminary preemption analysis," l it is clear that the consent
order is controlling.
76. Cf United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1454 (6th Cir. 1991)
("CERCLA sets only a floor, not a ceiling for environmental protection. Those state laws
which establish more stringent environmental standards are not preempted by
CERCLA.").
77. Section 6902(a) provides in pertinent part:
The objectives of this chapter are to promote the protection of health and the
environment and to conserve valuable material and energy sources by-
(1) providing technical and financial assistance to State and local govern-
ments.., for the development of solid waste management plans...;
(7) establishing a viable Federal-State partnership to carry out the purposes
of this chapter and insuring that the Administrator will... give a high priority to
assisting and cooperating with States... ;
(11) establishing a cooperative effort among the Federal, State, and local
governments and private enterprise in order to recover valuable materials ....
42 U.S.C. § 6902 (a).
78. It is precisely the cooperation explicitly called for in § 6902 that negates any infer-
ence of implicit field preemption. See supra note 77.
79. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1419 (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
80. See id. at 1416.
81. Preliminary preemption analysis under RCRA should take the form of an express
preemption inquiry, namely: whether the plaintiff's injunctive relief is less stringent than
that imposed under the consent order. See 42 U.S.C. § 6929.
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Since every consent order is different, courts must necessarily an-
alyze the requested relief on a case-by-case and claim-by-claim basis.
Therefore, the Feikema court should have gone through a full preemp-
tion analysis to establish whether the consent order preempted the
particular state regulations-here, damage claims and injunctive
claims.
Although the consent order is the vehicle of preemption, the
Feikema court did not establish whether it contained any express pre-
emptive language. The court simply stated that the consent order re-
quired Texaco, inter alia: (a) to take immediate remedial action, and
(b) to develop and implement an EPA-approved emergency measures
plan.82 After establishing that the consent order "derive[d] rights of
supremacy" from the Supremacy Clause, 3 the court proceeded di-
rectly to a conflict preemption analysis.8 4
There was insufficient evidence available at the appellate level to
establish whether the consent order expressly preempted either form
of relief requested. 5 It is clear, though, that the EPA had contem-
plated the need for future action to address areas not covered by the
consent order.8 6 Such open-ended regulation-the contemplation of
future measures-negates the inference that the Homeowners' re-
quest was expressly preempted. Arguably, the express possibility of
82. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1416 (stating that the record on review was silent as to the status
of the plan). In the absence of an express preemption provision or its equivalent, a con-
sent order entered pursuant to the authority of RCRA would import the express provision
of § 6929 which provides for preemption of less stringent regulations. The court ex-
plained that Texaco had implemented immediate remedial measures in accordance with
the consent order and that such requirements had been satisfied. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1416.
Therefore, the only remaining action under the consent order was for Texaco to submit an
emergency measures plan and to implement the plan upon EPA approval. Id. However,
the status of the emergency measures plan was unknown. Id. It is difficult to comprehend
how the court could pass upon the preemption issues, particularly the conflict issues re-
lated to the Homeowners' request for injunctive relief, without knowing the scope of the
conduct actually regulated by the emergency measures plan.
Since the requirements of the immediate remedial response plan had been satisfied, it
is possible that a conflict could arise if the requirements of that immediate remedial plan
were somehow undone by the requests for compensatory damages or injunctive relief. Yet
the Feikema court held that the Homeowners' claims for injunctive relief were preempted
without any evidence that such a conflict would occur. Conversely, if the request for dam-
ages sought recovery for something in actual conflict with a plan previously implemented
by the EPA, then an actual conflict would exist. See id. at 1419 (Murnaghan, J.,
concurring).
83. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1415.
84. Id. at 1416.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
86. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1411 ("[The consent order] recognized that the response action
might not address all contamination and that additional long-term measures might be
required.").
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"additional long-term measures" indicates that the EPA contemplated
soliciting the cooperation of the state in its efforts "to neutralize the
effects of the oil plume."87
The open-ended nature of the consent order also negates the in-
ference that the EPA intended implicitly to preempt further state ac-
tion through occupation of the field. Although Texaco may have
raised a colorable argument that the consent order had occupied the
particular "micro-field" related to this specific petroleum hazard
through comprehensive regulation, this argument fails to acknowl-
edge RCRA's goal of cooperative state and federal action." This posi-
tion also denies a strong presumption in favor of state law where the
state acts to protect the health and welfare of its citizens." The sav-
ings clauses of RCRA9° combine with the open-ended language of the
consent order to negate the inference that the EPA implicitly pre-
empted state action through comprehensive occupation of the field.
Because the EPA had selected and supervised the remedial meas-
ures, the Feikema court reasoned that the Homeowners' request for
injunctive relief was preempted by actual conflict.9" The court failed,
however, to analyze whether the damages claims were also in conflict
with the consent order.92 Moreover, the opinion provided only brief
analysis of the preemptive effect of the consent order on the particu-
87. Id. The savings clause which appears in the "citizen suit" provision of RCRA pro-
vides that:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of per-
sons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
standard or requirement relating to the management of solid waste or hazardous
waste, or to seek any other relief ....
42 U.S.C. § 6972(f). In Feikema, the court concluded that the language "nothing in this
section" limited the scope of the savings clause to the citizen-suit provisions alone, and
"'d[id] not purport to preclude pre-emption of state law by other provisions of the Act.'"
Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1414 (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 493
(1987)).
However, other courts construing this RCRA section have concluded that it applies
with force only when raised by a state that has adopted state standards, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 6926, that have been approved by the EPA for the regulation of hazardous waste.
See, e.g., Hermes Consol., Inc. v. Wyoming, 849 P.2d 1302, 1312 (Wyo. 1993) (reasoning
that Wyoming could not argue for compliance with a stricter state standard where they had
not taken action to become an "authorized state" under RCRA). Because Virginia is an
authorized state under RCRA, citizens of that state, like the Feikemas, should be able to
demand compliance with stricter state standards. Id. at 1312.
88. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
89. See United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1455 (6th Cir. 1991).
90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6929, 6972(0.
91. FeikemA 16 F.3d at 1416.
92. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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lars of the injunctive relief requested, 93 and did not clearly demon-
strate that an actual conflict existed. 94 The consent order in Feikema
"addressed measures to eliminate the causes of the leaking and to
neutralize the adverse effects of the oil plume."95 The requested in-
junctive relief did not on its face violate these objectives.96
Finally, had a detailed comparison been made between each
claim and the language of the consent order, the court could have
upheld portions of the injunctive relief and fashioned a remedy which
furthered RCRA's express objective of establishing a co-operative ef-
fort among the federal and state governments. 97 From a public policy
standpoint, the court missed an opportunity to extol the virtues and
benefits of state regulation and private injunctive relief in complex
areas such as pollution control-an area in which the states have regu-
lated for centuries.98 These benefits include: (a) the heightened
public perception of the legitimacy and potent power of the federal
government when it regulates in full cooperation with the states in the
important area of pollution control; and (b) the promotion of in-
creased citizen participation in the regulation of an area of deeply
rooted public concern.99
93. The Homeowners' claim asked for further "excavation, treatment and replacement
of contaminated soil to a specified depth and over a specified area .. . [as well as] 'en-
hanced ground water extraction and bio-remediation to reduce the off-site contamination'
and ... construction of a 'free phase hydrocarbon trench removal system across the water
table.'" Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1416.
94. Rather than demonstrating the extent of the conflict, if any, the court concluded
that the consent order "addresses the same site and conditions covered by the homeown-
ers' suit." Id. This conclusion, without more, does not compel preemption.
Unlike similar requests in other jurisdictions for excavation that clashed directly with
EPA directives to cap and contain, the injunctive relief requested in Feikema may harmoni-
ously augment the federal action. See Hermes Consol., Inc. v. Wyoming, 849 P.2d 1302,
1310 (Wyo. 1993); Illinois v. Teledyne, Inc., 599 N.E.2d 472,475-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). It
is unclear from the court's opinion where a conflict would, in fact, arise. Feikema, 16 F.3d
at 1411, 1416; see also supra note 82.
95. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1411.
96. Both the EPA and the Homeowners sought excavation, although the Homeowners
presumably desired to cover a larger area. Id. at 1411, 1416. The additional remedial
measures requested by the Homeowners, see supra note 93, were surely congruent with the
EPA's desire to "neutralize the adverse effects of the oil plume." Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1411.
Additionally, since one of the Homeowners' requests specifically focuses on "off-site
contamination," id. at 1416, the court's assertion that the EPA and the Homeowners ad-
dressed the same site is not entirely accurate. See id. This is another factor counseling
against a finding that the requested injunctive relief was preempted by RCRA.
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
98. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worked; What's
Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVrL. L. 1549, 1551 (1991).
99. See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. Rxv. 121, 191-94 (1985) (arguing that the retention of common-law
remedies fosters individual liberty).
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In sum, Feikema goes a long way towards establishing that com-
mon-law damage actions are not preempted by RCRA. It is unclear,
however, whether the decision established a per se rule or whether
damage claims may, in some instances, be preempted by an EPA con-
sent order.100 It is similarly difficult to draw conclusions regarding
RCRA's preemptive effect on injunctive claims because this case may
readily be distinguished from others which do not involve a prior con-
sent order.'0 1 Therefore, Feikema will likely have limited precedential
value. The Feikema court has not taken RCRA preemption jurispru-
dence very far.
5. Conclusion.-In Feikema, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit established that a consent order entered pursuant to RCRA
Section 700302 has the same preemptive effect as other federal laws
and regulations. The court concluded that state common-law actions
for damages are not preempted by RCRA due, in part, to the fact that
RCRA makes no provision for damages, and because the Act contem-
plates extensive state and federal cooperation in the field of hazard-
ous waste management. Despite RCRA's express objective of inter-
governmental cooperation, the court held that injunctive relief was
preempted because of an actual conflict with a previously entered
EPA-negotiated consent order.
JOHN F. EASTON
100. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
101. The court's holding with respect to preemption of injunctive relief was based on
actual conflict with a then-existing consent order, not general preemption based on the
EPA's authority to issue injunctive relief. Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1416.




A. A Blanket Rule for the Burford Abstention Doctrine in
Land Use Cases?
In Pomponio v. Fauquier County Board of Supervisors,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the
federal district court properly applied the abstention doctrine of Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co.2 when it dismissed the case. The court upheld the
district court's ruling, concluding that when a plaintiff's federal claim
stems solely from interpretation of a state or local zoning law, the dis-
trict court should stay its hand under the Burford abstention doctrine.'
The court determined that when the claim does not involve constitu-
tional questions or exceptional circumstances, federal courts should
abstain in order not to interfere with a state or locality's zoning pol-
icy.4 In so holding, the Pomponio court, in effect, espoused a per se
approach to the application of the Burford abstention doctrine in land
use cases, 5 and thereby extended the doctrine well beyond the narrow
scope established in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States.6
1. The Case.--In March 1989, Arthur Pomponio, a real estate de-
veloper, contracted to purchase approximately 1250 acres of property
located in the agricultural and conservation zoning districts of Fau-
quier County, Virginia.' A local zoning ordinance permitted the de-
velopment of minor residential subdivisions if certain maximum
density and open space requirements were met.8 In June 1989,
shortly after Pomponio submitted a preliminary subdivision plan for
review and approval by the Fauquier County Planning Commission, a
member of the Board of Supervisors negatively commented about
Pomponio's plan during an interview with a local newspaper.9
Pomponio alleged that the board member had not even reviewed the
1. 21 F.3d 1319 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 192 (1994).
2. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
3. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1328.
4. Id.
5. See generally Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Oumers:
The Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73,
124-31 (1988) (discussing the Fourth Circuit's emerging per se rule of abstention in land
use cases).
6. 424 U.S. 800 (1975).
7. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1320-21.
8. Id. at 1321.
9. Id.
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plan before making his remarks.1" After Pomponio had an opportu-
nity to argue that his plan fully complied with the ordinance, the Plan-
ning Commission concluded that a majority of the lots could not be
subdivided under the zoning ordinance." Pomponio appealed the
Commission's decision to the Board of Supervisors for interpretation
of the local ordinance," which subsequently voted to deny
Pomponio's appeal. 3 Pomponio then appealed the Board of Supervi-
sors' decision to the local circuit court and simultaneously pursued an
administrative appeal before the Zoning Board of Appeals. 4 Upon
the Board's denial of his appeal, Pomponio appealed their decision to
the county circuit court.'5
In the meantime, Pomponio's right to purchase the land under
the contract expired, and he nonsuited his two state court cases. 16
With no further remedy available under state law, Pomponio pursued
a damages claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.' 7 Pomponio alleged that
the Board intentionally misconstrued the zoning ordinance' 8 and vio-
lated his due process and equal protection rights under the Constitu-
tion.' 9 Instead of ruling on the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the district court, acting sua sponte, abstained and dis-
missed the case without prejudice."0 On appeal, a three-judge panel
of the Fourth Circuit held that abstention was inappropriate, as
Pomponio involved neither difficult questions of state law nor a risk
that federal jurisdiction would interfere with the state's efforts to es-
tablish a uniform land use policy.2 ' Sitting en banc, the Fourth Cir-
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1322.
12. Id. at 1323.
13. Id. The Board of Supervisors was chaired by James Green, the same individual who




17. Id. at 1323-24.
18. Id. at 1322.
19. Id. at 1324. To support his claim, Pomponio asserted that Fauquier County's Plan-
ning Director erroneously instructed the Commission staff to reduce the allowable density
of Pomponio's property and then falsely informed the Commission that the proposed den-
sity of Pomponio's plan exceeded the maximum density permitted by law. See Pomponio v.
Fauquier County Bd. of Supervisors, No. 91-1107, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17636, at *4 (4th
Cir. Aug. 3, 1992).
20. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1324.
21. Pomponio, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 17636, at *10-11.
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cuit reviewed the district court's decision to abstain under the Burford
doctrine for abuse of discretion.'
2. Legal Background.-
a. Supreme Court Cases.-Congress has vested in the federal
courts the jurisdiction 2 to enforce Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871.24 Although the federal courts are generally required to hear
all cases in which jurisdiction is conferred to them by Congress, some
abstention exceptions exist.2
5
The Supreme Court first articulated the abstention doctrine in
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.26 The Pullman Court held
that abstention is preferable when a state court can resolve an unclear
state-law issue, and thus spare a federal court the need to decide a
constitutional question.2 7 The Court reasoned that an erroneous de-
cision by a federal court on an unclear issue of state law may lead to
the disruption of state authority.28 Under Pullman, however, if a court
abstained, the plaintiff may reserve the right to return to federal court
after a state court has resolved the questions before it.
29
Two years later, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,3" the Supreme Court
considered the harmful effects of federal court intervention on a uni-
form system of state regulation." The Court held that a federal dis-
trict court may, as a matter of equitable discretion, abstain when
necessary to avoid interfering with a state government's domestic pol-
22. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1324.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1988) (granting original jurisdiction to the district courts
to hear civil cases to redress deprivations under color of state law).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations
of federal rights:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
Id.
25. See Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law From Bur-
ford to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of Judicial Federalism Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and
Kindred Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 859, 863 (1993). Exceptions to federal courtjurisdic-
tion had existed for at least 82 years prior to the announcement of the first abstention
doctrine in 1941. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 n.8 (1992).
26. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
27. Id. at 501.
28. Id. at 500-01.
29. Young, supra note 25, at 869-70.
30. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
31. Id. at 317-18.
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icy.3 1 Unlike abstention under Pullman, Burford does not permit the
federal court to retain any jurisdiction on federal issues.33 In Burford,
Sun Oil Company sued the Railroad Commission of Texas to enjoin
the execution of an order of the Commission that permitted the drill-
ing and operation of certain oil wells in the East Texas Oil Field. 4
Texas statutes, however, already provided a well-organized system of
regulation and review s.3  The Burford Court reasoned that an exercise
of federal equity jurisdiction in this case could result in delay, misun-
derstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with state
policy.3 6
The Court reiterated these principles in Alabama Public Service
Commission v. Southern Railroad Co.,s 7 where a railroad company chal-
lenged an order of the Alabama Public Service Commission. 8 Under
Alabama law, a party who disagreed with a final order of the Public
Service Commission was entitled to appeal to the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County.3 9 Because of the uniformity of the state regula-
tory process, the adequacy of state court review, and the local nature
of the case, the Supreme Court held that the federal district court
should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction.4" From the
Court's decisions in Burford and in Alabama Public Service Commission,
the principle commonly called the Burford doctrine has emerged.41
The Burford doctrine, however, was not explicitly cited in the
Court's next abstention case, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux."2 In Thibodaux, the Court suggested that abstention was
necessary because of the unclear nature of the state law and the im-
portance of the issue to the state.4 3 Thibodaux is distinguishable from
Burford in that Thibodaux did not anticipate interference with a state's
administrative processes.' Both doctrines, however, focus on the
32. Id. at 318.
33. Young, supra note 25, at 870-71. But see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206,
2216 (1992) (suggesting that it may be appropriate for a federal court to retain jurisdiction
in a Burford abstention case).
34. Burford, 319 U.S. at 316-17.
35. Id. at 325.
36. Id. at 327.
37. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
38. Id. at 342-43.
39. Id. at 348.
40. Id. at 349.
41. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1324.
42. 360 U.S. 25 (1959); see alo Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1324-25 (discussing the controversy
engendered by the Court's failure to refer to the Burford doctrine in Thibodaux).
43. See Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29-30; Young, supra note 25, at 873. Some commentators
refer to the abstention principles developed in the case as the Thibodaux doctrine. Id.
44. Young, supra note 25, at 874.
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threat of federal intervention in important state matters and thus
could be viewed as one in the same. 5
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,4 the
Court clarified the scope of the Burford abstention doctrine by
stressing the limited circumstances where abstention is permissible
and noting that "[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction
is the exception, not the rule."47 More recently, the Court further
examined the scope of the Burford abstention doctrine in New Orleans
Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans.48 The Court held that a
federal court must refuse equitable relief:
(1) when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing
on policy problems of substantial public import whose im-
portance transcends the result in the case then at bar"; or
(2) where the "exercise of federal review of the question in a
case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts
to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of sub-
stantial public concern."49
The Court in New Orleans explained that the presence of a complex
state administrative process alone does not necessarily require absten-
tion, even where the potential for conflict between federal and state
law may exist."° If federal adjudication would undermine the state's
desire for uniformity, then abstention may be warranted."
b. Fourth Circuit Cases.-By itself, the Burford abstention doc-
trine provides only a vague idea of when a state administrative action
would justify a federal court decision to abstain from exercising its
jurisdiction.2 As a result, the federal courts have had to shape their
own application of the Burford doctrine. 3 Not surprisingly, applica-
tion has ranged from the rigorous to the lax. 4
45. Id.
46. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
47. Id. at 813.
48. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
49. Id. at 361 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
50. Id. at 362.
51. Id.
52. Young, supra note 25, at 863-64.
53. Id. at 899.
54. See Blaesser, supra note 5, at 100 (analyzing the differences among the circuits in
their application of the abstention doctrine).
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The Fourth Circuit has demonstrated a strong judicial preference
to abstain in land use cases.55 It first addressed the issue of abstention
in zoning or land use laws in Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martins-
ville.56 The plaintiff contended that a section of the city code was un-
constitutionally vague and that the code section had been arbitrarily
and discriminatorily applied to it.57 The court concluded that absten-
tion was warranted on the basis of the Thibodaux doctrine because of
the state court's familiarity and experience in construing local land
use law.5" In Caleb Stowe Associates, Ltd. v. County of Albemarle,59 the
court applied the Thibodaux doctrine in a suit brought under Section
1983. ° The court found that abstention applied because the essence
of the action was the County Board of Supervisors' construction of a
purely state land use law. 1
The first zoning case to use the Burford abstention doctrine was
Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Baltimore County.62 In Browning-Ferris, the court
upheld abstention and stressed that state land use issues belong in
state courts and that federal courts should hesitate to intervene in the
ordinary land use case.63 Browning-Ferris departed from the court's
previous holding in Education-Services, Inc. v. Maryland State Board for
Higher Education,'4 where the court required that a state regulatory
scheme include a specialized court before Burford would apply.6 5 In-
stead, the Browning-Ferris court found that the existence of a special-
ized court is not an absolute prerequisite.66 Since Browning-Ferris, the
Fourth Circuit has consistently applied Burford instead of Thibodaux
when analyzing abstention in zoning cases.67
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Pomponio court held that under
the Burford doctrine trial courts should abstain in claims that stem
solely from the construction of state or local land use or zoning law.'
Where claims do not involve constitutional issues or exceptional cir-
55. Id. Between 1972 and 1988, the courts in the Fourth Circuit ordered abstention in
60% of all land use cases, and in 40% of land use cases brought under § 1983. Id. at 101.
56. 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974).
57. Id. at 482-83.
58. Id. at 483.
59. 724 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1984).
60. Id. at 1080.
61. Id.
62. 774 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1985).
63. Id. at 79-80.
64. 710 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1983).
65. Id. at 173.
66. Browning-Ferris, 774 F.2d at 80.
67. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1328.
68. Id. at 1328.
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
cumstances, courts should avoid interfering with a state or locality's
land use policy.69 Writing for the majority, Judge Widener relied on
the Supreme Court's guidance in New Orleans to determine when a
federal court sitting in equity must decline to hear a case under the
Burford abstention doctrine.7" The Court in New Orleans had declared
that under the Burford doctrine, a federal court should refrain from
exercising its jurisdiction where the "'exercise of federal review of the
question in a case... would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public con-
cern.'"7 1 Judge Widener reasoned that questions of state or local land
use or zoning law are classic examples of situations in which federal
review would be disruptive.72 Citing Justice Marshall in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas,7 3 the court stated that "in the usual case federal courts
should not leave their indelible print on local and state land use and
zoning law.., in effect, sitting as a zoning board of appeals."74
The court reaffirmed previous case law which held that, absent
unusual circumstances, a district court should abstain under the Bur-
ford doctrine in cases that arise solely out of state or local zoning or
land use law.75 The court stated that an unusual circumstance reflects
the presence of a "genuine and independent federal claim."76 A true
federal claim would include a valid claim of religious prejudice, a
claim of federal statutory preemption, or claims that involve First
Amendment rights.77
The court found that Pomponio's claims failed to present any un-
usual circumstances that would convert an ordinary zoning dispute
into a federal case.7" It concluded that Pomponio's argument
"boil [ed] down to an assertion that his plan complied with the zoning
laws, and the local authorities wrongfully disapproved his plan by mis-
applying the laws and by abusing their authority in the decision-mak-
ing process."7 9 The court distinguished Pomponio from New Orleans.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1327.
71. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)
(quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976)).
72. Pompon/o, 21 F.3d at 1327.
73. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
74. Pompono, 21 F.3d at 1327; see Boraas, 416 U.S. at 13 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (agree-
ing with the majority that zoning issues are inherently state issues).
75. Pompono, 21 F.3d at 1327.
76. Id. at 1327-28.
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In New Orleans, the Court declined to abstain under Burford, in part,
because the plaintiffs had not alleged that a state agency misused its
authority or improperly weighed relevant state-law factors."0 By con-
trast, the Pomponio court reasoned that abstention under Burford was
appropriate in the instant case precisely because the claim at issue
involved a state agency's misapplication of its lawful authority." After
finding that abstention in this case was proper, the court affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the case as the usual result under Burford
abstention. 2
In dissent, Judge Murnaghan disagreed with the majority's asser-
tion that Pomponio merely appealed an unfavorable agency deci-
sion.8" Judge Murnaghan pointed out that Pomponio did not file an
appeal of the unfavorable decision.8 4 Instead, Pomponio had sued in
federal court under Section 1983 for an abuse of process in order to
recover damages after the loss of a land purchase contract.85 Judge
Mumaghan reasoned that Pomponio's claims did not involve difficult
state law questions, nor would the exercise of federal jurisdiction dis-
rupt the state's efforts to establish a uniform land use policy.86 He
stated, moreover, that Pomponio never had the opportunity to prove
that he met the "unusual circumstance" exception because the district
court dismissed his claim.8 7
4. Analysis.-The Pomponio court held that when a plaintiff's
federal claim stems solely from the interpretation of state or local zon-
ing law, a federal court should stay its hand under the Burford absten-
tion doctrine.' In effect, the court determined that the potentially
disruptive effect of federal court intervention on state zoning policy is
sufficient to remove congressionally mandated jurisdiction from the
federal courts. While such an application of the Burford abstention
doctrine comports with Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent,
Pomponio is not such a case.
Although the court started with the "fundamental proposition
that abstention is the exception, not the rule,"89 by the end of its opin-
80. 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989).
81. Pompon/o, 21 F.3d at 1328.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1329.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
86. Pompono, 21 F.3d at 1329.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1328.
89. Id. at 1324.
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ion, the court seemed to have forgotten this proposition. The major-
ity seemed all too eager to abstain under Burford. First, the court did
not carefully distinguish the decisions it cited for support. In Brown-
ing-Ferris, Inc. v. Baltimore County,9° the plaintiff (BFI) claimed that the
county had arbitrarily and capriciously denied a renewal of its disposal
permit.91 Like the plaintiff in Pomponio, BFI alleged that the county
had acted under improper political or personal motives and sought
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.92 The court held that the district court
correctly invoked the Burford abstention doctrine when it declined to
hear the case.9" In light of the pending state administrative proceed-
ings, the Browning-Ferris court reasoned that if a federal court heard
the case, it would eventually be required to decide if BFI was eligible
for a permit; and, if BFI was eligible, the court would have to order
the state to issue the permit.94 In such a situation, the federal court
would become involved in the complexities of state land use control.95
In Pomponio, however, the plaintiff did not seek to influence state
administrative proceedings. Pomponio had nonsuited his state claims
and sought damages for the loss of his land purchase contract.96 As
Judge Murnaghan pointed out in his dissent, specific instances of arbi-
trary behavior, false statements, abuse of authority, and misconduct by
local zoning officials do not involve difficult questions of state law.97
Caleb Stowe Associates v. County of Albemarle,98 another Section 1983
land use case relied upon by the majority,9 9 is also distinguishable
from Pomponio. In Caleb Stowe, the plaintiffs conceded that they were
afforded sufficient procedural due process; °° however, they argued
that the zoning officials failed to correctly construe a state land use
statute.101 Construction of a state statute is precisely the type of ques-
tion the federal courts seek to avoid. In contrast, Pomponio claimed
that he did not receive adequate procedural due process, and pointed
to specific instances of misconduct by officials.' To decide
90. 774 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1985).
91. Id. at 77.
92. Id. at 77-78.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 79-80.
95. Id. at 80.
96. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1323.
97. Id. at 1329 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
98. 724 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1984).
99. See Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1326.
100. Caleb Stowe, 724 F.2d at 1080.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Pomponio's due process claim, the court was not required to interpret
Fauquier County's land use and zoning ordinances.
The court, nevertheless, construed Pomponio as a zoning case and
repeatedly stressed that local and state land use and zoning laws fall
within the province of the state.10 3 The court "[could] conceive of
few matters of public concern more substantial than zoning and land
use laws." 10 4 The court voiced concern that federal claims often "can-
not be untangled from the state or local zoning or land use law."'10 5
While the court is correct that land use and zoning law should be left
to the states, it did not pause to consider whether the zoning question
was the primary issue in the case. In fact, Pomponio's federal claim
under Section 1983 for abuse of process was the crux of his
complaint.106
After assuming that Pomponio was solely a zoning case, the court
examined whether the case contained an "unusual circumstance" that
would allow a federal court to hear the case." 7 The court did not
provide any insight as to how it came to its determination that no
unusual circumstances existed. To define an unusual circumstance as
one "which reflected the presence of a genuine and independent fed-
eral claim," the court gave three examples that simply do not apply to
the abuse of process issue raised in Pomponio."' The court did not
attempt to enumerate other possibilities where federal jurisdiction
would come into play; nor did it explain why Pomponio's Section
1983 claim was not "a genuine and independent claim."'09
If the court had applied its reasoning from a like case, Richmond,
Fredericksburg &Potomac Railroad Co. v. Forst," I it could have found the
existence of an unusual circumstance in Pomponio. In Forst, the court
held that Burford did not apply because Congress expressly provided
railroads with the opportunity to litigate state tax discrimination
claims in federal court."' Similarly, Congress has expressly deter-
mined that plaintiffs may bring claims in federal court under Section
1983 to redress alleged abuses of authority by state officials." 2 It
103. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1327.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1320.
107. Id. at 1328.
108. Id. The court referred to claims of religious prejudice, federal preemption, and
violations of First Amendment rights as unusual circumstances. Id.
109. Id.
110. 4 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 1993).
111. Id. at 253.
112. See Blaesser, supra note 5, at 73-74.
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would appear that Pomponio and Forst both fall within express grants of
federal jurisdiction that qualify as genuine and independent claims.
By its failure to find that a Section 1983 claim qualifies as an in-
dependent claim, the court has seemingly taken a step back from Forst
and narrowed the meaning of a genuine and independent claim.
The Pomponio court purported to apply the benchmark test set
forth in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans13 that
Burford abstention was inappropriate because the claim asserted by
Pomponio was not "a claim that a state agency has misapplied its law-
ful authority or has failed to take into consideration or properly weigh
relevant state-law factors.""1 4 Without further explanation, the court
rested its conclusion on the observation that Pomponio's action was
"just such a claim."" 5 However, the court left out of its analysis an
important clarification that the Supreme Court noted in New Orleans-
"[w] hile Burford is concerned with protecting complex state adminis-
trative processes, it does not require abstention whenever there exists
a process, or even in all cases where there is a 'potential for conflict'
with state regulatory law or policy."" 6 Although the potential for con-
flict may exist between Fauquier County's zoning law and federal law,
the Pomponio court failed to realize that the case involved zoning issues
only peripherally.
Two years before Pomponio, the court recognized this very distinc-
tion in Neufeld v. City of Baltimore.1 17 In Neufeld, the Fourth Circuit
held that the district court erred when it declined to hear Neufeld's
First Amendment and preemption claims."1 The court reasoned that
under New Orleans' principles the case "involved land use issues only
in a peripheral sense."" 9 In light of Supreme Court and Fourth Cir-
cuit precedent, the Pomponio court should have recognized that
Pomponio's claim involved land use issues only peripherally and that
his Section 1983 claim was the central issue to be decided.
Finally, to determine whether the district court properly dis-
missed the suit, the court offered only a sparse analysis and accepted
dismissal of the suit as the "appropriate course of action." 2 ' The
113. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
114. Pompon/o, 21 F.3d at 1328.
115. Id.
116. New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 362 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 801, 815-16 (1976)).
117. 964 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1992).
118. Id. at 348.
119. Id. at 351.
120. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1328.
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court cited Meredith v. Talbot County21 to support its dismissal of
Pomponio. But Meredith is clearly distinguishable from Pomponio. First,
the Meredith plaintiffs sought an injunction that required Talbot
County to take a zoning action.1 2 Second, the plaintiffs did not ini-
tially file suit in the local state courts.12' Third, and most significantly,
although the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, the
court stated in dicta that "[r]etention ofjurisdiction may have been a
more cautious route for the district court to have followed."1 24
While the Pomponio court acknowledged the recent Supreme
Court decision in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,125 the court ignored Anken-
brandt's proposition that when a federal court declines to hear a state
issue under Burford, it should retain jurisdiction over any federal issues
while a state court resolves the state issues.12 6 If it had followed Anken-
brandt, the Pomponio court could have retained jurisdiction over the
Section 1983 claim while it waited for the state court to resolve the
peripheral zoning issue.
In Ankenbrandt, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a domes-
tic relations exception to Burford exists in cases that involve the issu-
ance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree. 127 The Court
reasoned that the exception is necessary because "[s]tate courts are
more eminently suited to work of this type than are federal courts,
which lack the close association with state and local government orga-
nizations dedicated to handling [these] issues .... ,"28 The exception,
however, did not apply to Ankenbrandt because the allegations in the
complaint did not request the district court to issue a divorce, ali-
mony, or child custody decree."2 These issues had already been de-
cided; all that was left to do was decide the federal issue. 30 Of course,
in certain circumstances, a Burford abstention may be invoked in do-
mestic relations cases where the parties do not seek divorce, alimony,
or child custody. An example would be where a case presents "diffi-
cult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial
121. 828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987).
122. Id. at 230.
123. Id. at 232.
124. Id.
125. Pomponio, 21 F.3d at 1328; Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
126. Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2216 & n.8.
127. Id. at 2216.
128. Id. at 2215.




public import. . .""' In Ankenbrandt, however, no "difficult ques-
tions of state law" remained, and abstention was inappropriate.1 3 2
The exception to federal jurisdiction regarding zoning and land
use cases is analogous to the exception for domestic cases as both ex-
ceptions target traditional state law issues. In Pomponio and Anken-
brandt, the federal courts sought to avoid interference with the state's
efforts to establish a coherent policy on an important matter. How-
ever, the Pomponio and Ankenbrandt plaintiffs both sought damages for
abuse of process, an issue over which the federal courts do have juris-
diction. While the Ankenbrandt court acknowledged that there is no
blanket rule of exception, 3 the Pomponio court seems to advocate a
blanket rule of abstention in land use cases.
5. Conclusion.-In Pomponio, the Fourth Circuit determined that
when a claim does not involve constitutional questions or exceptional
circumstances, federal courts should abstain in order to avoid interfer-
ing with a state or locality's zoning policy. The Pomponio court, how-
ever, was not sufficiently detailed in its analysis and provided the lower
courts or practitioners with little guidance on how to apply its decision
to future cases. In effect, the court espoused a per se rule of absten-
tion in land use cases.
The court's blanket approach extends the Burford doctrine far be-
yond the narrow scope established in Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States, in which the Supreme Court stressed that ab-
stention is "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a
District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it."1" In so
holding, the court has denied plaintiffs in zoning and land use cases
the right to pursue Section 1983 claims, a remedy expressly created by
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
VIVIAN LEE
B. Equal Protection for Church Groups' Use of Public Schools After Hours
In Fairfax Covenant Church v. Fairfax County School Board,1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a
school board's practice of charging a church group a higher rental
131. Id. at 2216 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
132. Id.
133. See id. (stating that the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction "has no
place in a suit such as this one.").
134. 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
1. 17 F.3d 703 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2166 (1994).
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rate than that charged other nonprofit organizations for the use of its
facilities violated the church's freedom of speech and freedom of reli-
gion.' The court held that the district court erred, however, in not
applying its decision retroactively.'
1. The Case.-In 1980, Fairfax Covenant Church (the Church)
began renting space from the Fairfax County School Board (School
Board) to hold its weekly Sunday services.4 The School Board permit-
ted various groups to use school facilities under rules established in its
Regulation 8420.' Under Regulation 8420, local government agen-
cies, student organizations, and the Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts of
America pay no rent for using school facilities; cultural, educational,
civic groups, and state and federal governmental groups pay a non-
commercial rate designed to reimburse the county for the actual costs
of using the facilities.6 Regulation 8420 provides a special rate for
churches which allows the church to pay the noncommercial rate for
the first five years.7 Thereafter, the rate escalates to a commercial rate
over the next four years.8
In 1992, the Church filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983'
against the School Board in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia and sought a permanent injunction, a de-
claratory judgment, and compensatory damages.10 The Church al-
leged that the rental structure of Regulation 8420 violated its First
Amendment rights." The School Board responded that charging
2. Id. at 707.
3. Id. at 711.
4. Id. at 705.
5. Id. at 704. During 1991, about 8500 groups applied for use of the public school
facilities in Fairfax County; in 1992, 51 churches were utilizing the facilities. Id. at 705.
6. Id. at 704.
7. Id. at 705.
8. Id. The commercial rate is five times the noncommercial rate. Id. at 704-05.
9. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
10. Fairfax Covenant Church v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 811 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va.
1993).
11. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 705-06. The First Amendment provides, in part, that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The
Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Free Speech Clause all apply to the states
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churches below-market rates and allowing them long-term or perma-
nent use of school facilities would violate the Establishment Clause by
advancing or subsidizing the practice of religion, and therefore the
Establishment Clause is in conflict with the Free Speech Clause and
Free Exercise Clause.1
2
Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
held that Regulation 8420 was unconstitutional because it abridged
the Church's freedom of speech and infringed upon its free exercise
of religion. 3 The district court refused to apply its decision retroac-
tively and allow the Church to collect the excess amounts already paid
under the discriminatory rate structure. 14 Both parties appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.' 5
2. Legal Background. -
a. First Amendment Issues.-In Lemon v. Kurtzman,16 the
Supreme Court set forth a test to determine whether a statute that
affects a religious group offends the Establishment Clause. To pass
constitutional muster, "the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'"' 7 The Lemon
Court invalidated Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes providing
state aid to church-related schools because they provided state funds
for parochial school teachers, who the Court found were under signif-
icant religious control, and because the statutes required extensive
government monitoring of the schools' "secular" expenditures."i
Moreover, the Pennsylvania statute had "the further defect of provid-
ing state financial aid directly to the church-related school." 9 The
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Free Exercise Clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (Establishment Clause); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (Free Speech
Clause).
12. Fairfax Covenant. 17 F.3d at 706. The School Board conceded that it was required
to provide the Church access to its facilities because it had opened its facilities to the
public. Id.
13. Fairfax Covenant 811 F. Supp. at 1139-40.
14. Fairfax Covenant 17 F.3d at 706.
15. Id.
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
17. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
18. Id. at 617-22.
19. Id. at 621.
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Court concluded that each statute "involve [d] excessive entanglement
between government and religion."2 1
Subsequent to the Lemon decision, the Court considered a series
of cases involving government infringement upon freedom of speech
and freedom of religion. In Widmar v. Vincent,2 1 a state university reg-
ulation barred student groups and speakers from using a generally
open forum22 to engage in religious worship and discussion. 2' The
Widmar Court struck down the regulation because the university failed
to provide a "sufficiently 'compelling' interest to justify content-based
discrimination against respondent's religious speech." 24 The Court
rejected the university's argument that to allow religious groups to use
its facilities would violate the Establishment Clause under the Lemon
test. The Court determined that the open-forum policy would not
have the "primary effect" of advancing religion under Lemon because
"an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur
of state approval on religious sects or practices" and because the fo-
rum would be open to nonreligious as well as religious speakers. 5
In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,26 the
Supreme Court examined the application of a school board rule that
prohibited the use of school premises for religious purposes.2 7 The
20. Id. at 614. The Court previously had upheld state aid to church-related schools for
secular or neutral services such as bus transportation or textbooks. Board of Educ. v. Al-
len, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(transportation).
21. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
22. Open or public forums are places which "by long tradition or by government fiat
have been devoted to assembly and debate." They include public streets and parks. Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Public forums also
may be created when the state designates a particular place for public use, for meetings,
speech, use by certain speakers, or for discussion of certain subjects. Id. at 45, 46 n.7.
"Th [e] Court has recognized that the campus of a public university, at least for its students,
possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum." Wulmar, 545 U.S. at 267 n.5 (cita-
tions omitted).
23. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
24. Id. at 276. Tojustify content-based exclusions, a state "must show that its regulation
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." Id. at 270.
25. Id. at 274. The Court suggested that an open forum might have the "primary ef-
fect" of advancing religion if it were shown that religious groups "dominate" that forum.
Id. at 275.
26. 113 S. Ct. 2143 (1993).
27. Id. at 2141. The Court declined to rule whether the school was a limited public
forum or a nonpublic forum. Id. at 2147. The district court had stated that the school was
a limited nonpublic forum, open only for designated purposes and able to "remain non-
public except as to specified uses." Id. at 2145. The church argued that the school was
open for a wide variety of uses and therefore was "subject to the same constitutional limita-
tions" as public forums. Id. at 2146. Without resolving the argument, the Court reiterated
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Center Moriches School District (the District) adopted rules gov-
erning the use of school facilities by outside groups in which Rule 10
permitted groups to use school facilities for social, civic, and recrea-
tional purposes." Rule 7, however, prohibited the use of school facili-
ties for religious purposes.' Based on Rule 7, the District denied
petitioner's request to use school facilities to show a film about child
rearing because petitioner was an evangelical church and its film had
a religious slant."0
The Supreme Court stated the test for access to a non-public fo-
rum: "'The government violates the First Amendment when it denies
access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on
an otherwise includible subject."'31 The Court held that Rule 7 was
"unconstitutionally applied in this case" 2 because the proposed film
dealt with child rearing, an otherwise includible subject, but its show-
ing was denied solely because of its religious slant.3 3
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,34 the
Court considered whether certain ordinances passed by the City of
Hialeah violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.35
Out of concern for public health and safety, the ordinances restricted
its rule that "'[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter
and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the pur-
pose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.'" Id. at 2147 (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
28. Id. at 2144.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2144-45.
31. Id. at 2147 (quoting Corneliu, 473 U.S. at 806).
32. Id. The Court did not consider whether Rule 7 is facially invalid because the reso-
lution of that issue was not necessary to its decision. Id. at 2147 n.6.
33. Id. at 2147. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment,
but took issue with the majority's observation that its holding was consistent with Lemon.
Id. at 2148, 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argued that the Court should aban-
don Lemon. Id. at 2149-50. He asserted that in the past the Court has invoked or ignored
the Lemon analysis depending on the desired result in the case. Id. at 2150. This inconsis-
tent application, he noted, has produced an "Establishment Clause geometry of crooked
lines and wavering shapes." Id.
justice O'Connor later echoed Justice Scalia's call for the abandonment of Lemon in
Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994). She observed that "the
slide away from Lemon's unitary approach is well under way." Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In her estimation, Lemon's three-pronged analysis is too rigid to cover the
variety of Establishment Clause issues confronted by the Court. Id. To replace Lemon,
Justice O'Connor suggested that the Court adopt several tests which cover "narrower and
more homogeneous area[s]" of the law. Id. Having multiple tests, she argued, would allow
the Court to "pay attention to the specific nuances of each area" of law and might result in
.more consensus on each of the narrow tests than there has been on a broad test." Id.
34. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
35. See supra note 11.
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the slaughter or ritual sacrifice of animals-a devotational practice of
the Santeria religion. 6 The Court invalidated the ordinances because
it concluded that "suppression of the central element of the Santeria
worship service was the object of the ordinances," and the City failed
to demonstrate that there was a compelling state interest involved and
that the ordinances were narrowly drawn to protect that interest.3 7
The Court concluded that although the government had a legitimate
interest in protecting public health and preventing cruelty to animals,
the City could have drawn the ordinances far more narrowly and
avoided a complete prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial practices.
b. Retroactivity Analysis.-Over the past twenty-five years, the
Court's approach to retroactivity of decisions39 has changed signifi-
36. Church of the Lukum4 113 S. Ct. at 2222-23.
37. Id. at 2227. The Court's Free Exercise Clause cases indicate that "a law that is
neutral and of general application need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious prac-
tice." Id. at 2226 (citation omitted). However, "[a] law failing to satisfy these requirements
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest." Id.
38. Id. at 2229.
39. There are three ways in which a court may apply its holding.
First, a decision may be made fully retroactive, applying both to the parties before
the court and to all others by and against whom claims may be pressed .... This
practice is overwhelmingly the norm and is in keeping with the traditional func-
tion of the courts to decide cases before them based upon their best current
understanding of the law....
Second, there is the purely prospective method of overruling, under which a
new rule is applied neither to the parties in the law-making decision nor to those
others against or by whom it might be applied to conduct or events occurring
before that decision....
Finally, a court may apply a new rule in the case in which it is pronounced,
then return to the old one with respect to all others arising on facts predating the
pronouncement.
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535-37 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(citations omitted). The third method is called modified, or selective, prospectivity. Id. at
537.
Critics of prospective decision-making have attacked its validity on various grounds.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in Beam, stated:
The nature of judicial review constrains us to consider the case that is actually
before us, and, if it requires us to announce a new rule, to do so in the context of
the case and to apply it to the parties who brought us the case to decide. To do
otherwise is to warp the role that we, as judges, play in a Government of limited
powers.
Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He also noted that applying new rules selectively
would result in treating similarly situated litigants differently. Id. Similarly, Justice Scalia
has charged that prospective rule-making is inconsistent with common-law traditions: "[a]t
common law there was no authority for the proposition that judicial decisions made law
only for the future." Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2522 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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cantly. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,4° the Court recognized that in
certain situations a court may apply its ruling on a purely prospective
basis.41
In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we
have generally considered three separate factors. First, the
decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on
which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed. Second, it has been stressed that "we must... weigh
the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its op-
eration." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by
retroactive application, for "[w] here a decision of this Court
could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retro-
actively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the
'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity. 42
In American TruckingAss'ns v. Smith,43 a plurality reaffirmed the validity
of Chevron Oil in civil cases. 44 However, a four-Justice dissent vigor-
ously argued against prospective rule-making, stating that the Court
lacks constitutional authority "to disregard current law or to treat simi-
larly situated litigants differently."45
One year later in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,46 the Court
signalled a change in retroactivity analysis. In Beam, the petitioners
challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia liquor tax based on the
Court's decision in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. D/as.4 7 The Supreme Court
of Georgia invalidated the tax statute but applied its ruling on a pro-
spective basis under the Chevron Oil analysis. 8 Justice Souter's opin-
In contrast, supporters of prospective rule-making have defended it based on fairness
and respect for stare decisis. Justice O'Connor noted in American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191 (1990) (plurality opinion), that the Court usually decides that a
decision should be applied prospectively when it has determined that retroactive applica-
tion "would have a harsh and disruptive effect on those who relied on prior law." Id. at
191.
40. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
41. Id. at 105-06.
42. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
43. 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (plurality opinion).
44. Id. at 178.
45. Id. at 214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. 501 U.S. 529 (1991) (plurality opinion).
47. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). Bacchus held that a Hawaii statute which distinguished be-
tween imported and local alcoholic beverages violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 273.
48. Beam, 501 U.S. at 533.
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ion, which reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia,
did not command a majority. However, he and five other Justices
agreed that the holding in Bacchus should control the decision in
Beam. 4
9
In Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,5" the Court adopted
the position of the six Justices in Beam with respect to selective pros-
pectivity.51 Petitioners sought Virginia state tax refunds based on the
Court's decision in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury.52 The
Supreme Court of Virginia denied the refunds because it determined
that Davis should apply prospectively under the three-pronged Chev-
ron Oil test.5" The Court reversed, holding that
[w] hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement
of the rule.'
Harper explicitly banned selective prospectivity; moreover, dicta in the
majority opinion suggested that pure prospectivity may be improper
49. Id. at 544-49. Justice Souter determined that the Bacchus Court had followed the
general rule of applying its decision retroactively to the parties before it. Id. at 539. There-
fore, he reasoned, the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia should apply to the simi-
larly situated petitioners in Beam "[W]hen the Court has applied a rule of law to the
litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural
requirements or resjudicata." Id. at 544. Justice White agreed withJustice Souter's analy-
sis, but concurred separately to dispel any doubt as to the propriety of selective prospectiv-
ity. Id. at 545-46 (White,J, concurring). Justice Blackmun,joined byJustices Marshall and
Scalia, concurred in the judgment, arguing that "prospectivity, whether 'selective' or
.pure,' breaches our obligation to discharge our constitutional function." Id. at 548 (Black-
mun,J., concurring). In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia asserted that both "selective
prospectivity" and "pure prospectivity" are beyond the power of the Court because they
"alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the
three branches [of government]." Id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus three Justices
concluded that only selective prospectivity should be eliminated, while three otherJustices
determined that all prospective rule-making should be abolished.
50. 113 S. CL 2510 (1993).
51. Id. at 2517.
52. 489 U.S. 803 (1989). Under Davis, "a State violates the constitutional doctrine of
inter-governmental tax immunity when it taxes retirement benefits paid by the Federal
Government but exempts from taxation all retirement benefits paid by the State or its
political subdivisions." Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2513.
53. Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2515.
54. Id. at 2517. The Court in Davis had also applied its decision retroactively to the
parties before it. Id. at 2518.
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as well.55 The Court stated that "[n] othing in the Constitution alters
the fundamental rule of 'retrospective operation' that has governed
'U] udicial decisions for near a thousand years.'"56
3. The Court's Reasoning. -In Fairfax Covenant, the Fourth Circuit
retroactively applied its decision that the school board's regulation vi-
olated the Church's freedom of speech and freedom of religion.57
The opinion first addressed the freedom of speech question. The
court noted that the School Board had created a public forum by al-
lowing diverse groups access to school facilities.5" In finding the cir-
cumstances indistinguishable from those of the Widmar decision, the
Fairfax Covenant court held that Regulation 8420 violated the Church's
freedom of speech.59 The court rejected the School Board's argu-
ment that charging churches below-market rental rates would violate
the Establishment Clause, noting the lack of evidence that the Church
would dominate the school forum.6" The court also found that the
cost-recovering rent served to offset ongoing expenses for school facil-
ities rather than to subsidize the Church.6 Further, the court deter-
mined that there was no evidence that the public forum was
interpreted by the community as a religious endorsement by the
School Board.62 Using the Lemon analysis,6" the School Board failed
to show an Establishment Clause violation.' Similarly, under Widmar
there was no compelling state interest shown to justify Regulation
8420's discrimination against churches.65 The court also determined
that Regulation 8420 interfered with the Church's first amendment
right to free exercise of religion.6
Finally, the court determined that the district court should have
applied its decision retroactively.6 7 While unsure of the vitality of
55. In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that "[r]ather than limiting its
pronouncements to the question of selective prospectivity, the Court intimates that pure
prospectivity may be prohibited as well." Id. at 2527 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2516 (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
57. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 707, 711.
58. Id. at 706.
59. Id. at 707; see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
60. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 708.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 709.
63. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
64. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 708.
65. Id. at 707.
66. Id.; see supra note 11.
67. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 711.
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Chevron Oil in light of Beam and Harper,68 the court concluded that its
decision should apply retroactively to the parties before it even under
the more demanding Chevron Oil analysis because the record did not
satisfy Chevron Oils three-pronged test for prospectivity.69 The court
stated that Widmar did not establish new law7" and found that in light
of the School Board's $850 million annual operating budget, the po-
tential award to the Church was not "so substantial as to fall under the
inequitable-result exception in Chevron."71 The School Board's "good
faith" attempt to comply with the Establishment Clause was, more-
over, irrelevant to a Chevron Oil equity analysis.72 The court noted that
defenses such as laches and limitations would limit the damage award
and "offset any inequity arising from the fact that Fairfax Covenant
Church waited 11 years to file suit."7"
4. Analysis.-
a. Extending the Scope of Widmar.-In Fairfax Covenant, the
Fourth Circuit invalidated a school board regulation that charged
churches a higher rent than other nonprofit organizations because
the regulation violated the Church's freedom of speech and freedom
of religion."4 The court's decision represents a logical application of
First Amendment law governing open forums.
In Widmar, the Court struck down a state university regulation
that barred speakers and student groups from using an open forum
based on the religious content of their speech because the state failed
to show a compelling interest to justify the exclusion.75 Several fed-
eral courts have applied Widmar to invalidate school district rules that
prohibit groups from using school facilities based on the religious
content of their speech.76 Until Fairfax Covenant, no federal court had
68. See supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
69. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 710; see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
70. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 710.
71. Id. The Church claimed approximately $280,000 in damages.
72. Id. The court explained that good faith is only "relevant when the elements of a
cause of action, or where a defense to it, depend on the defendant's state of mind .... But
in the circumstances here, whether the defendant acted in good faith is irrelevant and
barely contributes to any possibility of an inequity." Id.
73. Id. at 711. Laches is defined as "neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken
together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party,
operates as a bar in a court of equity." BLACK'S LAw DIcrONARY 875 (6th ed. 1990) (cita-
tion omitted).
74. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 707.
75. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
76. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir. 1990); Wallace v.
Washoe County Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 187 (D. Nev. 1988); Country Hills Christian
Church v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 560 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Kan. 1983).
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yet considered whether the requirement of churches to pay a higher
rent than other nonprofit organizations violates the principles of
Widmar.
The Supreme Court's decision in Widmar supports the Fourth
Circuit's determination that a state must show a compelling interest to
justify charging churches a higher rent than other nonprofit organiza-
tions. Although Widmar directly addressed whether a state university
could exclude religious speakers from an open forum, the Court gen-
erally referred to the university's policy as discriminatory: "Here
UMKC has discriminated against student groups and speakers based on
their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious wor-
ship and discussion."" Thus, the Court did not limit its reasoning to
the total exclusion of religious groups from an open forum. Instead,
the Court required the state to show a compelling interest to justify its
discrimination against religious speakers in an open forum.7
In Fairfax Covenant, the School Board did not prohibit the
Church from using its facilities, but Regulation 8420 required
churches to pay a higher rent than other nonprofit organizations. 9
Because the Widmar Court indicated that a state may not discriminate
against religious speakers in an open forum absent a compelling inter-
est, the Fourth Circuit properly required the School Board to show a
compelling state interest tojustify charging the Church higher rent."
The court then correctly determined that the School Board failed to
show such a compelling state interest to justify its policy of discrimina-
tion against churches.8 '
Pursuant to Widmar, a state actor claiming that discrimination
against a religious group in an open forum is necessary to avoid of-
fending the Establishment Clause must show an actual Establishment
Clause violation under the Lemon analysis.8 2 In essence, the state actor
must show that the open forum will advance the practice of religion
because the religious group will dominate the forum. 3
The record in Fairfax Covenant indicates that there was no danger
that the Church's use of the School Board's facilities at a reduced rent
would advance the practice of religion. As in Widmar, "the forum
[was] available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious
77. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 269-70.
79. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 705.
80. Id. at 706.
81. Id. at 707.
82. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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speakers."84 Therefore, the Church did not "dominate" the open fo-
rum. 85 In addition, there was no evidence that the community inter-
preted the Church's use of the School Board's facilities as "a religious
endorsement by the School Board."86 Finally, the below-market rent
did not constitute a subsidy because churches were charged the same
amount as other nonprofit organizations, and the amounts were used
by the School Board to maintain school facilities.87
b. A Request for Guidance. -Although the Fairfax Covenant
court applied its decision retroactively based on Chevron Oil,88 much
of the opinion focused on whether a federal court still may decide
cases on a purely prospective basis.89 Judge Niemeyer acknowledged
that the "precise issue" in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation9"
was the propriety of selective prospectivity.9' He observed that strong
dicta in Harper appears to disapprove of pure prospectivity as well92
and reasoned that "[i]t might not be reading too much into Harper
and Beam if we were to conclude that Chevron, adopting the test for
determining when cases may be enforced prospectively, has lost all
vitality.""3 Yet the court felt constrained to decide Fairfax Covenant
under the established three-pronged nonretroactivity analysis because
Harper did not expressly overrule Chevron OiL9
The Fourth Circuit's discussion of pure prospectivity in Fairfax
Covenant essentially represents a plea to the Supreme Court for a de-
finitive ruling on the issue. Although the court questioned Chevron
84. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981); see supra note 5.
85. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
86. Fairfax Covenan4 17 F.3d at 709.
87. Id. at 708.
88. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 409 U.S. 97 (1971); see supra notes 40-42 and accompa-
nying text.
89. Fairfax Covenan4 17 F.3d at 710.
90. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993); see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
91. Fairfax Covenan4 17 F.3d at 710; see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
92. Fairfax Covenan4 17 F.3d at 710.
93. Id.; see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
94. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d
1550 (11th Cir. 1994). To determine whether to apply its holding prospectively, the court
stated that
Beam and Harper stand only for the proposition that, once a rule of federal law is
applied to the parties in the case in which it was announced, it must be applied
retroactively. Neither decision directly addresses whether a newly announced de-
cision need be applied to the parties in the instant case. Thus, the Beam and
Harper Courts did not overrule Chevron Oifs three-factor test.... [W]e therefore
look to Chevron Oil itself for our standard concerning retroactivity.
Id. at 1566 (citations omitted).
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Oil's continued "vitality,"95 the Fourth Circuit will continue to apply
the Chevron Oil analysis in situations where purely prospective rule-
making may be appropriate.
5. Conclusion.-In Fairfax Covenant, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's determination that the School District's Regulation
8420 violated the Church's freedom of speech and freedom of reli-
gion. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in
not applying its decision retroactively.
The reasoning used by the Fairfax Covenant court, however, may
not remain valid for long. If the Court abandons the Lemon test as
suggested by Justice Scalia andJustice O'Connor, Widmai's analysis for
content-based discrimination in public forums will have to be recon-
sidered. Similarly, if the Court follows the dicta in Harper concerning
retroactivity of decisions, Chevron Oil's test for purely prospective rule-
making may be eliminated. Thus, litigants soon may be faced with
new analyses for Establishment Clause violations, open forums, and
retroactivity of decisions.
KEVIN M. ROBERTSON
C. Stricter Procedural Safeguards Required for Adult Bookstore
Zoning Ordinances
In 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit struck down a
Prince George's County zoning ordinance that regulated adult book-
stores on the grounds that it lacked the constitutional safeguards re-
quired by Freedman v. Maiyland2 and FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas.3
Under the ordinance, an adult bookstore seeking a special exception
to the zoning law4 would "face at least an eight-month delay from the
date the application is filed to a judicial resolution of the
application."5
95. Fairfax Covenant, 17 F.3d at 710.
1. 32 F.3d 109 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and reh'g granted (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1994).
2. 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (articulating a three-prong test to determine whether proce-
dural safeguards exist to protect movie theaters against impermissible censorship by state
authorities); see infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
3. 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (plurality opinion). 11126 Baltimore Boulevard is the first case
in which the Fourth Circuit has addressed the mandate of FW/PBS. In FW/PBS, the
Supreme Court stated that the procedural safeguards in Freedman apply to adult bookstore
regulations. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
4. See 11126 Baltimore Bouleard, 32 F.3d at 112 & nn.1-3.
5. Id. at 117.
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Unable to judge whether the ordinance on its face provided the
necessary constitutional safeguards, the court examined comparable
ordinances in other jurisdictions and found that the delay was not a
brief specified period.6 As such, the ordinance operated as an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on protected speech.7 The court also con-
cluded that because Maryland procedures provide for a three and
one-half month time period to reach ajudicial decision, the appellant
was denied prompt judicial review.8 Although the court determined
that the ordinance lacked valid procedures to safeguard protected
speech, the court's opinion failed to specify standards that would gen-
erally determine whether a given time limit is unconstitutional.9
1. The Case.-In 1986, 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. (War-
wick Books) 0 filed an action (Warwick 1) in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland that sought to declare a Prince
George's County's adult bookstore zoning ordinance violative of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion.11 The trial court struck down the ordinance on two grounds.
First, the county's adult bookstore zoning provisions, which would ef-
fectively ban the operations of adult bookstores, lacked sufficient evi-
dence to support the interests advanced by the county.12 Second, the
special exception provisions in the ordinance, which required a
lengthy and difficult process before an operating permit would be is-
sued, were invalid because they granted zoning officials too much dis-
cretion." The Fourth Circuit disagreed on both grounds and
reversed.1 4 Warwick Books appealed, and the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded for further consideration in light of its recent holding
6. Id. at 115-16.
7. Id. at 116-17.
8. Id. at 117.
9. The court observed that "hardship" may be a factor for consideration. Id. at 116.
The opinion, however, gave no further guidance on how such hardship relates to constitu-
tionality of the time limits at issue.
10. The parties to the instant action have battled each other in the courts for more
than a decade. Warwick Books was first issued a use and occupancy permit for the adult
bookstore in June 1975. In the 1980s, the Prince George's County zoning laws became
increasingly restrictive with respect to adult bookstores. Warwick Books commenced ac-
tion to invalidate the new regulations and to secure its right to operate in the county. See
11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 886 F.2d 1415, 1417-18 (4th
Cir. 1989), vacated and remanded, 496 U.S. 901 (1990), dismissed, 924 F.2d 557 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 76 (1991).
11. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 684 F. Supp. 884 (D.
Md. 1988) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
12. 11126 Baltimore Boutevard, 684 F. Supp. at 899.
13. Id.
14. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 886 F.2d at 1429.
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in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas.'5 Before the case was heard on re-
mand, however, the Prince George's County Council amended the
zoning ordinance to conform with the district court's earlier deci-
sion." Concluding that the county was asking for an advisory opin-
ion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded to the
district court with instructions to dismiss. 17
Following that dismissal, Prince George's County further
amended its ordinance, to prohibit any adult bookstore from opera-
tion within the county unless it obtained a special exception, in addi-
tion to any other applicable requirements in the County Code. 8
Section 27-904.01 of the Prince George's County Code specifies the
time schedule for a special exception application.' 9 Although the or-
dinance itself does not provide for judicial review, the administrative
judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County issued an ad-
ministrative order which stated that when a case is filed it shall be
assigned to a specific judge who will hear oral argument no later than
five days after the date for filing a reply memorandum under Mary-
land Rules, and render a decision within five days after the conclusion
15. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 496 U.S. 901 (1990).
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (plurality opinion) was decided after
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Warwick I but before Warwick I reached the Supreme
Court.
16. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 924 F.2d 557 (4th Cir.)
(per curiam) (noting that during oral argument counsel for Prince George's County ad-
vised the court that the county council had amended the zoning regulations to comply
with the district court's ruling), cert denied, 112 S. CL 76 (1991).
17. Id. at 558.
18. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 32 F.3d at 112.
19. See PRINCE GEORGE'S CoUNW, MD., CODE § 27-904.01 (Supp. 1992). Subsection (b)
provides that "[tihe Technical Staff ... shall render a decision on whether to accept an
application within three (3) working days of receipt" of a completely and properly filled
out application. Id. Subsection (d) requires that "[w]ithin forty-five (45) days from the
date an application is accepted, the Technical Staff shall issue a written report ... for
review and consideration by the Zoning Hearing Examiner." Id. Subsection (e) dictates
that a hearing on the Special Exception application "shall be scheduled before the Zoning
Hearing Examiner and publication of the hearing... [and] shall take place within forty-
five (45) days from the date the application is accepted." Id. Subsection (f) states that
"f[the Zoning Hearing Examiner shall issue its written decision within ninety (90) days
from the date the application is accepted." Id. Subsection (g) allows a Notice of Appeal of
the Zoning Hearing Examiner's written decision to the District Council to be filed within
.one hundred five (105) days from the date the application is accepted." Id. According to
subsection (h), upon receiving timely notice of appeal, "the District Council shall conduct
an oral argument within one hundred thirty-five (135) days from the date the application
is accepted." Id. Subsection (i) provides that "a decision on appeal shall be rendered by
the District Council no later than one hundred fifty (150) days from the date the applica-
tion for a Special Exception is accepted." Id.
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of oral argument.2" These time limitations may be extended only with
the consent of the parties.2
Warwick Books contended that the new provisions of the County
Code violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and brought a
second suit ( Warwick I) in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the
county.23 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that the 150-day mini-
mum time period between the filing of the application and judicial
resolution was not a brief specified period as required under FW/PBS
to "guard against the abridgment of protected speech."24 In this con-
text, the court held that "the Prince George's County adult bookstore
ordinance is an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected
speech."25 The court later vacated its judgment and granted a peti-
tion for a rehearing en banc.26
2. Legal Background.-
a. Developing Procedural Safeguards for Protected Expression. -In
Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme Court sought to balance freedom of
individual expression with protections for the general welfare. 28 After
it examined a state statute, which regulated the content of a newspa-
per, the Court noted that "[i]t is no longer open to doubt that the
liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion
by state action."29 This liberty, however, is offset by "the authority of
the State to enact laws to promote the health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare of its people.""0
As a procedural matter, the Due Process Clause "require[s] that
the government not restrict a specific individual's freedom to exercise
a fundamental constitutional right without a process to determine the
20. In re B-Rule Appeals in Adult Bookstore Cases (Cir. Ct. Prince George's County,
Mar. 19, 1993).
21. Id.
22. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 828 F. Supp. 370, 371
(D. Md. 1993), reu'd, 32 F.3d 109 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and reh'g granted (4th Cir. Nov. 2,
1994).
23. Id. at 376.
24. 11126 Baltimore Boulevar4 32 F.3d at 117.
25. Id.
26. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1994).
27. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
28. See id. at 707-23.




basis for the restriction. " " Procedural safeguards against unconstitu-
tional censorship were established in Freedman v. Maryland,12 in which
a theater owner had been convicted of showing a film without prior
approval of the Maryland State Board of Censors. 3 In Freedman, the
Supreme Court articulated a three-prong test to determine whether a
law contains sufficient safeguards to "obviate the dangers of a censor-
ship system."34 The first prong of the test requires that "the burden of
proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the cen-
sor."35 Second, the censor must, "within a specified brief period,
either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film."36
Any restraint prior to a final judicial determination on the merits
"must... be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest
fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution." 7 Third, the
procedure must assure a "prompt final judicial decision." 8
b. Evolution of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence After Freed-
man.-In Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack,3 9 the Supreme Court elaborated
its meaning of "specified brief time period"4" as articulated in Freed-
man. The Court ruled that a fifty to fifty-seven day period necessary to
complete an administrative review before the initiation ofjudicial pro-
ceedings was not a "specified brief period."4 1 The Court also found
the disputed ordinance unconstitutional because it lacked any provi-
sion for a prompt judicial decision by the trial court.4 2
31. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 13.4(c) (4th ed.
1991).
32. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
33. Id. at 52. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the conviction despite the state's
concession that the film "would have received a license if properly submitted." Id. at 52-53.
34. Id. at 58.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 59. The Court required ajudicial review "because only ajudicial determina-
tion in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression,
... [and] suffices to impose a valid final restraint." Id. at 58; see also Blount v. Rizzi, 400
U.S. 410, 419 (1971) (noting only the judiciary possesses the necessary independence to
review constitutionally protected expression fairly).
37. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
38. Id.
39. 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
40. Id. at 141 (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59). In Teitel Film, an ordinance prohib-
ited the exhibition, in any public place, of any motion picture without first securing a
permit from the police superintendent. Id. at 140. The administrative process of appeal-
ing a permit denial took 50 to 57 days before the initiation ofjudicial review. Id. at 141.
41. Id. at 141-42.
42. Id. at 142.
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In Blount v. Rizzi,4" the lack of adequate procedural safeguards
rendered invalid a federal statute designed to deny use of the mail for
commercial distribution of obscene literature." Under the statute,
the General Counsel of the Post Office could begin administrative
proceedings to withhold mail and refuse to honor money orders from
any person upon evidence satisfactory to the Postmaster General that
the person used the mails to distribute obscene matter.4 5 The Post-
master General could then obtain a court order to detain an individ-
ual's incoming mall pending the conclusion of proceedings.' Those
persons or businesses whose mail was withheld could "'only get full
judicial review on the question of obscenity-by which the Postmaster
would be actually bound-after lengthy administrative proceedings,
and then only by [their] own initiative.'" 47 The fatal flaw of this pro-
cedure was that it failed "to require that the Postmaster General ob-
tain a prompt judicial determination of the obscenity of the
material."4"
The Supreme Court took yet a closer look at the time require-
ments of anti-obscenity statutes in United States v. Thirty-Seven Photo-
graphs.49 Pursuant to federal customs law, 0 customs agents seized
thirty-seven photographs belonging to the claimant when he returned
to the United States from Europe.51 As enacted, the statute did not
contain explicit time limits necessary to comport with Freedman, Teitel,
and Blount.52 To avoid a constitutional question, the Court looked to
the legislative history of the statute to determine what time limits, if
any, might apply.53 The Court found that "fidelity to Congress' pur-
pose" dictated an interpretation of explicit time limits in the statute.54
For purposes of examining goods imported into the United States, the
Court determined that the forfeiture proceedings must be com-
menced within fourteen days of seizure and completed within sixty
43. 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
44. Id. at 417.
45. Id. at 412.
46. Id. at 413-14.
47. Id. at 421-22 (quoting United States v. Book Bin, 306 F. Supp. 1023, 1028 (N.D. Ga.
1969)).
48. Blount, 400 U.S. at 418. The statute failed the Freedman requirements in two re-
spects: there was no requirement that judicial determination be prompt, and the burden
of seeking judicial review fell on the individual, not the government.
49. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
50. See 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1988).
51. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 365-66.
52. Id. at 368.
53. Id. at 369-72.
54. Id. at 372.
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days of commencement. 55 The Court noted, finally, that "constitu-
tionally permissible limits may vary in different contexts; in other con-
texts, such as a claim by a state censor that a movie is obscene, the
Constitution may impose different requirements."56
In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,57 the Supreme Court considered
whether a Dallas licensing scheme to regulate sexually oriented busi-
nesses was a prior restraint that lacked the procedural safeguards re-
quired by Freedman.58 The scheme incorporated a combination of
zoning restrictions, licensing regulations, and inspections. 59 In a plu-
rality opinion, three Justices found that the scheme failed to satisfy the
"specified brief period" of restraint prior to judicial review, nor did it
offer the applicant an "expeditious judicial review" of an adverse deci-
sion.' The plurality concluded, however, that the first prong of the
Freedman test-the censor must bear the burden of going to court and
bear the burden of proof once in court-is not required where the
license is the key to the maintenance of the applicant's business.6 1
The plurality reasoned that such an applicant would have "every in-
centive" to pursue a license denial through court.6 2 In a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment, three other Justices stated that
all three of the Freedman safeguards applied to invalidate the
scheme.65 In dissent, Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist inter-
preted the licensing scheme as a content-neutral time, place and man-
ner restriction, and would have held that none of the Freedman
procedural safeguards were needed.'
3. The Court's Reasoning.-
a. Time Period Requirements.-In 11125 Baltimore Boulevard,
the court observed that, "no clear guideposts mark [its] way in deter-
mining whether the 150-day time period for decision established in
the Prince George's County adult bookstore ordinance constitutes a
55. Id. at 373.
56. Id. at 374. To determine whether a statute will withstand the time requirements set
forth in Freedman, the Court will look at the face of the statute, not at how the statute has
been applied. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 802 (1988)
(holding the lack of procedural time requirements invalidated a state statute notwithstand-
ing the state's prompt issuance of licenses).
57. 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 220.
59. Id. at 220-21.
60. Id. at 228-29 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion joined by Stevens and Kennedy, JJ.)
61. Id. at 229-30.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring and joined by Marshall and Blackmun, J.).
64. Id. at 244 (White, J, dissenting and joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
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'specified brief period.'" 5 In regard to the reasonableness of the time
period, the court mentioned that the prohibition against operating
during the application process imposes a hardship on Warwick Books,
but declined to explain the degree to which constitutionally required
time limits might differ if no such hardship were imposed.' The
court rejected Warwick Books' assertion that Teitel Film Corp. v. Cu-
sack67 should be read as establishing a bright-line rule that a 50-day
period for an administrative decision fails the Freedman requirement.'
Instead, the court noted that the "'core policy underlying Freedman is
that the license for a First Amendment-protected business must be
issued within a reasonable period of time, because undue delay results in
the unconstitutional suppression of protected speech.'" 69 The court.
further explained that the "reasonableness of the time period during
which a restraint on speech may operate prior to judicial review 'may
vary in different contexts. "'70
Because Prince George's County did not "provide any evidence to
support a conclusion that 150 days is the most reasonably prompt time
frame within which a decision can be made" 71 the court looked at
"schemes devised and time limitations imposed by other jurisdictions
to remedy the perceived evils occasioned by adult bookstores."72 The
court found that several jurisdictions have held that appropriate in-
quiries may reasonably be performed in less than the 150-day period
imposed by Prince George's County.75 On this basis, the court con-
cluded that the 150-day time period for was not the shortest time pe-
riod in which an administrative decision reasonably could be
completed. 4
65. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 32 F.3d at 115 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S.
51, 59 (1965)).
66. Id. at 116.
67. 390 U.S. 139 (1968); see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
68. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard 32 F.3d at 115.
69. Id. (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1990)).
70. Id. (quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 374 (1971)).
71. Id. The court noted that "[u]nder Maryland case law a county's decision pertain-
ing to a special exception application is to be supported by competent material and sub-
stantial evidence in the record." 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's
County, 886 F.2d 1415, 1427 (4th Cir. 1989).
72. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 32 F.3d at 115-16; see, e.g., TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton
County, 24 F.3d 705, 708 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding sixty days to act on license applications
imposes no undue burden); Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford County, 831 F. Supp. 1241,
1249-50 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that a 44-day administrative time schedule is reasonable);
Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F. Supp. 1568, 1574 (D. Minn. 1992) (finding that a 90-day
time period for decision on adult bookstore license application was not per se
unreasonable).
73. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard 32 F.3d at 115.
74. Id. at 116.
1995]
MARYLAND LAW REvIEW
b. Judicial Review.-With respect to Warwick Books' asser-
tion that the ordinance failed to assure prompt judicial review of an
administrative denial,75 the court noted that 110 days typically would
be required in Maryland to obtain a judicial ruling after a denial.76
The court declared that, "'[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a
final judicial determination on the merits must... be limited to... the
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution.'" '77
After a comparison of the Prince George's County provisions with
those in other jurisdictions, 8 the court concluded that the ordinance
did not ensure sufficiently prompt judicial review. 79
4. Analysis.-When Warwick I reached the Fourth Circuit, the
standards set forth in Freedman had not yet been applied to the licens-
ing of adult bookstores.8 0 In the instant case (Warwick II), the Fourth
Circuit faced for the first time the issue of defining the nebulous
phrases "specified brief period" and "prompt judicial review" with re-
spect to the licensing of adult bookstores.8 "
a. Delineating a "Specified Brief Period. "-In FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas,82 the Supreme Court affirmed the notion that at least
two prongs of the Freedman test 3 apply to the licensing of sex-oriented
businesses, but failed to provide any standards for what constitutes a
75. Id. at 116-17.
76. Id. at 117.
77. Id. at 116 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965)) (emphasis
added).
78. Id. at 116-17.
79. Id. at 117. Under the current Maryland Rules of Procedure, there is a three and
one-half month time frame forjudicial decision. Id.; see MD. R. B4 & B7 (1993). The court
pointed out that although the county has no control over the time limitations imposed by
the Maryland Rules, it may impose upon itself more limited time restraints for filing the
administrative record, responsive pleadings and memoranda than is required by the Mary-
land Rules. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 32 F.3d at 117 n.12.
80. Neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit mentioned Freedman in their opin-
ions in Warwick I, see supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text, although several Supreme
Court decisions had, by that time, extended Freedman beyond the context of movie pic-
tures. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (reaffirming
Freedman's procedural safeguards as applied to regulations of use of a public theater);
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (upholding a statute per-
mitting customs agents to seize allegedly obscene material because statute could be con-
strued as complying with Freedman time limits); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971)
(requiring regulations regarding postal inspectors' seizing mail to satisfy the procedural
safeguards set forth in Freedman).
81. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 32 F.3d at 115-16.
82. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
83. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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"specified brief period."84 The only guidance given was the vague di-
rective that "It]he core policy underlying Freedman is that the license
for a First Amendment-protected business must be issued within a rea-
sonable period of time, because undue delay results in the unconstitu-
tional suppression of protected speech.""
As such, a determination of the reasonableness of the time period
would sensibly "require [ ] an examination of the type ofjudgments to
be made by the government officials and the hardship placed on the
class of applicants by the restraint."8 6 Yet, the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Warwick II identified no objective criteria by which legislatures
might measure the constitutionality of a proposed statute.8 7 The
court simply compared the time limits in the ordinance to those of
other jurisdictions as a measure of its constitutionality.88 Such a com-
parative approach would seem to offer a dubious yardstick. Indeed,
the court stated, "zoning decisions necessarily involve a detailed exam-
ination of numerous factors." 9 With no specified basis to determine
the reasonableness of review the time period, the court evasively con-
cluded that "[c]omparison of schemes devised and time limitations
imposed by other jurisdictions to remedy the perceived evils occa-
sioned by adult bookstores discloses that the necessary inquiries may
be performed in a shorter time frame than that imposed by Prince
George's County."9"
As Justice Black stated in his dissent to Thirty-Seven Photographs, it
is "peculiar and disturbing" to derive rules for the determination of
the constitutionality of a statute by "surveying previously litigated cases
and then guessing what limits would not pose an undue hardship."91
84. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228. The difficulty with the statute in FW/PBS was that an
applicant had to obtain the approval of the health department, fire department, and the
building official before a license could be issued, and there were no time limits in the
statute that set forth when those approvals or denials had to be made. Id. at 227.
85. Id at 228.
86. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 32 F.3d at 115.
87. Appellee's brief, for example, included no discussion of what procedural steps it
takes and how much time each step requires in the issuance of a license. To show that the
150-day limit was reasonable, the brief relied on the Warwick I decision which found that
six months was a reasonable time period, and therefore the five-month (150-day) limit
must also be reasonable. Brief for Appellee at 7-8, 11126 Baltimore Boulevard (No. 93-2151).
88. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 32 F.3d at 115-16.
89. Id. at 115.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 387 (1971) (BlackJ., dis-
senting) (citations omitted). Justice Black's point is particularly applicable to zoning ordi-
nances in view of the Supreme Court's recognition that, with regard to regulation of
potentially First Amendment-protected speech, "constitutionally permissible limits may
vary in different contexts." Id. at 374.
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The determination of the reasonableness of the time period by com-
parison with other jurisdictions should not be the only barometer of
constitutionality. It is an affront to state sovereignty for the constitu-
tionality of a state's laws to be judged solely by what other jurisdictions
found reasonable in their opinion. One possible method to ascertain
whether a time limit on zoning applications is reasonable would be to
place the burden on the government to introduce evidence as to the
reasonableness of the time limits.92 As the regulating entity, the gov-
ernment is certainly in a better position to provide such evidence than
licensing applicants.9" The applicant would then have the burden of
proving that the government's data is inaccurate or that the method
of application review is unnecessarily inefficient. Time limits imposed
in other jurisdictions could then be used to assess the factual accuracy
of the government's assertions, but not as an independent barometer
of the constitutionality of the statute.
b. Prompt Judicial Review of Administrative Denial. -The Freed-
man test, as extended to adult bookstore regulations by FW/PBS, re-
quires that there be "an avenue for prompt judicial review so as to
minimize suppression of the speech in the event of a license denial."94
This requirement followed the decision in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad,95 in which the Supreme Court held that a public theater's
standard to determine which shows may be performed "must be im-
plemented under a system that assures prompt judicial review."96 In
Warwick II, the Fourth Circuit interpreted this prong of the Freedman
test to require not only prompt judicial review, but also prompt judi-
cial decision.97 The court concluded that the "three and one-half
92. This process could be administered in either of two ways. Evidence could be intro-
duced regarding how long other types of zoning applications in that jurisdiction reason-
ably take to process. Presumably, a county or state would not slow down all zoning
decisions as a means of restricting adult bookstores. Alternatively, the government could
itemize the required administrative tasks and then approximate the time necessary to expe-
dite each task. Either of these methods would give courts a sound factual basis on which to
make a decision as to the reasonableness of the time limit imposed by the statute in
question.
93. This process would not create an additional burden in Maryland because "[u]nder
Maryland case law a county's decision pertaining to a special exception application is to be
supported by competent material and substantial evidence in the record." See 11126 Balti-
more Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 886 F.2d 1415, 1427 (4th Cir. 1989).
94. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 492 U.S. 215, 229 (1990).
95. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
96. Id. at 562.
97. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc., 32 F.3d at 117. The Eleventh Circuit has also deter-
mined that the administrative procedures must specifically provide for prompt judicial re-
view. See Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495 (11th Cir. 1994).
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month time frame for judicial decision under the present Maryland
procedures" is not sufficiently prompt.98 To reach this result, the
court compared the provisions of the county ordinance to similar reg-
ulations that the Supreme Court has considered.99 Again, the defi-
ciencies of such a comparative method beg the question of finding a
more reasoned standard.
At least two circuits have interpreted the prompt judicial review
standard differently. The Fifth Circuit has understood FW/PBS to re-
quire only that the state "offer a fair opportunity to complete the ad-
ministrative process and access the courts within a brief period."10
Taking a different approach, the Seventh Circuit observed that "it is
not clear why the Court in Freedman set out the apparent requirement
that an ordinance ... explicitly provide for promptjudicial review. A
person always has a judicial forum when his speech is allegedly in-
fringed."' The Seventh Circuit found that although the ordinance
at issue contained no provisions for "expeditious judicial review," the
state's common-law writ of certiorari would suffice.1 02 Because the
Supreme Court has yet to clarify this issue, the true intent of the
Court's requirement of prompt judicial review remains shrouded in
uncertainty.
5. Conclusion.-In 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, the Fourth Circuit
invalidated a county ordinance that regulated adult bookstores on
grounds of excessive delay in administrative and judicial review of the
licensing application. Although the court stated in its conclusion that
"there is little authority to guide [its] decision,"103 it failed to establish
a standard that would guide future decision-makers as to what consti-
tutes a "brief specified period" for an administrative review. The court
likewise failed to specify what constitutes "prompt judicial review"
98. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 32 F.3d at 117.
99. Id. at 116. This comparison differs from the court's treatment of a specified time
period, where it compared the present facts to other federal district and circuit court deci-
sions. See supra note 72.
100. TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton County, 24 F.3d 705, 709 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fifth
Circuit noted that "a 'brief period' within which all judicial avenues are exhausted would
be an oxymoron." Id. However, the regulation at issue in TK's Video did provide that the
filing of a notice of appeal stays any administrative decision revoking or suspending a li-
cense. Id.
101. Graffv. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993) (reviewing an ordinance
that required newsstand operators to acquire a permit or face eviction).
102. Id. at 1324-25.
103. 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, 32 F.3d at 117.
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under FW/PBS,104 in terms that will inform legislatures of the parame-
ters necessary to pass constitutional muster.
ERICA M. STEINACKER
104. The only standard given in FW/PBS is that the license must be issued, or there must
be a final judicial determination denying issuance, in a reasonable time period. FW/PBS,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1990).
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XIV. FAMILY LAW
A. Confidential Maintenance of Unsubstantiated Child Abuse
Investigation Reports and the Scope of Familial Privacy
In Hodge v. Jones,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that Maryland's confidential maintenance of a
child abuse investigation report, after the parents had been cleared of
the charges by the Department of Social Services (DSS), did not vio-
late the parents' substantive due process right of familial privacy.2
The court stated that a mere allegation of reputational injury and the
possibility of public disclosure of the confidential records did not im-
plicate a constitutional privacy right.' The court further concluded
that Maryland's statutory scheme for the investigation of child abuse
and neglect evidenced a proper concern with, and protection of, the
parents' interest in privacy.4 Although the court's decision is consis-
tent with Supreme Court jurisprudence confining familial privacy to
governmental attempts to proscribe individual conduct or otherwise
affect the parent-child relationship, the reasoning suggests that unwar-
ranted disclosure of personal information could violate a constitution-
ally imposed duty of confidentiality.
1. The Case.--On January 20, 1989, David and Marsha Hodge
took their three-month-old son, Joseph, to the Carroll County General
Hospital for examination and treatment of his swollen right arm.5 Af-
ter diagnosing the child's condition as a fractured ulna "without ade-
quate historical explanation," the examining physician contacted the
Carroll County Department of Social Services (CCDSS) to report sus-
pected child abuse.6 An investigation by a Child Protective Services
(CPS) caseworker and a Maryland state police officer ultimately
yielded no evidence of abuse.7 The CPS caseworker filed a report
with the CCDSS classifying the case as "ruled out" and "unsub-
stantiated."'
1. 31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994).
2. Id. at 167.
3. Id. at 165-66.
4. Id. at 166.
5. Id. at 160.
6. Id. Health practitioners who have reason to believe that a child has been subjected
to abuse must notify the local Department of Social Services. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw
§ 5-704(a) (1991).
7. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 160.
8. Id. at 160-61. On January 27, 1989, the same day the CPS caseworker filed the
report, the Maryland Department of Human Resources adopted new disposition categories
for reported incidents of child abuse, reducing the categories from "confirmed," "indi-
1995] 1005
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Shortly thereafter, two specialists diagnosed the child's condition
as osteomyelitis, a bacterial bone infection, and performed the neces-
sary corrective surgery.9 The Hodges informed the CCDSS of the cor-
rected diagnosis.' 0 The CCDSS, however, denied the Hodges' request
for the full report of the incident, as well as their repeated requests
for the destruction or expunction of any CCDSS file or document on
the investigation." Each request was denied under Maryland's statu-
tory bar against disclosure of confidential materials 2 and the CCDSS's
purported inability to expunge the file until 1994.'"
The CCDSS entered the Hodge investigation report into the Au-
tomated Master File (AMF), a computerized data base containing a
record of every Maryland citizen who has received any services from a
local Department of Social Services office.1 4 The AMF information is
alpha-numerically coded." It is shielded by state law from disclosure
to the general public. 6
The CCDSS's continued refusal to disclose and expunge the in-
vestigation report prompted the Hodges to file a civil rights action in
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against
cated," "uncertain," or "ruled out," to "indicated" or "unsubstantiated." Id. at 161 n.1.
Because the new regulations did not take effect until February 6, 1989, the caseworker
classified the Hodge case as "ruled out" and "unsubstantiated" to comport with each regu-
lation. Id.
9. Id. at 161.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see Md. Ann. Code art. 88A, § 5 (1991) (custody, use, and preservation of
records concerning applicants and recipients of social services and public assistance); MD.
REGs. CODE tit. 07, § 01.07 (1991). (confidentiality of records).
13. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 161. At the time in question, the CCDSS was statutorily required
to expunge "unsubstantiated" reports after five years if no further incidents involving the
same alleged perpetrator were reported during that time. Id. at 161 n.3. The Hodge re-
port, filed inJanuary 1989, would have been expunged inJanuary 1994. As of 1991, "ruled
out" reports must be expunged within 120 days of the report's filing. MD. CODE ANN., FAs.
LAw § 5-707(b) (1991).
14. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 161.
15. Id.
16. Id. Section 6 of Article 88A provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person or persons to divulge or make known in any
manner any information concerning any applicant for or recipient of social serv-
ices, child welfare services, cash assistance, food stamps, or medical assistance,
directly or indirectly derived from the records, papers, files, investigations or
communications of the State, county or city, or subdivisions or agencies thereof,
or acquired in the course of the performance of official duties.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 6(a) (1991 & Supp. 1993). The regulations establish the proce-
dures for requesting and gaining access to records and information in the Central Registry.
See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 07, § 01.02 (1991); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 07, § 02.07.14 (1989). See
also infra note 104 and accompanying text.
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the CCDSS and various state officials.1 7 The complaint alleged a viola-
tion of the Hodges' liberty interest in familial privacy." The district
court ruled that Maryland's maintenance of child abuse investigation
reports after the parents have been cleared of the charges by the DSS
violated the parents' substantive due process right to familial privacy
and their procedural due process rights." The trial court rejected the
defendant state officials' qualified immunity defense and granted in-
terlocutory summary judgment to the Hodges on the issue of liabil-
ity."° The defendant state officials appealed the denial of their
qualified immunity defense to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.21 The circuit court reversed the decision of the
district court.2
2. Legal Background.-
a. The "Pre-Privacy" Cases.-The concept of familial privacy
has evolved from a host of Supreme Court cases tracing their lineage
from Meyer v. Nebraska23 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.24 In Meyer, the
17. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 162. The Hodges filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which im-
poses liability on "any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another person
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
18. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 162.
19. Id. at 160. By comparing it to the protected liberty interest in personal privacy
acknowledged by the Supreme Court, the district court reasoned that "the protected lib-
erty interest in familial privacy encompasse[d] an 'interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters.'" Hodge v. Carroll County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F. Supp. 593, 600 (D.
Md. 1992) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)). That interest is implicated
"when government shares private information or when government collects private infor-
mation in the absence of any legitimate state interest for such collection." Id.
20. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 162.
21. Id. The defendants invoked the "collateral order" doctrine in appealing the denial
of their qualified immunity defense. Id. Under this doctrine, a district court's denial of a
claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Qualified immunity entities a defendant who did not violate clearly
established law not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. See id. at 526. This
entitlement is effectively lost if the case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Id. at 526-
27. The denial of a defendant's motion for dismissal or summaryjudgment on the ground
of qualified immunity conclusively determines the defendant's claim of right not to stand
trial on the plaintiffs allegations because there are no further steps that can be taken in
the district court to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is barred. Id. at 527. More-
over, the issue of immunity is separate from the merits of the underlying action because
the reviewing court need only determine a question of law-whether the conduct of which
the plaintiff complains violated clearly established law. Id. at 527-28.
22. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 168. The court reversed the district court's order rejecting the
defendant state officials' qualified immunity and vacated the partial judgment for the
Hodges on the issue of liability, Id.
23. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
24. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Court held that a state statute prohibiting the teaching of modern
foreign languages to elementary school children violated substantive
due process. 5 The Court stated that the instructor's right to teach
and the parents' right to engage him to instruct their children for this
purpose were within the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6 More was at stake than the economic liberties of
teacher and parent. 7 The legislature had attempted to interfere with
"the power of parents to control the education of their [children] ."2
In Pierce, the Court struck down as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment a law that required all children between the ages of eight
and sixteen to attend public school. 9 The Court held that the law
unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents to direct the up-
bringing and education of their children.3" Although neither case ar-
ticulated the right of privacy, both Meyer and Pierce have been viewed
as the true progenitors of the doctrine of familial privacy."1
In Prince v. Massachusetts,"2 the Supreme Court characterized
Meyer and Pierce as decisions that "have respected the private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter."33 The Court cautioned that
the family itself was not beyond regulation in the public interest and
that the state had a legitimate interest in limiting parental freedom
and authority in areas that affect a child's welfare.3 4 As a result, the
Court in Prince held a statute that made it unlawful for a parent or
guardian to furnish a minor any newspapers, magazines, periodicals,
or other articles of merchandise to sell on the streets or in other pub-
lic places was within the state's police power.3"
b. The Privacy Cases.-The Supreme Court announced the
right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.6 In Griswold, the Court in-
validated a Connecticut statute that banned contraceptives, stating
that a right of privacy was contained within "zones of privacy" or
25. 262 U.S. at 402-03.
26. Id. at 400.
27. See id. at 401.
28. Id.
29. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
30. Id.
31. SeeJed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 743 (1989) (sug-
gesting that today Meyer and Pierce are classified together as the forebears of contemporary
privacy decisions).
32. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
33. Id. at 166.
34. Id. at 166-67.
35. Id. at 170. The Court balanced the state's police power against the parents' claim
of control over the child. Id. at 169.
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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"penumbras" of specific constitutional guarantees.3 7 The right of pri-
vacy included the freedom of married persons to decide what to do in
the privacy of the marital bedroom.3 8
The Court further modified the privacy concept in Roe v. Wade. 9
The Roe Court created a species of privacy unattached to specific guar-
antees in the Bill of Rights.' In Roe, the right of privacy arose from
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty, and was
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate
her pregnancy.41
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,42 the Court held that
mandatory maternity leave provisions for school teachers in the fourth
or fifth month of pregnancy were unconstitutional.4 The Court con-
cluded that "freedom of personal choice in matters of ... family life
[was] one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
44
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,45 the city filed criminal charges
against a grandmother for residing with her grandson in violation of a
zoning ordinance that limited the occupancy of a dwelling unit to
members of a single family.46 The Moore Court invalidated the ordi-
nance.4 7 After a recitation of the Griswold line of case law as well as
the "pre-privacy" cases, the Court concluded that "the Constitution
37. Id. at 484-85.
38. See id. at 485-86.
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id.
42. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
43. Id. at 651.
44. Id. at 639-40. The Supreme Court also has acknowledged a fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their children. In
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Court considered an Illinois statute that pre-
sumed unwed fathers unfit to raise their children. Id. at 650. On the death of the mother,
the statute declared children of unwed fathers wards of the state and placed them with
court-appointed guardians. Id. at 646. The Court held that all Illinois parents were consti-
tutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children could be removed
from their custody. Id. at 658. The Court emphasized that "[tihe rights to conceive and to
raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and 'far more
precious . . . than property rights.'" Id. at 651 (citations omitted); see also Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that termination of parental rights requires at least
a clear and convincing evidence standard).
45. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 496-97.
47. Id. at 506.
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protect[ed] the sanctity of the family"4" and acknowledged a "'private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.'" 49
In Whalen v. Roe,5" a case involving individual privacy, the
Supreme Court interpreted the constitutional right of privacy as pro-
tecting two distinct interests: (1) the interest to make certain deci-
sions autonomously, and (2) the interest to avoid disclosure of
personal matters.51 In response to a concern that prescription drugs
were being diverted into unlawful channels, New York enacted a stat-
ute requiring the maintenance of records in a centralized computer
with the names and addresses of persons who obtain by prescription
certain drugs for which there exists both a lawful and an unlawful
market. 12 The Whalen Court held that the New York statute did not so
threaten either confidentiality or autonomy that it violated the consti-
tutionally protected right of privacy."
The Whalen Court concluded that the remote possibility of unwar-
ranted disclosure was not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire
patient-identification program. 4 Patients and physicians challenging
the statute pointed out that even without public disclosure, private
information had to be disclosed to the authorized state employees.55
Because disclosure to state employees under a duty of confidentiality
differed from disclosure to the public, the Court concluded that
"[r] equiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having re-
sponsibility for the health of the community, does not automatically
amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy."56 The Court ac-
knowledged that in some circumstances the state's duty to avoid un-
warranted disclosure of personal information "arguably ha[d] its roots
in the Constitution."
5 7
c. The Registry of Child Abuse Reports and Recent Federal and
State Jurisprudence. -In Glasford v. New York State Department of Social
Services, 8 the plaintiff was the subject of a report of child abuse which
48. Id. at 503.
49. Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
50. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
51. Id. at 599-600.
52. Id. at 591.
53. Id. at 605-06.
54. Id. at 601-02.
55. Id. at 602.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 605-06. The strict statutory safeguards against public disclosure in Whalen
permitted the Court to avoid consideration of the constitutionality of an unwarranted dis-
closure. Id.
58. 787 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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had been entered into New York's central register of suspected child
abusers.59 He claimed that the report interfered with his protected
liberty interest in his reputation and in his relationship with his fam-
ily.6° The federal district court found that the complaint stated no
violation of a protected interest and granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss.6 The court held that the effect on reputation, without
more, was not a constitutionally protected liberty or property
interest. 6'
New York's child abuse registry laws were attacked again in
Valmonte v. Bane.63 The laws required employers in the child care field
to make inquiries to the central register to determine whether poten-
tial employees were among those listed. 61 If a potential employee was
on the list, then the employer could only hire the individual if the
employer maintained a written record of the specific reasons for the
decision to hire.65
Unlike G/asford, the plaintiff in Valmonte had applied for child
care positions and alleged that the state's communication of the
names of individuals in the central register to potential employers in
the child care field implicated a protectable liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment." The Second Circuit held that there was a
deprivation of a liberty interest where plaintiff's inclusion in the regis-
ter caused defamation to her character and created a statutory imped-
iment to employment in the child care industry.67
The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld that state's child abuse regis-
try laws in Roth v. Reagen.68 A person accused of sexually abusing his
stepdaughter, whose name was placed in the child abuse information
registry with the statement that the accusation was unfounded, filed a
mandamus and declaratory judgment action to request that his record
59. Id. at 385.
60. Id. at 387.
61. Id. at 388-89.
62. Id. at 388. The court noted that the complaint did not allege that the plaintiff's
employment prospects suffered as a result of the report in the central register. Id. Plain-
tiffs relationship with his family also was not altered as a result of the report in the central
register. Id.
63. 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).
64. Id. at 995.
65. Id. at 996.
66. Id. at 994, 1000.
67. Id. at 1002. But see Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986). In Bohn, the Eighth Circuit noted that the identification of
the Bohns as child abusers and the maintenance of data on them exposed the Bohns to
"public opprobrium" and, thereby, stigmatized them. Id. at 1436 n.4. The court found
that Mr. Bohn's reputation was a protectable interest. Id.
68. 422 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 1988).
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be expunged and to declare Iowa's child abuse registry laws unconsti-
tutional.6 9 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that reputation was
a property interest sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of
the Due Process Clause.7" It also rejected his assertion that the place-
ment and maintenance of his name in the registry on the basis of an
unfounded report was an invasion of his constitutional right of pri-
vacy.7 1 To reach its decision, the court noted that the records were
highly confidential and that criminal penalties covered the unauthor-
ized public disclosure of the identity of persons in the registry.7 2
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In upholding Maryland's confidential
maintenance of unsubstantiated child abuse investigation reports, the
circuit court first noted that the sanctity of the family unit was a funda-
mental precept "firmly ensconced in the Constitution and shielded by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."7" The court
stated that "[It]he concept of familial privacy ha[d] been restricted by
the Supreme Court to (1) thwarting governmental attempts to inter-
fere with particularly intimate family decisions, and (2) voiding gov-
ernment actions that sever, alter, or otherwise affect the parent-child
relationship."74 The court further established that the maxim of fa-
milial privacy was neither absolute nor unqualified and could be out-
weighed by a legitimate governmental interest.75
The court concluded that whatever the precise confines of the
familial privacy right, the defendants' actions could not be classified
within the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the privacy cases, and
thus did not establish a violation of an identified liberty interest."
The Hodges failed to demonstrate that the defendants' actions had a
significant impact on the parent-child relationship or on their family's
ability to function.77 The complaint "reveal [ed] no more than a con-
clusory allegation of reputational injury."78 Neither a conclusory alle-
gation of reputational injury nor the remote possibility of public
disclosure of confidential records constituted a violation of a substan-
69. Id. at 465.
70. Id. at 467.
71. Id. at 468.
72. Id. at 468-69.
73. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 163 (citations omitted).
74. Id. (foomotes omitted).
75. Id. at 163-64 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 164.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 165; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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tive due process right.79 In so holding, the court also noted its disa-
greement with the Hodges' contention that the state lacked a
legitimate governmental interest once an abuse report had been
deemed "unsubstantiated" or "ruled out."80
Given its holding that no substantive federal constitutional light
was violated, the court determined that it was technically unnecessary
for it to discuss the district court's denial of qualified immunity.81
Nevertheless, troubled by the district court's "generalized formulation
of a constitutional right which prevents reasonable government offi-
cials from knowing just what conduct is actually prohibited by the
broad concept of family inviolability," the court felt compelled to ad-
dress the denial.8 2 The court concluded that it would have applied
qualified immunity because the confines of the familial privacy right
were not so clearly established" that the defendant state officials
could objectively or reasonably have known that their conduct vio-
lated the Due Process Clause. 4
Retired Supreme CourtJustice Powell, sitting by designation, con-
curred in the judgment of the court.8 5 He agreed with the court that
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from civil mone-
tary damages.8 6 Justice Powell, however, preferred not to reach the
merits of the underlying constitutional question. 7
79. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 165-66; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding damage
to reputation alone did not implicate any "liberty" or "property" rights secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
80, See infta notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
81. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 167 (quoting Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1988) ("If
there is no violation of a federal right, there is no basis for a section 1983 action and no
answer to a plea by the public officer of qualified immunity.")).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1416 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that the consti-
tutional right of family integrity was not clearly established), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 1189
(1994); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[T]he dimensions of [the]
right (of familial privacy] have yet to be clearly established."); Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d
1210, 1217 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that the right of family integrity was nebulous).
84. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 167-68; seeAnderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) ("The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right."); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
("[G]ovemment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."). The Hodge
court of appeals also determined that its holding obviated any federal constitutional re-
quirement of procedural due process. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 168.
85. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 168-69 (Powell, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 169. Justice Powell reasoned: "[E]ven assuming that [diefendants' actions
infringed a constitutionally protected liberty interest, such interest was not clearly estab-




4. Analysis.-In Hodge, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit properly limited the scope of familial privacy in accordance with
the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence. That jurisprudence
makes clear that the right of familial privacy is neither absolute nor
unqualified.88 As the concept evolved from the liberty interest of the
early cases of Meyer and Pierce to a substantive right of privacy under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court confined the concept to cases
that involve an individual's freedom of action in the intimate realm of
family life. So confined, the right of privacy attached to the right-
holder's own actions.89 It is a substantive right that immunizes certain
conduct-such as the use of contraceptives, the abortion of a preg-
nancy, or residence with members of an extended family-from state
proscription or penalty.9 °
In Whalen v. Roe, the Court suggested that the individual's interest
in the continued confidentiality of personal information stored by the
government was protected by constitutional privacy.91 The Whalen
Court, however, did not extend the right of privacy to the governmen-
tal collection and retention of personal information.92 When applied
to the concept of familial privacy, Whalen suggests there is a constitu-
tional right of confidentiality once private data is accumulated. In
Hodge, this right of confidentiality was not violated by the mere main-
tenance of unsubstantiated child abuse investigation reports.
Even assuming the familial privacy rights were broad enough to
include an interest in access to personal information, the family is not
beyond regulation in the public interest.93 The state has a legitimate
88. See Hodge, 31 F.3d at 163; see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (rec-
ognizing that the Constitution protected the parent-child relationship in appropriate
cases).
89. See Rubenfeld, supra note 31, at 740.
90. See id. See generally Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV.
1335, 1396 (arguing that Griswold and Roe combined well-respected constitutional privacy
notions-primarily drawn from Fourth and First Amendment case law-with turn-of-the-
century "liberty" jurisprudence created under the Fourteenth Amendment to produce a
new form of privacy dealing with "liberty of choice.").
91. 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977); see supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
92. Wha/en, 429 U.S. at 602 (1977). The Court has interpreted Whalen as holding that
the Constitution does not prohibit the compilation of personal information in centralized
computer files. See United States Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989); see also Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Heath, 848
S.W.2d 927, 931 (Ark. 1993) (recognizing that the essence of the decision in Whalen is that
the right of privacy does not extend to matters relating to the government's collecting and
retaining data concerning private citizens).
93. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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interest in the health and safety of its minor citizens.94 The right of
familial privacy does not include the right to be free from child abuse
investigations.95 Indeed, the maintenance of reports contemplates no
further interference with the family structure than the investigation
itself.
The state, moreover, has a legitimate interest in the maintenance
of unsubstantiated reports of child abuse. Abuse investigations are
not always accurate, and a series of "unsubstantiated" entries for a
given child can indicate a pattern of emotional or physical harm to
the child that warrants further investigation by the state.9 6 Retained
reports also protect the individual whose records are kept by the pre-
vention of repeated investigations when more than one person makes
the same accusation.97 Such reports allow the state to defend itself in
the event of a suit alleging inadequate investigation of a reported in-
stance of abuse.98
Nevertheless, parents suspected of child abuse have a genuine
concern that the information about the abuse investigation will be-
come publicly known and adversely affect their reputation. Although
reputational injury coupled with the deprivation of another recog-
nized liberty or property interest, or the infringement of some other
legal-status or right conferred by state law, is constitutionally pro-
tected, reputational injury alone is not a due process interest.99 Like-
wise, the remote possibility of an unwarranted disclosure does not by
itself implicate a constitutional right.1"'
Given Maryland's extensive confidentiality provisions protecting
child abuse investigation reports, there appears to be no realistic ave-
nue by which such a stigma could attach. The unauthorized disclo-
sure of confidential information about reports of abuse or neglect is a
misdemeanor subject to imprisonment of up to ninety days, a fine of
not more than $500, or both. 101 The disclosing person may also be
liable for damages in a civil suit."°2 A statement that the accusation is
94. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (noting that the state has a "parens
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child"); Prince 321 U.S. at
167 ("[T] he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare.").
95. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993).
96. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 166.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 166-67.
99. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
100. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
101. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 6(b)-(e); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 07, § 01.07.10.
102. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 07, § 01.07.10.
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"unsubstantiated" must be placed in the report."' 3 Child abuse inves-
tigation information, moreover, is entered into the AMF in alpha-
numeric code and is not accessible to the general public. T1
There are strong policy arguments not to expand the concept of
familial privacy to include an interest in access to confidential infor-
mation. Unlike individual privacy, familial privacy involves the inter-
est of the child as well as the interests of the parents and the state. 10 5
One commentator has suggested that attempts to accommodate fam-
ily autonomy and privacy significantly compromise the protection of
children. 106 Others persuasively argue that familial privacy should be
seen as an obstacle to independent representation for allegedly
abused children in private custody cases.'0 7 Presumably, a more ex-
pansive notion of familial privacy would limit the ability of the state to
intervene on behalf of the child.
In practice, the court's decision in Hodge requires that parents
who claim a violation of their familial privacy liberty interest must al-
lege more than a reputational injury or the possibility of public disclo-
sure of confidential records. A constitutional remedy will arise only if
an unauthorized disclosure of accumulated information results in the
infringement of another constitutionally recognized liberty or prop-
erty interest, or some other legal status or right conferred by state
law.10  Absent a significant impact on the parent-child relationship,
103. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 07, § 02.07.08a.
104. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-714 (availability of information). Information
contained in the reports can be disclosed only to a limited number of persons specified by
statute, including social services and law enforcement personnel who investigate abuse or
provide services to persons named in the reports, licensed practitioners who render medi-
cal care, the parent or custodian, and the alleged child abuser. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A,
§ 6(b). A person suspected of abuse must be given notice before the name of that person
is entered in the central register. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-715(b). The person may
request a hearing to appeal the entry of his name in the central register. Id. § 5-715(c).
105. But see David A. Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: AJurispru-
dential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3-6 (1980) (arguing that some Supreme Court deci-
sions respect a child's right to autonomy but others ignore it).
106. SeeJudith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ.
L. REv. 569, 569 (1992). McMullen argues that the law's reverence for family privacy and
family autonomy is based on two often false assumptions: "(1) that privacy strengthens
families, and (2) that parents will act in the best interests of their children." Id.
107. See, e.g., Kerin S. Bischoff, Comment, The Voice of a Child: Independent Legal Represen-
tation of Children in Private Custody Disputes When Sexual Abuse Is Alleged, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
1383 (1990). Bischoff argues that "[p]arents embroiled in custody disputes involving alle-
gations of abuse are particularly inappropriate representatives of their child's welfare or
wishes." Id. at 1398.
108. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976). The Supreme Court has indicated,
for example, that not all employment interests are constitutionally recognized. In Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-69 (1972), the Court held that a nontenured state col-
lege professor employed on a year-to-year basis had no protected property interest in his
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the mere maintenance of investigation reports is constitutionally
permissible.
A more problematic scenario involves an unauthorized disclosure
that does not result in the infringement of some other legal status or
right. The Supreme Court in Whalen concluded that there was no pri-
vacy violation in the disclosure of personal information to appropriate
government officials. 1" Nevertheless, aware of the threat to privacy
implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information
in computerized data banks, the Court indicated that a constitutional
right of confidentiality of personal information accumulated by the
government exists as part of the right of privacy.'11
Whalen implies that statutes with inadequate safeguards against
public disclosure will be invalidated for failure to show a proper con-
cern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy. It
indicates that a right of confidentiality exists to protect a residual in-
terest in the prevention of a further erosion of the right to privacy. In
this context, the unauthorized disclosure of a child abuse investiga-
tion report that does not infringe on some other legal right or status
may still violate the right of confidentiality.
5. Condusion.-By declining to extend the concept of familial
privacy to the confidential maintenance of unsubstantiated child
abuse investigation reports, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit properly concluded that Fourteenth Amendment privacy juris-
prudence permits the accumulation of personal information by state
officials. Maryland's child abuse and registry laws strike an appropri-
ate balance between the state's interest in the protection of children
against abuse and the individual's interest in privacy and reputation.
The court's decision does not, however, signify that there are no con-
stitutional remedies for improper disclosure of sensitive information.
The Constitution still requires strict confidentiality provisions to pro-
tect individuals from unwarranted disclosure.
NICHOLAS G. STAVLAS
employment. To reach this conclusion, the Court conditioned constitutional recognition
of a property interest on the possession of "a legitimate claim of entitlement" rather than a
mere expectation of benefit. Id. at 577.
109. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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XV. HEALTH CARE LAW
A. EMTALA and the Maryland Malpractice Act: Competing Causes of
Action?
In Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital, Inc.,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed whether a claim
brought under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor
Act2 (EMTALA) must first undergo arbitration as mandated by the
Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims Act (Maryland Malpractice
Act) .' The court held that EMTALA plaintiffs may proceed directly to
litigation because the Maryland Malpractice Act's arbitration require-
ment does not govern EMTALA claims.4 In reaching this conclusion,
the court declined to decide whether EMTALA incorporates state law
mandates, but, in dicta, presented reasons both for and against the
incorporation of state arbitration requirements into EMTALA. 5
1. The Case.--On October 5, 1989, Robert Brooks suffered from
a sudden inability to walk and went to the emergency room of Mary-
land General Hospital at 2:00 p.m.6 He did not carry medical insur-
ance.7 After he waited for more than six hours, hospital personnel
examined him, but did not treat him.' Instead, they transferred him
to the University of Maryland Medical System's emergency room three
and one-half hours later.9 Once there, Brooks waited three additional
hours before receiving a pan-myelogram and CAT scan.10 Because of
technical difficulties, hospital employees did not review the results of
these tests for three days.11 Brooks later suffered injury to his spine.12
1. 996 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1993).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This statute imposes a duty upon hos-
pitals to screen individuals presenting themselves to the emergency department for treat-
ment, regardless of whether the individual is covered by insurance. Id. § 1395dd(a). If the
individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must treat the individual to
stabilize that condition, or transfer the individual to another facility. Id. § 1395dd(b). If
the hospital chooses to transfer the individual, it must first stabilize the medical condition
unless the situation falls under an exception to this requirement. Id. § 1395dd(c).
3. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 710; see Mr. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PRoC. § 3-2A-O1 to-09 (1989
& Supp. 1994). Under this Act, all claims against a health care provider for damages result-
ing from medical injury must undergo arbitration before a judicial remedy is sought. I.
4. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 710.
5. Id. at 714-15.
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Brooks sued both hospitals and their medical personnel in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland for violation
of EMTALA.' 3 He alleged that the delay in screening and treatment
by both hospitals and their responsible medical personnel had caused
him irreparable spinal cord injury, which required him to undergo
surgery and extended rehabilitation.14 In response, the defendants
moved for dismissal on the grounds that Brooks had failed to comply
with the Maryland Malpractice Act because he had not attempted to
arbitrate his EMTALA claim before he filed it in district court. 5
The district court dismissed Brooks' complaint and held that the
arbitration requirement applied to his EMTALA claim because the
Maryland Malpractice Act governs all allegations that involve the ren-
dering or failure to render health care.16 Brooks appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and requested the court to
consider whether an EMTALA claimant may seek a judicial remedy





(i) Maryland Malpractice Act.--To allay a medical malpractice
insurance crisis in 1976, the Maryland General Assembly passed the
Maryland Malpractice Act, 8 which mandates arbitration for all medi-
cal malpractice claims prior to litigation.19 The legislature sought to
reduce the cost of defending malpractice claims by encouraging nego-
tiated agreements and "screening out frivolous claims at the arbitra-
tion level."2" In turn, the legislature hoped that lower litigation
expenses would decrease the cost of malpractice insurance and stabi-




16. Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp. Inc., Civ. A. No. HAR-91-2819, 1992 WL 142690, at
*2 (D. Md. June 15, 1992).
17. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 710.
18. For a discussion of the Maryland malpractice insurance crisis in 1974, see Attorney
Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 307, 385 A.2d 57, 76 (1978), overrued in part on other grounds
by Newell v. Richards, 323 Md. 717, 594 A.2d 1152 (1991).
19. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 to -05 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
20. Newell 323 Md. at 732, 594 A.2d at 1159. Earlier, the Johnson court had viewed
these goals as adequate justification for the creation of a different mechanism to resolve
malpractice claims in comparison with other tort actions. Johnson, 282 Md. at 308, 385
A.2d at 76-77.
21. Johnson, 282 Md. at 308, 385 A.2d at 76.
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The Maryland Malpractice Act encompasses only traditional mal-
practice claims. 2 Such claims allege that medical professionals have
breached a duty in the exercise of their "professional expertise or
skill."2 3 Maryland law requires medical personnel and hospitals to
perform their duties with the degree of care that similarly situated
doctors and hospitals nationwide must use.24 This national standard
of care includes a consideration of the latest medical advances and the
health care resources available under the circumstances. 5
If plaintiffs allege malpractice, they must comply with arbitration
procedures delineated by the Medical Malpractice Act.2 6 First, indi-
viduals must obtain a certificate from a qualified expert attesting to a
departure from the applicable standard of care and file that docu-
ment along with a claim to the Director of Health Claims Arbitration
Office. 27 The Director ensures service of the claim upon the defend-
ants28 and organizes the arbitration panel.2 9 The panel determines
liability and damages, and delivers its award to the Director within one
year from the service of the claim on all defendants.3 0 The Director
subsequently arranges for service of the award upon the parties.31 Fi-
nally, any party dissatisfied with the panel's determination may file an
action in court to nullify the award. 2
22. See Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 34, 459 A.2d 196, 200 (1983).
23. Id. at 36, 459 A.2d at 201.
24. Davis v.Johns Hopkins Hosp., 86 Md. App. 134, 146-47, 585 A.2d 841, 847 (1991).
In 1975, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted a national standard of care, as opposed to
a strict locality or similar locality standard. Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n,
276 Md. 187, 194-201, 349 A.2d 245, 249-53 (1975). However, the recently amended ver-
sion of the Maryland Malpractice Act suggests that Maryland may be reverting to a similar
locality rule, stating that courts should judge health care professionals by "standards of
practice... in the same or similar communities." See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &JUD. PROC.
§ 3-2A-02(c) (Supp. 1994). A minority ofjurisdictions continue to use the strict locality
rule, which compares the physicians' conduct to that of others in their own community. 2
J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAw: LIABILITY & LITIGATION § 25.20 (rev. ed.
1989). Many jurisdictions have expanded the strict locality rule by also considering the
standard of practice in similarly situated communities. Id.
25. Davis, 86 Md. App. at 147, 585 A.2d at 847.
26. See Tranen v. Aziz, 304 Md. 605, 612, 500 A.2d 636, 639 (1985) (holding that the
Act establishes specific procedures that must be followed, including arbitration, prior to
court proceedings regarding a malpractice claim).
27. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(a)(1), (b)(1) (1989).
28. Id. § 3-2A-04(a)(1).
29. Id. §§ 3-2A-03(c), 3-2A-04(c).
30. Id. § 3-2A-05(e)-(g).
31. Id. § 3-2A-05(g).
32. Id. § 3-2A-06(a)-(d).
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(ii) EMTALA.-Courts have recognized that EMTALA 33 im-
poses a duty on hospital emergency rooms to screen and stabilize all
persons seeking medical attention. 4 Because most states do not re-
quire hospitals to treat people presenting themselves at emergency
rooms, EMTALA fills a gap in tort law by providing a cause of action
for the failure of hospitals to treat.3 5 Under EMTALA, individuals
may allege denial or delay of screening and stabilization regardless of
their financial status. 36 Consequently, because plaintiffs need not es-
tablish their inability to pay for medical services to bring their claims,
EMTAA is not restricted to indigent plaintiffs.37
33. EMTAIA provides:
(a) Medical screening requirement
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any
individual... comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the
individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hos-
pital must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the
capability of the hospital's emergency department to determine whether or not
an emergency medical condition . . . exists....
(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency medical conditions and labor
(1) In General
If any individual.., comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the
individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide
either-
(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such fur-
ther medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the
medical condition, or...
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility ....
(c) (1) If an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition which
has not been stabilized.. . , the hospital may not transfer the individual unless-
(A) (ii) a physician ... has signed a certification that based upon the
information available at the time of transfer, the medical benefits reasonably
expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment at another
medical facility outweigh the increased risks to the individual ....
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
34. See, e.g., Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (D.C.
Cir. 1991). The relevant legislative history of EMTAIA explains that the legislature aimed
to prevent disparate treatment among patients. See H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1 at 27 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 579, 605.
35. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041 (explaining that although "most questions related to the
adequacy of a hospital's standard screening and diagnostic procedures must remain the
exclusive province of local negligence law[,]" the failure of a hospital to treat generally
does not exist under state law).
36. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 268-69 (6th Cir. 1990).
37. Id. at 272. However, while many courts apply EMTALA regardless of the economic
status of the plaintiff, other courts only allow EMTALA claims for economically disadvan-
taged patients. See Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., The Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor
Act: Denial of Emergency Medical Care Because of Improper Economic Motives, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1121, 1121"45 (1992).
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EMTALA claims differ from traditional malpractice actions in two
significant ways." First, plaintiffs may only file EMTALA suits against
hospitals."9 The Fourth Circuit analyzed the legislative history of EM-
TALA in Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America40 and found that Congress
exclusively sought to provide a sole cause of action against hospitals
and thus .excluded physicians and emergency personnel.41 Second,
EMTALA does not define a specific method of screening that hospi-
tals must employ.4" Indeed, the Baber court held "that EMTAIA does
not impose on hospitals a national standard of care for screening pa-
tients."" According to the court, Congress intended to prevent dispa-
rate treatment among patients by forcing hospitals to screen
individuals uniformly and cease "patient dumping."4' EMTALA only
holds hospitals to their facilities' internal standards, rather than to
national or local standards of care.45 Thus, in Baber the Fourth Circuit
determined that "EMTALA is no substitute for state law medical mal-
practice actions."46 Instead, the statute simply ensures that all patients
will receive the level of care that the hospital is capable of rendering.47
b. Preemption by EMTALA.-With respect to a federal cause
of action, state law must yield to federal law in the identification of
state law elements and defenses.' The Supreme Court generally as-
sumes that federal statutes are intended to operate unimpeded by
state law unless an express provision gives effect to state law.49 The
Court has held, moreover, that the Supremacy Clause ° requires fed-
eral law to preempt state law that interferes with the purposes and
38. In C/eland, the Sixth Circuit specifically rejected the proposition that the language
of the statute indicates that Congress did not provide "a guarantee of the result of emer-
gency room treatment and discharge." Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271.
39. While EMTALA allows the Department of Health and Human Services to levy as
much as $50,000 against physicians violating the Act, the statute limits the private individ-
ual to a "civil action against the participating hospital .... " 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(d) (1)(B),
(2) (A).
40. 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992).
41. Id. at 877.
42. Id. at 879.
43. Id.
44. Id. Patient dumping "refers to a hospital's refusal to treat an emergency patient,
even though the hospital is physically capable of doing so, simply because the patient may
be unable to pay." Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1304 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
45. Baber, 977 F.2d at 879-80.
46. Id. at 880.
47. Id. at 879.
48. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990).
49. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209 (1946).
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
1022 [VOL. 54:942
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
objectives of federal statutes."' However, the Fourth Circuit has noted
that courts must honor the substantive aspects of state statutes when
no conflict with federal objectives exists.12 In essence, federal law in-
corporates state law requirements where any gaps exist in federal
statutes.
The EMTALA statute explicitly incorporates these general pre-
emption principles. EMTALA provides that it "[does] not preempt
any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that the re-
quirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section."5 3 In
Deberry v. Sherman Hospital Ass'n, 4 a federal court in Illinois deter-
mined that Congress did not intend for EMTALA to preempt all state
regulation regarding the same duties of a hospital to screen and stabi-
lize.55 The court ruled that preemption occurs only when compliance
with both federal and state law is impossible.56
Because of EMTALA's language and decisions such as Deberny,
courts will evaluate whether a conflict exists between EMTALA and
state law that might preclude compliance with aspects of state law. For
example, in HCA Health Services of Ind., Inc. v. Gregoy,57 an Indiana
court recognized a conflict between EMTALA's statute of limitations
and the requirement that all state malpractice claimants first bring
their cases before the Department of Insurance and a medical review
panel.5" The court noted that EMTALA has a two-year statute of limi-
tations, but contains no provision for its tolling pending the satisfac-
tion of state procedural requirements.5 " The court pointed out the
difficulty that the issuance of a medical review board opinion could
take longer than two years and, thus, effectively eliminate the plain-
tiff s access to a federal cause of action.6 ° In conclusion, the court
found that EMTALA plaintiffs need not follow state law prior to litiga-
tion because this is an area of direct conflict in which EMTALA pre-
empted state requirements. 61
51. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988).
52. Rowland v. Patterson, 882 F.2d 97, 99 (4th Cir. 1989). Here, the plaintiff sought
federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity over a state malpractice claim, which is not a
federal question. Id. at 98.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (1988).
54. 741 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
55. Id. at 1307.
56. Id.
57. 596 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
58. Id. at 977.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also Smith v. Richmond Memorial Hosp., 416 S.E.2d 689, 695 (Va.) (ruling a
claimant need not comply with state notice requirements because a state provision that
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3. The Court's Reasoning. -In Brooks v. Maryland General Hospital,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the
Maryland Malpractice Act imposes an arbitration requirement upon
EMTALA claims.62 In reversing the decision of the federal trial
court,6" the court found that an EMTALA claim falls outside the scope
of the Maryland Malpractice Act, and therefore is not subject to arbi-
tration requirements.64
Judge Niemeyer began his opinion for the court with an analysis
of the purpose of EMTALA and the duties imposed under the stat-
ute.65 He noted that Congress passed the Act in order to create a new
cause of action but not "to provide a federal remedy for misdiagnosis
or general malpractice."6 Congress mandated that hospitals screen
and stabilize all patients as they would any paying patient, in order to
prevent the hospital practice of patient dumping when patients can-
not afford medical care.67 The court noted that EMTALA does not
address the quality of the diagnosis or the general level of care as a
malpractice statute does; rather, the federal law stipulates that hospi-
tals must adhere to their own standards and screen all patients
uniformly.68
The court then addressed the scope of the Maryland Malpractice
Act to decide whether it applied to Brooks's EMTALA claim. The
court found that, while the Act's language seems broad, Maryland
courts have limited its application to traditional malpractice claims,
involving the failure of professionals to meet the requisite standard of
care.
6 9
Since a pure EMTALA claim does not constitute a traditional
malpractice claim, the court reasoned that the Maryland Malpractice
allowed the tolling of a malpractice statute of limitations directly conflicted with EM-
TALA's statute of limitations), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct: 442 (1992); cf. Reid v. Indianapolis
Osteopathic Med. Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (holding that EMTALA
preempts state-mandated review by a medical panel, but that the Act incorporates state
caps on medical malpractice damages).
62. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 710.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 715.
65. Id. at 710.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 710-11. The court explained, "Congress expressed concern that hospitals
were abandoning the longstanding practice of providing emergency care to all due to in-
creasing pressures to lower costs and maximize efficiency. Under traditional state tort law,
hospitals are under no legal duty to provide this care." Id.
68. Id. at 710-11.
69. Id. at 712-13. The Act technically "covers all claims against health care providers
for injury 'arising or resulting from the rendering or failure to render health care' .... "
Id. at 712 (quoting Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 36, 459 A.2d 196, 199 (1983)).
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Act did not apply in the instant case because Brooks did not allege
that the professionals were negligent in their screening or treatment
of him.7" Rather, he alleged that the hospital's failure to use uniform
screening and stabilization procedures delayed his treatment and
caused his condition to worsen.71 The court concluded that Brooks
did not need to arbitrate his claim before proceeding to court.72
In dicta, the circuit court discussed, but declined to determine,
the impact of state law on EMTALA claims. The court explained that
preemption was not relevant in the instant action because Brooks did
not file a claim under a state statute providing the same cause of ac-
tion; thus, no conflict between state and federal law existed.73 More
significantly, the court reiterated that no overlap existed between EM-
TALA and the Maryland Malpractice Act because EMTALA does not
encompass traditional medical malpractice claims. 4
After reviewing Supreme Court preemption doctrine, the court
discussed issues relevant to determine whether an EMTALA cause of
action implicitly adopts state arbitration requirements. Courts must
make this determination when faced with a case in which EMTALA
and state malpractice claims coexist in the same lawsuit.75 To support
a claim that EMTALA might incorporate the state arbitration require-
ment, the court pointed out: (1) that Congress only intended EM-
TALA to fill a gap in state law; (2) that EMTALA calls for "limited
preemption;" and (3) that EMTALA already assumes state damages
limitations.7 6 On the other hand, the court recognized potential
problems from incorporation.77 The court pointed to the likelihood
that conflicting standards of care and differing burdens of proof
under the state malpractice law and EMTALA would raise difficult is-
sues without clear resolutions. 7 The court was particularly concerned
that EMTALA's two-year statute of limitations is inconsistent with state
arbitration procedures that could easily delay a claim for over two
years.79 Indeed, the court could not reconcile the differences be-
70. Id. at 713.
71. Id. at 709. The court held that the Maryland statute does not cover a claim regard-
ing disparate screening that does not allege a breach in the standard of care of the profes-
sional community. Id. at 713.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 714.
74. Id. at 714-15.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 715.
78. Id. In particular, whether the presumption of correctness of the state arbitration




tween the federal and state laws because "[no language in EMTALA
indicates that compliance with state arbitration requirements tolls the
federal statute of limitations."80
4. Analysis.-In Brooks, the Fourth Circuit correctly ruled that a
pure EMTALA claim does not fall within the scope of the Maryland
Malpractice Act's arbitration requirements. Despite similarities, EM-
TALA claims and traditional malpractice claims are distinct causes of
action. First, case law and the Maryland Malpractice Act both limit
the Act's application to claims that involve the alleged breach of a
recognized standard of care in the medical community. Yet, neither
Maryland courts nor the General Assembly has concluded that hospi-
tals with emergency rooms possess a duty to treat all parties.8" Conse-
quently, because EMTALA expressly creates a duty to treat where
none exists in Maryland,8" EMTALA claims should be considered sep-
arately from the provisions of the Act.83
Second, the standards of care imposed by the two statutes differ
greatly. While traditional malpractice claims in Maryland follow a na-
tional standard of care,84 EMTALAjudges hospitals by their own indi-
vidual standards.8 5 Theoretically, a hospital could delay a patient's
screening and stabilization for many hours as long as it followed this
same practice for every patient; the practices of other hospitals are
irrelevant. Third, as the Brooks court noted, EMTALA claimants must
sue hospitals, unlike traditional malpractice plaintiffs who may also
bring actions against medical personnel.86
Finally, Congress declined to recognize EMTALA as a medical
malpractice statute, even though in practice it may function as one
because plaintiffs have brought EMTAILA claims without regard to
their economic status.87 Congress viewed the statute only as an effort
to stop "patient dumping.""8 In light of these differences and the con-
80. Id.
81. Davis v.Johns Hopkins Hosp., 86 Md. App. 134, 147-48, 585 A.2d 841, 848 (1991),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 330 Md. 53, 622 A.2d 128 (1993). For a detailed
discussion of the duty to treat, see Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares?: The Evolution of the
Legal Duty to Provide Emergency Care, 26 Hous. L. REv. 21, 25-50 (1989).
82. See Brooks, 996 F.2d at 713.
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
87. See Stricker, supra note 37, at 1122 ("[Pllaintiffs alleging improper medical treat-
ment have attempted to use EMTALA for purposes beyond Congress' intent.").
88. HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, EQUAL AccESs To HEALTH CARE: PATIENT
DUMPING, H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1988), cited in Demetrios G. Me-
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gressional view that EMTALA is not a malpractice statute, a court
should not independently declare a region of overlap between the
state and federal statutes.8 9
The Brooks court did not need to decide how state and federal law
interact because the Medical Malpractice Act does not include EM-
TALA claims.90 But the court did explore considerations it might
have applied if Brooks had filed both an EMTAIA and a traditional
malpractice claim in the same action.91 Under the circumstances,
Brooks might well have made both an EMTALA and a malpractice
claim. The Brooks court warned that the standards of care invoked
under arbitration procedures and EMTALA claims may be irreconcila-
ble.9" Yet, obtaining the certificate of the professionals' breach of the
standard of care does not conflict with EMTAIA's provisions, which
apply solely to a cause of action against the hospital.9" Inasmuch as
the certificate evidences a hospital's breach of its duty of care, it would
not address the EMTALA duty to screen and stabilize all patients
uniformly.
EMTALA's statute of limitations presents an even greater obstacle
to incorporation of the arbitration procedures of the Maryland Mal-
practice Act. EMTALA does not provide for the tolling of its two-year
statute of limitations under any circumstances. Thus, defense attor-
neys could easily eliminate an EMTALA cause of action by delaying
the plaintiffs case in arbitration until the statute of limitations has
passed.94 Such a situation certainly conflicts with the Congressional
goal to prevent patient dumping.95 Although an initial review indi-
cates that EMTALA should preempt the state statutory requirements
when claimants file both EMTALA and traditional malpractice claims,
blanket preemption would enable any plaintiff to bypass the state arbi-
tropoulos, Note, Son of COBRA: The Evolution of a Federal Malpractice Law, 45 STAN L. REV.
263, 288 (1992).
89. The Maryland General Assembly could create overlap by enacting a law that im-
poses on hospitals the duty to treat, since both federal and state legislatures may regulate
within the same field. See Deberry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1307 (N.D.
I1. 1990) (holding that double regulation is permissible unless compliance with both laws
is impossible). The court would then need to determine the extent of preemption if com-
pliance with both statutes were impossible. Id.
90. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 714-15.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 715. The court was concerned that the standard of care used to prepare the
certificate of breach conflicted with EMTALA's standard of care. Id.
93. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
94. See HCA Health Servs. of Ind., Inc. v. Gregory, 596 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (recognizing the possibility that the statute of limitations may expire before a medi-
cal review panel delivers its opinion).
95. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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tration procedures altogether by alleging an EMTALA claim. Such
preemption would ignore the state's interest in arbitration as a means
to lower the cost of malpractice insurance.
It is not inconceivable, moreover, that an EMTALA claim could
coexist with a state malpractice claim without the need for preemp-
tion.9 6 If malpractice arbitration proceedings finish before the expira-
tion of the federal two-year statute of limitations, plaintiffs can still file
federal causes of action. However, courts must protect the EMTALA
claim from extinguishment with the running of the statute of limita-
tions. Allowing courts to toll the EMTALA statute of limitations pend-
ing arbitration of the traditional malpractice claim could protect
EMTALA claims in other cases as well. But in Vogel v. Linde,97 a case
following the Brooks decision, the Fourth Circuit refused to toll the
statute of limitations because EMTALA lacked an express provision
that allowed such tolling.9" The court explained that the Supreme
Court requires the "statute of limitations [to run] against all persons,
even those under a disability, unless the statute expressly provides
otherwise."99
Decisions such as Vogel may encourage Congress to provide gui-
dance in this matter. For instance, Congress could amend EMTALA
and label it a federal malpractice statute or could provide for the toll-
ing of the statute of limitations pending state-mandated arbitration.
Even if Congress does not act to remedy this situation, a plaintiff
may still be able to delay an EMTALA claim while the malpractice
claim goes through arbitration. At the time the plaintiff files with the
Health Claims Arbitration Office, an EMTALA claim could be filed in
federal court. If the EMTALA suit was filed in a timely manner, de-
fense counsel would move for dismissal on the theory that the claim
must undergo arbitration before a federal court could hear the case.
A claimant could then request the court to stay the EMTALA proceed-
ing pending arbitration of the malpractice claim. A court could fairly
grant such a delay if the EMTALA claim did not appear a pretext to
bypass the state provisions. Under principles of equity, the court can
96. See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 270 (6th Cir. 1990)
(rejecting the notion of preemption).
97. 23 F.3d 78 (4th Cir. 1994).
98. Id. at 80. In Voge4 the plaintiff filed suit nearly three years after the alleged EM-
TAILA violation. Id. at 78-79. The plaintiff requested that the period be tolled from the
time of the violation until the time at which a committee for the plaintiff was appointed
due to plaintiff's incompetency. Id. at 80.
99. Id.
1028 [VOL. 54:942
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
both ensure access to a federal cause of action and simultaneously
respect the state's interests in arbitration proceedings. 100
5. Conclusion.-In Brooks, the Fourth Circuit addressed the
scope of EMTALA with respect to the Maryland Health Care Malprac-
tice Claims Act. The court held that a plaintiff may seek judicial reso-
lution of an EMTALA claim without first undergoing arbitration
under the state act. While the court formulated its holding on this
ground alone, it also addressed the issue of preemption. Given the
many differences between EMTALA and the state act, the lack of con-
gressional guidance on the matter, and the separate possibility of an
equitable remedy, it is unlikely that the court will find that EMTAIA
incorporates many, if any, requirements of state medical malpractice
law.
NANCY L. WILLIAMs
100. SeeJewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262, 276, 587 A.2d 474, 481 (1991) ("In all fairness,
the tort case [for assault and battery] must be kept alive pending the outcome of the arbi-
tration proceedings to prevent the running of limitations.").
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